f.^ 



THE 



VicKSBURG Campaign, 



BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA 



I'NDEi; THE CO:M>rAXD OF 



GEISTERAL U. S. GRANT, 



IN 1862-63; 

AN HISTORICAL REVIEW. 

BY 

SAM? ROCKWELL REED. 



Dkiiic.vtkd to the Patriotic American Yoluxteers, the Best Soldiers in the World, whose Herok- 

Valor, Intelugence, and High Spirit, WrrHorx Reward and Without the 

Aid of Great Gexerai^hip, Fought the Great War THitoruii 

TO the Triumph of the Nation. 



X 

CIXCIXXATI: 

Robert Clarke &: Co., 6t, 6;^ Sc 65 W. F<iurth St 

I 882 









Coi'YKK.uT, 1N82, By Samuel Rockwell Heed. 



PREFACE. 



Of heroic histoiii'ss of geinnals of tlie great Civil War, written to show tliat the 
Nation was saved I)y a phenomenal military genius, there are enough. Enougli of 
egoizing military biograpliies, brazenly self exalting, and derogating from officers 
of better service, who are kept silent by army subordination, or are silent in the 
grave. Enough of military lives written for political campaign lives, with the 
superlative rodomontade of such party literature. Enough of hero-worshiping myth 
which slights the heroic army. It is time to lift the history of the great war 
out of the degradation of selfish prescription; of menial body service; of time- 
serving party necessity; of the fungus of popular myth, up to the plane of inde- 
pendence and true criticism. It is tinijc for real history to be written, to do justice 
to the patriotic volunteers, the best soldiers in the world, who, without the leading 
of a great military genius, and notwithstanding the leading of great military 
blunders, which multiplied their hardships and slaughter, and prolonged the war, 
fought it through with indomitable resolution, to the dearly earned triumph of 
the Xation. In this aim is this review written. . 



The Vicksburg Cami'ai(;n. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE nation's KE,70ICIK(i — THK I'lUOl'Al! AIM i.N OF 
THE PUBLIC MIND BY THE I'HErEDI.Nd VKAlt 
OF FAILURE. 

The rejoiciiifi' of tlio touiitiy over the sur- 
reiider of Vickshurg' to Ucii. Gkant'is ariuy, 
July 4, ISOo, and its extravagant estimate of 
tlie importance of tliat event, may be better 
a))))rec'iate(l by a fil^iice at the previous long 
course of the consuming of mighty energies, 
boundless iKvtriotic sacrifices, and vast ex- 
}>enditure without adequate results, with very 
little to feed luitional glory, and witliout any 
jmsitive progress toward ending the war. 
This seemed continually expanding, and the 
task of i)utting down the rebellion more; dis- 
couraging. Yet the people never flinched. 
Still, volunteers continued to rise up in a 
continuous tide, rushing with eagerness to the 
slaughter under a coni))ination of civil and 
military incompetency of leadership. Injus- 
tice" would be done to the patriotism and 
pluck of a great people by pretending that all 
was then cajiable, suc(.'essful, and glorious. 
It was an awful waste of brave and intelligent 
volunteers, and of colossal resources, and ex- 
j)enditure, by incapacity, and it was a long 
time of great discouragement. Yet tiic great 
peo])le never weakened in their resolve to 
jireserve the Union. It is time for the truth, 
and the truth is most glorious to the jKMipJe. 

After the slaughter at Pittsburg Landing, in 
which an army of as brave men as ever ti'ud 
the soldier's brogans was sacrificed by sheer 
neglect in its Commanding General of all that 
belongs to the practice of a soldier, the 
national army rested. With Buell's troops 
it was strong enough to have followed the 
enemy at once to (.'orinth, but it was in 



liKA.Ni's (IcpaiMincnt. ami uidcr IIali.eck'.s 
general command, and it waited forPlALLECK. 
After a battle our army always had a season 
of inactivity, rather the more after a victory 
than a defeat. The battle ended on the 7th 
of April, liS()2. Hallkck ordered Poi-E'sarmy 
of 25, (100 from Mi-ssouri to Pittsburg. He kept 
BuELi/s army. He laid open the entire West 
to gather troops to put into a .state of sus- 
pended animatiou. Q'he destroyed equipment 
of Graxt's army was replaced. Halleck left 
St. Louis, April 19, to come and take com- 
mand of an army raisctl to more than 
100,000, to begin his famous siege approaches 
to Corinth, iifteen miles away, lield by not 
half his number, and these recently repulsed 
witii great slaughter. 

Halleck put Guam- into disgrace ; on the 
other hand, he dispatched the AVar Depart- 
ment tliat it was tlie opinion of the army 
that Gen. Sherman saved the day, and he rec- 
ommended his promotion to be Major Gen- 
eral. This was done. It is an exam])lc of the 
way war re])utations are made. Grant was 
still nominfllly in command of the District of 
West Tennessee, but his army, which was 
now divided between right wing and reserve, 
was under the immediate command of 
Thomas and McClernand, to whom Halleck 
.sent orders direct, ignoring Grant. Halleck 
now moved on Corinth by siege approaches, 
intrenching in every part at each move, and 
moving at the average rate of liUlf a mile a 
day. It was like McClellan's approach to- 
ward Kichmonfl. He was in constant aj)pre- 
hension of attack, and he made the evacua- 
tion of Corinth by the enemy his whole ob- 
jective. There was no attempt to flank Cor- 
inth or cut ofl' the enen^y's retreat. Hai.- 
lei'k's only thought was of being attacked. 



4 — 



He was only too glad to have the enemy go 
away. His strategy was upon the advice of 
the Messina Magistrate to the watclr. 

Dogberry— You are to bid any man stand in the 
prince's name. 

Watch— How if he will not stand? 

Dog.— Why then take no note of him, »ut let him 
go; and presently call the watch together, and 
thank God you are rid of a knave. 

Wlien he had cautiously reached Corinth 
lie found that the Confederatearniyliad with- 
drawn at leisure. To cover up this impotent 
conclusion he dispatched Washington that he 
was making vigorous pursuit of the demoral- 
ized enemy, and that Gen. Pope report- 
ed the capture of 10,000 prisoners and 
15,000 stand of arms. Pope had report- 
ed none and captured none, and there 
was no chance for this pursuit. But this 
achievement with the longbow got Halleck 
present and lasting glory, and because of that 
he was presently, after McClellan's retreat, 
called to Washington and made General in 
Chief to direct all things from Washington, 
and to be President Lincoln's military ad- 
viser. Thus was the nation organized for 
victory. This is another example of the way 
that the war made great military reputations 
and high ranks. And now that great army, 
which had been organized and disciplined by 
all this daily marching, bivouacking, intrench- 
ing, outpost duty, and constant vigilance in 
the face of the enemy, and which Sherman in 
the Jlemoirs says could have gone anywhere-, 
was broken up and placed for the defensive. 

In this as in all the war, in nearly all the 
commanders as in the administration, the 
paralyzing error was in the idea that the 
Union was to be restored by recovering terri- 
tory and places, instead of destroying the 
Confederate armies. Halleck had no need 
of BuELL for Corinth, even if with a capable 
commander he had at Pittsburg Landing. 
BuELL would have gone on from Nashville to 
Chattanooga or through Alabama. And now 
Halleck ordered Buell to move into East 
Tennessee. 'This was Lincoln's pet desire, 
and Halleck supported it. Lincoln fancied 
a great Union population there which, if pro- 
tected, would restore Tennessee to the Union, 
and this political idea overruled military con- 
ditions. Halleck insisted, against Buell's 
judgment, that he should make the Memphis 
A Charleston Railroad, running through Cor- 



inth, Northern Alabama, and Chattanooga, 
his line of communications and of movement. 

For a distance of luore than eighty miles 
this line was along the enemy's front. To 
protect this railroad was an impossibility. 
But all of Halleck's movements were as if 
afraid that the war would end too soon. 
Buell proceeded to obey orders by repairing 
this road, and fortifying its stations and 
bridges. It was a great work, and at this 
time he asked the War Department for au- 
thority to feed and clothe the escaped slaves 
for this intrenching labor, but was informed 
that Congress had not appropriated for it. 
This, we think, was the first systematic proposal 
for the employment of the escaped slaves in 
a straightforward manner. Buell, while 
obeying Halleck's order to repair the Mem- 
phis tt Charleston road for his base line, pro- 
ceeded also to provide one for practical use 
by giving orders for the repair of the roads 
from Nashville through Tennessee. While 
our army was thus scattering, and wasting its 
energies, part on the defensive and part on., 
impossible undertakings, the Confederate 
armies in the great Interior, as in the East, 
were concentrating for a grand advance. 

Tiiat of Bragg, assisted by the co-operative 
columns of Kirby Smith on the east, and of 
Van Dorn on the west, was to carry forward 
the line of tiie Confederacy to the Ohio River, 
reinstate the rebel State government in Ten- 
nessee, set up a rebel' State government in 
Kentucky, and make these States the great 
field for recruits and supplies, and the mili- 
tary base the Ohio. It was a brave undertak- 
ing, and the imbecility on our side made its 
opportunity. Buell had brought from 
Corinth little over 2-1,000 men ; about 10,000 
more were distributed through Middle Ten- 
nessee and Northern Alabama, holding places 
which he had taken before he went to Pitts- 
burg Landing. While he was repairing and 
fortifying railroads for his flank march in the 
enemy's front to East Tennessee, BnAciCi's 
grand advance began with 00,000 veteran 
trooT"is, his movements veiled by a clund of 
cavalry, and his lines of advance talcing him 
into the friendly inhabitants of Kentucky. 

This coiupelled Buell to desist from his 
vain labors, and to gather up his troops from 
a wide region and take the field in the ott'en- 
sive defensive against Bragg's combined 
forces. Leaving a garrison to hold Nashville, 
he marched eastward to meet JiKAuo, wliere 



— 5 — 



he might be expected to debouch- from the 
Cumberland ridge. Keeping his well disci- 
plined troops completely in hand, protecting 
all his trains, his men never demoralized by 
this return march, nor by BRAGii's superior 
numbers, but, confident and high spirited, 
BuELL moved lirst to offer battle to Bragg, 
but upon his own ground; then, Bragg 
avoiding this, Buell moved in a parallel 
line, always ready for battle, but with the 
condition that it must be upon his own 
ground, always threatening BRAiio while 
moving toward his own re-enforcements. The 
result of this skillful generalship was that 
when Bragg got within about twenty-tive 
miles of Louisville he found that he wanted 
to face about. Buell, now re-enforced, as 
promptly faced about to march with him and 
attack him. 

For this stroke of genei'alsliip, which 
against such heavy chances saved his army, 
saved Kentucky and l\Iiddle Tennessee, and 
.'^aved the North, and whose skill alid com- 
plete success has not been surpassed in any 
war, Buell was summarily removed from 
command. This is another example of the 
way war makes reputations and dispenses re- 
wards. The splendid success was marred by 
a reverse t<5 a part of one wing of the army at 
Berrysville, where the disregard of instruc- 
tions by the commander of tliat wing spoiled 
well laid plan for a general battle. But 
ail army of iJU.UOU or .S0,000 men spreads over 
a wide region, and the non-co-operation of its 
several commanders can defeat any Com- 
manding General. Such disregard of instruc- 
tions by tlie commander of a corjis, in this in- 
stance, unknown to Buell, defeated a plan 
of general battle, which would have made de- 
feat destruction to Bragg. It enabled him 
to have a nominal success in a dash at a few 
of our brigades, to carry back with his Ken- 
tucky State Government and great plan 
to plant the boundary of the Confederary on 
the Ohio. 

Meanwhile, in July, Halleck had been 
ordered to Wasliington. On leaving he 
restored Grant to command of his former 
troops, with headquarters at Corinth. T^ie 
defensive policy and the holding of territory 
were pursued. A combined operation 
against Price, who had seized luka, failed 
by the neglect of that division which was 



with Grant to attack, waiting while Pkhe 
drew away from its front and marched on 
the double quick three miles and fell with his 
whole force on Rosecrans. Rosecrans, as 
was his wont, spoke his nnnd on this. Sub- 
sequently Rosecrans, with abottt half the 
number of the enemy, gave Van Dorn a 
slaughtering repulse at Corinth. Altliougli 
this was in the defensive line, yet it disabled 
Van Dorn for his part in the grand plan of 
invasion. After this Rosecran.s, much to 
Grant's relief, Badeau says, was ordered to 
the command of Buell's army. 

Rosecrans' victory at Corintli was on the 
4th of October. Badeau says that on tiie '2'n\\ 
Grant "assumed comniand of the Depart- 
ment of the Tennessee, which included Cairo, 
Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Missis- 
sippi, and the portions of Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee west of the Tennessee River." Thus it 
appears that at tliis time Grant was fully re- 
instated and his conunand enlarged in bounds, 
and that it followed Rosecrans' victory at 
Corinth, for which the latter w'as promoted 
Major General. In the same month Grant 
was largely re-enforced from the Northwestern 
States, and now he ]>roposed to Halleck, 
October 26, 18G3, a concentration for an ad- 
vance. He said: "I think I would be able to 
move down the Mississippi Central road, and 
cause the evacuation of Vicksbnrg." 

Badeau says, with due sense of the im- 
portance of this germ of the idea of the 
Vicksliurg campaign: "This was the first 
mention, in the correspondence of the two 
commanders, of the place destined afterward 
to become so renowned." This was the 
initiative of the Vicksbnrg cam^^aign, wliich 
was to occupy a great army and a great 
steamboat fleet and gunboat .squadron for 
more than eight months, and which was now 
to begin after eight months, in which great 
forces and enormous expenditure were con- 
sumed in merely defensive operations, or in 
futile attempts, all of Avhich had made no 
progress except to expand the war, and call 
continually for more men and n)oney. In 
following articles we shall see how sped this 
great offensive campaign, which after long 
waiting, and immense consumption of men 
and means, at last brought rejoicing to a 
patriotic nation. 



— 6 



CHAPTER II. 

THK CAMPAKiN ON THE INTERIOR UXE — ITS ENER- 
OETIC START, ITS PAUSE, IRRESOLUTION, BACK- 
ING, AND FILLING, UNTIL RELIEVED BY VAN 
DORN's destruction of its SUPPLIES. 

den. Grant, now in command of ii depart- 
nient embracing the Mississippi River, and of 
a large army, wrote Gen. Halleck, then in 
cliief command at Wasliington, November 
'2C>, proposing an advance down the Missis- 
si i>pi Central Raih'oad, his objective being 
Vicksburg. Still the Jiotion disabled all our 
military plans, that the recovery of places, 
not the destruction of armies, was the way to 
restore the Union. But Grant's line of 
operations was better than his main ob- 
jective, for it was toward the enemy's main 
army. This was under Pemberton, who had 
))een placed over Van Dorn, and was holding 
the line of the Tallahatchie which cro.sses 
tiie Central forty miles soutli of Grand Junc- 
tion. This is on the same road, where crossed 
by the road from Memphis ihrough Corinth, 
and is about midway between Corinth and 
Memphis, and was a central point for Grant's 
concentration of his divided forces. And yet, 
although Grant's forces were on three sides 
of Grand Junction, he had not occupied that 
place, and that road to Memphis was closed 
to him, and he had to communicate there- 
with by way of Columbus, Ky. 

Grant announced to Halleck November 
'2: "1 have commenced a movement on Grand 
Junction with three divisions from Corinth 
and two from Bolivar. Will leave here to- 
morrow and take command in person. Tf 
found practicable I will go to Holly Springs, 
and may be Grenada, completing railroad 
and telegraph as I go." Holly Springs is on 
the Central road, twenty-tive miles south of 
Grand Junction, and about half way to the 
Tallahatchie. Grenada is about sixty miles 
further south, and is where tlie Yallabusha 
crosses the railroad. Halleck replied: "I 
ar)prove of ycjur plan of advancing upon the 
enemy as soon as you are stnjng enough 
for that purpose." This was permission 
enough, properly leaving him discretion as to 
sufficiency of force and line of operation. 

Grant had force enough. His good fortune 
in all this operation was that he was sup- 
IK.rted by abundance of men, and supplies 
jind niii>()intiii(Mits of every sort. November 
4 he had moved to Grand Junction, He Jiad 



ordered Sherman to co-operate by moving 
two divisions from Memphis, but on the Sth 
of November he informed Sherman that he 
estimated Pemberton's force at oUjtKiO, and 
that he felt "strong enough to handle that 
number without gloves." Tiierefore he coun- 
termanded the march from Memphis. 

Unfortunately Grant's advance, which be- 
gan so energetically, halted. A disturl)ing 
element had now come in. Badeau relates 
it with charming simplicity. McClernanu 
was one of those whom Sherman and Badeau 
call political Generals. He had proved him- 
self a good soldier, but this only aggravated 
his fault. McClernand had obtained from 
Lincoln a special order to raise troops for an 
expedition to open the ^lissi-ssippi River. 
Halleck disa])proved, but tiiis was one of 
those peculiar military operations which 
Lincoln took in hand. Grant heard of Mc- 
Clernand's expedition through the news- 
papers, and it diverted his energies from 
Pemberton. He saw that such an expedi- 
tion would gather up or at least subordinate 
Sherman, and would reap the glory of occtii- 
pying Vicksburg if his operations caused its 
evacuation. For, not to destroy the enemy's 
army, but to occupy the evacuated Vicksburg, 
was Grant's objective with his great army. 

He also suspected that this telegram 
from Halleck. November 5, pointed 
to the diversion of troops from 
his conunand at ^Iemv>his to Mc- 
Clernand: "Had not troops sent to re-enforcc 
you better go to Memphis hereafter? I hope 
to give 20,000 additional men in a few days." 
Grant, on the 9th, sent this feeler: "Re-en- 
forcements are arriving very slowly. If tlicy 
do not come in more rapidly I will attack as 
I am." In fact Grant had only the day be- 
fore countermarched Sherman's two divisions 
back to Memphis, because, he said, he had 
force enoiigh to handle Pemberton without 
them. Badeau narrates that next day, grow- 
ing more uneasy about McClernand, Grant 
telegraphed: "Ami to understand that I lie 
here still while an expedition is fitted out for 
Memphis, or do you want me to push as far 
south as possible? Am I to have Sherman 
subject to my orders, or is he and his force re- 
served for some special service?" 

No one had caused (Jkant to lie there still. 
Heliad Halleck's consent to his going, and 
he had turned back forces to Memphis, .saying 
he had enougli. Halleck answered promptly : 



— 7 — 



"Yon have coniinaiid of all troops sent to 
your department, and liave permission to 
ti^ht the enemy when you please." Badeau 
relates that thereupon Grant on tlie 14tli 
informed Sherman: "I have now complete 
control of my department," and accordingly 
ordered him to "move with two divisions of 
twelve full regiments each, and if possihle, 
with three divisions, to Oxford, or the Talla- 
hatchie, as soon as possible. I am now ready 
to n\ove from here (La Grange) any day, and 
only await your movements." 

Thus were his plans backing and filling be- 
cause of McClernand. And now he had 
changed his mind again, and had ordered 
Smickman to join him with all his movable 
force for the march on Pkmberton. This at 
hist was a rational plan, but it was naught 
without cxcctition, and the delay had already 
given tlie enemy time to recover. But so 
earnest was Grant now in this plan that he 
telegraphed Sherman November 15 to meet 
him at ("olumbus, Ky., where he gave Sher- 
iiiaa full iiistrtictions as to co-operation by 
moving three divisions so as to join Grant at 
tiic Tallahatchie. Sherman marched promptly 
November 24. 

Hali.eck ordered the forces at Helena to 
co-operate by crossing the Mississippi and 
cutting the Central Railroad in 1'emberton's 
rear. And now all seemed resolved and 
promising. But again McClernand's 
shadow loomed across Gkant'.s horizon. 
Badeau says: "On the 23d Halleck again 
broached the subject of the river expedition, 
doubtless urged on by the President. * '■■ ■•■ 
He incittired how many men Grant liad in 
his department, and wliat force could be sent 
down the river to Vicksburg. Grant replied 
tliat he had in all 72,000-nien, of whom 18,000 
were at Mempliis, and 16,000 of these could 
l)c spared for the river expedition." He also 
announced next day that he had given orders 
for the advance of his entire force, including 
Sherman; had written to Steele in Arkansas 
to threaten Grenada, and had asked Admiral 
I'oRTER to send boats to co-operate at the 
moutii of the Yazoo. He asked: "Shall I 
countermand tlie orders for this move?" 

But Halleck had not asked Grant to tarry, 
nor to let any of his troops go in the river ex- 
pedition tmless he could spare tliem, and 
( ji RANT liad said he could spare 16,000. Hal- 
leck answered no. Badeau says Grant's 
cavalrv crossed the Tallahatchie on the 29th, 



and his headquarters were at Holly Springs, 
being an advance of twenty-five miles in 
twenty-three days, since the 4th; also, that 
"Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the 
Tallahatchie at Wyatt," which is six miles 
west of the railroad crossing, and that on the 
same day Grant telegraphed Halleck: "Our 
troops will be in Abbeville (just south of the 
Tallahatchie) to-morrow, or a battle will be 
fought." But the main body would not be 
at Abbeville for several days, and there was 
no enemy near for a battle. Sherman says in 
his Memoirs: 

We reached Wyatt on the 2d day of December, 
and there learned that Pombertou's whole army ' 
had fallen back to the Yallabusha, near Grenada, 
caused, in great measure, by alarm at the demon- 
stration on their rear from Helena. " '■'■'■ '■■ Wh 
had to build a l)ridge at V\ yatt, which consumed a 
couple of days, and on the 5th of December my 
whole command was at College Hill, ten mile.s from 
Oxford, whence I reported to Gen. Grant at Oxford. 

Oxford is ten miles south of the Talla- 
hatchie, and twenty-five from Holly Springs. 
Halting as Grant's movement had been, the 
campaign was full of promise to a resolute 
General, and Grant had dottble Pemberto.n's 
force. But Badeau shows that the shadow of 
McClernand, with an independent command, 
coming down the Mississippi, weakened 
Grant. At this point, where he had all in 
his hands for a campaign against Pember- 
ton's army, he wanted to turn back. He 
asked Halleck from Abbeville: "How far 
South would you like me to go?" He hud 
lost Ills object and his resolution. 

He now wanted another change of plan. 
December 5 he suggested this to Halleck: "If 
the Helena troops were at my command I 
think it wotild be practicable to send Sher- . 
man to take them and the Memphis forces 
south of the Yazoo River, and thus secure 
Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi." This 
was to turn his back on the Confederate 
Army to recover places b.V avoiding it. Hal- 
leck's answer gave Grant the asked for 
addition to his command, and now Grant 
countermarched Sher.man again back to Mem- 
phis to command a river expedition to attack 
Vicksburg from the river, Grant to await hi.s 
operation and to "co-operate." But how to 
co-operate when, even with all his forces, he 
had decided it not safe to go further, is what 
Grant could not tell. He ordered Sherman 
to "proceed to reduce Vicksburg, assisted by 



8 — 



the gunboats," and he said, with a vagueness 
befitting such co-operation : "I will hold the 
forces here in readiness to co-operate with 
you in such manner as the movements of the 
enemy may make necessary." 

BAnEAti tells the objective of all this re- 
version of the plan of the campaign. He 
says : 

Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should 
obtain the command of the river expedition, and 
therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis on the 
very day that he secured the authority, so that if 
possible the latter might start before McClernand 
could arrive. Halleek, too, sent the permission 
without that deliberation which he sometimes dis- 
played. 

If Bapeau may be believed, Grant's cam- 
paign had turned from Pemberton toward 
McClernand, and Halleck was co-operating. 
Bat they had not yet circumvented Lincoln. 
Says Badeau : 

On the 18th came at last the unwelcome word 
from Washinuton: "It is the wish of the President 
that Gen. McClornand's corps shall constitute a 
part of the river expedition, and that he shall have 
the immediate command, under your direction." 

This would put McClernand in command 
of that which Grant's altered plan had de- 
signed to be the winning side of the "co- 
operation ;" then the subsecjuent proceedings 
would interest Grant no more. His strategy 
was beaten. 

But there was one turn left: If Grant 
slmuld return and take command of the river 
expedition, McClernand would be subordi- 
nated. And now did Grant's proverbial luck 
come to his relief in the shape of Van Dorn's 
cavalry,' which, December 20. made a de- 
scent on Holly Springs, and destroyed the 
stores of Grant's army. With the same trust 
in luck as at rittsl)urg Landing, he had taken 
little care to fortify ins supply depot. The 
rebels estimated the destruction at $4,000,- 
000; but this, perhaps, was at Confederacy 
prices. Whatever the figure, it was enough 
for Grant, who now decided that a river for a 
base, and gunboats to hold it, was the only 
j)racticable way of war in this countrj'. So 
he decided to countermarch, and to join 
Shkkman, and subordinate McClernand, and, 
leaving Pemberton free to go to defend 
Vicksl)urg, to liimself undert;ike to reduce 
that place from the river. Tims ended the 
lii'st stage of tiie Vicksburg campaign. All 
this tended to nuike the final viclorv the 



more a cause for rejoicing. This, howevef, 
does not include Sherman's "co-operating" 
part; further along we shall see how that 
sped. 



CHAPTER ril. 

the change of base — retreat from the in- 
terior LINE — how SHERMAN WAS MARCHED UP 
AND DOWN — THE MANY REASONS WHY. 

Gen. Grant's movement down the line of the 
Mississippi Central Railroad, in the best time 
of year, when the roads were good, had ad- 
vanced his headquarters from Grand Junction, 
November 4, to Oxford, December 5, forty- 
five miles in thirty-one days. Here he tarried 
till Van Dorn's visit at Holly Springs on the 
20th, when he decided to go no further in a 
country of such impolite practices. This was 
not such a constant pressure as keeps an 
enemy busy in defense and retreat. And 
there is a being always at hand to find mis- 
chief still for the idle to do, as was exempli- 
fied by Van Dorn and Forrest behind 
Grant's back. 

Gen. Sherman, Grant's energetic coadjutor, 
marched three divisions from Memphis, 
which is straight west of Grand Junction, 
November 24, by three roads, stopped two 
days at the Tallahatchie to make a bridge, 
and reached a point on Grant's flank with 
his whole command December 5. All this 
was to find that he must march back again 
as fast, while Grant waited for the new oper- 
ation. ^Scraps which Badeau prints from 
Halleck's dispatches make appear that he 
was as irresolute as Grant; but they show 
that he gave Grant full discretion and sup- 
port, and that when the enemy fell back from 
the Tallahatchie Halleck became sanguine 
as to the interior line, and gave Grant 
plenary authority, including the command of 
the Arkansas army. In conclusion he said: 
"Telegraph what are your present plans." Ba- 
deau prints only this clause. GRANT'sanswer 
told the change of plan to a river expedition, 
he to co-operate on the interior line. 

Grant wrote Sherman December 8 inclos- 
ing Halleck's dispatch, and asking Sherman 
to come to Oxford and confer on a plan, say- 



My notion is to send two divisions back to Mem- 
phis and fix upon a day when they should effect a 
landing, and press from here with this command at 



9 



the proper time to co-operate. If I do not do this I 
will move our present force to Grenada, ineluding 
Steele's. '•' '■' When a good ready is had to 
move innnediately on Jackson, Miss., cutting loose 
from the road. Of tho?p two plans 1 look more 
favorably on the former. 

[ii the former itlaii he \v:is distinctly to 
itieet Sherman at Yicksbiirg in a eoiirerted 
attack. In the latter plan he would h;ive 
only about as far to march from Grenada to 
.Jackson, as he marched to the same place 
from Bruinsburg, after consuming a great 
army and navy and transport fleet for near 
six months. And the country was much bet- 
ter for the march. 

Gen. Sherman had marched from Memphis 
with two divisions to join Grant; had coun- 
termarched; had marched from Memphis 
again with three divisions, and by energetic 
movement had joined Grant .south of the 
Tallahatchie. And now he was to go back. 
Badeau aoes not state what argunumt con- 
vinced Sherman of the projjriety of tliis new 
back action; but Sherman started back im- 
uiediately. As Baueau lets out that this was 
to snatch the river expedition from McCler- 
NAND, we might suppose that Grant took 
Sherman into his contidence, if it were not 
that Sherman, who is a very George Wash- 
ington for inability to prevaricate, says that 
the idea of McClernand's coming did not en- 
ter into his dreams at that moment. 

But after Grant had sent back Sherman to 
head off McClernand, came Halleck's an- 
nouncement that McClernand was to com- 
mand the river expedition. This seemed an 
irreparable blow; but then Van Dorn came 
tr> Grant's relief by destroying his stores, and 
this supplied a reason for his going back to 
get command of the river e.xpcdition: Says 
Badeait: "Since Sherman was not to com- 
mand it, he was anxious to do so himself." 
But to show to Halleck that it was not a 
retreat, but a"'change of base," he telegraphed : 
"The enemy are falling back from Grenada." 
If so they were giviiig up the Yallabusha, 
the only obstacle to Grant's march directly 
to .Jackson or Vicksburg. Bareau says the 
destruction of supplies was but a "temporary 
iiu>onvenience," Jjut Grant wanted to go 
back. Thus in the .shifting of plana to cir- 
cumvent McClernand, Sherman was left to 
the sacrifice. 

Although Badeau finds so many reasons 
for Grant's turning back at the first im- 



pediment as to make Van Dokn's visit a 
friendlj' service, yet he pauses to tell what 
might have been: 

Grant has told me that had he known thou what 
he soon afterward learned— the possibility of sub- 
sisting an armv of 30,000 men without supplies 
other than drawn from an enemy's country — he 
could at that time have pushed on to the rear of 
Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in captur- 
ing the place. 

Very likelj'I btit McClernand might have 
been the first to get in. 

Badeau says: "Grant was now ionvin(;ed 
of tlie impossibility which lie had foretold, of 
maintaining so longaline of supplies through 
liustile territory." He had undertaken a cam- 
paign to demonstrate his foretold impossi- 
bility. The Irish pilot was engaged by the 
skipper upon his solemn affirmation that he 
knew every rock in tlie channel; and when 
the ship struck, he exclaimed: "That's one 
of thcnil" When Generals set out on cam- 
paigns which thev^ have foretold to be impos- 
sible, they generally succeed in proving their 
foretelling. * 

And when Grant had found, <luring Van 
Dorn's lu-eak of his communications, that he 
could draw sufficient sitpplies from the coun- 
try, Badeau fetches in the crowning reason 
for his turning back: "He discovered that 
Pemberton would not tight." Grant's great 
strategy, he says, was not to take places, but 
destroy armies. He had "indeed "meant and 
hoped to threaten Vicksburg, but his prime 
object was the defeat of Pemberton." But 
the facility with which, in Badeau, Grant's 
afterthoughts j-each back into his original 
plans, shows tiiat at all times he "builded 
wiser than he knew.'' And now, as he came 
solely to light Pemberton, and Pemberton 
would not stay and fight, what could he do as 
a military man, but turn back and leave 
liim'? 

And thus, after we had spent an army of 
from 100.000 to 200,000 for a year to recover 
interior territory and "strategic" places which 
we foiully declared had broken the backbone 
of the rebellion, we then evacuated them to 
seek the l)ackbone in another place, from 
which it vanished again like the pirates' 
})uried treasure. The reader of the history of 
our wonderful war, who reads how well Hal- 
leck employed an army greater than either 
tliat fought at Waterloo, in taking the great 
strategic point of Corinth, in 1862, will read 



10 — 



also tliiit ill I8(j4, when Ucn. (Jkurgk, H. 
Thomas was left by 8herm.\x to defend Ten- 
nessee, Kentucky, and tlie North uj;ainst 
Hooi), Corintl\ was Hoon's base. This is the 
way the war cost iS7,0(i(1,0(M»,()0(l, and took four 
years. 

Grant's retreat be,uan )jy tlic march of Mc- 
Phkr.sox's division from the Tallahatchie 
January 4. But the retreat was slow; the 
roads were bad; they always are bad in times 
of indecision; "and as it had been deter- 
mined to abandon Northern Mississippi, the 
accumulated Quartermasters' and ordnance 
stores Jiad to be removed with the army." 
Happily Van Dorn's cavalry had lightened 
the lal)or of carrying stores back. "It was 
not till the 10th of .lanuary that the head- 
(juarters were established at Memphis." 
This completed the great interior campaign, 
with a striking parallel to the lamous march 
of the King of France. 



CH AFTER IV! 

THE MOVKMKNT IN CONCERT — THt: DISCORHS. 

Although Gen. Grant, with an exalted 
patriotism which never stooped to count the 
cost of sacrifices in his country's afiairs, had 
given up the interior campaign to take the 
command of the river expedition from Gen. 
McClernanu, yet the affair had now become 
so complicated by the orders from the War 
Department that McClkrnand would be in 
command of the expedition, while Grant, 
the commander of the department, would be 
left in the rear. 

By judicious deliberation in forwarding the 
War Department's order to .McOi.ernanu at 
►Springfield, 111., liappily spliced by the break 
of communications by Van Dorn and For- 
rest, it was hoped that Sherma.x would get 
started before McGlernand. Fortunately 
thi.s was the event; but Mc('i,krnani> received 
orders direct from the War Department, and 
followed about a week after, which left Sher- 
man time for his assault on V'icksl>urg. Thus 
did Grant do what he could to prevent the 
errors at Washington. 

The last words which Gen. .Shek.man re- 
ceived from Grant, December 14, defined 
Grant's line of co-operation in the great con- 
cert of movements; 

The eoemy are yet ou ttio ValUbusLa. i txui 



pushinff down on tlieiu slowly, but so as to keep up 
the impression of a continuous move. - - My 

lieadquiirters will probably be in Coft'eeville [ten 
miles aVjove the Vallabushal one week hence. '■= " 
''■'■ It would be well ii you iwuld have two or three . * 
small boats suitable for unvigatiut; the Yuzoo. It 
may be necessary for me to look to lL;i,t base of sup- 
plies before we get through. 

Gen. Sherman, in his Memoiiv, writing of 
the failure of Grant's column to attack in 
concert with Rosecrans at luka, remarks: 
"In my experience these concerted move- 
ments generally fail, itnless with the very 
best troo])S, and iben in a country on whose 
roads some reliance can I)e placed, whicii is 
not the (^ase in Xorthern Mississijjpi." 

Perhaps there has not l)een in all the wars of 
ancient and modern Generals a plan of such 
farfctching and uncommunicable concerted 
movements as this, in which the concert of 
one army in the interior of Mississippi and 
another by a river expedition from Memphis, 
not hearing from one another for two weeks, 
was to be so exactly timed that their guns 
would ttnite on a given day in the fanfare 
finale at Vicksburg. 

This is only one of the examples of the su- 
periority of military genius in this fresh 
young country. Even through the tone of , 
distinguished consideration which these emi- 
nent Generals preserve toward each other, 
Grant in Badeau, Sherman in his Memoirs, 
Sherman maintains that Grant's orders re- 
quired him to assault at Vicksburg, and gave 
him to expect to hear simultaneously the 
sound of Gr.\nt's guns; while Baoeau plants 
Grant impregnably on that clause of his first 
order which said: "I will iiold the forces in 
readiness to co-ojierate wifh you in such man- 
ner as the movements of the enenty may 
make necessary;" and he maintains that 
Grant did this literally in his retreat. And 
if the enemy's movements made that retreat 
necessary, who can deny the literal co-opera- 
tion! Thus were both these distinguished 
commanders right, and each did alike distin- 
guish his military genius. 

Some notion of ihc imnicnsc resources 
called ou,t by the goscrn incut, may be foruKul 
from the narration that whereas Sherman, 
who had jitst bent all his energies to march 
three divisions froui Memphis to Oxford to 
join Grant for a campaign, left that place 
December 8th, to march back, his expedi- 
tion froxu Memphis started on the lyth, the 



11 — 



flay before Van DoHN ralleil on Oka.nt at Hol- 
ly Springs. The grand anipliibious armada, 
was composed of 42,000 men with ail the equip- 
ment and supplies of an army, fifty-eight 
steamboats, andCommodoi'o Poktkk's gunboat 
Heet of sixty vessels of all classes, carrying , 
280 guns and soi) men. 
(Jen. Sherman. says: 

The preparations were nece.ssarily hasty iu the 
extreme, but this was the essence of the whole 
(ihm— viz.. to reach Vicksburg. as il were, by sur- 
prise, while Gen. (Jrant held in check Pemberton's 
army about Grenada, leaving me to contend with 
tile smaller garrison at Vieksbiirg, and its well 
known strong batteries and defenses. 

To gather such an expedition, and j'each 
Vicksburg by surpri.se, was like those social 
surprise parties which .send notice. And Van 
DoKN had done the .surprising thing to Gr.\kt 
a week before Sherman reached the place of 
attack. 

Tiie sight of this armada, as '•maneuvering 
by division.s" it descended the Mississippi, 
Gen. Sherman describes as grand and inspir- 
ing. It was also grandly dear to the country ; 
for the necessities of our Generals, East and 
West, to have fleets to move their armies for 
inland operations, and to protect their bases, 
burned the candle at both ends. The ar- 
mada reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles 
above Vicksburg, on the Arkansas side, De- 
cendier 24. J^eaving here a division which 
sent a brigade to break up the railroad lead- 
ing from Vicksburg west toward Shreveport, 
La., the rest i>roceeded on the 2Gth to John- 
son's plantation, just below the mouth of the 
Yazoo, and there debarked. The other di- 
vision arrived and debarked tlie next night. 
And now Sherman's part in this great milita- 
ry >ym])iipny whs to be ivlaycd. 



cll.M'TKi; V. 
<;e.\. shekma.n"s assault on the chukasaw 

UU'JFS. 

(Jen. Sherman developed great talent for 
finding difficult ])laces to assault, but even he 
could hardly have found one more difficult 
than this which he had turned back from a 
[iromising interior campaign to reach. He 
liad landed his army on an island of live to 
six miles, between the Ya/.oo River and the 
line of bluffs nmning northeast from Vicks- 
bn(g (in the ea.st side of the Yazoo. This 



island is formed by the Yazoo, the Mississippi, 
and bayous, and lies opposi'.e that part of the 
VJck.sburg Bluffs next to the town, which is 
called Ghickasaw Elufls or Walnut Hills. 
Furtiier up the range is called Haines' Biuff, 
which the Yazoo runs near to in two places. 
twelve and twenty miles above Vickslnirg, 
and thus Haines" BluH' effectually closed the 
Yazoo to our gunboats. 

The island has on the north the crooked 
Yazoo, on the northeast a deep bayou, the 
Chickasaw, which runs from the Yazoo to- 
ward Chickasaw Bluffs to a broad, shallow, 
forked bayou called Old River, which comes 
down from above along the line of bluffs, 
and runs between the island and 
the bluffs to the ili.'^si.ssippi, just above 
Vicksburg, The big bayous have little 
bayous, cutting into the island, and it is 
dotted with lagoons and swamps. It is ten 
feet below high water, and, save on the Yazoo 
side, and .some old cotton fields along Chicka- 
saw Bayou, was heavily wooded. Shkr.man's 
reconnaissance found that the only part from 
which an assault seemed practicable was that 
which for about two miles below Chickasaw 
Bayou fronted (["hickasaw Bluffs. To uuike 
the assault from there. Old liivcr must first 
be crossed by two narrow causeways, eacit 
under a concentrated lire. 

On the Walnut Hills side Old Biver had a 
levee to keep the Hood from the stri]) of bot- 
tom between that and the hills. As Sherman 
states water nuirks ten feet high on the trees 
of the islaiul, this levee must have been at 
least as high as that. This levee was tlie 
enemy's first line; it made a regular para}>et, 
and was held by infantry. Between this 
levee and the line of hills was a road that ran 
along thi^ bottom up to Yazoo City. The 
levee was a complete cover to this road, so 
that the enemy's forces could be moved along 
it, under cover, to meet Sherman's crossing at 
any point. At the foot of the bluffs, at places 
to command these two narrow causeways, 
were batteries to enfilade them. These were 
supported by infantry in rifle pits and <jn 
spurs of the hills. Along the foot of the hills 
were rifle pits, and the to])S wei'e crowned by 
elaborate works ami batteries. 

The official report of (ien. Sher.ma.n to (icn. 
Rawlins isa good <lcscription of the situation 
in which he had to storm the line of hills to 
carry out his part of the co-opeiative mo\t>- 
ment: 



12 — 



Immediately in our front was a bayou, passable 
at only two points, on a narrow levee or sandbar, 
which was perfectly commanded by the enemy's 
sharpshooters that lined the levee or parapet on its 
opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip 
of beach or table land, on which were constructed 
a series of rifle pits and batteries, and behind that a 
high abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were 
marked all the way up with rifle trenches, and the 
crowns of the principal hills presented heavy bat- 
teries. 

The country road loading from Vicksburf? to 
Yazoo City runs along the foot of these hills, aud 
answered an admirable puipose to the enemy as a 
covered way, along which he moved his artillery 
and infantry promptly to meet us at any point at 
which we attempted to pass this difficult bayou. 
Nevertheless that bayou, with its levee parapets, 
backed by the line of rifle pits, batteries, and 
frowning hills, had to be passed before we could 
reach terra firma, aud meet our enemy on anything 
like fair terms. 

All these conditions made as nice a slaugh- 
ter x>en as the greatest strategist could find to 
.-iend an army to. For this nad he counter- 
marched from a very promising interior cam- 
paign, and formed a grand armada. Gen. 
Sherman's report vindicates his failure by 
showing that success was impossible; but 
there is this indomitable quality in the 
soldiering of Sherman and Grant, that the 
absolute impossibility of an assault, and the 
certainty of vain slaughter of men, was no 
reason for not sending them into it. Volun- 
teers were food for powder, and there was an 
air of greatness in great slaughter. The very 
exuberance with- wiiich our young nien vol- 
unteered made some of the regular officers 
^travagant in consuming them. And they 
had good fortune in this, for they who con- 
sumed most came to the top, and the few who 
achieved results with economy in men were 
thought little of. 

A brigade of Gen. G. W. Morgan's division 
was to carry the hills, supported by Frank 
Bi,air's brigade of Steele's division at the other 
crossing, a mile or more away. Gen. Sher- 
man recites his jjlan, which was precise in its 
several stages, and complete; but in execu- 
tion it stuck at the first stage. He tells the 
action in fewer words: 

The assault was made and a lodgment eft'ected on 
the hard table land near the county road, 
and the heads of the diflferent assault- 
ing columns reached different points 
of the enemy's works, but tnere met so 
withering; a fire from the rifle pits and cross fire of 
;;rape and canister from the batteries that the col- 



umns faltej-ed, and finally fell back to the pomt of 
starting, leaving many dead, wounded, and prison- 
ers in the hands of the enemy. 

Say 2,000 brave volunteers done tor in that 
job. 

Gen. Sher.man's report pays a hui\d.sonie 
tribute to the valor of the 6th ^lissouri 
Regiment, which was sent from A. J. Smith's 
division to make a diversion from Morgan. 
He says "the circumstances called for all the 
individual courage for which that regiment 
is justly celebrated." He continues: 

The 6th Missouri crossed over rapidly by com- 
panies, and lay under the bank of the bayou, with 
the enemy's sharpshooters over their heads, within 
a few feet; so near that their sharpshooters held 
out their muskets, and fired down vertically upon 
our men. The orders were to undermine this bank 
and make a road up it, but it was found impossi- 
ble; and after the repulse of Morgan's assault I or- 
dered Gen. A. J. Smith to retire this regnnuni un- 
der cover of darkness. 

Tn thf ^femoirs he says lliesc men scooped 
out holes in the bank with their hands for 
shelter against the fire from aljove, and that 
they had to he recalled one at a time after 
dark. To iross a narrow sand spit, de- 
ploy against a steep parapet held by a line 
of the enemy, tmdermine a road througli it, 
to carry an assatilt beyond up a steep hill 
thoroughly fortified, or to make a diversion 
while De Courcey's brigade did pretty mncit 
the .same, seems like a forlorn hope. Gen. 
Sherman states the result: 

When the night of the '2'M\ closed in, we stood 
upon our original ground, and had suffered a re- 
Ijulse. The effort was necessary to a successful ac- 
complishment of my orders, and the combication 
was the best possible under the circumstances. 

Sherman meant to make another assault 
next day, and embarked Steele's division to 
go up the Yazoo to Haines' Bluflt' "and mal;e 
a dash at the hills;" but fortunately a heavy 
fog next day prevented the boats from mov- 
ing. During the night the sound of trains 
was heard bringing in Pemberton's troojw, 
A heavy rain set in, and, warned by the water 
marks on the trees, Sherman re-en\ barked liis 
army. Sherman's othcial report was chival- 
rously just. He said : 

I assume all the responsibility, and attach fault 
to no one, and am generally, satisfied with the high 
spirit manifested by all. '- * - I attribute our 
failure to the strength of the enemy's position, both 
natural and artificial, and not to lii.- siiptrioi' fiKhi 
ing. 



Indeed the enemy had no opportunity to 
show great fighting qualities. 

But when Gen. Shekman came to write his 
Memoirs, twelve years after, his view had 
changed. As with Badkau's Grant, after he 
had risen to greatness of superstructure, he 
seen\ed to think it necessary to strengthen his 
hase by reconstructing history toshow that he 
had been infallible from the beginning. He 
now wrote: "The attack failed, and I have al- 
ways felt that its failure was due to the fail- 
ure of Gen. GEORCiE W. Moruan to obey his 
orders, or to fulfill his promise made in per- 
son." That promise was to scale those hills. 
It can not be denied that Morgan did not do 
it. Sherman says in these afterthoughts: 
"One brigade (DeCourcey's) of Morgan's 
troops crossed the bayou safely, but took 
cover behind the bank,and could not be moved 
forward." But this is the same cover which 
the 6th Missouri took, whose courage Sher- 
man so commended in his report. Let us, like 
the two dutiful sons of Noah, with averted 
faces, drop the mantle of charity over this ex- 
posure of military and moral weakness of a 
great General. 



r'HAITIOi; VI. 



THE QUESTION BETWEEN (iRANT ANH SHERMAN 

OF grant's failure to co-oi'erate in the 

ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. 

Badeau makes an argument to refute the 
common supposition of the time "that Sher- 
man's reverse was the consequence of a fail- 
ure on Grant's part to move south from 
Grenada and appear in the rear of Vicksburg 
at the time of tlie assault."' He makes iliese 
.strong points: 

1. Grant "meant, if he could, to hold 1'em- 
bekton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman 
U) enter Vicksburg without any material op- 
])osition." 

2. But if he liad so heltl 1'embkuton it 
would have made no ditl'erence to Sherman; 
for "the strength of the works at Vicksburg 
was hot fully appreciated when this arrange- 
ment was ma<le; they were so strong that 
had Grant been able to keep Pe.mberton's 
entire force in his own front, there would 
liave been no ditrereni result to Sherman's 
endeavor."' 



3. Sherman "never could have anticipated 
a tactical co-operation from Grant; for Grant 
had neither promised nor suggested it;" 
therefore when at Oxford he laid out the plan 
of concerted movements, and his part in the 
interior, he said in liis letter of instructions 
to Sherman — "I will hold the forces here in 
readiness to co-operate with you in such 
manner as the movementsof tlie enemy nufke 
necessary" — he meant not tactical, but moral 
co-operation. 

4. Sherman, in liis i-eiiort of the assault, 
shows that he was not looking for Grant's 
tactical co-operation in it, for he says: "Not 
one word could I hear from Gen. Grant, who 
was supposed to be pnshhifj wnthy "I pro- 
posed * * * to attack the enemy's right, 
which, if successful, would give us substan- 
tial possession of the Yazoo Tliver. and iiliirr 
as in rommuiiication with Ge'n. (innit." The 
italics and gaps are Badeau's. 

5. Sherman covild not liave expected "tac- 
tical co-operation" from Grant, nor even 
moral co-operation in his assault; for this 
remark in Sherman's reyiori of tlie assault 
shows that he had before heard that Grant 
was falling back: "The rumor of Gen. Grant 
having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie 
became confirmed by my receiving no intelli- 
gence from him." 

6. "Sherman himself declared that his fail- 
ure was owing to 'the strength of the enemy's 
position, both natural and artificial.' " As 
one sufficient cause is in logic sufficient, ergo 
his failure was not owing to Gr.vnt. 

7. Sherman's own report .shows that the 
enemy's forces at Vicksburg were so large 
tiiat, wiUiout regard to Grant, success was 
impossible, for he says: "I supposed therr 
('the rebel) organized forces to amount to 
about lo,000, which could be re-enforced at 
the rate of about 5,000 a day, provided Gen. 
Grant did, not occupy all the. attention of Pein- 
herton^s forces at Grenada." The italics in 
all these citations are Badeau's. 

8. Sherman's general letter of ini'orma- 
tion of the campaign to the division 
commanders, w'hich Badeait cites as ^'before 
the attach'^ — in fact December 23, M'hile com- 
ing down the river — told the plan of co-oper- 
ation as "to act in concert with Gen. Grant 
against Pemherton's forces, supposed to have 
Jurkson, J/Z.s.v., as a jioinl of concentration.''' 



— 14 



Also: "It may be necessary (looking to 
rjRANT'8 approach) before attacking Vicks- 
burg. to reduce the battery at Haines' Bluff, 
so as to enable the gunboats and lighter 
transports to ascend the Yazoo and coimwinl- 
cate with Gi'ii. Grant." Also: '•(I'l-diit's Ifft 
find center rvere at the /«*V arcowitx aiqirnacliuKj 
tlie YoUnhiKha, near Grenfida, and the railroad 
fo his rear, by which he drew his supplies, was 
reported to be seriously damaged. This may 
disconcert him somewhat, but only makes 
n)ore important our line of operations." 
Again: '^ At the Yall<ibu>tha Gen. Grant viai/ en- 
counter the 'irmy of Gen. FeniJK'rton, the same 
which refused him battle on the line of the 
Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified, 
l)ut as he (Pemberton) M-ill hardly have time 
to fortify the YalJabusha. and in that event 
(ien. Grant will immediately advance down 
the high ridge lying between the Big Black 
and the Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on^ 
the YurMo." The quotations in this number 
seem to show Sherman's expectation of 
(Jrant's co-operation; but Badeau quotes 
them as testimony to the contrary. 

1>. This -same romantic letter of general in- 
telligence, by Gen. Sherman to the several 
otificei's, issued while the grand armada was 
descending the Mississippi, showed that he 
contemplated, among other things, landing- 
above Vick.sburg and marching into the in- 
terior to attack Vicksburg from the east on the 
line of the railroad from that place to .Tack- 
son, thus: "I purpose to land our whole force 
on tl)e Mississippi side, and then to reach the 
l)oint where the Vicksburg and .lackson Rail- 
road crosses the Big Black, after which to 
attack Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats 
assail it by water." This would offer to Grant 
a fine opportunity to join him. 

10. Sherman himself absolves Grant from 
blame for lack of "tactical co-operation" in 
this a8.sault, in his general absolution, in his 
report, when li'e says: "The effort was neces- 
sary to a successful accomplishment of my 
orders, and the combinations were the best 
jiossible under the circumstances. I assume 
all the responsibility, and attach the l)lanie 
to no one.'' 

IJmu: \i: thus j)r()Ves in liis cnlirc s.'itisl'ac- 
lioii. by these italicized citations from Gen. 
Siii:i::m\n's re])nrt. and from his previous let- 
ter dl' roiiui II tic anticipations, that he could not 



have expected any tactical co-operation from 
Grant in the attack on Vicksburg, and did 
not expect it, and that Grant's inability to 
give the moral co-operatioji, which was all 
that he meant, by holding Picmberton on the 
Yallabusha, made no difference to Sherman, 
because the defenses of Vicksburg were so 
strong, by his own showing, and so strongly 
defended, without Pemisertox, that Sherman 
would have been repulsed all the same. 
Therefore, what Grant did was a matter of 
no consequence to Sherman, who thus, by 
the grand plan of movements in concert, was 
sent to slaughter his army in a solo. 

Therefore does Badeau conclude: "Of course 
those who think or have said tl)at(icn. (Jra.nt 
was to meet Sherman at Vicksburg, or to co- 
operate witli him in the assault, never can 
have seeii these papers." But lie justifies 
Sherman by this left handed stroke: "Sher- 
man deserves all praise for his determination 
to attempt the assault, when he knew not 
only that Grant never intended to suj)i)0rt 
him in its tactical execution, bul that he was 
probably imable to render even the strategical 
support to the movement which had been 
originally planned." And he appliesa poultice 
to Sherman to soothe his sole responsi- 
bility for his failure by this: "Indeed, when 
Grant threw both bis armies on the Missis- 
sippi, success still tied before him as coyly as 
in the interior." 

On the other side. Siii:iiMA\. in his Memoirs, 
]irints (iiiANT'f; letter, caliint;- him to confer at 
Oxford on the new ])hiii, (iRant saying; "^ly 
notion is to send two tlivisions liack to Meiii- 
]ihis, and fix tipon a day when they should 
effect a landing, and ])ress from here with this 
command at the jiroper time to co-operate." 
He also thought that the following in Grant's 
letter of instructious meant practical co-o]ier- 
ation: "Inform me of the earliest j>racticable 
day when you will embark, and siicli [)lans as 
may tiien be matured. 1 will hold the forces 
here in readiness to co-operate with you iii 
such manner as tbc movements of the enemy 
may make necessary." 

Also a letter from Grant, dated December 
14. rc('eived by Sherman at ^lemphis, wliich 
he says "completes all instriictions received 
by me governing the first movement against 
Vicksbm-g," had this as to co-operation: "The 
enemy are as yet on the Vallal)usba. 1 am 
pu.shing them down sbiwly, but so as to keep 



— 15 — 



up tlu- iiu{>iesi<ioii of a coiitiuuouH move. 
■••■ My headquarters will probably be 
in Ccffeeville one week heuce. *' * •■■ It 
would be well if you could luive two or three 
small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. 
It may beeoine necessary for me to look to 
tliat base of supplies before we get through." 
Looking to the Yazoo for supplies, looked to 
a cutting loose from his interior liasc and a 
Tiiarch on tiierear of Vicksburg. 

<ien. SiiKKMAN" also affirms that it was the 
]>\i\\\ and understanding of concert of action 
with (riiANT that required him to make the 
assault immediately at Vicksburg, as "neces- 
sary to the sut^cessful acconiplislnnent of my 
orders," without regard to the impossibility 
of successful as.sault. He says: "Up to that 
jnoment I iiad not heard a word from Gen. 
< i KANT since leaving Memphis; and most as- 
suredly I had listened for days for the sound 
of his guns in the direction of Yazoo City." 
In that belief he had intended an otlier as- 
sault tiie next day, when the providential fog. 
])reventing the boats from moving up to 
Haines' Biulf, saved the sacrifice of another 
2,000 volunteers — perhaps twice as many. 

Tims <locs each of these distinguished Gen- 
erals make out his ease, and prove that they 
suddenly turned back from a true military 
line, and divided the army, to enter upon a 
plan o\' remote concerted movements, in 
which there was to be no concert or co-opera- 
lion, and in which the only definite idea was 
that Shkuman was to go down and butt 
against the Vicksburg blurt's, which were as 
well kiu)wn to be impregnable before as after 
he had sacrificed 2,000 brave volunteers in 
proving it. P"or Vickslmrg was not a gi'een 
spot, to i>c taken unprepared, lint had been 
foi-tilicd a year before; and in the previous 
.Inly had withstood a protracted bombard- 
ment by the united fleets of FAitRA(;uT and 
Por.TKi;. To ad<f to the completeness of the 
two arguiiieiits. Sherman gives his case away 
by an uiujualilied indorsement of Bapkap. 

llxm.Af makes very evi<lent that <;uant and 
Sn Ki:.\i AN wt!re thrown otV the usual balance 
of tlieir military judgn\i'nt by I.iNfoi.N's ec- 
centricity in giving Gen. .M( C"i.i:i;nanu the 
ecuutnand of an e.vpedition to t)pen the Mis- 
sissip])!. He had so far been a fortunate Gen- 
eral. lJAiii:\u says he liad G.icsar's fatal fault 
— he was ambitious. Gkant fancied that 
McCi-KRNANL* would have a great opportunity, 



and tliat irreparal)le irregularity might grow 
from the still higher elevation of a man who 
was not of the army class, and whona no reg- 
ular officer could serve under. If Grant and 
Shkrman could have known then the military 
rudiments which they learned afterward, 
they could liave goiu- on down Central Mis- 
sissippi with an army of 70,000 men, and 
swept all before them, leaving to McClernanj) 
to go and sink his army in the bog. That 
they sacrificed the real campaign, and took 
their own army to the bog, to avert the ap- 
prehended mischief of McClernand's success, 
niay prove that their military judgment was 
unhinged, bur, it nevertheless exalts tlu'ir 
patriotism. 



CILM'TEI! Vn. 

M'CLERN.\XL) takes command — THE VICTORY OK 
FORT HINU.MAN — TURNINCi THE Ml.SSISSIPei — 

cjrant's emdakrassment with mVi.ERNANI) — 

GRANT COMICS TO THE COMMAND. 

Gen. Sher.man's a.ssault at Chickasaw JJhill's 
was on the 29th of December. The fog next 
day prevented his steamboat expedition up tin; 
Yazoo to Haines' Bluft" "to make a dash at the 
hills." The rain set in; the water marks ten 
feet higlj on the trees warned him, and he or- 
dered the re-embarkation of the stores, and 
preparations for the army to embark during 
the night of January 1, 1863. He .says: 
"From our camps at Chickasaw (bayou) we 
could hear the wliistle of trains arriving in 
Vicksburg, and could see battalions of men 
inarching up toward Haines' Bluft' and tak- 
ing j)Ost at all xioints along our front.'' 

Up to thaf moment, he says: "1 had not 
heard a word from Gen. Grant since leaving 
Memphis; and most assuredly I had listened 
for days for the sound of his guns in the di- 
rection of Yazoo City." On the morning of 
•lanuary 2 the command was all afloat, when 
Sherman heard that Gen. McCdernani> was at 
the mouth of the Yazoo. Sherman left his 
armv there, an<l found Gen. McClernand 
"with orders fi-om the War I)epartn>ent to 
commaml the expeditionary force on the Mis- 
sissipiji River." He reported to McCleknani> 
what iiad l)een done, and that troops were 
pouring into Vicksburg, which must be 
Pemberton's army, "and that Gen, Grant 
must be near at hand." But McCleenand 



l(j — 



.surprised him by the information "that Gen. 
Gk.vnt was not coming at all; that his depot 
at Holly Spring.s had been captured by Van 
DoRX, and that he had drawn back from 
Cofteeville and Oxford to Holly Springs and 
Lagrange; and, further, that (juimby's di- 
vision of Grant's army was actually at Mem- 
pliis for stores when he passed down." 

Sherman thought that this explained "iiow 
Yicksburg was being re-enforced;" also, that 
ii made any attempt on the place from the 
Yazoo hopeless; tlierefore, "all came out of 
the Yazoo, and on the 3d of January ren- 
dezvoused at Milliken's Bend, about ten 
miles above." McClernanp's order assuming 
t'ommand divided the "Army of the Missis- 
sippi" into two corps, of two divisions each, 
the first, his own, commandedby Gen. Geo.W. 
Morgan, the .second bj' Gen. Sherman. Grant 
was still in the interior. A steamboat and 
her tow of barges,with Sherman's ammunition, 
had been captured by a rebel boat, which 
came out of Arkansas River, and taken up 
that river forty miles, to FortHindman. Gen. 
Sherman says tliat he perceived that this lia- 
bility in the rear would be unpleasant in 
operations at Vick.sburg; therefore, he pro- 
posed to McClernand to let him go up the 
Arkansas and take the fort. Porter to send 
gunboats. 

The conclusion was that Porter and Mc- 
Clernand went along, taking three ironclads 
and the whole army, which had not yet de- 
barked, reaching the Arkansas on the 9th, 
the troops landing three miles below the fort 
next day. The enemy had a strong line of 
in trenchments below the fort, running from 
river to interior swamp. The front of this 
was a dead level much obstructed. The 
troops lay on their arms without fires or cov- 
ering that January night, to be ready for as- 
sault in concert with the boats next day. 
This a.ssault had to be made over a slaughter- 
ous place, but the volunteers went at it vin- 
ttinchingly. Meanwhile the gunboats ran 
their bows into the bank in front of the fort, 
and, it being but little above the river, they 
poured their tire into tlie embrasures, i)utting 
the gunners to flight, they commnnifating 
their panic to the rest. 

Outside the fort, at the strong line from 
river to swamp, the enemy made a more reso- 
lute defense, and our brave volunteers had 
to advance against a seeming impregnable 
line, under great exposure. In this operation 



they lost 077 killed and wounded. AVliilc 
this was going on, several otticers in the fort 
hung out white flags; Commodore Porter 
landed in the fort, and received the surren- 
der. There was quarreling among Confed- 
erate officers over this alacrity with the wliite 
flag, but the surrender could not be re- 
called. Our forces dismantled the fort, car- 
ried off its small arms and .stores, .sent 4,791 
prisoners North; re-embarked on the i;^>th; 
came down the Arkansas IJiver in a snow 
storm, and stopped at Hcli'na. at the mouth 
of that river. 

Here McClernand got a letter from (iRAXT, 
written before the result, sharply reprimand- 
ing him for making this .side issue expedi- 
tion. McClernand replied, assuming the re- 
sponsibility and defending;- the enterpri.se. 
Badeau says that Grant supposed that Mc- 
Clernand planned the expedition, and he 
had no confidence in his military judgment, 
and therefore "he expressed his dissatisfac- 
tion both to McClernand and Halleck" 
But such a victory could not be repaired, and 
Grant, finding that Sherman conceived the 
expedition, took a different view, and gave 
the credit to Sherman. Sherman says that 
McClernand's report did not give proper 
credit to the navy. This increased Porter's 
distrust of McClernand's military judgment, 
which he communicated to Washington. 

It is evident that if the expedition had not 
gained a victory — an article long a stranger 
to that army — it would have disposed of GexL 
McClernand. As it was, it made Gen. Grant 
stiil more unreconciled to him. Grant vis- 
ited the army afloat at Napoleon, and, as Gen. 
Sherman narrates: "On the 18th day of 
January ordered McClernand with his own 
and my corps, to return to Vicksburg to dis- 
embark on the west bank, and to resume 
work on a canal across a peninsula, which 
had been begun 'bj' Gen. Tho.mas Willea.ms 
the summer before, the object being to turn 
the Mississippi River at that point." 

Gen. Grant at this time was greatly em- 
barrassed by his anomalous relation to this 
expedition. He was in command of the de- 
partment, but McClernand had an order giv- 
ing him command of the river e.xpedition. 
He was Grant's subordinate by all regular 
military, conditions, but yet he seemed in a 
degree independent. This is an instance of 
ihe way Lincoln had of dispensing plums in 
the way of separate commands. 



17 — 



Orant liari abandoned liis interior cam- 
paign, and left Sherman in the breach to go 
back and take tlie command of the river ex- 
pedition away from McClernand, but lie 
found his plans blocked by that special order. 
His position was enougli to perplex a Bona- 
parte. Indeed he could see no way to real 
military results but to dispose of McCler- 
nand. One luan must not be allowed to stop 
the way of such mighty forces as were now 
gathering at Vicksburg. Happily, Grant's 
patriotism was equal to the necessity. 

Grant had allowed no feeling of jealousy to 
cause him to withhold his counsel and orders 
from McClernand. When he had first gotten 
back to Memphis January 10, he had written 
him vigorous words: "This expedition must 
not fail." His order at Helena to McCler- 
nand to put his army at work to turn the 
Mississippi gave him opportunity for a great 
achievement. He repeated on the 22d: "I 
hope the work of changing the channel of the 
Mississippi is begun." But while thus gener- 
ously planning, and giving McClernand the 
chance for the glory. Grant was not content. 
Badeau says lie had no confidence in Mc- 
Clernand's military at)i!ity; he must 
have known still less of his ability to turn 
the Mississippi River. Thus was McClernand 
an obstacle to Grant, and it was a niilitiiry 
necessity that he should be disposed of. 

After Grant had visited the expedition at 
Napoleon, just from the tine but irregular vic- 
tory of Fort Hindman, he wrote Hallkck, 
January 20: "1 regard it as my duty to state 
that I found there was not sufficient confi- 
dence in Gen. McClernand as a commander, 
either by the army or navj', to insure him a 
success." Bade.au states in addition that 
McClernand was captious and insubordinate, 
insisting on "matters of military etiquette 
and law;" "raising objections to the orders of 
his commanding officer;" "making sugges- 
tions contrary to all the principles of military 
science," and so on. He cites an extreme 
case: McClernand went so far as to object to 
Grant's receiving comjjlaints from officers of 
his command, made not through him, and to 
Grant'.s practice of issuing orders to McCler- 
nand's subordinates, not through him, as 
creating confusion and insubordination. He 
added : 

One thing is certain: two Generals can not eom- 
mund this army, issuing independent and direct 



orders to subordinate officers, and the public serv- 
ice be promoted. 

In this McClernand, a mere volunteer, was 
taking on rules, order and discipline as if he 
were a regular army officer, with all which 
that implies; whereas, there being regular • 
officers under him, it was quite the regular 
thing for Grant to send orders to them igno- 
ring him. Besides, "suggestions contrary to 
the principles of military science" could not 
be tolerated. 

All this undermining operation was pro- 
moting the discipline of the army in a sort 
that tended toward the great end, and it re- 
sulted in Grant's receiving permission from 
Halleck to take command, which he as- 
stimed in person January 29, McClernand 
thereby being set back to the command of 
his corps. And now at last was Grant ready 
to begin his great campaign against the Mis- 
sissippi River, three months after he had 
started on the interior line. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
the wonderful river — the more wonderful 

MILITARY GENIUS — THE TRUE SOLDIER's LIFE — 
THE SEESAW MILITARY POLICY'. 

The Mississippi River is creation's wonder. 
At no part are its elements more wonderfully 
combined than in the Vicksburg region ; nor 
could there be found in its whole length more 
difficulties for a military operation from the 
river than that to which the force of circum- 
stances had now brought Gen. Grant. An 
idea of the region is requisite to an apprecia- 
tion of the military achievement, and is in- 
teresting in itself. Badeau draws from the 
memoir of Gen. J. H. Wilson, of the en- 
gineers, and this paper borrows from 
Badeau: 

All the way from Cairo to New Orleans the 
Mississippi meanders througti a vast alluvial region, 
the whole of which is annually overflowed, except 
where levees have afforded a partial barrier. This 
great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and ex- 
tends on the east to the upland plains of "feniiessee 
and Mississippi, while on the west it is bounded by 
the lesser elevations of drift alone. The blurts that 
form the escarpment of the eastern plains are 
usually quite steep, and thickly overgrown wiih 
timber, underbrush, and vines. At various points 
in its course the river touches one extremity or the 
other of the bottom land, washing the base of the 



— 18 



bluB's, nnd oi'leii rutting deep into llie soft strata, 
l-'olmnlius, Furl Pillow, Meuiphis, Helena, Vieks- 
biirs, Grand iiulf, and Port Hudson are points of 
this kind, and rise from eighty lo 'JtJO feet above the 
freshets. 

The alluvial region, througnout its entire ex- 
tent, is higher near the banks of the river, and falls 
oil' gradually, till it reaches the line of thebluttV; 
the drainage is therefore toward the hills, and is the 
source of the intricate network of bayous for which 
the basin is remarkable. The Coldwater, the Talla- 
hatchie, the Yazoo, the Washita, the Ked, and 
Ati'hafalaya rivers, besides numerous other and 
smaller streams, are accordingly nothing more than 
huge side drains. During freshets, the water that 
breaks over the Mississippi banks or through the 
crevasses, flows through cypress swamps and a 
lahyiinth of bayous, till it reaches the blutl's, and 
is again forced back into the paient stream. 

iicsides the bayous, crescent shaped lakes, the sole 
remains of the ancient meauderings of the river, 
abound on both sides, often at considerable' dis- 
tance from the present channel. The forests of the 
alluvial region are extremely luxuriant and dense: 
couonwood, tulip, sweet gum, magnolia, syca- 
more, and ash are found, with an almost impene- 
trable jungle of ('ane and vine. The cypress swamps 
that occupy the lower portions of the bottom are 
nearly always under water; and this, with the 
slimy character of the soil, and the treacherous 
beds, and slippery steep banks of the bayous, ren- 
ders the country almost impassable in summer, and 
entiiely so, excent by boats, in win'.er. 

Into tills domain of lialf creation had Gen. 
Grant ))roiiylit his line army. Here in this 
very Slongh of Despond wa.'s it to wrestle with 
tlie dense forests, the jungle of cane and vine, 
the deep hayoiis and lagoons, obstructed by 
sunken and overhanging trees, the cypress 
swamps, the slimy soil, and the treacherous 
i>()ttom, for the next three months, in the most 
malarious conditions, with immense labors, all 
of which B.iDEAi' says were destined to prove 
abortive, save to prove Gen. Grant's fertility 
in resource; and all of which, in the con- 
suming of men by disease, made the destruc- 
tion of a campaign of battles in an open cotin- 
try a light matter. 

The eastern line of bluffs coming down in 
a southwest course on the east side of tlie 
Yazoo, and called Haines' Bluti'and Walnut 
Hills, meets the Mississippi at Vicksburg. 
Below "that place the river runs near the 
blutf for several miles; then diverges a little 
and a swamp intervenes; then comes to the 
lilutT again at Warrenton, eight miles below 
^'il•ksbl^•g, and so continues for three miles; 
thfcn diverges widely in great crooks, and, 
with a turn to the northeast, strikes the bluff' 



again at Grand Gulf, just below the mouth of 
Big Black River. Here it turns sharply to 
the southwest again, in the general course of 
the bluffs, but diverging, till at Bruinsburg, 
ten miles below Grand Gulf, and just below 
the mouth of Bayou Pierre, it is two miles 
from the bluff's. 

At Vicksburg the bluflFs were regarded as 
unassailable. They were of the same charac- 
ter below that place, and had heavy guns at 
different points. Warrenton was fortilied. 
Grand Gulf was a little Vicksburg in its sit\i- 
ation as to bluff's and rivers, and its easy de- 
fensibility. Where the river left the bluffs 
the swamps were a defense. At Bruinsburg, 
thirty-hve miles below Vicksburg by land 
and twice as far by the river, was the tirst 
place wliere there was a landing not crowned 
by bluff. From here there was a road into 
tlie interior, and the line of bluff is two miles 
inland. Bruinsburg was easily defensible, 
but there was a limit to the enemy's exten- 
sion of forces or to his vigilance. All along 
the west side of the river was a labyrinth of 
bayous, lakes, lagoons, and swamps, and of 
great crooks in the river. Gjsant had for his 
camj)s and field of oiierations the great bot- 
tomless region west of the river, drawing all 
his supplies from the North. 'J'lie Confed- 
erates had for their field the high land on the 
east side, drawing their supplies from the 
rich interior region of Xortfiern Mississij>pi, 
now given up to them. 

BADEAti, who is always exem])t from the 
error of overstating Gen. Grant's forces, 
states that the whole number now in his 
command was l.SO.OOO, all engaged in the 
Vicksburg operation, either immediat(^ly or 
in supjiort. Fifty thoiLsand were j)laced in 
camps at Young's Point, eight miles above 
Vicksburg, andat Millikin's Bend,twelvemiles 
further up. McPherson's corps was at Lake 
Providence, forty miles above, to work at a 
bayou and swamp route of 400 to 600 miles 
to Red River. The base of supplies aiui re- 
enforc<-meiits was at Memphis. Says Badeai': 
"They were i>iit in camps along the west 
bank of the river, on the low swamp land. 
overHowed this year to an unusual extent." 
He continues: ''The camj)s were frequently 
submerged, and the dis(!a.ses con.scqucnt to 
this exi>osure jirevailed among the troops; 
dysentery and fevers jiiade sad havoc, and 
even tlie smallpox was introduced." "The 
levees furni.shed the only dry land deep 



19 



pnougli fur graves, and for miles along the 
river bank tins narrow strij) was all that ap- 
[)eared above the water, furrowed its whole 
length with graves. The troops were thus 
hemmed in by the burial places of their com- 
ra<les." 

The old army song, "Tlie soldier's life is 
always gay," is calculated to foster a levity 
which ill befits its danger. Onr volunteers 
were taught the better lesson that a soldier's 
life is sad. How much better the moral effect 
of the generalship which constantly reminds 
a soldier of his mortality! The trooj)S were 
also kept alert by a rising river above their 
heads, barred only by a treai^lierous levee. 
The great fleet of steamboats had to be kept 
for arks, in emergencies, as well as for the 
(jfticers to live in, and to carry tbe troops on 
their' various alligator expeditions. Mean- 
while, this great army, sunk in the swamps 
west of the Mississippi, was as isolated from 
any co-operation or iTifluence on any of the 
land operations. East or West, as if it had 
been sunk in the sea. 

B.^nEAU says that Grant bent all his ener- 
gies to the river expedition. "He determined 
now to abandon the railroad from .Tackson 
to Columbus (Ky.), and to move all his troops 
south, except those absolutely necessary to hold 
the line from Memphis to Corintli." He dis- 
mantled the river batteries between Memphis 
and Columbus, and removed the floating bat- 
teries. Interior territory, strategic places, 
and all other objects were set aside for this 
great enterprise to open the Mississippi. He 
wrote Halleck that he should ''require a 
large force for tJtie final struggle," and ad- 
vised that re-enforcements be held in readi- 
ness. "He also inquired if it would not be 
good policy to combine the four departments 
at the West — Roskckans', Steele's, Banks'. 
and his own — under one commander," of 
which he, by his rank, would have the com- 
mand. 

This gives an idea of the wav he was bending 
his own and would have bent all other ener- 
gies in the west to the Vicksburg operation. 
This suggestion \vas not accepted at the time, 
save to place Steele's (the Arkansas) depart- 
ment under his control. 

Our system of separate departments, with- 
out concert or co-operation, and Hallkck's 
ingenious management from W\'ishington, 
were so successful in alternating our several 
operations in the West that we gave up what 



we had gained in one flepartment when we 
were to make an effort in another. Gen. 
Grant's withdrawal fronV North Mississip{)i 
and West Tennessee, and from the whole in- 
terior, to plant his army in the Vicksburg 
swamps, carried this see-sawing practice to 
perfection. 

Rosecraxs had had a bloody battle at Miir- 
freesboro December 31, 18(ii',and was organizing 
for his great Chattanooga campaign. And now 
Va.\ Dorn's and IA)rrest's cavalry, set free by 
Grant's withdrawal, made Braog's cavalry 
so superior to that of the Army of the Cum- 
berland that it was hemmed in, and con- 
fined to the supplies which it transported 
from the Noi-th. while the rebel armies drew 
supplies from the greater part of Tennessee, 
and from all Northern Mississippi and Ala- 
bama, which might have fed our armies in- 
stead of the Confederate. And now. Gen. 
Grant's army being deeply ])lanted in the 
bottomless region west of the Mississippi for 
an indefinite period, the Confederate forces, 
on their secure interior line, could move 
from one of our departments to the other 
wherever required. 

This is the way the Confederate <^ienerats, 
with not half so many men in arms, hap- 
pened to match our numbers so well at the 
point of action. This is one of the parts of 
management which made the war last four 
years, cost $7,000,000,000, and call to arms at 
one time 1,200,000 men. 

What Stanton and Halleck could do in 
supporting a Commanding General in a cam- 
paign, when they tried, may be measured by 
tueir furnishing fortius river expedition, to 
take a single place. 1150,000 men, a transport 
fleet, a gunboat fleet, supplies of every sort 
in profusion, and a constant reserve and 
stream of re-enforcements to feed the dread- 
ful waste from disease in the Mississippi 
swaTups. 

What Stanton aTul Halleck could with- 
hold from the support of an army in a true 
campaign, when they tried, uuiy be measureil 
by their treatment of Rosecrans during the 
same period. They higgled over the cost of 
his requisition for saddles to mount 5,000 of 
his infantry; they called his request for re- 
peating arms for the flank companies a fanci- 
ful innovation; they treated his plan to.have 
a njounted force superior to the enemy, so 
that he might draw supplies from the coun- 
try instead of tlun', as an excuse for delay; 



20 



they gave no heed to the conditions and pos- 
sibilities of supplies; ihey assumed to know 
more of his situation than he could know on 
the ground. 

They managed so as to withhold from him 
the co-operation of Burnside in East Ten- 
nessee. Stanton, with an oath, refused him 
another man. They peremptorily ordered 
him to go forward with less than 65,000 men, 
on a campaign with a longer line of commu- 
nication than that for which Grant had 
abandoned an interior campaign because he 
declared it impossible. This down the interior 
where the Confederate forces from east and 
west could concentrate upon him. Thus did 
folly at Washington co-operate with divided 
commands and lack of concert in the field, to 
expand the war. 



CHAPTER IX. 

changing the bed of the MISSISSIPPI RIVER. 

Gen. Grant descended upon Vicksburg 
with several diverse plans. It was an applica- 
tion to military operations of the universal 
law of chances, which was discovered by the 
scientific philosopher. Buckle, by which, out 
of many, some one is likely to have a differ- 
ent fortune. They may be classified under 
three heads: First, plans to turn the course 
of the Mississippi River away from Vicksburg; 
■second, plans on the east side to get to 
the Yazoo with gunboats for an operation 
from the interior toward the rear of Vicks- 
burg; third, plans on the west side to find an 
interior route to get away from Vicksburg. 

The first plan to which he applied his ener- 
gies was to turn the Mississippi by a cut 
across the tongue of land opposite Vicksburg. 
As the object of the expedition was to open 
the Mississippr, and as Vickburg was the ob- 
struction, then, if the river could be induced 
to take a short cut away from Vicksburg, it 
would be opened, and, to use Lincoln's poetic 
phrase, "the father of waters would fiow un- 
vexed to the sea." Thus, by a singular turn 
of events, had Grant's great military cam- 
paign become converted to the work of chang- 
ing the bed of Ihe Mississippi. 

It has been mentioned that the river makes 
a short bend to northeast, and runs five miles 
to tlie Vicksburg bluff, and then turns still 
shorter and runs back southwest, leaving a 



tongue of land which for five miles is little 
more than two miles wide. This seems an 
eccentric course in so great a river, in a dead 
level country, in which it can go where it 
pleases. Reasoning that the Mississippi is 
amenable to economical considerations, and 
would prefer the shorter way, it was thought 
that if it were led by a starter in the way of a 
canal, it would take this course, and wash out 
the rest for itself. And it appears that in all 
these great projects Grant was his own engi- 
neer, and the engineer corps had only to do 
the details. 

Accordingly the soldier.s were set at work 
grubbing and digging this canal, the several 
brigades furnishing details for each day. 
Great trees had to be grubbed out, and the 
canal protected by levees, as the river was 
higher than the land. Badeau relates that 
this "plan of turning a mighty river from its 
course" attracted the attention of the civilized 
world; "that the rebels loudly predicted 
failure, and the gibes of those who opposed 
the war at the North were incessant. .Still 
Grant toiled on. Four thousand soldiers 
.were constantly euiployeilon the work, besides 
negroes, who were coin)iii ratively of little use." 

The scientific mind has not settled the ques- 
tion why rivers run crookedly. The Missis- 
sippi, running through the most level region 
in tlie world, all of which seems its own delta, 
is the crookedest river. There is nothing to 
hinder its running straight but its own self- 
contained forces. Indeed its banks, made by 
itself, are higher than the bottom beyond 
them, and as it annually flows over its banks, 
it has all the surface temptations to run away; 
but it retires each season within the .same 
banks. 

The Mississippi is not only like a snake in 
its sinuous course, but in shape, being biggest 
in the middle. Further south its side drains 
reach the gulf, and the river grows less. 
Along Vicksburg it rolls 120 to 1-30 feet in 
depth. In a depth of 120 feet below the bot- 
tom of Grant's canal it was rushing along at 
the speed of five or six miles an hour. To 
dam the Nile with bulrushes was a feeble 
figure for this project. "Still Grant toiled 
on," or the 4,000 soldiers did, and the rebels 
mocked. 

But Badeau vindicates Grant's sagacity by 
this: "On the 4th of February he reported 
to Halleck that he had lost all faith in the 
practicability of the scheme. Tlu; canal, he 



— 21 — 



said, is at right angles with the thread of the 
current at hoth ends, and both ends are in an 
eddy — the lower coming out under bluffs 
completely commanding it. Warrenton, a 
few miles below, is capable of as strong de- 
fense as Vicksburg, and the enemy seeing us 
at work here, have turned their attention to 
that point." In -so short a time, and after 
the work of only 4,000 soldiers, had Grant's 
far reaching mind perceived that the inlet to 
the canal was at an eddy, where the river ran 
upstream; likewise the outlet, and that the 
outlet ran against the same bluff whose can- 
non vexed the father of waters at Vicksburg. 
"Still Grant toiled on," still the details of 
4,000 soldiers were sent every day to this 
exhilarating labor. The country had formed 
great expectations from tlie canal. To abandon 
it would give an impression of failure. Thus 
were our generals burdened with the neces- 
sity to satisfy public opinion in their rear. A 
wing was cut to a point higher up the river, 
to reach the current. The batteries opposite 
the outlet were ignored as a thing which it 
would be time enough to think about when 
the river had taken its destined bed. Dredges 
Avere procured, and deeper work was laid out, 
besides the long wing. And so the work 
went on after Grant had vindicated his sagac- 
ity by pronouncing it useless as an attempt 
to divert the river, and that if diverted it 
would still be obstructed by the luutf bat- 
teries. Says Badeau: 

The troops who were engaged for two months on 
the canal were encamped immediately on its west 
bank, and protected from possible inundation by a 
levee; but the continued rise in the river made a 
large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the 
water out of the camps and canal. 

Thus while they were digging to divert the 
river from its bed, they had to dam, to keep 
their heads above water: 

The work was tedious and difficult, and seemed 
interminable; ami toward the last it became also 
daniierous; for the enemy threw shells all over the 
peninsula, and as Grant had predicted, erected bat- 
teries which commanded the lower end of the 
canal. 

Badeau invariably makes the failure of 
Grant'.** plans praise his military sagacity by 
its fulfilling his prediction. Yet the canal 
was on the ragged edge of sticccss, and soon 



the Mississippi would have had a chance to 
cut across and strike the new batteries on tlie 
bluff, when an untoward event spoiled all: 

But at last there seemed some prospect of success; 
the dredgeboats worked to a charm; the laborers 
reached a sufficient depth in the soil; the wing was 
ready to connect with the main artery, and the 
undertaking was apparently all but completed; 
when, on the 8th of March, an additional and rapid 
rise in the river, and the consequent increase of 
pressure, caused the dam near the upper end of the 
canal to give way, and every attempt to keep the 
rush of water out proved abortive. 

The torrent thus admitted struggled for a while 
with the obstacles that sought to stay its course, 
but finally, instead of coming out below, broke the 
levee of the canal liself, and spread rapidly across 
the peninsula, overwhelming every barrier, and 
separating the northern and southern shores as 
effectually as if the Mississippi itself flowed be- 
tween them. It swept far and wide into the in- 
terior, submer-ing the camps, and spreading into 
the bayous, even to the Tensas and Lower Red. 
The troops were obliged to flee for their liv<s, 
horses were drowned, implements were broken and 
borne away by the current, and all the labor of 
many week.s was lost. 

Thus the river, which was to be tempted by 
a chance to shorten its course, rushed out as 
if it had no regard for space. "Attempts 
were made to repair the damages, but on the 
27th of March Grant reported that all work 
except repairing the crevasses in the canal 
levee had been stispended for several days, 
the enemy havingdriven the dredges entirely 
out." "As he had foretold, the batteries 
erected on the hills below Vicksburg com- 
pletely enfiladed the canal." Thus was his 
military prescience proved by the failure oi 
his plan. 

Although the plan of changing the river to 
this canal was not given up, yet while other 
projects were going forward work on it was 
resumed, upon the moderated plan of making 
it navigable for shallow craft to carry stores, 
for some yet inchoate purpose. Much labor 
was expended on it in establishing its levees, 
to recover the peninsula and the whole region 
from the river's overHow, and in removing 
the river's deposit. 

But the river kept obstinately on its course, 
its mighty, rushing volume, 120 feet below, 
seemingly unconscious of this surface tempta- 
tion. When the river was high it drowned 
the canal; when it fell the canal fell too; 
so it was never used. But Badeau says it did 
good in furnishing occupation for the volun- 



— 22 — 



teers. And now Gen. Grant's fertility in 
military resources was spread out in other 
plans. 



CHAPTER X. 

THK LAKE PROVIDENCE ROUTE FOR DIVERTING; 
THE MISSISSIPPI AND THE ARMY — THE YAZOO 
J'ASS ROUTE — ESCAPE OF THE ARMY FROM A 
TRAP. 

Altiiough Gen. Grant prosecuted the iin- 
dertiiking to change the bed of the Mississippi 
River with great energy and hiborof the sol- 
diers, and was at first sanguine of making ''the 
father of waters flow unvexed to tlie sea," 
leaving Vicksburg, like Babylon, a monument 
of retribution, yet he did not trust all to 
this. At the same time, with McPherson's 
corps, he was prosecuting the Lake Providence 
]>lan. This plan comes under the third head 
— viz.: plans to get away from Vicksburg, 
and go somewhere. 

Lake Providence is a crescent shapeil lake, 
perhaps part of the former bed of the river, 
six miles long, a mile west of the river, forty 
miles above Vicksburg by an air line, and 
twice or thrice as far by the river. The plan 
was to cut a canal from the river to this lake. 
P>om the lake there was a partly defined 
cliannel called Bayou Baxter, running 
through a cypress swamp to Bayou Macon, 
one of a labyrinth of bayous. In its souther- 
ly course Bayou Macon, opposite Vicksburg, 
is forty miles from the river; about forty 
miles further south — or three or four times as 
far as by the course of the bayou — it joins the 
Tensas Bayou or river. All these bayous 
are rivers, and all the rivers bayous, 
flitferingouly in size. The Tensas reaches the 
Washita about west of Natchez, and the 
Washita the Red River, and thus the Lake 
Providence route in a wonderfully tortuous 
course of 400 to 600 miles would reach the 
Mississippi about 200 miles below Vicksburg. 
The object of this circumnavigation is 
stated by Badeau: "Through these various 
channels it was thought possible to open a 
route by which transports of light draught 
might reach the Mississippi again below, and 
thus enable Grant to re-enforce Banks (then 
either on the Red River or the Atchafalaya) 
and to co-operate with him against Port Hud- 
.son." This was to give up Vicksburg till a 
more convenient season. This idea came 



alone from Grant's active mind. There was 
no desire at Washington that he should 
abandon Vicksburg to go and re-enforce 
Banks, "then on either the Red River or the 
Atchafalaya" or somewhere. And if Banks 
was to be re-enforced it would be more 
natural to do it by way of the gulf than by 
this tortuous route and by abandoning the 
Vicksburg enterprise. 

This route would be, by the course of the 
bayous, from 400 to 600 miles througii tlie 
enemy's country, and through the greater 
mirt these bayous could be quickly shut in by 
felling across them the gigantic trees that 
grew along theirbanks. To this route for a 
line of supplies had Grant come to avoid tlie 
difficulty of guarding aline on the Mississippi 
Central Railroad; and the objective was to go 
in search of Gen. Banks, who was somewhere. 
But here again Grant's proverbial hick inter- 
posed and .saved from involving troops or 
supplies ii; this net. The nature of the under- 
taking, and the result, its great objectin keep- 
ing the volunteers employed and working oH' 
their excessive spirit, and its demonstrating 
Grant's fertility in military resouVce, are so 
well narrated by Badeau that to comment on 
it would be to paint the lily: 

The levee was cut. and a canal opened between 
the river and the lake, through which the water 
passed rapidly; but peculiar dilKcullies were en- 
countered in clearing Bayou Baxler of the over- 
hanging forests and fallen timber with which it 
was obstructed. The lancl from Lake Providence 
and also from Bavou Macon recedes until the 
lowest Interval between the two widens out into a 
cypress swamp, where Bayou Baxter is lost. This 
flat was filled with water to the depth of several 
feet; and tlie work of removing tlie timber thai 
choked the baym for a distance of twelve or fifteen 
miles was in consequence exceedingly ditlifult and 
slow; but, if this could have heen accomplished, 
the channel, in high water, would have been cun- 
tinuous, although intricate and circuitous to a 
remarkable degree. 

So McPherson's corps was engaged in the under- 
taking for many weeks. The impossibility of ob- 
taining the requi.site number of liaht draught 
steamers, however, would have rendered this route 
useless, even had it been thoroughly opened. But 
no steamer ever passed through the tortuoiJis chnn 
nel, which served only to employ the superfluuus 
troops, and to aemonstrate the fertility and variety 
of devices developed during this anomalous cam- 
paign. 

Thus the impossibility of using tlie route if 
it could have heen opened reconciled Grant to 



the impossibility of oponin;^ it, and otn:\i alike 
ilistingiiislied tluit fertility in resources 
whieli made this campaign "anomalous." 

Besides, "the project excited attention and 
speculation," and many thought that it 
would divert the Mississippi to this route, 
and then by way of the Atchafalaya into the 
uulf, leaving Yicksburg and ail the lower 
river towns. But Badeau says that Grant 
did not enter into this expectation, "He be- 
lieved that Vicksburg was only to be won by 
hard tighting," and meanwhile he was 
"simply affording occupation for his men." 

!So this route was given up, after all the 
practicable occupation for the men had been 
got out of it, "at about the same time that 
all hope of effecting anything by the canal 
was abandoned." But during this time 
Grant's remarkable fertility in resource had 
been directing another undertaking, by way 
of Ya^coo Pass. 

This plan comes under the second head, viz.: 
plans to get into the interior east of Vicks- 
burg. Yazoo Pass is six miles below Helena, 
Ai-k., on tlie east side of the Mississippi, 160 
miles above Vicksburg in a direct line, and 
twice or thrice as far by the river. It was a 
narrow and tortuous bayou that once ran 
from the river to Moon Lake — a crescent 
shaped lake, perliaps once the river bed — 
thence eastward to ('oldwater River or bayou, 
thence southward to the Tallahatchie, which 
in a crooked ('ourse of about 100 miles unites 
with the Yallabusha at Greenwood to torm 
the Yazoo — an exceedingly tortuous river or 
bayou. Greenwood is near 100 miles above 
N'icksburg in a line, and more than 200 by 
the course of the Yazoo. Yazoo Pass had 
long been closed at the Mississippi by a levee. 

In all the Yazoo operations the enemy had 
an immense advantage in the free naviga- 
tion of the Yazoo River above Haines' Bluff, 
and in a large fleet of steamboats which had 
taken refuge there. With these they could 
carry troops up the Yazoo, Tallahatchie, and 
('oldwater to place obstructions against 
(S rant's expedition. The levee was cut on 
the 2d of February, and tiie rush of water 
made an opening for steamboats into Moon 
Lake. But the impenitent "rebels had be- 
gun to make obstructions lower down by fell- 
ing huge trees into the i)ass." "A single one 
of these barricades was a mile and a quarter in 
length, and composed of no fewer than eighty 
trees reaching completely across the stream." 



Worse than this, of the various trees, nearly 
all were of wood that would not Hoat. 

Consequently "the removal was a tedious 
task. Many of the trees, weighing at the 
least twenty tons, had to be hauled out upon 
the shore by strong cables." This served the 
great object of "occupation for the superflu- 
ous men." Besides, the crevasse "submerged 
the entire country, exce])t a very narrow 
strip of land near the sliore. The men, in 
parties of 500, were thus obliged to work in 
the water, as well as during almost incessant 
rains." But by this kind of labor the barriers 
were at last removed, "and a heavy growth of 
overhanging timber cut away, and the dis- 
tance from Moon Lake to the Coldwater was 
finally cleared." Bitt while thus occupied 
above, "the enemy had gained time to se- 
curely fortify below." 

On the 15th of February the way to the 
Tallaliatchie was declared practicable, and 
Gen. Ross, with 4,500 men, was ordered to 
move in. "He embarked in twenty-two 
light transports, preceded by two ironclad 
gunboats, and a mosquito fleet, as the liglit 
armored craft suitable for this navigation 
were called." There was some delay in get- 
ting light transports, but the expedition en- 
tered the pass February 24, and reached the 
Coldwater, twenty-five miles from the Mis- 
sissippi, March 2. The Coldwater is of the 
same bayou character, and runs through a 
dense wilderness; the Tallahatchie is a simi- 
lar stream, but larger. The exjiedition ])ro- 
ceeding cautiously, through an almost un- 
broken forest, reached the Lower Tallahatchie 
March 10. 

And now, saj's Badeau: "Grant deter- 
mined to prosecute liis entire camj)aign, if 
possible, irt this direction. The idea was to 
reach the Yazoo, above Haines' Bluff, with 
liis whole army. The distance from Milli- 
ken's Bend would have been nearly 900 
miles." And half of this would be bj' nar- 
row, tortuous bayous, and rivers, through an 
enemy\s country, susceptible to all sorts of 
obstructions and defenses. Quinby's division 
was ordered in to support Ross; then Mc- 
Pherson's whole corps, and a ilivision from 
IVfemphis, as fast as transjiortation could be 
procured. 

And now again did Grant's proverbial luck 
interpose to save liim from sending his wJiole 
army into this trap. Great difficulty was 
found in getting liglit draught and short 



— 24 — 



steamboats for these narrow and crooked 
streams, and the great bulk of the troops was 
detained at Helena. Meanwhile Ross' flotilla 
had reached the junction of the Tallahatchie 
vvitli the Yallabusha, wliich forms the Yazoo at 
(jreenwood. Here the Confederates had made 
a battery called Fort Pemberton. which the 
gunboats e^igaged on the 11th of March, and 
again on the 13th, aided by a battery on 
.shore, without success. The country was all 
under water, save narrow strips along the 
rivers; the troops had no way to flank the 
battery; therefore all depended on the ability 
of the gunboats to silence the battery, and 
thus the expedition came to a standstill. 

As the site of the fort was little above the 
water, an effort was made to drown it by cut- 
ting the levee of the Mississippi, 300 miles 
away, at Austin, eighteen miles above Hele- 
na; but this did not work right. The enemy 
were now sending troops up to Greenwood by 
tlieir free navigation of the Yazoo. Batteries 
would be as obstructive in the rear of our ex- 
pedition as in "front. Says Badeau: "In 
order to relieve Ross, who was , now in immi- 
nent danger of being surrounded, isolated as 
he was, away off in this tangled network of 
forest and bayou, Grant devised still another 
scheme." 

Thus, like a chapter of a serial novel, this 
chapter ends, leaving the Yazoo Pass expedi- 
tion in a crisis on the Tallahatcliie, and keep- 
ing the reader in suspense until the next 
chapter. Grant, in order to relieve this expe- 
dition, shall devise another, which in its turn 
shall need rescue. 



CHAPTER XT. 

TUK Steele's bayou plan — the relieving ex- 
pedition RELIEVED. 

Gen. Grant's next plan comes also under 
the second head — viz., plans to get by way of 
the Yazoo into the fnierior to operate on the 
rear of Yicksburg. It liad also the present ob- 
ject of making a diversion to relieve the Yazoo 
Pass expedition, now in danger of being 
surrounded on the Tallahatchie. The plan 
was to go to the Yazoo "Along anotlier of 
those labyrinthine routes that leaves the 
Yazoo River below Haines' Bluff, and after 
innumerable windings re-enters the same 
stream sixty miles above that point." 



Porter, with five ironclads and fouj" moi'- 
tar boats, and Sherman with his division, 
composed the expedition. This preparation 
indicates the high expectation. Steele's 
Bayou, running south, enters the Yazoo five 
miles from its mouth. The route was up the 
Yazoo to Steele's Bayou, up that to Black 
Bayou, east by that across to Deer Creek 
Bayou, up that to Rolling Fork Bayou, which 
diverges to a soutlicast direction and runs 
across to Big Sunflower Bayou, down the Big 
Sunflower to its confluence with the Yazoo, 
the route being about 150 miles. 

As McPherson had' failed to get transports 
for his corps for tlie Yazoo Pass expedition. 
Grant now ordered him down to be ready to 
follow Sherman. 

"The drift timber soon began to obstruct 
the channel, and the gunboats got entangled, 
but nevertheless forced their way through. 
The turns were so short that the Admiral was 
obliged to heave his vessels around the bends, 
not having a foot to spare. It took him 
twenty-four hours to advance four miles." 

Sherman's division was to land at necessary 
points to clear out the obstructions, and the 
gunboats got far ahead. Porter had passed 
through Black Bayou with much diffi- 
culty, and liad requested Sherman to clear it 
out, he working his way on in Deer Creek. 
During the 19th of March Sherman, at Hill's 
plantation, on Black Bavou, heard frequent 
guns of the navy, and that night a negro 
In'ought him a message from Porter, written 
on tissue paper, which the man had hid in a 
piece of tobacco, saj'ing that Porter had met 
infantrj' and artillery, which shot his men 
when they expo.sed themselves outside the 
armor to shove off the bows of the boats, on 
which he could not get steerage way. He be- 
sought Sherman to come to the rescue. 

This is from Sherman's graphic narrative. 
He had with him at Hill's plantation Giles 
A. Smith and 8U0 men. He ordered these to 
start up Deer Creek nextmorning. At the same 
time he went down Black Bayou in a canoe 
till he came luckily to the steamboat Silver 
Wave, just come up full of men. Taking some 
of the working parties into a coal barge, towed 
by a navy tug, he i^roceeded, followed by the 
Silver Wave. The night was dark, and they 
went "crashing through trees, carrying away 
pilot house, smokestacks, and everything 
above deck." but could only make two and a 
half of the four miles. We then disembarked 



25 — 



iuul inarclictl through thecaiiebrake, carrying 
lighted candles in oiir hands, till we got into 
the open fields at Hill's plantation, where 
we lay down for a few hours' rest." 

Hhkkm.vn's narrative so well illustrates this 
"anomalous campaign" that it is continued 
verbatim: 

On Sunday ninrning, March 21,iissoon as day- 
light appeared, "we started, following the same 
route which Giles A. Smith had taken the day be- 
fore, the battalion of the 13th United States Regu- 
lars in the lead. We could hear Porter's guns, and 
knew that moments were precious. Being on foot 
myself, no man could complain, and we generally 
went at the double quick, with occasional rests. 
The road lay along Deer Creek, passing several 
plantations, and occasionally, at the bends, it 
crossea the swamps, where the water came above 
my hips. The smaller drummer boys had to carry 
their drums on their heads, and most of the men 
slung their cartridge boxes around their necks. 

The soldiers generally were glad to have their 
general and field oflicers afoot, but we gave them a 
fair specimen of marching, accomplishing about 
twenty miles by noon. Of course our speed was ac- 
celerated by the sounds of the navy gunSj which 
became more and more distinct, though we could 
see nothing. At a plantation near some Indian 
mounds we met a detachment of the Sth Missouri, 
that had been up to the fleet, and had been sent 
down as a picket to prevent any obstruct'ions Delow. 
This picket reported that Admiral Porter had found 
Deer- Creek badly obstructed, and turned back: 
that there was a rebel force beyf>.nd the fleet, with 
some six pounders, and nothing between us and 
the fleet. 

So I sat down on the doorsill of a cabin to rest, 
but had not been seated ten minutes when in the 
woods just ahead, not 300 yards oft", 1 heard quicK 
and rapid firing of musketry. Jumping up I ran 
up the road, and found Lieut. Col. Rice, who saia 
that the head of his column had struck a small 
force of rebels with a working gang of negroes, who 
on the first fire had broken and run back into the 
swamp. I ordered Rice to deploy his brigade, his 
left on the road, and extending as far into the 
swamp as the ground would permit, and then to 
sweep forward until he uncovered the gunboats. 
The movement was rapid and well executed, and 
we soon came to some large cotton fields, and 
couid see our gunboats in Deer Creek, occasionally 
firing a heavy eight inch gun across the cotton field 
into the swamp beyond. 

About that time a Major Reiley, of the Sth Mis- 
souri, galloped down the road on a horse he had 
picked up the night before, and met me. He ex- 
plained the situation of affairs, and offered me his 
horse. I got on, bareback, and rode up the levee, 
the sailors coming out of their ironclads and cheer- 
ing most vociferously as I rode by, nnd as our men 
swept forward across the cotton field in full view. 
I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on the deck 



of one of his ironclads, with a shield made of a sec- 
tion of smokestack, and I doubt if he was ever 
more glad to meet a friend than he was to see me. 
He explained that he had almost reached the Roll- 
ing Fork when the woods became full of sharp- 
shooters, who, taking advantage of trees, stumps, 
and the levee, would shoot down every man that 
poked his nose outside the protection of their 
armor; so that he could not liandle his clumsy 
boats in the narrow channel. 

The rebels had evidently dispatched a force from 
Haines' Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling 
Fork;. had anticipated the movement of Admiral 
Porter's fleet, and had completely obstructed the 
channel of the upper part of Deer Creek Ijy felling 
trees into it, so that further progress in that direc- 
tion was simply impossible. It also happened that 
at the instant of my arrival a party of about 400 
rebels, armed and supplied with axes, had passed 
around the fleet and got below it, intending in 
like manner to block up the channel by the felling 
of trees, so as to cut oft" retreat. " '■'■' I inquired 

of Admiral Porter what he proposed to do, and he 
said he wanted to get out of that scrape as quickly 
as possible. * * " 

He informed me that at one time things looked 
so critical that he had made up his mind to blow 
up tiie gunboats and escape with his men through 
the swamp to the Mississippi River. ■•■ '■= " It 
took three days to back out of Deer Creek in Black 
Bayou, at Hill's plantation. '■'■ I reported the 

facts to Gen. Grant, who was sadly disapjjointed at 
the failure of the fleet to get through to the Yazoo 
above Haines' Bluft', and ordered us all to resume 
our camps at Young's Point. 

The Confederates made poor use of their 
opportunity. The felling of half a dozen 
trees ahead was enongli to detain Porter's 
squadron for their further operations. If 
instead of amusing themselves for twenty- 
four hours in popping with sharp-shooters 
behind trees and the levee at the heads of 
Porter's men whenever one was thrust out, 
they had first taken a score of negroes to the 
rear, and felled a dozen trees, they would 
have had that squadron trapped. And here 
the few families on the plantalions were a 
shield to Gen. Sherm.\n's troops; for, but for 
them, the reprehensible Confederates would 
have cut the levee, which would have let 
from six to eight feet of water upon them. 
But there was a blind goddess, called Fortune, 
watching over Grant in all these perilous 
undertakings. 

Thus did the liberating expedition narrowly 
liberate itself. Meanwhile Ross and Quimby 
liad gotten out of Yazoo Pass, and the army 
was restored to its former amphibious camps. 

Yet there was a large slice of satisfaction 



— 26 



in this failure, for it illustrated what might 
have been had Grant involved his whole 
army in the laliyrinth of the Yazoo Pass 
route, or in the Lake Providence route, in 
which was as much as 200 miles of this nar- 
row, tortuous, and easily trapped navigation. 
Tims did the narrow escapes of Grant's army 
from his own various plans exemplify his 
provcrhial luck. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE PROCESS OF II.\RI>ENIN<; THE SOLItllCRS — THE 
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST — THE SWAMP 
ANGELS — THE PL\X TO (JET AWAY FROM 
VICKSBURG. 

This historical review follows chiefly B.\- 
HEAx's Military Life of Gen. Grant. This is 
not so much for the reason that it is accurate, 
truthful, or complete; nor that it does not 
withhold facts that enlighten, and suggest 
things that darken; but because it is sufticient 
for a view of the campaign; because it gives 
Gen. Grant's inward thoughts and back- 
reaching afterthoughts; because Bapeau sees 
so fervently Grant's great military genius, 
that he discerns in present failures the work- 
ing of ultimate success; because even the 
line of argument which, runs through his 
book involuntarily gives away information; 
finally, because the book is authentic, in that 
it was revised by Gen. Grant, and is the 
same as his own. In our much quoting from 
Badeau it may be received that when signs of 
quotation are used, the text is from Badeau 
unless otherwise signified. 

Badeau st.ys, with admirable cai;dor, that 
all of Grant's plans and expeditions had thus 
far been abortive in direct results, but he 
y)oints out how these failures proved Grant's 
variety of resources, and prepared for ulti- 
mate success; and he says: 

These various attempts and expeditions on both 
sides of the Mississipj^i, although unsuccessful in 
their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial 
resuHs. The national forces, so constantly em- 
ployed, became hardened by exposure, and of course 
improved in spirits and health ; they obtained also 
a thorougli knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of 
the country in which they were operating, and were 
thus better able to encotniter those ditticulties. 

The volunteers were from all sni;ts of occu- 
pations — mechanics, skilled artisans, profes- 



sional men, students, clerks, railroad men, 
journalists, farmers' sons, and so on. Most 
of them, although accustomed to active lives, 
and standing pluckily the soldier's marching, 
bivouacking, fighting, and other work of 
the soldier, had not been trained in the heav- 
iest labor. Comparatively few of the class 
which does the heavy unskilled laborenlisted. 
Consequently the most of the volunteers 
needed to be "hardened by the exposure'' of 
working in the water in the' swamps and 
bayous to pull out sunken trees by main 
strength, and of digging canals in the swampy 
ground, and otlier like serious labors, besides 
living in camp in swampy and sometimes 
siibmerged ground. Through this they be- 
came "of course improved in spirits," in the 
same manner as Mark Tapley was in joUitj' 
by the circumstances of the American Eden, 
And the "thorough knowledge which the}' 
obtained of the peculiar difficulties of the 
country in which the}' were operating," led 
their minds from its bottomless depths uj)- 
ward to revere the great military genius 
which had brought them to that region, and 
rejoiced them to get away. 

Nature's great law of elevation by the sur- 
vival of* the fittest was working the jtrejiara- 
tion of that army for its futuje triumphs. 
The individual who goes down among 'the 
unfit is unable to see the benignity of tliis 
law, which . all know to be wise in gen- 
eral. The volunteers who passed through that 
beneficial ordeal had gratifying testim'ony 
in the multitude of graves of their former 
comrades rising around them — now a great 
host of swamp angels — that they who still 
lived were of nature's elect. Said Gen. Wm. 
E. Strong, himself of that army — the Army 
of the Tennessee — in paying a tribute to its 
elect qualities, in his address at the dedica- 
tion of the statue to Gen. McPherson at 
Clyde, July 22, 18S1: 

It was composed of meu whose bodies were so 
inured to hanlships thai di.-i ase could make no im- 
pression upon thuni. Kach num represented tive 
others who ha<l started with him: the five had 
succumbed to disease, or to the bullets of the ene- 
my; four out of the five were under the sod that 
was to be made free soil by their exertions and the 
exertions of their comrades; the fifth was at home, 
discharged from the service by reason of disability, 
broken in health, for life, or with a leg or an arm 
gone. The sixth man, to wliotn no swamp could 
give a fever, to whom wet clothes for a week could 
not give the rheumatism, to whom no march, how- 



'Zi 



ever long, ■\vas a hardship — this culled and selected 
sixth man was there, robust, healthful, the ruddy 
plow of health coursiug through every thousandth 
jiart of a square inch of his body, and visil)le 
through ove?y pore of the skin, the jiatent seal and 
superscrivition of -the Almighty that ho was the 
genuine coin of the realm. 

This was nature's supreme law of the sur- 
vival of the llttcst, in its most suuunary 
workini^. ^ 

But Ijadkau is an historian of varied re- 
sources. When he comes to sum up the re- 
sults of the campaign, and to compare it with 
]5ox.\1'Arte's about Uliu, much to Bonaparte's 
inferiority, he states among other advantages 
which Bonaparte had over Grant: "Instead 
of moving fresh from a camp like that of 
Boulogne, the Army of the Tennessee liad 
spent months amid the swamps and fevers of 
the Mississippi.". 

But the multitude is alwaj^s devoid of 
reason. The populace is incapable of under- 
standing any military operations save by re- 
sults. The popular mind must be fed by 
liattles; it can not appreciate the swamp 
method of sifting and hardening an army. 
(,'onscquently there was great discontent in 
tlie people, which found so much expression 
as to vawaken the administration. Badeau 
says: 

'J"he country, meanwhile, and the government 
liad become very impatient. Clamors were raised 
everywhere against Grant's slowness; the old 
rumors about his personal character were revived 
[for character read habits] ; his soldiers were said to 
be dying of swamp fevers and dysentery in the 
morasses around Vicksburis; he was pronounced ut- 
terly destitute of genius or energy; his repeatedly 
ballled schemes declared to emanate from a brain 
unfitted for such trials; his persistency was dogged 
obstinacy, his patience sluggish dullness. 

The people's feeling was the most stirred by 
the accounts of the consuming of the volun- 
teers by tlie diseases incident to their swamp 
camps and labors. Although volunteers have 
Jiigher spirit than regulars, and go to their 
death with more alacrity, yet they have 
faults, the chief of which is that they are in- 
telligent, and can not be reduced to the qual- 
ity of the unthinking machine, which, in 
our regular army, is the first requisite for a 
soldier. And each one has a lot of kinsfolk 
at home, who look upon his life as precious. 
Possessed of tlie invention of reading and 
writing, which has brought so much evil into 
the world, he writes home his experiences, 



and these circulate from tongue to tongue. 
In this way the sickness, death, and hard- 
ships of Grant's troops, and his abortive 
plans, were spread among the people. 

The newspaper war correspondents, al- 
though frowned tipon in that campaign, 
could not be wholly extinguished, and they 
helped the evil news to spread. Thus does 
a republican government seem incompatible 
with regitlar army operations; because that 
wliich is called the spread of intelligence 
exposes a General to a tire in the rear. Wliile 
his prejiaratory operation is putting the 
ordeal which sifts out the sixth man, the live 
who go down make a noise in the rear, 
Badeau says that "some of Grant's best 
friends failed hiiu at the critical moment." 
He gives in a foot note this sad fall of a 
prominent Illinois politician whose political 
influence had been Grant's main lift and 
stay : 

A Congressman, who had been one of Grant's 
warmest friends, was found wanting at this 
juncture. He went to the President without being 
sent for, and declared that the emergencies of the 
country seemed to demand another commander be- 
fore Vicksburg. To him Mr. Lincoln rcjplied: "I 
rather like the man; 1 think we'll try him a little 
longer." 

Badeau shows that but for this happy- 
go-lucky temper of Lincoln, McCler- 
NAND would have been put in com- 
mand. But in spite of Lincoln's laissez 
faire manner, the feeling of the peo- 
ple did disturb him. Halleck also— than 
whom no regular army man in high rank 
could be content with less military progress — 
became seijsible that some move must be 
made to qifiet the public by seeming to do. 

Halleck wrote Grant April 2d, remarking 
unfavorably on his "division of his forces into 
several eccentric operations," as frittering 
away his strength, besides being dangerous 
in the presence of an enemy. He continued: 

What is most desired (and your attention is again 
called to this object) is that your forces and those 
of Gen. Banks shall be brought in to co-operation as 
early as possible. If he can not get up to co-operate 
with you in Vicksburg, can not you get troops 
down to help him at Port Hudson? ••■ * ■■'■ As the 
President, who seems to be rather impatient about 
matters on the Mississipi)i, has several times asked 
me these questions, I repeat them to you. 

Halleck had written Banks February 2: 
"Gen. Grant's forces have for some time been 



— 28 — 



operating in tlie vicinity of Vicksbnrg, and 
the President expects that you will permit no 
obstacle to prevent you from co-operating 
with him by some movement up the Missis- 
sippi River." The intention was that Banks 
should take Port Hudson. But Banks had 
been obliged to take the offensive, both east 
and west of the river, to prevent his being 
sliut in by the active Gen. Dick Taylor, who 
had a wide range for recruiting west of the 
river and in Texas, to say nothing of Georgia, 
and although succeeding in his operations, 
he had not been able to spare a force for Port 
Hudson. 

But such was now the stress of Ttrant's 
situation and of the administration; under 
the pressure of public opinion, that Halleck 
and Lincoln were anxious to liave Grant 
make a movement that should appear to be 
going forward, even to abandon Vicksburg to 
tlie hereafter, and go where no man could 
tell what was the object, or how the army was 
to be supplied, or how it was going to meet 
the danger of such a wide division in the face 
of the enemy. But to this plan to quiet the 
nation did Halleck now consent, and Grant 
addressed himself to it by inventing a new 
canal and bayou route to get away from 
Vicksburg. The rules of war justify strata- 
gem to deceive the enemy, and they apply 
all the same when the military necessity is to 
satisfy your own people. That this route for 
boats was an impossibility from the begin- 
ning, was not a material point, so long as it 
served the present need of a tliversion to the 
President and the nation. 

During this time Mr. Charles A. Dana, 
then holding the "anomalous" position of 
Assistant Secretary of War, was sent by Secre- 
tary Stanton to view the situation, and re- 
port coniidentially. A view taken at Gen. 
Grant's luxurious headquarters on one of the 
largest river steamers, brightened by the gen- 
erous hospitalities of the staff, and of Grant's 
lirilliant circle of Generals, who received him 
as a long lost brother, proved to his military 
eye that Grant was the right man and in the 
right place. And as McClernand was not of 
tlie circle, the Confidential Secretary of War 
became imbued with the belief that to have a 
"politicalGenerar'in soimportanta command, 
ranking even next to Grant, was "anoma- 
lous." The result of this conviction will ap- 
pear further along. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

the port HUnSON PLAN — A NEW CANAL — 
grant's GENERALS ALL PROTEST — PRODDED 
BY TJIE FIRE IN THE REAR, HE PERSISTS — 
GRANT RESCUED BY HIS PROVERBIAL LUCK. 

Gen. Grant's Port Hudson or Duckport 
Canal plan comes under the third general 
class — viz., plans to getaway from 'Vicksburg. 
It was to cut a canal from the river at Duck- 
port, just above Young's Point, three or four 
miles to a small bayou that came down from 
Milliken's Bend, called Walnut Bayou; this 
bayou, eight or ten miles further down to the 
southeast, looped back in the most eccentric 
course to the northwest to Roundabout Bayou 
— very roundabout — on which is Richmond, 
about thirty miles west of Vicksburg. Bend- 
ing to the southeast, this baj'ou runs into 
Bayou Vidal, which makes a turn to the west. 
By a turn to the northwest the Mississippi 
is right south of this part of Bayou Vidal, 
and on it is New Carthage, to which runs di- 
rectly south a branch of Bayou Vidal, about 
four miles. Bayou Vidal fetches a circuit to 
the west and east and comes to the river at 
Mrs. Perkix*. which, in an air line from 
Duckport, is twenty miles, but by these 
bayous is sixty or more; to New Carthage 
from Duckjiort is about fifty miles. Grant 
wrote Halleck that these bayous were "nav- 
igable for large and small steamers, passing 
around by Richmond to New Carthage. There 
is also a good wagon road passing around by 
Richmond to New Carthage" (from Young's 
Point). "There is also a good wagon road 
from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage." 

These roads followed these bayous, for the 
reason that along their banks the ground was 
the highest, and was a little above water dur- 
ing the Mississippi floods, if the river levees 
held. The term "good" applied to them was 
a bright anticipation. Grant thus told Hal- 
leck his plan : 

The dredge.s are now engaged in cutting a canal 
from here into these bayous. 1 am having all the 
empty coal boats and other barges prepared for 
carrying troops and artillery, and have written to 
Col. Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to 
tow them. With them it would be easy to carry 
supplies to New Carthage and any points south of 
that. 

Badeau says tlie object and reasoiv of this 
route were that Grant now "proposed to send 
an army corps to co-operate with Banks. 



— 29 — 



With this increased force Port Hudson could 
certainly he taken, and then Banks' entire 
army might be combined with Grant's, and 
moving up from below, a co-operative attack 
be made on Vicksburg." 

Grant's plan was to reach the Mississippi 
by this bayou route, at New Carthage; from 
there to take Grand Gulf, twenty-two miles 
below (by the river) by assault; to send from 
there an army corps of 20,000 to Banks to 
operate against Port Hudson, four hundred 
miles below, holding the rest of the army at 
Grand, Gnlf, drawing its su]>plies by this 
bayou route from Milliken's Bend until Port 
Hudson had been taken,, after which the 
army was to be supplied from New Orleans. 
And then "Banks' entire army might be 
combined with Grant's, and moving up from 
below, a co-operative attack be made on 
Vicksburg." 

This was not that Grant had not more men 
than he could use; and not that Banks had 
any to spare, or could come up and join him 
on Vicksburg; for Banks could not do thisj 
without losing Louisiana. The great objective 
was to get out of the Vicksburg predicament 
without revealing to the country the failure. 
The bayou route for this operation could be 
as easily obstructed as the Yazoo Pass and 
Steele's Bayou routes liad been. And the road, 
such as it was, crooked around fifty or sixty 
miles in a hostile country, where the difficul- 
ty of guarding it would make mere play of 
the guarding a line of supplies by the Missis- 
sippi Central Pailroad, which Grant had 
given up as impossible. The whole plan 
depended on getting transports through his 
canal, and as it happened, none ever got 
through. 

Badeau says: 

In order to accomplish tliis movement it was nec- 
essary for Grant to throw his whole force siuiul- 
taueonsly south of Vicucsbupj;, as a siny;le corps 
woiiKl be exposed to the risU of attack from the gar- 
rison, as well as fron» the rebel army in the in- 
terior. 

Therefore the forces were concentrated at 
Milliken's Bend. "Hurlbut (at Memphis) 
was stripped of every nuin that could be 
spared from the rear. Yawls and flatboats 
were collected from St. Louis and Chicago." 

Had this plan been carried forward the 
military situation wou^ld have been complete, 
as follows: 20,000 of Grant's army sent 400 
miles below to Port Hudson, on the chances 



of a siege of that place; the rest of the mova- 
ble army isolated at Grand Gulf, awaiting 
the result and return from Port Hudson, and 
hemmed in by the enemy from Vicksburg 
and the interior, its supplies depending on 
this circuitous route of fifty to eighty miles in 
a country affording every facility for hostile 
incursions and obstructions; Milliken's Bend 
held by a small force exposed to attacks from 
Vicksburg and the West; the river above 
Vicksburg exposed to the lodgments of Con- 
federate forces from the interior, now wholly 
given up to them. And even before this. 
Grant's transports had to be convoyed from 
Memphis. 

When Grant disclosed this remarkable 
plan to his general officers, if caused, as Ba- 
ueau represents, a sort of emeute: 

When the idea became known to those In his in- 
timacy, to his staff', and to his corps commanders, 
it seemed to them full of danger. To move his 
army below Vick.sbnrg was to separate it from the 
North, and from all Us supplies; to throw what^ 
fseemed an insurmountable obstacle between him- 
self and his own base; to cut hiscoramnnications, 
and place his army exactly where it is the whole 
object and aim of wa* to get the enemy. 

Says Badeau:, "Shi.:rman, McPiierson, Lo- 
gan, Wilson, all opposed— all, of course, 
within the limits of soldierly subordination — 
but with all energy," and "strove to divert 
their chief from what they considered this 
fatal error:" 

Even after the orders for the movement had boon 
issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's headquartors, 
and proposed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, 
that the only way to take Vicffsburg was from the 
north, selecting some high ground on the Missis- 
sippi for a» base. Grant replied that such a plan 
would require him to go back to Memphis. "Ex- 
actly so," said Sherman; "that is what I mem.". 

The earnest Sherman went back to his head- 
quarters, and April 8 wrote a letter to Raw- 
lins, Grant's Chief of Staff, setting forth his 
plan. In short, it was to take the main army 
back to Memphis, or other practicable high 
ground, and to the line down the Mississippi 
Central, which he and Grant had abandoned 
on the 8th of December. Gen. Sherman was 
not a man who learned nothing and forgot 
nothing; he had learned more in that swamp 
in three moiiths than had not been taught 
him in four years at West Point. 

Badeau says that Grant read Sherman's 
letter in silence, and made no comment; and 



— 30 — 



he adds as an example of Grant's magnan- 
imity to Sherman, "The letter has never since 
been mentioned between the two com- 
manders." But Grant persisted in the Port 
Hudson plan because "he believed that a 
retrograde movement, even if temporary, 
would be disastrous to the country, which 
was in no temper to endure another reverse; 
he was determined to take no step backward, 
and so declared." He means that the coun- 
try "was in no temper to eiulure" another 
retrograde by Grant, and that it would be 
disastrous to him. The continuance of Gen. 
Grant's career of usefulness to his country 
depended on his seeming to go forward, what- 
ever the fate of his army. Thus did the fire 
in the rear keep him from going back to the 
line which Sherman advised, and tluis did it 
force him into a plan so strange that it 
alarmed all his Generals: 

There was some excuse for these Generals 
for their lack of confidence in a plan which, 
BADEAUsays, went counter to all "established 
principles of military science." Grant had 
not till that time developed his great military 
genius. His affair at Belmont was called a 
l)lundering slaughter witliout any military 
olijcct. His urgency for the Fort Henrj' 
march, suggested by Gen. C. F. Smith, who 
had reconnoitered the place, Avas very credit- 
al)le to his enterprise, but the navy took the 
fort, while Grant's delay to invest it with his 
IS, 000 men allowed the enemy's 2,000 infantry 
to retreat to Fort Donelson. Grant waited at 
Fovt Henry a week before moving to Fort 
D inclson, twelve miles. At Fort Donelson 
he waited for the navy to batter down 
the fort, and, that failing, he reported to 
Halleck his purpose to intrench, antici- 
jKiting "a protracted siege," for he said, "I 
fear the result of an attempt to carry the 
])lace by storm with new troops." He 
was next day unaccountably absent for 
six hours while a furious battle raged. 
And then the fort was taken by Gen. 
C. F. Smith, leading " in person a 
stornnng column of those "new troops," 
for which not Smith but Grant was promoted. 
At the surrender of Fort Donelson, Grant 
had over 30,000 men, and the Confederate 
])ower was broken before him. He left his 
command without notice to Halleck, and 
went off on a convivial time up the Cumber- 
land for a week, on a government chartered 
steamer, during which Hallkck could get 



nothing from him. Halleck reported him 
to Wasiiington, and was authorized to arrest 
him. His explanation was that Grant liad 
returned to his "old habits." He indnced 
Halleck to plead for him, but Halleck sus- 
pended him from command. While thus in 
disgrace Grant was promoted to be Major 
General. Halleck "restored him to com- 
mand just as Smith had ordered Sherman 
to take position at Pittsburs; Landing. Grant 
lost his army at Pittsburg Landing. Hal- 
leck had kept hiiu suspended during the 
Corinth campaign. He had failed in his 
part of tiie concerted movements Avith Rose- 
cran.s on luka. The only victory during his 
command in that department, as Badeau 
says, was this of luka, and that of Corinth, 
which was won by Rosecrans. He had failed 
in the Holly Springs campaign, and had now 
occupied a great army and navy for 
three months in abortive schemes in 
the swamps and bayous. He had been 
kept up thus far by the support of some 
i|Very influential politicians. This was the 
property which distinguished Grant and 
Sherman from those they called "political 
Generals," as well as from the regular officers 
of the army. Therefore, it could not be ex- 
pected that these subordinate Generals would 
receive a plan which set at naught all mili- 
tary science — as Badeai^ proudly claims — with 
that complete submission of military judg- 
ment which his commands carried after his 
military genius had developed. 

There would be little encouragement to 
military heroes to write their own histories if 
they nuiy not take some privileges therein. 
Badeau ingeniously laps the energetic re- 
monstrances of Grant's Generals against his 
Port Hudson scheme, over to the operations in 
the rear of Vicksburg, into which he drifted 
after he had landed at Bruinsburg. In this 
way he carries forward their protests against a 
plan which Grant abandoned, and lodges 
them upon his subsequent successful opera- 
tion, which was quite the reverse of the otiier. 
Thus does he put all of (Grant's lieutenants in 
tlife category of remonstrants against his suc- 
cess. 

This, however, is only a moderate use of the 
privilege of the historian of his own e.xploits. 
No one knew better than Bonaparte the ad- 
vantage of writing his own war bulletins. He 
taught his ]\Larsl/ials that his part was to take 
all the glory of victories; theirs to be content 



-31 — 



to shii'?fe by reflecting his beams. For all 
these Generals to be silent, while placed in 
tlieir coniander's history as protesting against 
his successful plan, wlien the\' had only pro- 
tested against one so eccentric that lie aban- 
doned it. was only due subordination. Gen. 
iSuEU.MAN, who.se temper has been greatly mis- 
understood as iiiipulsive and fierj% whereas 
he is a very Moses for meekness, quietly as- 
sents to this representation of his letter. He 
even corroborates it by a plea that all he 
wi'ote it for was to get Grant to call for the 
opinions of the rest of his corps commanders, 
and thereby expose McCleknand, of whom 
Sherman says he does not believe that he had 
any plan at all. He further corroborates by 
an unqualified indorsement of Badeau's his- 
tory of the Vicksburg campaign, in all of 
which, as in the rest of Badeau's, work, 
SuKKMAN is patronized as a good subordinate 
to Grant, but as needing Grant's directing 
mind. 



CHAPTER XIV. 
a prize offerep for a victory — excuses for 

THE nation's impatience — GLANCE AT OTHER 
rOMMANDEKS — THE FEARFl'L EXPENSES — HIS- 
TORY REPEATS ITSELF. 

During the period of Gen. Grant's Greco- 
Ronum wrestling with the Mississippi swamps 
aiul bayous, Gen. Halleck devised the 
original scheme of breaking the spell of ill 
fortune, which seemed to have settled upon 
our military operations everywhere, by pro- 
claiming an offer of the vacant Major General- 
ship in the regular army to the General in 
the field who first won a victory. 

There could hardly be a more delicate rec- 
ognition of the motives which govern the 
reguhir army man, and of the distinction 
which Gen. Sherman, in liis Mem- 
oirs, has beautitully defined be- 
tween the professional General as one 
who "looked to personal fame and glory" 
alone, while the volunteers — the political 
Generals^look to these as "auxiliary and 
secondary to their political aml)ition." Of 
the commanders in the fiehl, only Gen. 
RosECRANS made response to this liolding up 
of a Major Generalship as a bone to a lot of 
dogs to jump for. But Rosecrans' long civil 
life had spoiled his regular army manners, 
and he was prone' to speak out in a way that 



— speaking idiomatically— cooked his goose. 
He sent tiie following: 

Mi'itFREESBORO, Marcli C, 1803. 

General: Your.s of tlie 1st instant, announcing 
the offer of a vacant Major Generalship in the regu- 
lar army to the General in the field who first wins 
an important and decisive victory, is received. As 
an officer and a citizen, I feel degraded at such 
auctioneering of honors. Have we a General who 
would fight for his own personal benefit when he 
would not for honor and his country? He would 
come by his commission basely in that case, and 
deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are 
all the brave and honorable Generals on an equal- 
ity as to chances? If not, it in unjust to those who 
probably deserve most. 

W. S. Rosecrans, Major General. 
Major General H. W, Halleck, Gommanderin Chief, 

Washington, D. C. 

Of course the vacant ^lajor Generalcy was 
not for Rosecrans, and his getting out of 
comnuind was only a question of time and 
opportunity'. 

Althotigh Gen. Grant's historian describes 
the impatience of the people and tlie govern- 
ment as so imminent that Grant was com- 
pelled to set forth the Port Hudson plan, to 
get awaj' from Vicksburg, in order to prevent 
his removal from command, and relates that 
"Senators and Governors went to Vicksburg 
and then to Washington to ask for his re- 
moval," and that "McClernand and Hunter 
and Fremont and McClellan were spoken of 
as his successors," and that "McClernand's 
machinations at this time came very near 
succeeding," yet he generously makes ex- 
cuse for this impatience. He says: 

Indeed, it is not surprising that the government 
should have urged him on. No substantial victory 
had cheered^the flagging spirits of the North since 
Grant's own successes at Corinth and Inka, of the 
preccaiiig autumn. Banks had achieved no mill 
tary results with his mammoth ex])edition; Burn- 
snle, in December, had suHered the repulse of Fred- 
ericksburg: Rosecrans had not got further tluTU 
Murfreesboro, and the great force of 00,000 or 70,000 
men at Grant's disposal had accomy lished absolutely 
nothing during six long, weary mouths of elfort and 
delay. 

Thus, in apologizing for the popular im- 
patience, does he ingeniously set forth tliat 
no other commander had done any better. 

To say that it luid accomplished absolutely 
notiiing during six months, does not giv^it 
justice. The peculiar property of this line of 
operation was that it placed that great army, 
and all its attachments, where it was as com- 



-^2 



pletely sequestered from all intiuence on 
other military operations; from co-operation 
with any; from holding or defending any 
part of the Confederacy or the North, as if it 
liad been sunk to the bottom of that morass. 
The operations of the Army of the Potomac, 
tiiose of RosECRANS in Middle Tennessee: the 
expedition to East Tennessee; the campaign 
of Banks against an enterprising commander 
in West Louisiana, and all other operations 
from the Potomac to the Indian Territory, 
and round the coast, had not the smallest 
material moral or strategical aid from this 
great army which was digging its graves in 
the swamps west of the Mississippi. 

Banks' ''mammoth expedition" of about 
30,000 men had to hold a large region jigainst 
an active enemy, and the details of garrisons 
reduced his movable force to less than 14,000, 
and with this he had to take the field in an 
acti%'e campaign to defend Louisiana. Rose- 
CRANS, with 43,400 men, had fought a very 
bloody pitched battle with Bragg's army of 
about equal nvimbers. ami was the victor. 
"The great force of 60,000 or 70,000 men at 
Grant's disposal" was stated by Badeaii as 
130,000 a short time previous. This, with the 
gunboat fleet, and the steamboat fleet of 
transports, kept constantly in attendance, 
made this by far the most "mammoth expedi- 
tion" of the time. * 

And the place to which Grant had brought 
this great expedition, in order to meet, as 
Badeau says, and destroy Pemberton's army, 
was so strong that when Grant wrote Hal- 
LECK, March 27, that he had learned that 
there were "not to exceed 10,000 in the city 
(Vicksburg) to-day," he added: "The batteries 
are the same, however, and would cause the 
same difiiculty in landing that would be ex- 
perienced by a heavy force." Thus he granted 
that 10,000 men, with the defenses of the 
place, could keep at bay his great land and 
naval forces. Some hints may be found, even 
in Baheai's history, of the degree to which 
other armies were crippled to feetl this swamp 
maelstrom. 

For example, RosECRANs had to enter on a 
winter campaign in the great interior, with 
nothing on tlie west to prevent concentration 
against him, with but 43,400 fighting men. 
^everal of Halleck's letters to Grant give 
urgent orders not to detain the steamboats, 
"on account of the great entanglement it 
causes the Quartermaster's Department in 



su]i{)lying our AVestern armies." In particu- 
lar the need to have them to transport sup- 
plies to RosECRANS was urged. One of Grant'.s 
answers to this urgency, dated March 29, ex- 
plains that before he came he ordered ISIc- 
Clernand to send back the steamboats, but 
"on my arrival here I found the river rising 
so rapidly that there was no telling at what 
moment all hands might be driven to the 
boats." Thus was the great fleet of chartered 
steamboats kept for ark.s to rescue the army 
if the levees should break. 

As an instance of Mc'Clehnani>'s insubordi- 
nation, Badeau gives two extracts from 
letters of McClernand, at Vicksburg, to 
Grant, at Memphis, adding: "These letters, 
it will be remembered, are addressed by a 
subordinate to his commanding officer." The 
tirst is the following, and the other is of the 
same urgent tenor: 

Great prudence needs to be exercised in detach- 
ing transports from this fleet to return to Meniphi.s, 
as the Mississippi is rising rapidly, and may dehige 
our trooyis at any time. You will at onee perceive 
the great importance of this caution, as it involves 
the very existence of the army here. 

The isolation of Grant's great forces from any 
influence on the war is in part illustrated by 
his letter to Halleck April 4, which has this: 

From information from the South, by way of 
Coriuth, I learn that the enemy in front of Kose- 
crans have been re-enforced from Richmond, 
Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from 
Vicksburg. They have also collected a large cavalry 
force of 20,000 men. All the bridges eastward from 
Savanna (Tenn.) and north from Florence are be- 
ing rapidly repaired. Chalmers is put in com- 
mand of North Mississippi, and is collecting all the 
partisan rangers and loose independent companies 
of cavalry that have been operating in this depart- 
ment. He is now occupying ttie line of the Talla- 
hatchie. This portends preparations to attack Rose- 
crans, and to be able to follow up any success with 
rapidity. Also, to make a simultaneous raid into 
West Tennessee, both from North Mississippi and 
by crossing the Tennessee River. 

The naming of Savanna and Flomice as 
Confederate lines of operations recalls the be- 
ginning of the Halleck-GraJit campaign up 
the Tennessee a year previous. These, to- 
gether with the withdrawal from Northern 
Mississippi and Alabama, in order to open 
the Mississippi River, give some measure of 
Qur progress in recovering territory, which we 
had made our objective. Meanwhile the 
rapid rise of the premfum on gold, which 



reached 72 while Grant was exploring the 
ISIississippi bayous, marked the fall of the 
faith of the money market in the prog- 
ress of restoring the nation, and showed 
at what a discount the government was sell- 
ing its bonds to pay these double expenses of 
a great army and navy aimlessly tied up in a 
morass. 

The observation is profoundly made that 
historj' repeats itself. . Badeau makes it in 
likening Grant's Vicksburg campaign to the 
first Italian campaign of Bonaparte; tlie 
crossing of the Mississippi River under the 
protection of the navy in this being an his- 
torical repetition of Bonaparte's cro.s.sing the 
Apennines, and the movements and victories 
which followed being an equally striking par- 
allel. Hai^leck thought it bore a striking 
parallel to Bonaparte's campaign about Ulm. 
Badeau accepts this, so far as it goes, but 
thinks the addition of the other requisite to 
fulness. 

They who enjoy the projecting of these re- 
peating histories maj'^find in Grant's Vicks- 
burg campaign in 1862-3 a remarkable repeat- 
ing of the history of Gen. McClellan's Pe- 
ninsular campaign in 1861-2. Each com- 
mander found that a navigable line for sup- 
plies, the navy to guard it, and a fleet of 
transports to carry the troops, were essential 
to his operations. Each withdrew his army 
from an interior line, leading into the heart 
of the Confederacy, and took it by water to 
an exterior line, which opened the interior 
and the North to the enemy, and wholly neu- 
tralized the army as to any influence 
on other operations. Each took his army 
into a morass, and set it at enormous labors 
which came to nothing. 

Each retreated from practicable lines of 
operations in a healthy up-country and took 
it to the most unhealthy region and imprac- 
ticable line attainable, which consumed 
more by sickness than by battles. Each 
chose a line which would give to the Confed- 
erates their best fortified place, and the se- 
cure possession of their territorial resources 
and lines of supply. Each claimed that his 
was the vital operation, and that interior 
armies should be drawn from to strengthen 
him. After consuming immense' resources 
for months, each retreated from a hopeless 
operation, by a "change of base," to a new 
plan, whose success was as improbable. In 
each the volunteers, after all these discourage- 



ments, fought like veterans and heroes, as 
soon as tliey got a chance, enduring extraor- 
dinary hardshij>and privation, and marching 
by night and fighting by day, without mur- 
muring, and eager to be led like soldiers to 
fight the enemy. 

But here the historic parallel diverges, and 
one part turns toward success. 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE PORT HUDSON PLAN — THE PROCRESS IN 
"throwing THE WHOLE ARMY AT ONCE" INTO 
GRAND GULF — THE NAVIGABLE ROUTE DROPS 
OUT — THE ARMY STUCK IN THE MUD — A NEW 
PLAN. 

Orders were issued "in the last week in 
March" for concentrating all the forces at 
^lilliken's Bend, for the Port Hudson plan. 
"Hurlbut" (at Memphis) "was stripped of 
every man that could be spared from the rear; 
yawls and flatboats were collected from St. 
Louis and Chicago, and on the 29th of March, 
McClernand was sent by the circuitous roa<ls 
that lead from Milliken's Bend, by way of 
Richmond and west of Roundaway Bayou, 
to New Carthage, twenty-seven miles below. 
McPherson and Sherman were to follow as 
rapidly as ammunition and rations could be 
forwarded." 

The way, by ci-nssing directly from ^Milli- 
ken's Piend to Bayou Vidal, was not more 
than half so long as the water route, which 
was to go by waj^ of the Duckport Canal 
through the looping Walnut Bayou to Bayou 
Vidal. The canal had not yet been opened. 
The supplies for the army were to follow by 
the canal and bayou navigable route as soon 
as the canal was opened, and for this Grant 
was collecting tugs and all sorts of shallow 
craft from all the North. The troops moved 
without tents or baggage, and with only 
wagons enough to carry, with what they car- 
ried on their backs, ten days' rations. The 
rest of the transportation teams of each corps 
was left behind to follow in mass after the 
whole army had passed. The artillery of each 
division accompanied it, but the usual supply 
of ammunition was cut down one-half. 

cThe road was soft before, from overflow, 
and the passage of the troops made it a 
slough. In the greater part the soldiers had 
to build it up with logs. "New Carthage, 



34 — 



howevel", M-aH occupied on the Gtli of April." 
"Occupied" is a strategic term; tiie advance 
liad reached there with McClernand, but the 
corps was still struggling with the slough 
and the road building along Baroii Yidal. 
This bayou, after a southeast course, turns 
shortly to the west, corresponding to a bend 
in the river which here issouthof the bayou. 
Just west of this turn in the bayou, and 
on its north side, is Smith's plantation, and 
at this point a branch runningdirectly south 
connects Bayou Yidal with the river at New 
Carthage, the main bayou continuing in a 
circuit to the west. 

The levee of this branch, between Smith's 
and New Carthage, was broken in several 
places, and the torrents pouring in made 
cross currents difficult for boats or floating 
bridges. "Boats were accordingly collected 
from all the bayous in tlie vicinity, and 
others were constructed of such material as 
was at hand. One division with its artillery 
■was thus conve3^ed across Bayou VitUil and 
through the overflowed forest to the levee at 
New Carthage; but the ferriage of an entire 
army in this way would have been exceed- 
ingly tedious, and a new route was found 
from Smith's plantation ••■ •■■ ••■ to Per- 
kins', twelve miles below." This route Kept 
along the north and west side of the main 
Bayou Yidal, which fetches a half circle and 
comes to the river at ^Irs. Perkins" planta- 
tion, about eight miles below New Carthage, 
by the river, and sixteen by this road. 

But Bayou Yidal, in the west part of its 
bend, was broken by cross bayous, all ovei'- 
flowed. "Four bridges, two of them GOO feet 
long, had to be laid across the swollen bayous 
which interrupted this route.'" McClernand 
says 2,000 feet of bridges had to be made. 
Says Badeau: "These were built of the 
barges and flats previously used at Smith's 
plantation, and of forest timber." Of course 
this protracted labor exhausted the ten days' 
rations, and the few teams which accompanied 
the divisions were kept going back and forth, 
and others were added, to try to keep Mc- 
Clernanu supplied. 

While McClernanp's corps was struggling 
along all this way from l\Iilliken"s Bend to 
Smith's, luiilding up a log way and bridges 
for his own wagons and artillery, and for the 
army which was to follow when he had made 
a road, he received valuable co-operation 
from Gen. Grant. Savs BAnEAr: "Grant's 



orders had been explicit and urgent to Mc- 
Clernand to seize and occupy Grand Gulf. 
In order to appease the insatiable ambition 
and conceit of that subordinate, he had given 
him command of the advance, and charged 
him with an operation which, if succes.sful, 
would have reiulered McClernand famous at 
once. On the 12th of April he wrote to that 
officer: 'It is my desire that you should get 
pos.session of Grand Gulf at the earliest oppor- 
tunity.' " 

But "the insatiable ambition and conceit 
of his subordinate" had been appeased by 
sending his corps in the advance to build a 
road for itself and the rest of the army over 
the strangest and most impassable route ever 
chosen for the march or supply of an army. 
At that time not one of his divisions had 
reached the river, and it appears, by a scrap 
of the same dispatch of the i2th, that Grant 
was then concerned to know how McCler- 
nand was to get his troops from Smith's plan- 
tation to New Carthage. And as McClernand 
liad then no means of crossing the river, if 
he had been there, the expectation must have 
been that his troops would swim for it, carry- 
ing their guns in their teeth. 

Grand Gulf was a little Yick.sburg in situa- 
tion and defenses, and as little likely to be 
taken by direct attack. It had been fortified 
a year before, and was now armed and pre- 
pared. The opportunity which Grant gave 
to McClernand to make himself famous at 
once was of the same character as that which 
King David instructed Gen. Joab to give to 
Col. Uriah. But for many days after the 12th 
McClernand's troops were to be occupied, in 
building roads and bridges for themselves 
and the rest of the army — a very useful, not 
to say vital, work to the expedition, but one 
not calculated to achieve fame. 

On the 13th Grant sent to ]\[cCleknani> 
this necessary caution against going on from 
Gfand Gulf: 

It is not ilesirable that you shonkl move in any di- 
rection from Grand Gtilf, but remain under the pro- 
tection of the gunboats. The present plan, if not 
changed by the movement of the enemy. \\i\] l)r to 
hold Grand Gnlt. 

^leanwhilc the difficulty of sui>plyiiig tlie 
army by that single route, which it was base 
flattery to call a road, had become serious, 
even while the greater part of the army had 
not started. The operation did not realize 



the briglit anticipation "to throw his whole 
force simultaneously south of Vickshurg." 

At this time Gkant, at Milliken's Bend. 
was in labor with a grave dilemma, which he 
set forth to Halleck in a letter dated April 
12, fourteen days after McClernand had 
started. The Duckport Canal, which was to 
let the transports into the bayous for the sup- 
)ily of this great movement, was not opened 
wlien McClernand started. Flatboats and 
tugs were gathering for using it. But now a 
(juestion i)resented itself. The road by which 
the army was plodding was only twenty 
inches above the water in the swamps. The 
river was near live feet higher tlian tlie land. 
To cut the levee and let the river into the 
canal might drown McClernand's corps, and 
cut ofl" all communication by the road. On 
the other hand, not to open the canal was to 
take away the main means which the plan 
had dependeci upon for supplying the army. 
Says Grant to Halleck: 

There is nothing now'in tlie way of my throwing 
troops into Grand Gulf, and then sending them on 
to Port Hndson to co-operate with Gen. Banks in 
the reduction of that place, but the danger of over- 
llowing the road from here to New Carthage, when 
the water is let into the new canal, connecting the 
river there witli the bayou coming out at New Car- 
tilage. One division of troops is now at New Car- 
thage, and another on the way. •■' ■■= '■' The wagon 
road (this road must now be nearly completed), by 
tilling the lowest ground, will be about twenty 
inches ahove the water in the swamps. The river, 
wiiere it is to be let into the canal, is four and eight- 
tenths feet above the land. 

This gives the situation of the road build- 
ing at that time, and'of the progress of the 
movement, which Badeau strategically makes 
diiiL But the canal cjuestion was peculiar. 
"Nothing now in the way of throwing troops 
into Grand Gulf," excepting that if the 
river were let into the canal it might sweep 
away McClernand's corps, and "throw" it 
into the bayous and cypress swamps. That 
of itself might not be objectionable, for Mc- 
( 'lernand is the bete noire in the history of all 
the Yicksburg operations, but it might also 
make the road imnassable without opening 
any water route. Well might Grant say in 
this letter: "The embarrassment I have had 
to contend against on account of extreme 
high water can not be appreciated by any 
one not present to witness it." 

But here again did Grant's proverbial luck 
turn up to rescue hiiu from the fatality of his 



plan. The embarrassing question was settled 
by tlie river's subsiding and leaving the 
Duckport Canal above water. Badeau 
says one steamer got through, but 
says not what became of her; but 
"afterward tiie depth of water was 
.insufficient to allow transports (this means 
barges and flatboats) of even the smallest 
draught to make their way, and all siipplies 
of ordnance stores and provisions had to be 
hauled over the miserable muddy roads." 

Badeau leaves judiciously dim tlie time 
when the opening of the levee was made to 
let the river into the canal, but it appears by 
the result that it was when the river was 
falling fast, so that one steamer only caught 
it on the run. But Gen. Grant, in a dispatch 
from Milliken's Bend to Halleck, April 19, 
twenty-one days after McClernand had 
started, states that the promise of the canal 
and bayou route was then all that his fancy 
had painted, thus: 

By clearing out the bayous from timber there will 
be good navigation from here to New Carthage for 
lugs and barges, also small stern wheel steamers. 
The navigation can be kept good, I think, by using 
our dredges constantly, until there is twenty feet 
fall. On this subject, however, I have not taken 
the opinion of an engineer oBicer, nor have I 
formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant 
me in speaking positively. 

Grant was his own engineer in all the 
bayou, canal, and road undertakings. Ba- 
deau says he attended to all details, even to 
the duties of wagonmaster of the several 
corps. But at this time the need to encour- 
age the administration and the countrv with 
news of the success of this remarkable under- 
taking caused an optimism in the dispatches, 
wliich was laudable for that purpose, but 
which somewhat impairs historical accuracy. 

Thus had the water route, which was the 
main dependence for the supply of the army 
in the I'ort Hudson operation, vanished. The 
bottom had dropped out of the plan. Mc- 
Clernand had one division at New Carthage, 
twenty-live miles above Grand Gulf by the 
river; another division bridging and building 
its way to Mrs. Perkins' plantation on the 
river, sixteen miles below New Carthage by 
the Bayou Vidal route, and the others still 
floundering in the slough and rebuilding 
the road between Smith's plantation and 
Milliken's Bend, from which the rest of the 
army had not yet started. To move the army 



— 36 — 



and its supplies by that road was impractica- 
ble. To Ripply even McClernand's corps by 
it would be difficult; to do this while the rest 
of the army was moving on it, still more dif- 
ficult. The Port Hudson expedition was at 
a deadlock, and some new means of supply- 
ing the army must be found, or it must with- 
draw its advance. The means invented to 
relieve the expedition from this dilemma, 
"demonstrate'' — as Badeau remarked of tlie 
Lake Providence plan — "the fertility and va- 
riety of devices developed during this anom- 
alous campaign." 



CHAPTER XVI. 

GEN. grant's splendid GENERALS — THEIR ZEAL- 
OUS WORKS WITHOUT FAITH-^THE HEROIC SPIRIT 
OF THE VOLUNTEERS — RUNNING THE VICKSBURG 
GUNS — THE RESULTS. 

Much praise is given by Gen. Grant's his- 
torian to his Generals for their zealous co-op- 
eration in his Port Hudson plan, when tiicy 
found that "Grant was firmly determined to 
inake the movement, and the disapproval ol , 
his ablest Generals had no eflTect to deter him." 
He continues: 

Sherman, thinking the plan almost certain of de- 
feat, for that reason felt the greater need of making 
thegreater effort to insure its success. He did not fail, 
nor did any of those officers whose faith in tlie en- 
terprise was least, to do their utmost to falsify their 
own opinions. 

Indeed, had Grant's subordinates been less thor- 
oughly subordinate, had they done less than their 
best to attain a result which they believed almost, 
if not quite, iniattainable, no determination, nor 
daring, nor energy in their commanaer could have 
availed. But not a word of dissatisfaction or crit- 
icism escaped from these true soldiers after it once 
became evident that Grant was immovable. 

This is a beautiful tribute. But, although 
Badeau takes the remonstrances which Sher- 
man and others made against the plan of di- 
viding the army, and sending part to Port 
Hudson on a campaign of indefinite length, 
holding the rest at Grand Gulf, trusting all 
to the supplies by this precarious route, and 
by a stroke of the pen extends them to 
Grant's operations in the rear of Vicksburg, 
which Grant took up after he had abandoned 
the Port Hudson plan, yet he is conscious of 
a chasm between these two, whicli lie liridges 
in this admirable manner: 



At this time, however, he had not himself deter- 
mined to do all that he afterward attemjjted. His 
plans, indeed, were always ripened into their full 
fruition by the emergencies and opportunities of a 
battle or campaign; his judgment was always 
sharpened by events: his faculties were always 
brighter at a crisis; his decisions were most un- 
erring when compelled to be most sudden ana 
irrevocable. 

Tlius the march out to Jackson, to take 
Vicksburg. was the full fruition of the plan 
to abandon Vicksburg and go to Port Hud- 
son. But although his brightened faculties 
abandoned his plan, and took anotlier which 
was contrary, the objections pf his Generals 
to the Port Hudson plan are extended by his 
veracious mouthpiece to the .Tackson and 
Vicksburg plan, to show that he did it against 
all of them. 

After thus bridging the chasm for Grant. 
and destroying the bridge for his Generals, 
Badeau thus repeats his present plan: "His 
design now was to move his army to 
some point below Vicksburg, where he might 
be able to supply himself by the roads and 
ijayous in Louisiana, and thence send a corps 
to co-operate with Banks in the reduction, of 
Port Hudson." (Banks was then in West 
Louisiana in an active campaign). "After 
that place should have fallen, Bank.x, with his 
whole armj', and the corps from Grant, was 
to march up and unite in the campaign 
against Vicksburg." (Banks could notmarch 
up with his wholearmy, nor half of it, without 
losing Louisiana). *«* "In order to accom- 
plish this movement it was necessary for 
Grant to throw his whole force simulta- 
neously south, as'a single corps would be ex- 
posed to the risk of attack from the garrison, 
as well as from the rebel army in the inte- 
rior." 

In this throwing of his whole ariiij' siinul- 
taneou.sly he had got one corps strung out 
along this tortuous and miry defile of a road 
between Milliken's Bend and Perkins', forty 
miles, and the base of his plan — the naviga- 
ble line of supplies — had dropped out, and 
the rest of the'army was at Milliken's Bend, 
unable to move, because tlie (jiiestion of sup- 
plying even the advanced corps had yet to be 
solved. And now it had become imperatively 
necessary to invent some new means to sup- " 
ply the expedition, or it would have to back 
out, and another cry of failure would go up 
in the rear. T'nilci' tlii.-i pressure the desperate 
resort of sending the frail river steamboats 



37 



laden Tilth supplies past the Vicksburg bat- 
teries was resolved upon. 

The result of previous experiments had not 
been encouraging. Some of the mailed ves- 
sels had gone by, but no ordinary river steam- 
er. And the Vicksburg batteries had im- 
proved their gunnery. At the request of Ad- 
miral Farragi't, who wanted some vessels of 
light draught to operate against the enemy's 
ironclads in Red River, two of Col. Ellett's 
rams ran past Vicksburg April 25; one was 
knocked to pieces, the other much damaged. 
This appears to be the last experiment made 
i>efore the one now to be tried, on which de- 
pended the fate of the expedition. For now 
it was not only a question of supplies, but 
boats must be sent down to ferry McCler- 
nand's corps over the Mississippi to attack 
Grand Gulf. 

Three steamboats and ten barges laden with 
supplies, escorted by one wooden and six 
ironclad gunboats, composed the experi- 
mental expedition, which had to pass by 
"twenty eight heavy guns that commanded 
the river for fifteen miles." The steamboats 
were partly protected by bales of cotton and 
wet hay. They took the barges in tow. The 
gunboats engaged the batteries. The descrip- 
tion of this passage is highly dramatic. The 
gunboats were considerably battered, but not 
disabled. One of the steamboats, the Henry 
Clay, was disabled by a shot, and while adrift 
was set on fire by a shell, and burned. An- 
other, the Forest Queen, was hulled by a shot, 
and then disabled by another through the 
steam drum, but she drifted down below, and 
was taken up by a gunboat and landed. The 
third steamboat was unhurt. They cast off 
the barges when they got under fire. 

As an example of the kind of men that 
composed our volunteer armies, the following 
is cited from Baueau: 

Only two of the steamboat masters were willing 
to encounter the danger; the crew of one transport 
[barge] also remained aboard, but all others 
shrank. When, however, it became known in the 
army tliat volunteers were wanted for the danger- 
ous task, men enough to man a hundred steamers 
pressed themselves upon the commanders; pilots, 
masters, engineers, and men, all vvere found in the 
ranks and among the otiicers on shore, and from 
these crews were speedily improvisud for the trans- 
port fleet. 

The fate of the barges is left obscure. 
Baueau says they were "materially damaged," 



and that "some of them went sweeping down 
the current even below New Carthage," which 
means that they went into the enemy's hands. 
In narrating an anecdote of the exultation of 
"an old rebel" at New Carthage, at whose 
house McClernand had made his headquar- 
ters, at what he fancied was the destruction 
of the whole flotilla, Badeau mentions this: 
"By daylight, however, the wrecks had all 
passed by, and after aWhile a gunboat ap- 
peared below the bend, and then a transport; 
then, one after another, the whole fleet of iron- 
clads and' army steamers hove in sight from 
their perilous passage." Baueau calls the 
barges transports, and he here mentions one, 
and the steamers and gunboats after "tlie 
wrecks had all passed by." Through this 
mist it appears that the passage went hard 
with the transports and steamers. 

Gen. Grant went to Smith's Plantation the 
day after this passage. After his return he 
wrote Halleck, April 19, of the barge?; 
"Whilst under the guns of the enemy's bat- 
teries they were cut loose, and I fear that 
some of them have been permitted to run 
past New Carthage undiscovered. They were 
relied upon to aid in the transportation of 
troops to take Grand Gulf." 

Of course Gen. Grant then knew whether 
the barges had gone by, but he wished to spare 
the country's feelings by breaking the news 
gently. The three steamboats that were tow- 
ing the ten barges cast them loose as soon as 
under fire; one of the three was burned, an- 
other disabled, and herself had to be taken in 
tow. This left but one steamboat to pick up 
and land the ten barges after they had passed 
the fifteen miles of the Vicksburg guns, and 
then the Warrenton batteries, which left only 
about sixteen miles to New Carthage, and 
this in a river running five ^or six miles an 
hour, and on which, in high water, landings 
are very difficult, except at places prepared. 

One steamboat could not do much in fuck- 
ing up and landing ten loaded barges in such 
conditions. As for the gunboats they were 
engaging the batteries and holding back 
against the current. Gen. Grant says in the 
same letter: "Our vessels went down even 
slower than the current, using their wheels 
principally for backing." But the barges 
were speeding on with the current. It ap- 
pears, therefore, that the most of the barges 
were lost. But the dramatic scone of this 
heroic running of the batteries clectrilied the 



38 — 



country, and Gen. Grant, in pursuance of the 
military necessitj'^ to send encouraging ac- 
counts, wrote Halleck: "Our experiment of 
running the batteries at Viclisburg, I think, 
has demonstrated the entire practicability of 
doing so witli but little risk." 



CHAPTER XVII. 

grant's IMPASSIVE>'ESS I'NDER FAILfRES — 
m'cLERNAND delays ATTACKING GRAND GULF 
TILL HE CAN GET THERE — THE TIME WHEN THE 
NAVIGABLE BASE FAILED — SPARING HALLECK's 
FEELINGS — MORE BOATS RUN PAST VICKSBURG — 
HALF ARE SUNK — CHANGE OF BASE TO HARD 
TIMES. 

During all these operations Gen. (4rant had 
experienced many failures, which would 
seem to be severe disappointments, but he 
bore them all with stoicism, and indeed with 
seeming unconsciousness. In several of them 
Badeau regards the failure in the end as ap- 
proving Grant's forecast in the beginning. 
The Duckport Canal and bayou route was the 
base of his Port Hudson plan. The dropping 
out of this navigable base must have been a 
severe disappointment; but it is not easy to 
lind when this happened. Badeau grows 
judiciously miscellaneous at times. The order 
of events in which he places it would make it 
much earlier than is shown by Grant's dis- 
l)atches to Halleck, and these did not inform 
Halleck that it had ever failed. 

Grant's letter of April 12 to Halleck shows 
that he had then full faith in the navigable 
route, and that there were only two reasons 
why he did not then cut the levee and open 
the canal. First, that he liad then but three 
tugs and fifteen barges "suitable for this nav- 
igation;" second, that the cutting of the levee 
might drown the road and McClernand's 
corps. Therefore, he said it was necesssary 
to build the road to use until he got water 
craft enough, and until the river conditions 
got right for opening the canal. When he 
returned from Smith's Plantation he wrote 
Halleck April 19 this favorable view of the 
navigable route: "By clearing out the bay- 
ous from timber there will be good naviga- 
tion from here to New Cartilage for tugs and 
barges, also small sternwheel steamers. The 
navigation can be kept good, 1 think, by using 



our dredges constantly until there is twenty 
feet fall " 

Twenty feet fall is a pretty good margin for 
a dug way. He adds the condition, "by 
clearing out the bayous from timber," wliich, 
in Walnut Bayou, would have occupied Mc- 
Clernand's corjis all suiumer. He also 
guards bis statement with the following, 
which illustrates the trust in luck with which 
Grant embarked in expeditions involving the 
fate of a campaign and an army: "On this 
sul^ect, however, I have not taken tlie opin- 
ion of an engineer officer, nor have I formed 
it upon sufficient investigation to warrant me 
in speaking positively." Not having con- 
sulted an engineer as to the practicability of 
a navigation on wiiich his plan depended, 
and not having looked into it himself, he was 
in a situation to rest in a confiding trust in 
luck. 

When Grant went forward to Smith's Plan- 
tation the second time he wrote Gen. Sher- 
man, April 24, before any attempt had been 
made to use the water route: "The water in 
the bayous is falling very rapidly; out of all 
j>roportion to the fall in the river, so that it is 
exceedingly doubtful whether they can be 
made use of for the purposes of navigation." 
This was only five days after he had written 
Halleck that the navigable route was even 
more than his fancy had painted, and that 
with the dredges going it would be good, 
though the river fell twenty feet. Yet three 
days later than this he wrote Halleck of 
the difficulty and "tedious operation" of mov- 
ing troops from Smith's Plantation to the 
Mississippi, because of the flood and cross 
currents through the breaks in the levees of 
Bayou Vidal. Thus did Grant's navigable 
route, which was the base of his Port Hudson 
plan, fade away while yet the river was so 
high as seriously to obstruct his operation. 
But he gave no sign of this to Halleck. He 
spared Halleck's feelings. And now the 
failure of this main dependence of the plan 
was eclipsed by the dramatic spectacle of run- 
ning the Vicksburg guns. In following out 
the fate of the navigable base this paper has 
gone both back and ahead of events. 

Badeau states, with emphatic reflection on 
Gen. McClernanu, that Grant wrote him on 
the 12th: "It is my desire that you should 
get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest 
practicable moment." At that time McCler- 
nand's corps was strung along the route from 



— .59 — 



Miiliken's Bend to Smith's Plantation, build- 
ing the road; and the means of getting over 
tiie fiood and swift currents between Smith's 
and New Carthage had yet to be found. 
Again, on the 13th, Grant cautioned him: 
"It is not desirable that you should move in 
any direction from Grand Gulf, but remain 
under protection of the gunboats." Again, 
on the 18th: "I would still repeat former in- 
structions, that possession be got of Grand 
(iult'atthe earliest practicable moment. * * * 
I will be over here again in a few days, and 
hope it will be mj' good fortune to tlnd j'ou 
in safe possession of Grand Gulf." 

The last was written from Smith's Planta- 
tion, to which Grant had come becau.se of a 
message sent him from Porter through Sher- 
:\r.\N, that he could not harmonize with Mc- 
Clerxanh. Says Badeai': "Grant was suffer- 
ing from boils at the time, but the day after 
receiving this request he rode forty miles, 
from Miiliken's Bend to Perkins' Landing, 
and there gave McClernand further instruc- 
tions." But Grant's letter toHALLECK, April 
lit, shows that his ride was only to Smith's 
Plantation. Badeau's quotations show also 
that Grant wrote from Smith's to McCler- 
NANU,' who was then at New Carthage. But 
although this 'ride was only half so long as 
Badeau thought, yet this and the boils to- 
gether seem to have quickened Gen. Grant's 
military faculties to such a degree that he 
jierceived that something more than desire 
was required to take Grand Gulf. 

His letter to Halleck states that "the 
whole of his (McClernard's) corps is between 
Itichniond and New Carthage." Richmond 
is back on Bayou Vidal only nine miles from 
Miiliken's Bend. What McClernand's troops 
were doing is told by Grant's letter to Hal- 
leck, April 12: "The wagon road (this work 
must now be nearlj' completed), by filling up 
the lowest ground, will be about twenty 
inches above the water in the swamps." Mc- 
< 'i,erxani)'s corps was building a road for the 
army. Grant also found at Smith's Planta- 
tion that there was great difficulty in getting 
troops from there to New Carthage. He also 
found that most of the barges he had sent 
down had gone to parts unknown, and, 
hence, that three things were requisite to an 
attack on Grand Gulf: First, to get the army 
to a place on the river where it could em- 
bark; second, boats to ferry it over; third, 
supplies. 



So much was developed by the quickening 
of military sense by a horseback ride of 
twenty miles with boils. Thus did those 
boils do good service to their country. Ba- 
deau says that bj'- this ride "Grant became 
convinced that nothing would be accom- 
plished until he took command in person 
and remained with the advance," and that 
"he returned, therefore, to Miiliken's Bend to 
hasten the transportation of McPherson's 
corps." The word transportation here means 
the wagons that belonged to McPherson's 
corps. And Badeau explains this remarka- 
ble turn of Grant' to the rear from a convic- 
tion that his presence was vital at the front, 
by an admiring ascription that Grant at- 
tended to all the details of every part of tlie 
transportation, movement, and supply of the 
army, directing the Quartermasters, commis- 
saries, teamsters, and issuing orders not only 
to division, but to regimental commanders. 

This representation that Grant turned back 
to these minute details, from the capture of 
Grand Gult, which he then held vital to his 
plan, and which he was convinced would not 
be done until he took command in person, is 
a remarkable tribute to the minuteness of 
Gen. Grant's mind; but it appears by what 
Grant did that he discovered the three essen- 
tials above noted, and w^nt back to provide 
means to supply his advanced corps by send- 
ing on more wagons, and to provide both 
means of supply and means to ferry his army 
over the river by sending more boats to run 
the batteries. 

Going back a little this fine anticipation of 
present performance, and a valuable promise 
of present aid to Gen. Banks are found in a 
dispatch iroui Grant to Banks, dated Miili- 
ken's Bend, April 14: "I am concentrating 
my forces at Grand Gulf. Will send an army 
corps to Bayou Sara by the '25th, to co-operate 
with \'ou on Port Hudson." Fortunately the 
active enemy kept Banks so busy that he did 
did not wait for this co-operating corps, 
which, at the tinre when it was promised at 
Bayou Sara, was still floundering in the 
slough of Bayou Yidal. But the information 
and the promise to Gen. Banks illustrate the 
high intelligence and accurate plan whicii 
governed all the Vicksburg operations. 

Gen. Grant dispatched to Halleck, April 
23: 

Six boats and a number of l>arges ran tl'.e Vicks- 
burg batteries last niglit. All the boats got bv 



— 40 — 



more or less damaged. The Tigress sank at 3 a. m., 
and Is a total loss— crew all saved. The Moderator 
was much damaged. I think all the barges went 
through safely. * * * Casualties, so far as re- 
ported, two men mortally wounded, and several 
(numbei not known) more or less severely wounded. 
About 500 shots were fired. I look upon this as a 
great success. 

Bapeau narrates the affair more succinctly, 
save that in this plaeehe calls the steamboats 
transports: 

On the 2fith of April six*Dther transports [steam- 
boats] attempted to run by the yicksburg batteries: 
five of them succeeded, although in a damaged con- 
dition; one was sunk by being struck in the hull by 
a solid shot. The crews of alt the transports [steam- 
boats], like those of their predecessors, were com- 
posed of volunteers for the purpose from the army. 
Twelve barges, laden with forage and rations, were 
sent in tow of the last six steamers, and half of them 
got safely by. 

Six of the twelve barges, laden with sup- 
plies, went down to form the Mississippi 
delta. Likewise one steamboat, which carried 
the hospital stores, preparatory to the Grand 
Gulf action. This was a dear way of supply- 
ing a great army, and this was to be the way 
until the Port Hudson expedition was over. 
But Uncle Sam was rich, and Grant said it 
was a great success. And none of these steam- 
ers or barges could return for another load. 

A shipyard was set up for repairs. In this 
again we have a hint at the quality of these 
volunteers: 

Mechanics were found in the army to do the 
work ; for it was a striliing feature of the volunteer 
service throughout the war, that no mechanical or 
professional need arose when accomplished adepts 
could not be found in almost any regiment to per- 
form the duty required. 

The following shows that there is no mis- 
take as to the amount of destruction, and also 
the next move: 

The army craft was soon in*a condition to be of 
use in moving troops: but the destruction of two 
transports and six barges reduced the number so 
that it was found necessary to march tlie men from 
Perkins' Pbmtation to Hard Times, twenty-two 
miles further, and a distance of seventy miles from 
Milliken's Bend. 

The last extract anticipates events l)y a few 
days in this very important stage of the Port 
Hudson movement. 



CHAPTER XVIIi. 

GEN. GKANT moves TO THE FRONT — GRAND GULF 
TO BE CARRIED BY STORM — THE 1.3tH CORPS 
DESTINED FOR THE SACRIFICE — CHANGE OF BASE 
TO HARD TIMES — VAST WORK IN ROAD BflLDIMi 
BY THAT CORPS. 

Gen. Grant's historian relates that on the 
18th of April, at Smith's Plantation, he con- 
cluded that Grand Gulf would not be taken 
until he took command in person, "there- 
fore"' he returned to Milliken's Bend to at- 
tend to" McPherson's wagon train. On tlie 
21st he dispatched Halleck, still from Milli- 
ken's Bend: "I move my headquarters to 
New Carthage to-morrow. Every effort will 
be made to got speedy possession of Grand 
Gulf, and from that point to open the Missis- 
sippi." A dispatch to Halleck, 23d, wasstdl 
dated at Milliken's Bend, but a letter of the 
24th to Sherman showed that he had reached 
Smith's Plantation. Till now his orders to 
McClernand had been to embark at New 
Carthage on barges and steamers, drop down 
to Grand Gulf, twent\^-two miles, and carry 
it by assault. It was about the same as a 
similar attempt from Milliken's Bend on the 
Vicksburg bluff. 

But when Grant had reached Smith's Plan- 
tation now the second time, and had to direct 
operations, he found, as he wrote Sherman 
April 24: "The difficulties of getting from 
here to the river are great." Yet so far back 
as the 18th he had written Gen. McClernanj) 
from there that he would be over there again 
in a few days, and expected to find him in 
possession of Grand Gulf. But now he 
wrote Sherman: "I foresee great difficulties 
in our present position ;" and he suggested that 
possibly Sherman might find a chance to pitch 
in at Vicksburg or Haines' Bluff and relieve 
the situation. But Grant had now found that 
to take the army to New Carthage was im- 
practicable; also that, after so much destruc- 
tion of boats by running past Vicksburg, he 
had not means of river transportation for so 
long a distance as to Grand Gulf. 

McClernand had found it impracticable to 
take his corps to New Carthage because of the 
flood and strong currents from the breaks in 
tiie levees of Baj'ou Vidal, and had built a 
road from Smith's Plantation by a circuit on 
the west side of Bayou Vidal to where it again 
fetches to the river at Perkins' Plan]|;^ation, 
twelve miles below, where were either two or 



41 



three of his four divisions. And now Grant, 
in the progress of his knowledge of the situa- 
tion, found that because of the destruction of 
boats in running Vicksburg, his means of 
transporting his army to the assault were too 
small, and that the passage was long. There- 
fore McClernan'D marched by another in- 
terior half circle, following the course of 
Bayou St. Joseph, which fetches to the river 
again at Hard Times, by which Grant's route 
of supply was attenuated to seventy miles 
from Milliken's Bend. Says Badeau: 

"The new road lay along the west bank of 
Lake St. .Joseph. and across three large bayous, 
over which bridges were built by the troops, 
the materials being taken from plantation 
houses near by. The whole route was in a 
miserable condition, and after the march 
once began the roads became intolerable. But 
on the 29th of April the entire 13th Corps had 
arrived at Hard Times, 10,000 men having 
moved from Perkins' Plantation on trans- 
ports." 

Hard Times is four miles above Grand Gulf. 
Grant's reconnaissances, Badeau says, had 
found that between Warrenton and Grand 
Gulf, a distance of forty miles by the river, 
"there was but one point where a good road 
existed from the river to the blutfs, the whole 
still being overflowed on the left bank of the 
river. This dry point was at a place called 
Congo Island, and was so strongly protected 
by natural defenses that it was not judged 
advisable to attempt a landing there." 

These natural defenses are thus alleged : 
"The road led to Cox's farm on the Big Black 
River, and to use the landing would have ne- 
cessitated crossing Big Black in the face of the 
enemy." To avoid the necessity, after the 
landing, of crossing a narrow river against 
probable opposition, Gran'!" decided to storm 
the intrenchments of Grand Gulf, by landing 
in front of them from crowded barges towed 
by trail steamers. Grand Gulf is a little 
Vicksburg in situation and defensibility. The 
river runs a little north of east for five miles 
till it strikes the biutf, then turns a short cor- 
ner and runs southwest, in the general line 
of the blutf. Its impact against the clay of 
the bluft" has made a shape at this tuui which 
gives the name of gulf. And thus the line of 
blulf is nigh the river bank. 

Big Black River, connecting with the Missis- 
sippi at the upper end of Grand Gulf and the 
flooded bottoni above, *protected the place 



from approach in that quarter. On the south 
side of Big Black is a bold spur in the bluff, 
j^ltting out, and rising higher than thegeneral 
range of the bluff. In a description made by 
Admiral Porter, after Grand Gulf fell into our 
hands, he calls this elevation Point of Rocks. 
His description is as follows [Boynton's His- 
tory of the Navy] : 

"Grand Gulf is the strongest place on the 
Mississippi. •■■ * * One fort on Point of 
Rocks, seventy-five feet high, calculated for 
six or seven guns, mounting two seven inch 
rifles and one eight inch and one Parrott gun, 
on wheels (carried off). On the left of this 
work is a triangular work, calculated to 
mount one heavy gun. These works are con- 
nected with another fort by a covered way 
and double rifle pits, extending three-quarters 
of a mile, constructed with much labor, and 
showing great skill on the part of the con- 
structor. The third fort commands the river 
in all directions; it mounted one splendid 
Blakely 100 pounder, and one eight.inch; two 
thirtj'-two pounders were lying bursted and 
broken on tlie ground." 

That whicli Porter calls a covered way and 
double rifle jjits was along the foot of the 
bluff, and within short musket range of the 
bank of the river. The river was nearly on a 
level with the bank, and boats presented a fair 
mark. The lower fort was where a road as- 
cended the hill to the interior. The forts had 
bonibpronf magazines. This rifle trench, 
near!}' on the level of the narrow belt of 
plateau between the bluff and the river, and 
within what one of the navy officers calls 
pistol-shot of the river, was the most formidable 
part of the work to a force landing to carry 
the place by storm. The greater number 
might escape the shot from the batteries, pro- 
vided these did not happen to sink the trans- 
ports, but infantry in this secure trench could 
mow them down as fast as they could land. 
The line of rifle trench was held by a brigade, 
the greater part of the force being in reserve 
behind the top of the blurt". 

The current of the river at Grand Gulf is 
swift, and strikes the shore. As many of Mc- 
Clernand's corps as could be crowded into 
the barges and towing steamers, say 10,000, 
were to be held in readiness just out of range 
of the upper battery, and, when the gunboats 
had silenced the heavy guns, were to be towed 
down, packed in clumsy barges like sheep for 
the slaughter house, to make a landing under 



42 — 



this fire, in the way that towed barges must 
in a rapid river. 

While those troops stand thus bound fft 
the sacrifice by the order of one impassive in- 
dividual, let this paper pause to remark the 
immense work which they had done in the 
last thirty days. This review has too pro- 
found respect for the army profession to. give 
praise to the commander of that fated corps, 
whom Grant and Sherman describe as a "po- 
litical General." Besides, in all the Vicks- 
burg operation Gen. McClernand gives so 
much trouble to Grant and Badeau as to ex- 
cite sympathy for ihem. But in that corps, 
now destined to the sacrifice, were 20,000 vol- 
unteers from the Northwestern States — or so 
many of the 20,000 as had survived Grant's 
swampordeal — who were serving theircountry 
for the love of it, and who had done a vast work 
in building roads and bridges for the army 
on a route of march and supplies, now drawn 
out to seventy miles. 

They had started from Milliken's Bend 
without tents or baggage, with ten days' 
rations, and few cooking utensils. Through 
that wonderful military route of .soft allu- 
vium and swamp they had built up a road, 
which, now that the fiction of a navigable 
route had faded, was the sole road for the 
^march and supply of an army of 50,000 men. 
Even the reticent allusions whici) Grant and 
Badeau make give ground for the belief that 
Gen. McClernand did not exaggerate the 
work of his corps when he said in his ad- 
dress: 

"Vour march through Louisiana, from Milliken's 
Bend to New Carthage and Perkins' Plantation, on 
the Mississippi River, Is one of the most remark- 
able on record. Bayous and uiiry roads, threatened 
with momentary inundation, obst'-ucled your prog- 
ress. All these were overcome by unceasing labor 
and uutiaggiii!; energy. The two thousand feet of 
bridging which was improvised hastily out of 
materials created on the spot, and over which you 
passed, must long remain a marvel. 

Gen. McClellan's whole army did greater 
laijor than this on the Peninsula, and while 
astride the Chickahominy ; but this work in 
the Mississippi swamps was all done by the 
soldiers of McClernand's corps. And it was 
after they had been worked three months in 
digging canals and pulling sunken trees out 
of bayous and swamps, in undertakings which 
their intelligence told them liad no chance of 
success. Yet when these volunteers at last 



were permitted to set foot on firm ground, 
they marched by night and fought by day, 
on scanty rations, with a gallantry that was 
irresistible. What real military enterprise 
could be called doubtful with such troops, 
directed by military intelligence? 

Badeau says that Grant, "in order to ap- 
pease the unappeasable ambition and conceit 
of his subordinate, had given him command 
of the advance." Thus had he assigned to 
McClernand's corps the honor of making a 
road for tiie army through that wonderful 
route. Also that he had "charged him with 
an operation which, if successful, would have 
rendered McClernand famous at once." 
That operation was now to be performed, and 
McClernand's devoted corps stood ready, for 
the sacrifice. It was to be done in the per- 
fection of the military art, as practiced by 
Grant and Sherman, which held that the 
first step of a reconnaissance of a fortified 
place is a general assault, and that the art of 
war has no way of judging whether an under- 
taking is in a military sense impossible, save 
by sacrificing an army in the attempt. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

learning the art of war by general as- 
saults — takino volunteers at their word — 

BOiMBARDMENT of grand gulf — SHIPS AND 
FORTS — ARMY RESIGNATION TO INFERIORITY — 
BOTTOM tiONE FROM THE PORT HUDSON PLAN — 
A NEW MOVEMENT. 

In the history of the wars of the great Gen- 
erals of Europe, it appears tluit the costly 
metbod of taking, fortified places by storm is 
reserved for fortresses of great strategical con- 
sequence, under imperative circumstances, 
wliich nuike the object adecjuate to the in- 
evitable sacrifice of soldiers. And these as- 
saults are regarded by military men as so 
much beyond wliat a General uiay properly 
command men to do, that it is the practice to 
call for volunteers for the leading column, to 
receive the first fire, to whom special honoris 
awarded. And the military man can in gen- 
eral calculate whether the conditions in 
which the assault is to be made are such as to 
give reasonable promise of success to what 
brave men may be e;c;pected to do. 

But in this fresh young country, where all 



— 43. 



things are infused by tlie spirit of its geo- 
graphical greatness, a commander forms a 
plan to escape from his second aborted cam- 
paign to another so remote and va;<ne as to be 
indescribalile. whose preliminary starting 
point depends upon landing troops from 
towed and crowded tlatboats upon a narrow 
plateau in front- of a thoroughly fortified 
jilace, to carry it by assault. This storming 
of Grand Gulf f-rom the river had been reck- 
oned upon at Milliken's Bend as a vital part 
of the Port Hudson plan, without any infor- 
mation as to its practicability, and without 
any of that knowledge of the situation which 
was attainable to any military man who made 
it his business to know. And in general, as 
at Chickasaw Bayou, in the siege of Vicksburg, 
at Kenesaw Mountain, 8pottsylvania, Cold 
Harbor, Petersburg, and Richmond, to order 
a general assault on intrenehments was re- 
garded as a proper tentative operation, in the 
nature of a reconnaissance; and the failure, 
with losses of from 2,500 to 7,000 men, without 
having hurt the enemy, was accepted as proof 
of the Commanding General's enterprise. 
These were the tactics which Lincoln immor- 
talized by the classic plirase, "pegging away." 

But in our army all were volunteers. The 
common figure of speech for their volunteer- 
ing was that they offered their lives to their 
conn4,ry. Our greatest Generals accepted that 
figure of speech as reality. When young men 
rose up so spontaneously to serve their couii- 
try for the love of it as to make an embar- 
rassment of riches, and with an enthusiasm 
which was quite irregular in the regular army 
school, our Generals could afford a kind of 
tactics which consumed them liberally, and 
to seek fame and promotion by a standard 
which rated the greatness of generalship by the 
magnitude of the slaughter of their bwn men. 
Tiierefore do we see in the tactics of our great- 
est Generals that general assaults on fortified 
places were a sort of preliminary observation. 

When on the one part is a people who have 
so little to do that as many as a million and a 
half — in all — volunteer to serve their country, 
just for tlieloveof her; and on the other hand 
a professional army class whose rise in rank, 
}>ay, and honors is in propt)rtion to their con- 
sumption of these, the life of a volunteer be- 
comes very cheap. In the "effete" military 
powers, where men have to be forced into the 
ranks, or dearly enlisted by bounties, the tac- 
f-ics are naturally less consuming. The Port 



Hudson plan made the taking of Grand Gulf 
by storm an essential part, as it did the navi- 
gable route by a canal and unknown bayous. 
And the projector was as wise as to the possi- 
bility of one as of the other. 

"The plan," .says Badeau, to take Grand 
Gulf, "was for the naval force to bombard 
and silence the batteries, and immediately 
afterward the troops were to land at the foot 
of the bluff and carry the works by storm. 
Accordingly 10,000 troops of the 1.3th Corps 
were crowded aboard the transports and 
barges, and moved down the stream to the 
front of Grand Gulf, at a point just out of 
range." This was on the 29th of April. "At 
8 o'clock Porter began tlie bombardment 
with all his ironclads, seven in number, and 
one ordinary gunboat. For five hours and 
twenty minutes he kept up a vigorous fire 
without intermission, running his vessels at 
times almost within pistol shot of the bat- 
teries. At twenty minutes past 1 o'clock the 
Admiral withdrew, the utter futility of his ef- 
fort having been amply demonstrated." Ba- 
deau .says: "It would have been madness to 
attempt a landing under unsilenced guns 
like these." But there was that all along the 
front which would have been a thousand 
times worse to a landing force than those two 
batteries of thirteen heavy guns. Mr. Henri 
CoppEE, author of "Grant's Campaigns" — 
who.se book is Badeau to a considerable ex- 
tent, but not .so much .so as Badeau — inti- 
mates that it was fortunate that the navy did 
not succeed in silencing the great guns. Thus 
does it appear from one biographer that 
Grant's proverbial luck did again inter- 
pose to save him from the fatality of his 
plan. 

The gunboats suffered, much more in this 
bombardment than in running the Vicksburg 
batteries. They were badly battered, and 
several of them required extensive repairs to 
fit them for service. On three of tliem 
eighteen men were killed and fifty-seven 
wounded. This was probably greater than 
the enemy's loss, although the heavy guns of 
the navy must have been more than thrice as 
many as in tlie batteries on shore. As many 
as 3,000 rounds were fired by the navy. This 
action was an illustration of tlie feebleness of 
the idea which had taken deep hold in our 
regular army — that ships can take forts. 
There must have been a decrepitude in a pro- 
fessional army class who could so readily ac-« 



— 44 — 



cept a theory of the imbecility of their own 
profession. 

The theory that ships can take forts was the 
base upon which Scott had constructed his 
"anaconda plan," the main part of which 
was a gunboat fleet to go down the Mississippi. 
He had instilled this delusion deeply into 
Lincoln. McClellan imbibed it. Halleck 
believed it, or professed to. It is an example 
of the wonderful intelligence which directed 
the war from Washington, that Halleck, the 
General in Chief, thought that an expedition 
to open the Mississippi River was the most 
important expedition in the war. So he said 
to Grant while he was fighting the swamps 
and bayous west of the Mississippi. And 
while Banks had to take the field in West 
Louisiana to prevent the losing of the State, 
river and all, Halleck was continually order- 
ing him to go and help Geant open the Missis- 
sippi River, as if to get one passage through 
would open the Mississippi, while the Con- 
federate armies were unbroken in all the 
country on both sides of it. He ordered 
Banks, and Grant urged him, to drop all, 
and come up and help Grant open the Mis- 
sissippi; which, if Banks had done, would 
have given up both Louisiana and the Missis- 
si jipi River. 

This feeble idea of the army that it could 
not resist ships, nor even such light shells as 
the river gunboats, pervaded all our military 
operations in the first two years of the war, 
and some of the most important of them to 
the end. It took McClellan away from an 
interior line, and isolated him in a malarious 
peninsula; for he pleads that he expected the 
navy to silence the batteries at Yorktown and 
Gloucester Point, and that because they could 
not his surprise movement began with a 
month's siege. At Fort Donelson, Grant, 
with double the force of the enemy, waited for 
Commodore Foote with four mailed giin- 
boats to take the fort, and came near losing 
his army by his unguarded waiting. It was 
upon this delusion in Lincoln's mind that 
gunboats could clear out forts, that McCler- 
nand got a special commission to raise and 
command an expedition to open the Missis- 
sippi. 

Grant and Sherman, both educated at West 
Point, thought this commission to McCler- 
nand to open the Mississippi by means of a 
fleet, so great an opportunity to him that it 
demoralized them, and one of them hastened 



back from a true military line to snatch the 
river expedition from him, while the other 
feebly waited to be driven back by the loss of 
his supplies. It would be unreasonable to 
impeach the military sense of Lincoln or Mc- 
Clernand, when Scott — the Great Captain — 
Halleck, McClellan, Grant, Sherman, and a 
lot of others of that class which assumes to know 
all military knowledge, maintained the same 
noti«n of the superioritj"^ of navies to armies, 
yet the remark must be made that McCler- 
NAND was not a regular army General; he had 
not been trained in a school in which each 
follows the preceding, in a routine like pack 
mules in a string, and he ought to have 
known better than to have promoted a river 
opening expedition upon such an idea. The 
probability is that Grant unwittingly took a 
bad job off' his hands when he assumed com- 
mand of the river opener. 

Grant's Port Hudson plan had assumed 
that the storming of Grand Gulf was as easily 
done as said. After all was over Badeau put 
into his history, and Grant confirmed, his 
faultfinding with McClernand because he 
had not taken Grand Gulf before he got to 
the river, or got any means to cross the river. 
The taking of Grand Gulf bj-^ storm was the 
key of the Port Hudson plan, as the bayou 
navigable route was its base. And now this 
was found to be "madness," and the navi- 
gable base had dropped out. 

Yet something must be done, and done 
quickly; for the line of supplies by a pre- 
carious road, through a hostile country, was 
now attenuated to seventy miles. At the best 
that army could not be supplied by it; and 
if the Confederates should turn their attention 
to it, the greater part of the army would be 
needed to keep it open. The next move — as 
Badeau said of the failure of the Lake Provi- 
dence plan — will serve '"to demonstrate the 
fertility and variety of resources develo[)ed 
during this anomalous campaign." After the 
bombardment had failed, the transports were 
brought back to Hard Times, the troo{>s 
landed, and in the night they marched down 
the river five miles below Grand Gulf to De 
Shroon's The transports ran past Grand Gulf 
in the night, the gunboats engaging the bat- 
teries again to cover them. And now on the 
next day a new movement was to be made, 
which, through the interposition of Grant's 
proverbial luck, got turned around from a re- 
treat into that whicli was indeed a movement, 



— 45 — 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE DELIVERANCE — SUCCESSFUL CROSSING OF THE 
MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON. 

On the 29th of April, says Adam Badeau, 
the failure of the naval cannonade of Grand 
Gulf having developed the idea that "it would 
have been madness to attempt a landing," and 
tlie gunboats and transports having passed 
down below. Grant wrote to Halleck: "I teel 
now that the battle is more than half over." 
Thus was the failure to take Grand Gulf by 
storm the more than half achievement of the 
battle. 

On the 30th as many of the troops of Mc- 
C'lernand's corps as with their artillery could 
be placed on the transports at a time were 
embarked at De Shroon's, and set out to find 
a landing on the east side of the river. The 
destination was as free as the familiar one of 
trading vessels — "For Cowes and a market." 
Grant, says Badeau, "had hardly hoped to 
get a footing anywhere north of Eodney," 
which is eighteen miles below Grand Gulf; 
and of the praeticabilitj- of getting a footing 
there he Had the same abiding trust in the 
unknown as in his bayou route of naviga- 
tion, and in the taking of Grand Gulf by 
storm. 

Here came to the rescue the nation's ever 
faithful friend, the slave. "That ni>;ht in- 
formation was procured [received] from a 
negro that a good road led from Bruinsburg, 
six miles below Grand Gulf to Port Gibson, 
twelve miles in the interior, and on high 
ground. When th« embarkation began, it 
was with a view to steam down the river 
until land should be found; but this infor- 
mation being relied on, the first transports 
went direct to Bruinsburg, and found the 
negro's story correct." Such a deliverer of a 
great military plan from a drifting into the 
unknown ought to be mentioned more 
reverently. 

Behold now the great Mississippi River 
opening expedition, which started in 
with 130,000 men and a great navy, 
now with its head brigade, like the 
nucleus of a comet, embarked on flat- 
boats, and drifting down the Mississippi 
on a voyage of discovery, to find a lodgment 
from which Gen. Grant might send 20,000 
troops to Port Hudson to operate on the 
bowels of the river there; the rest of the 



great expedition stretching behind, like the 
comet's spreading tail, through De Shroon's, 
Hard Times, Richmond, Young's Point, Mil- 
liken's Bend, Helena. Memphis, to the active 
recruiting stations in the Northwestern 
Stales, all co-operating in the river opening 
operation ! 

Gen. McClernand's report divests the expe- 
dition of some of this romance by narrating 
that he and a party hadreconnoitered down to 
opposite Bruinsburg, and had observed this 
landing. That report tells also of much scouting 
and reconnoitering all the way from Milliken's 
Bend to Smith's Plantation, New Carthage. 
Perkins', and so on down to Hard Times, De 
Shroon's, some of which were strange voyages 
of discovery; also of skirmishing dashes with 
parties of Confederates all along the route 
from Milliken's Bend, and of the necessity of 
incessant vigilance against their desire to im- 
merse them by cutting the levees of the bay- 
ous. But this review prefers Badeau and the 
more romantic account, with the negro as the 
savior of the army from the General's di- 
lemma. 

Happily the nucleus of the great comet 
found a dry landing at Bruinsburg unde- 
fended. And now, indeed, the battle for 
Grand Gulf, and likewise for Vicksburg, was 
"half over." For, once established on the 
east side of the river. Grant was master of the 
situation, and, if he could not beat the enemy, 
he had no business to come. The topograph- 
ical conditions were singularly favorable. 
Just below Grand Gulf the river diverges from 
the bluff line, leaving an interval of bottom, 
which widens to three miles. Down to where 
Bayou Pierre joins the river at Bruinsburg, 
this bottom had so recently emerged from the 
river flood that it was impracticable for even 
skirmishers. This information the writer got 
from a Confederate officer who tried it. 

From Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, thirteen 
miles, the road is a little north of east. 
Bruinsburg, Port Gib.son, and Grand Gulf 
make three points of a triangle. The road 
from Grand Gulf is seven miles. On this 
road Bowen's forces from Grand Gulf, which 
is northwest of Port Gibson, were coming; 
also from Vicksburg, by way of Hankinson's 
Ferry over the Big Black River, which fetched 
them by roads north-northeast of Port Gib- 
son. The fortunate conjunction of the wet 
bottom along the river above Bruinsburg 
prevented direct interference from Grand 



— 46 — 



Gulf with the landing of troops, and Boaven 
decided that at Port Gibson was the place to 
make the stand, for tliat would cover the 
roads both to Vicksburg and Jackson. 

Tlie length of the ferriage from De Shroon's 
was six miles, and the embarking and land- 
ing of troops and artillery is not a quick 
operation by such means; but by 4 p. m. Mc- 
Clernand's column movea for the bluffs 
about three miles in the interior, reaching 
the upland before sunset, and pushing on in 
tlie night to reach Port Gibson. in time to pre- 
vent the enemy from destroying the bridges 
at that place over Bayou Pierre. At 1 o'clock 
a. m. the head ot* the column, nine miles 
from Bruinsbnrg, and four miles west of Port 
Gibson, struck a line of infantry and artillery: 
the head brigade dejiloyed, returned and 
silenced the fire, and then rested till morn- 
ing. 

Bowen's report shows that this was Gen. 
Green's force of about a thousand men, which 
had been sentforward into position the day be- 
fore, and which thereby was enabled to 
choose its ground. The rest of Bowen's 
forces were coming up during the night and 
next day. The Confederate line was on a 
range of hills running across two diverging 
and converging roads which parted about 
half a mile in front, and came together in the 
rear at Port Gibson, and were about two 
miles apart at the Confederate line. 

BowEN stated his number in a lumping way 
as 5,500. Grant, two days after tlie battle, 
wrote Halleck that it was 11,000. Tlie mat- 
ter is mixed by troops on the way from "Vicks- 
burg, and the absence of clear statement how 
many got into the engagement. Badeau 
quotes Grant's estimate, but does not give his 
own. The real number was probably be- 
tween the two. The only rational object 
BowEN could have in advancing to the fight 
was to hold Grant until force enough could 
be brought up to beat or drive him back to 
his boats. In any other view his fighting was 
folly, and, to a very great General, with 
such an overwhelming number on the ground 
and coming up. exposed his small force to be 
cut off and captured. As the battle was 
fought, however, its tactical object was only 
to drive Bowen from the ground. 

McCleknand's report states that his move- 
ment to the attack was along tiie two diverg- 
ing roads that led to the enemy's right and 
left, his reserves being where these two roads 



parted; that the first brigade of Oster- 
HAUs' division, at 5:30 a. m., encountered 
the enemy's right, and after an obstinate re- 
sistance drove them, when they fell back to 
cover and to a new and strong position. His 
second brigade came ud and he attacked the 
new position, but found insurmountable ob- 
stacles in the nature of the ground, and de- 
cided that a front attack at that point was 
impracticable. It was now 2 p. m., and about 
this time J. E. Smith's brigade of Gen. Lo- 
GAN'sdivisioncame up,and attempted the same 
position with the same result; thus, he says, 
"attesting the correctness of Gen. Osterhaus' 
admonition on that point." 

OsTERUAUs now demonstrated on the ene- 
my's right center, and at the .same time 
moved a strong force to his extreme right, 
and "personally leading a brilliant charge 
against it, routed the enemy, taking three 
pieces of cannon. A detachment of Smith's 
brigade" (J. E. Smith, Logan's division) 
"joined in the pursuit of the enemy to a 
point within a half a mile of Port Gibson." 

Gen. McClernand now takes up the opera- 
tions on his right. "At 6:15 a. m., when suffi- 
cient time had elapsed to allow Osterhats' 
attack to work a diversion in favor of my 
right, I ordered Gen. Carr to attack the ene- 
my's left. Gen. Benton's brigade promptly 
moved forward to the right of the main roail 
to Port Gibson. His way lay through woods, 
ravines, and a light canebrake; yethe pressed 
on until he found the enemy drawn up be- 
hind the crest of a range of hills intersected 
by the road. * * •■' The hostile lines im- 
mediately opened on each other, and an oli- 
stinate struggle ensued. 

Stone's brigade moved forward on the left 
of the. road into an open field and opened on 
the enemy's left center. "The action was 
now general, except at the center, where a 
continuation of fields, extending to the front 
of my line for more than a mile, separated the 
antagonists. The enemy had not dared to 
show himself in these fields, but continued 
to press my extreme right, with the hope, as 
I subsequently learned, of crushing it, and 
closing his concave line around me." Bowen's 
report shows that he made such an effort, and 
claims considerable progress in it. "Gen. 
HuVEY came up at an opportune moment, 
and reported his division to be on the ground." 
By the time Hovey had formed his division 
near the fork of the two roads, Smith's di^ 



<^ 



47 — 



vision came up, and Hovey moved forward 
to the support of Care's on the right. 

In the execution of this order Gen. McGinnis' 
brigade moved to the riglit front, in support of 
Benton's, encountering the same obstacles that, had 
been overcome by the latter. Col. Slack's brigade 
moved by the flank near the main road, and with- 
out much ditticulty gained its proper position to 
the left of McGinnis. During the struggle between 
Benton's brigade and the enemy, the former had 
moved to the right to secure its flank, and left a 
considerable gap between it and Stone's, The gap 
was ininiediately closed up by a portion of Gen. 
Hovey's division upon its arrival upon the ground 
assigned to it. The enemy's artillery was only 150 
yards in front, and was supported by a strong line 
of infantry, which, it was reported, had just been 
re-enforced, and was the occasion of the shout of 
the enemy distinctly heard about this time. 

To teruiiuate the sanguinary contest which had 
continued for several hours. Gen. Hovey oraered a 
charge, which was most gallantly executed, and re- 
sulted in the capture of 100 prisoners, two stands of 
colors, two twelve pounder howitzers, three cannon, 
and a considerable quanity of ammunition. A por- 
tion of Gen. Carr's division joined in this charge. 

Tlien conies this pleasant incidentr "About 
this time I heard that Maj. Gen. Grant had 
come up from Bruitisburg, and soon after had 
the pleasure of meeting him on the field." 
Without doubt the pleasure was mutual. 
There is said to be no brotherhood so warm as 
that of brothers in arms. By tiiis expression 
of pleasurable emotion does Gen. McCler- 
KAND ingeniously state the stage of the battle 
at the time when he first had the pleasure of 
the sight of Gen. Graxt. He continues: 

Determined to press my advantages, I oraered 
(iciis. Carr and Hovey to push the enemy with all 
vigor and celerity. This tliey did, beating him 
liack more tlian a mile, and frustrating all his en- 
deavors to make an immediate stand. ■'■'■ ••■ Re- 
turning to bring up the narrative of other opera- 
tions. Gen. Smith's division came up to Shaefler's 
about 7 a. m., aud just before Gen. Hovey moved 
to the support of Gen. Carr. The four divisions of 
my corns were now on the field, three of them actu- 
ally engaged, and the fourth eager to be. The last 
immediately moved forward into the fields in front 
of Shaetfer's house, aud together with a portion of 
Gen. Osterhaus' division, held the center, and at 
the same time formed a reserve. 

Tlie second position taken up by the enemy on 
my right front was stronger than tlie first. ■■'■ 

Having advanced until they had gained a bold 
ridge overlooking the bottom, Gens. Hovey's and 
Carr's divisions again encountered the enemy's fire. 
A hot engagement ensued, in the course ot which, 
discovering that the enemy was massing a formida- 



ble force on my right flank, I ordered Gen. Smith 
to send forward a brigade to support that flank. 
Burbridge's brigade moved rapidly forward for that 
purpose; meanwhile Gen. Hovey moved his artil- 
lery on the right, aud opened a partially enfilading 
and destructive fire on the enemy. The effect ot 
these combined movements was to force the enemy 
back upon his center with considerable loss. 

Here, with a large concentration of forces, he re- 
newed the attack, directing it against litiy right cen- 
ter. Gen. Carr met aud retaliated it with both in- 
fantry and artillery with great vigor. At the same 
time Landram's brigade of Gen. Smith's division, 
re-enforced by a detachment from Gen. Hovey's di- 
vision, forced its way through cane and underbrush 
and joined in Carr's attack. The battle was now 
transferred from the enemy's left to his center, and 
after an obstinate struggle he was again beaten back 
upon the high ridge on the opposite side of the 
bottom, and within a mile of Port Gibson. Gen. 
Stevenson's t)rigade of Logan's division came up iu 
time to assist in consummating this final result. 

The shades of night soon closed upon the stricken 
field, which the valor of our men had won and held, 
and upon which they found the first repose since 
they had left De Shroon's Landing twenty-four 
hours before. 

So much for Gen. McClernand. In his 
view he commanded, and his four divisions 
fought the battle, aided at the close by tv.'o 
brigades of Logan's division, one of which, J. 
A. Smith's, tried to carry a position on the 
left, against Osterhaus' admonition, and 
failed, and a detachment of which "joined in 
the pursuit of the enemy," when Osterhaus 
nuide his final successful charge on the left; 
the other, Gen. Stevenson's, "came up in 
time to assist in consummating the final re- 
sult on the right." 

Badeau narrates that "the artillery fire was 
heard at the landing, eight miles off", and 
CrRANT started at once for the front, arriving 
in tlie field at 10 a. m. on a borrowed horse 
[borrowed, a military term] and with no es- 
cort but his staff [also on borrowed horses]. 
He immediately assumed direct command." 
He narrates that "McClernand was pressing 
the rebels vigorously on the right with the 
bulk of his force, but Osterhaus' division on 
the left had not been so successful -■■ * * 
until two brigades of Logan's division in 
McPherson's corps appeared. * * * Mc- 
Pherson coming on the ground in person 
* * this was about noon. Grant at 
once directed him to throw John E. Smith's 
brigade to the support of Osterhaus, with 
instructions to advance on the left, and, if pos- 
sible, outrtank the enemy." 



-48 — 



"Grant and McPherson accompanied this 
brigade;'' therelore "'the movement was per- 
fectly successful." Logan seems to disappear 
in the presence of so many commanders "in 
person." Thus was Gen. Grant in command 
of the whole, and at the same time leading a 
brigade in a flank movement. "As soon as 
the position of the enemy could be definitely 
ascertained, and the ground sufficiently re- 
connoitered, a charge was made across the 
avine and on the rebel flank, simultaneously 
with a direct attack by Osterhaus in front. 
This combined effort soon drove the rebels 
from their position on Grant's left, and sent 
them in precipitate retreat toward Port Gib- 
son." And now it was before sunset. "Be- 
fore sunset their right was completely broken 
and swept awav." 

The principal difference between McCler- 
nand and Baueau in this is that Badeau has 
Grant and McPherson, "in person," with a 
brigade, take the affair out of the hands of 
Osterhaus and his division, and make the de- 
cisive operation; while McClernand has 
Osterhaus plan and carry out the finishing 
movement, assisted by a detachment from J. 
A. Smith's brigade. Badeau does not recog- 
nize Logan. 

He narrates that "McClernand, mean- 
while, notwithstanding the determined gal- 
lantry and steady progress of Hovey, Carr, 
and A. J. Smith, was sending repeated mes- 
sages to Grant for re-enforcements on the 
right, but his wishes were only partly grati- 
fied." Grant knew better than McClernand 
whether he needed re-enforcements. Grant's 
official report has this statement, and that 
McClernand, even before Logan had arrived 
with his two brigades, wanted both Logan's 
and Quinby's whole divisions. 

But he says he had been over there, and 
"could not see how they could be used there 
to advantage." However, when the two bri- 
gades of Logan's division arrived he sent one 
(Stevenson's) to McClernand; but Badeau 
says that before this "appeared on the right, 
the rebels had begun to withdraw, and the 
sight of fresh national troops added to their 
demoralization, although not to their discom- 
fiture, as Stevenson did not really become 
engaged." This gives to Stevenson's brigade 
even less weight in the final consummation 
than McClernand gives. But it supports 
Grant's judgment that he knew better than 
McClernand whether he needed re-enforce- 



ments, particularly when he had none to give 
him. 

The battle was fought bj' McClernand's 
corps of about 16,000, and two of Logan's di- 
visions, making about 19,000, according to 
Badeau. Except the difference made in the 
flanking movement on the left by one of Lo- 
gan's brigades, by Gen. Grant accompanying 
it in person— McPherson, Logan, and J. E. 
Smith being also present in person— the most 
material difference in the accounts is that 
McClernand fancied he was in tonimand, 
and he reports all the dispositions aiid move- 
ments as if he were the god of the machine; 
whereas Badeau says that at 10 a. m. Grant 
assumed direct command, and then led in 
person a brigade in a flanking movement. 
The probability is that the most essential 
presence in person was that of the volunteers 
of the ranks, and their immediate officers, 
the Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, Colonels, 
and Brigadiers, especially the men in the 
ranks. 



CHAPTER XXI. 

the day .\fter the battle — bridge build- 
ing — BOWEN'S ME.IT — KILLED AND WOUNDED — 
THE WAY THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT IN THE 
REPORTS — EMANCIPATION OF THE SOLDIERS 
FROM THE SLOUGH. 

The "last order" of Gen. Grant to Gen. 
McClernand at night after the battle shows 
an expectation of a renewal next day, and of 
a possible night attack from the enemy. 
Badeau quotes for admiration : 

Push the enemy with skirmishers well thrown 
out until it gets too dark to see him. Then phice 
your command on eligible ground wherever night 
ttiids you. Park yourartillery so as to command the 
surrounding country, and renew the attack at early 
dawn. If possible, push the enemy from the field 
or capture him. No camp fires should be allowed, 
unless in deep ravines aud to the rear of troops. 

Camp fires would reveal their presence to 
the enemy. Such energj' of orders, after a 
retreating foe, is more than half the battle. 
Says Badeau: 

Early on the morning of the 2d AlcCleriiand's 
troops, flushed with the success of the day before, 
and elated at the idea of tieiiig at last on dry land, 
with plenty of open country for operations, pushed 
into the town, finding no enemy but the wounded. 

This elation of the troops at getting out of 



49 — 



the swamps strangely forgets the hardening 
and inspiriting elTect whicli he liad before 
ascribed to the swamp labors. 

Grant immediately detached one brigade of Lo- 
gan's division to tlie left, to engage the attention of 
the rebels there, while a heavy detail of McCler- 
nand's troops was set to work rebuilding the bridge 
across the South Fork. The break was more than 
120 feet long, but was repaired with extraordinary 
rapidity, ollicers and men working up to their waists 
in water, and the houses in the neighborhood being 
torn down for limber. 

No further pursuit was made till afternoon, 
when another division of McPherson's corps 
(Crocker's) had come up from the river, and 
this corps now came to the front, McCler- 
nand's resting and falling to the rear. Mc- 
Pherson's report says of the above movement 
of one brigade to engage the enemy's atten- 
tion on tlie left: 

While waiting the construction of a bridge. Gen. 
Stevenson's brigade was moved down near the 
crossing of Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, 
to engage the attention of the enemy, who were 
strongly posted on the hills on the northern side. 

This position of the enemy, while they 
wanted only to retreat, is explained by Gen. 
Bowen's report, thus: 

The enemy attempted no pursuit, and all crossed 
in safety to this side of Bayou Pierre, destroying the 
bridges behind us. Gen. Baldwin, misled by the 
burning of the railroad bridge, and by rumors that 
it was the suspension bridge, took the road due 
north through Port Gibson, instead of the Grand 
Gulf road, and unfortunately destroyed the bridge 
over the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, cutting me oft' 
from most of the meat, which had oeen sent be- 
tween the two forks for safety. 

I had sent a train around to bring it all here, and 
some of the wagons were cut off. They are coming 
in, however, and I expect none will be lost. 1 am 
endeavoring to get it over a ferry on North Fork, 
and if I do not succeed, shajl at all events try to de- 
stroy it. I ordered all the commissary stores left in 
town (mainly corn) to be burned. 

Thus was Bowen holding a bold rear to get 
away his meat, while Gr.\nt was engaging his 
attention to cover the building of the bridge. 
Bade,\u says: "While this was doing two 
brigades of Logan's division forded the bayou 
and marched on." 

McPherson, however, shows that the two 
brigades made a detour to southeast three 
miles, to find a ford across South Fork, which 
gave them nine miles of marching to get to a 
point three miles advanced beyond Port Gib- 



son. This was good marching, btit through 
the several circumstances the pursuit did not 
begin till after 4 p. m., at which hour the 
bridge was ready. 

The South Fork, running northwest, crosses, 
a mile northeast of the town, the road which 
runs northeast from Port Gibson, and keeps 
on the same course two miles further, to junc- 
tion with North Fork, which running west 
southwest, crosses the same road five and a 
half miles northeast of Port Gibson. 

While the pursuit pauses is a time to 
sum up tiie results of the battle. Bowen had 
made an orderly retreat from all but Badeau. 
He stated his losses at 448 killed and 
wounded, and 384 missing. His wounded fell 
into Grant's hands. The temptation to count 
these once as wounded, and again as prisoners, 
was so strong in this campaign as to make it 
pardonable to the historian. Grant's reports 
never descended to such a detail as the casual- 
ties. Badeau says they were 848 killed and 
woiinded. McClernand's report states the 
losses of his four divisions in detail, making 
an aggregate of 803, and leaving 45 to Logan's 
two brigades. McClernand says two guns 
were taken; Grant wrote Halleck four; 
Badeau says six; these above two were 
counted from the field guns disabled and left 
at Grand Gulf. 

Badeau gives all the credit to the gallantry 
of McClernand's division commanders. This 
is an instance of the radical difference between 
a real General and a mere volunteer Gen- 
eral, who has taken it up by instinct. For in 
all of Gen. Grant's battles, as narrated by 
Badeau, Grant directs and carries out every 
movement in every part, division, brigade, 
and regiment, and his genius so pervades all 
parts that every detail of success is his own; 
while, on the other hand, ill fortune in any 
part is because of incompetency in subordi- 
nates. But although McClernand imagined 
that he had commanded in a successful bat- 
tle, yet, being a mere volunteer, or political 
General, the success was gained in spite of 
him, by the gallantry of his Generals of 
divisions. All the accounts show the splen- 
did gallantry of the soldiers of the ranks, 
and of their immediate officers. It was a 
stand up fight against brave troops, aided 
by a strong position, and the victory was won 
by valor, and not by tactics. 

Whether, with at least twice the enemy's 
nnmber, and with more arriving as fast as 



50 



they could be fcrrieil. to lose at the least as 
many killed and wounded — probably twice 
as many — as the enemy, who would have 
been forced to a precipitate retreat if his posi- 
tion had been turned, was as well as general- 
ship could do, is not for this review to pro- 
nounce upon; for this review is simply his- 
torical, and has not the high ambition of mili- 
tary criticism. It was a question for Gen. 
Grant, but it does not appear that the ques- 
tion how to use superior numbers to save his 
own troops entered much into Gen. Grant's 
tactics. It came to be thought in our war 
that victories were great in proportion to the 
killed and wounded of our own men. Gen. 
McClernand's i-eport gave this ojiiinion: 

This, the battle of Port Gibson, on Bayou Pierre, 
was one of the most admirably and successfully 
fought battles in which it lias been my lot to partic- 
ipate since the present unhappy war commenced. 
If not a decisive battle, it was determinate of the 
brilliant series of successes that followed. 

As Gen. McClernand claims to have ar- 
ranged and directed the fighting of the battle, 
he may be accepted as the most competent 
judge; and he gives conspicuous credit to his 
subordinate Generals — a matter of detail 
which Baueau habitually omits. 

Gen. Grant, however, gave to the whole of 
McClernand's report of this campaign the 
following indorsement: 

Respectfully forwarded. This report contains 
so many inaccuracies that to correct it, to make a 
fair report to be handed down as historical, would 
require the rewriting of most of it. It is preten- 
tious and egoti.-tical, as is sufficiently shown by 
my own and all other reports accompanying. 

That Gen. Grant has a severely critical 
judgment of what a fair report should be, to 
be handed down as historical, from which all 
egotism is eliminated, no reader of his ma- 
tured conclusions in Badeau's history can 
cjiiestion. 

For Gen. McClernand, who narrates that 
he planned the battle, to set down in a public 
record that it "was one of the most admirably 
and successfully fought in which it has been 
my lot to participate," does carry the sound 
of egotism to the ear. Yet when it is consid- 
ered that, besides Arkansas Post, which was 
his own, the only battles in which he had 
ever participated were those of Grant, and 
that at Belmont Grant had to excuse the 
afifair by the very unfortunate plea of the 



lack of discipline of the troops he had long 
trained; that at Donelson McClernand's di- 
vision was doubled back, and Wallace's with 
it, while Grant was unaccountably absent, 
and that the only other battle was at Pitts- 
burg Landing, it is found that his compara- 
tive ascription is exceedingly moderate. 

But in spite of the killing and wounding of 
848 brave men, the battle gave new life to the 
soldiers. Save to the survivors from Donel- 
son, it was their first victory under Grant. 
After their dreadful experience in the Slough 
of Despond it was emancipation. True, it 
was only a soldier's life still, in a campaign of 
great hardship, but it was their first taste of a 
soldier's life for at least six months — and such 
dreadful months! And the footing which 
they had now gained opened the way to suc- 
cess bj' the work of a soldier which every vol- 
unteer could'see. And none of them doubted 
the result if led straight on to Vicksburg. No 
one but their Commanding General was in 
doubt, and that doubt was now to cause him 
a severe mental conflict. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

retreat of the enemy across the big black 
river — the pursuit — enemy leave grand 

GULF — grant's mental STRUGGLE BETWEEN 
THE PORT HUDSON PLAN AND A FORWARD MOVE- 
MENT. 

In the afternoon of the 2d Crocker's di- 
vision, of McPherson's corps, had come up, 
and the bridge was done, and says Badeau: 
'"Grant now ordered McPherson to 'push 
across the bayou and attack the enemy in 
tlank, in full retreat through Willow Springs, 
demoralized, and out of ammunition.' " The 
way that Grant's military intuitions could 
tell McPherson in what state to find the en- 
emy is shown further along. He had found 
telegrams from Bowen to Pemberton stating 
that "'he had been compelled to fall back, his 
ammunition having become exhausted." 

McPherson "started at once, and before 
night his two divisions had crossed the South 
Fork and marched to the North Fork, eight 
miles further on" (five and a half miles from 
Port Gibson). "They found the bridge at 
Grindstone Ford still burning, but the fire 
was extinguished and the bridge repaired in the 
night, the troops passing over as soon as the 



— 51 — 



last plank was laid. This was at 5 a. m. on 
tlie 3d. Before one brigade had finished cross- 
ing, the enemy opened on the head of the 
column with artillery, but tlie command was 
at once deploj^ed and the rebels soon fell 
back." And thus it continued all the way to 
Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black River, 
tliirteen miles from Port Gibson, over which 
BowEN had crossed with all his troops and 
trains, including those from Grand Gulf. 

BowKN had saved his bacon, and had made 
an orderly retreat from all but the "demoral- 
izing" Biideau. At Willow Springs a road 
ran west to Grand Gulf, and Logan diverged 
on this road; but, after marching five miles, he 
heard that Grand Gulf was abandoned, and 
he then fetciied a turn back into the road of 
jiursuit north. The advance of the pursuit 
reached the bridge at Hankinson's Ferry at 
night, in time to save the bridge from the 
enemy's last men, who were then trying to 
destroy it. The conversion of this ferry to a 
bridge had been recent. The manner was 
told the writer hereof by a Confederate officer, 
in charge of a company of sharpshooters, who 
was far in the rear of the retreating column as a 
sort of rear guard, in the nature of skirmish- 
ers. 

The two flatboats of the ferry had been 
placed end to end, and at that stage of tlie 
river they just spanned it. Bowen had found 
this bridge good enough for his artillery and 
wagons. By suljsidence of the river the boats 
had become jammed between banks. The 
rear party could not move them, and they 
would not burn. To scuttle them was vain, 
as they would not sink, and could be easily 
patched up. The men cut levers from the 
woods and were trying to pry the end off. 
Tlieir guns were stacked in the road, and part 
were working to dislocate the bridge, and 
otliers were washing their feet in the river or 
otherwise taking things easy, all unconscious 
of the approach of a party of "Federal" cav- 
alry along the farms on the left bank of tlie 
river further down. 

Tlie river at the ferry makes a short bend 
round to northwest. Trees along the nar- 
row bottom on the other side had veiled the 
coming of the cavalry, and when they 
emerged from this cover they were in a posi- 
tion to rake the rear of the bridge party, 
across a river so narrow that two flatboats 
spanned it. They quickly dismounted be- 
hind the trees, came forward, and opened fire. 



The bridge party abridged the order of their 
going, and went at once. A causeway on the 
north side led from the ferry through a 
quarter or half a mile of bottom to the up- 
land. This wooded bottom, from recent over- 
flow, was a swamp. Into this cover the Con- 
federates made a precipitate flank movement. 
From behind trees they returned the fire. 

Soon another "Federal" party came up the 
road with two guns, which were whirled about 
and let drive. This made their cover insuf- 
ficient. Wlien they emerged from the 
swamp, out of range, their Confederate 
gray was converted to the more in- 
digenous butternut. Bowkn meanwhile had 
bivouacked for the night, two miles ahead. 
Thus did Grant, the child of luck, come in 
possession of a bridge over the only obstacle 
on the direct road to Vicksburg. 

McPhekson's troops rested for the night 
and following days, from Hankinson's Ferry 
back to Willow Springs. Badeau relates that 
by this time Grant perceived that the Con- 
federate "movements since the battle had all 
been made to cover the escape of the gar- 
rison" of Grand Gulf. "Accordingly, on the 
morning of the 3d Grant started from Wil- 
low Springs in person with one brigade of 
Logan's division, and a cavalry escort of 
twenty men, for the town." This start, how- 
ever, was not till after McPherson's "gaining 
the crossroads" from the retreating enemy, 
which must have been late in the forenoon, 
and after T>ogan had taken that road. "On 
the way he learned that the rebels had aban- 
doned all the country between the Big Black 
River and the Bayou Pierre," therefore he 
kept on with only the cavalry escort. 

He "found the naval force in possession " 
The "cannon had been buried or spiked, 
while the garrison had begun its retreat at 8 
o'clock the evening before." Badeau gives 
Grant's energetic and minute orders for the 
dispositions of his army for that night and 
following. McPherson was to hold the line 
from Hankinson's back to Willow Springs 
and beyond. McClernand was to "guard 
the roads in the rear," to "watch the enemy's 
movements far down the Bayou Pierre," and 
to "make a reconnaissance in that direction 
with one division." This employment of tlie 
larger part in guarding and far reconnoiter- 
ing in the rear, after Grant had "learned 
that the rebels had already abandoned all the 
country between Big Black River and Bayou 



— 52 — 



Pierre," proves that the Holly Springs lesson 
had not been thrown away on Grant. 

Grant's tactics were still on the Port Hud- 
son plan. Says Badeau: 

Grant's intention was to collect all his forces at 
Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of pro- 
visions and ordnance stores, and in ihe meantime 
to detach a corps to co-operate with Banks against 
Port Hudson, and so effect a junction of their 
forces. 

The change of this plan from a retreat to 
an advance was to cost Grant a severe men- 
tal conflict, which was even now shadowing 
him. The issue was the crisis of that cam- 
paign and of his military life. He had 
gained the long desired secondary base for the 
withdrawal to Port Hudson; shall he con- 
tinue on that reverse movement or turn and 
go forward to victory? 

He had uttered the Port Hudson plan to 
Halleck and Lincoln as from the ripened 
experience of his defeated swamp under- 
takings. He had reiterated the promise that, 
once at Grand Gulf, he would turn all his 
mind to "opening the Mississippi River," and 
would do it by sending a corps to Banks. He 
liad promised Banks 20,000 men with such 
precision of time- as would make him plan 
upon this his operations in his great depart- 
ment. The Port Hudson plan had played a 
strategical part to stop a gap — that is to say, a 
yawp of people in the rear. Shall he now 
abandon all his promises? And what if, 
having so abandoned, he should fail in the 
new plan! 

On the other hand was tlie terrible tempta- 
tion of a retreating enemy. Tlie universal 
instinct is to pursue the flying. Badeau says 
that Grant's great tactical rule was to let his 
"movements be governed by those of the 
enemy." The spirit of his soldiers had re- 
bounded from the Slough of Despond, and 
they were eager to go forward. Great gen- 
erals have said that the high spirit of troops 
inspires the commander. The indomitable 
spirit of these volunteers, which not all their 
dreadful swamp experience could crush, was 
enough to lift any commander above himself. 
l^ADEAU says that Grant himself "felt the in- 
spiration of success." The novel taste of 
victory had given him an awakening; like as 
the pet tiger, brought up from a kitten in the 



household, unconscious of his nature, ex- 
periences an illumination at the accidental 
taste of living blood. 

But while this conflict raged, the forward 
movement waited from the night of the 3d 
till the 11th, during which the only move- 
ments were for convenience in "living otF the 
country." and as Badeau says with mysteri- 
ous strategy, "were in the nature of develop- 
ments." Meanwhile the Confederacy shook 
with desire, vastly transcending its ability of 
performance, to gather forces to crush the in- 
vader. Fortunately, living off the country 
was good; for the impossibility of feeding the 
army by supplies battled from Milliken's 
Bend was already found. Grant said: "We 
picked up all the teams in the country, and 
free Africans to drive them. Forage and 
meat were found in abundance through the 
country." 

To Sherman, who, following in the gleaned 
part, was concerned for the future. Grant 
wrote: "You are in a country where the 
troops have already lived off the people for 
some days, and may find provisions more 
scarce; but as we get upon new soil they are 
more abundant, particularly in corn and 
cattle." 

The way of running supply boats past the 
Vicksburg guns had also been found to have 
too large a discount. The last that is told of 
this is that on the 30th "orders were issued to 
the Chief Commissary and Quarternuister of 
the command to prepare two more tugs to 
run the blockade, each with two barges in 
tow, and to load them to their full capacitj' 
with rations." Badeau tells not what became 
of them. Peimberton's report states that his 
guns sank two of them. Perhaps the fate of 
all by the time they had run Warrenton and 
Grand Gulf was too sad for utterance. 

Grant, at Grand Gulf, issued vigorous orders 
for the forwarding of supplies from Milli 
ken's Bend. The base was changed from 
Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf, thus shortening 
the wagon route on the west side to sixty 
miles. He also wrote Halleck, without any 
mention of future movement. After writing 
dispatches till midnight, Badeau says, 
dramatically: "At midnight of the 3d he 
turned his back on the Mississippi River, and 
started for HankinsOn's Ferry," 



— 53 — 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

GEN. grant's battle BULLETINS — GENIUS OF BO- 
NAPARTE — ARRIVAL OF THE BIOGRAPHER — LIxM- 
ITATIONS of the LAY REVIEWER OF MILITARY 
OPERATIONS. 

From Grand Gulf Gen. Grant wrote Gen. 
Halleck a report of his operations since the 
29th of April, giving this view of the battle: 

On the following: day the whole force with me 
wns transferred to Bruinsbur.s, * "•' * and the 
inarch immediately commenced for Port Gibson. 
Gen. McClernand was in the advance with the 13th 
Army Corps. About 2 a. m. on the 1st of May, 
when about four miles from Port Gibson, he met 
the enemy. Some little skirmishing tools place, but 
not to any great extent. 

The 13lh Corps was followed by Logan's di- 
vision of McPherson's corps, which reached the 
scene of action as soon as the last of the 13th 
Corps was out of the road. The fighting continued 
all day and until dark, over the most broken coun- 
try I ever saw. " - It was impossible to en- 
gage any considerable portion of our force at any 
one time. The enemy were driven from point to 
point toward Port Gibson, until night closed in, 
under which it was evident to me they intended to 
retreat. 

The pursuit was continued after dark until the 
enemy was met again by Logan's division, about 
two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the 
country is sucli that further pursuit in the dark was 
not deemed practicable or desirable. On the 2d 
our troops moved into town without finding any 
enemy but the wounded. 

. Gen. Grant in this does not seem aware 
that the battle was more tlian a heavy and 
protracted skirmish. He puts Logan's whole 
division into a prominent place, although 
Badeau says that only two of Logan's four 
brigades came up, and only one of these got 
engaged. 

In the matter of giving honor Grant had 
this generous conclusion: "Where all have 
done so well it would be out of place to make 
invidious distinction." 

After he had written this letter he wrote a 
telegram giving an enlarged view, making 
the battle general and decided, routing the 
enemy, and leaving out the circumstance of 
McClernand's being in the advance. This 
would be that account which would go to the 
country: 

We landed at Bniinsburg April 30, moved imme- 
diately on Port Gibson, met the enemy ll.OOOstrong 
four milos south of Port Gibson at 2 a. m., and en- 
gaged him all day, entirely routing him, with the 
loss of many killed, and about 500 prisoners beside 



the wounded. Our loss about 100 killed and 500 
wounded. 

The enemy retreated toward Vicksburg, destroy- 
ing the bridges over the two torks of Bayou Pierre. 
Tiiese were rebuilt and the pursuit continued till 
the present time. Besides the heavy artillery at 
this place, four field pieces were captured certain, 
some stores, and the enemy driven to destroy much 
more. The country is the most nroken and diffi- 
cult to operate in I ever saw. Our victory has been 
most complete, and the enemy thoroughly demor- 
alized. 

By this ingenious arrangement the great 
and decisive battle and brilliant victory 
would go to the country, with the glory of it 
appropriated by a "We," while the modified 
battle and undecided result, with McCler- 
nand in the advance, would go to Halleck to 
fix T^IcClernand's status. 

The war bulletin is a standing simile fu» 
truthfulness. Cesar's "Veni, vidi, vici" is 
the classic model upon which the finest war 
bulletins are only an expansion. That master 
of the art of war, Bonaparte, was master of 
the art of war bulletins. Possession of the 
latter genius is presumptive evidence of pos- 
session of Bonaparte's genius in the other. 

In the appendix Gen. Grant's military 
historian says he gives copies of all dispatches 
between Grant and Halleck during the en- 
tire Vicksburg campaign. This care for the 
completeness of the record enables the reader 
to perceive that the information given by the 
dispatches was of the same high order as that 
which invented the several plans of this 
"anomalous campaign." 

This- care for historical completeness brings 
next in the order of the record,. following 
Grant's improved account of the battle of Port 
Gibson, the following, which, although of 
but two lines, is greatest in consequences: 
"Gen. Grant to Gen. L. Thomas, Hankin- 
son's Ferry, Miss., May 5, 1863. I have the 
honor to request that Capt. Adam Badeau, A. 
A. D. C, be ordered to report to me for duty 
.on my staff." A divine jioet has enipliasized 
the slenderness of the thread on which future 
events are suspended. From this dispatch of 
two lines came the historj% in three volumes, 
which is the authority of this admiring his- 
torical review. From this, Capt. Adam Ba- 
deau grew to be Gen. Badeau. From a line 
of soft places in the army he evolved to the 
post of Con.sul General at London, which is 
held to be the softest place abroad in the gift 
of the government. 



— 54 — 



This soft seat, in the course of twelve years, 
enabled him to finish in elegant leisure his 
second and third volumes, and to have tliem 
duly revised by tlieir illustrious hero. From 
thence he was transferred to the light and 
genteel occupation of Minister to Copen- 
hagen. Thus does the great republic give the 
lie to the tradition of the old world despot- 
isms, that an autocratic government, with 
pensions in its unlimited hands, is essential 
to the encouragement of literature. 

Capt. Adam Badeau, A. A. D. C, was not a 
West Pointer — to use the military idiom — 
but his constant perception of the immeasur- 
able difference between a volunteer and a 
West Pointer makes him almost one. 
Besides, his confidential relation to 
Gen. Grant, on his staff, enrich- 
ing his mind to write his military life, 
sharing, as it were, his bed and board — ]:)oard, 
a dry metaphor — hearing from his own Ups 
the maxims of the art of war, must have 
been a better military education than the 
mere rudiments taught at West Point. 

The tradition holds that Adam Badeau had 
served a term in the noble profession of iour- 
nalisra, and that he acquired his facility in 
that elevated and impartial style which treats 
alike the most commonplace doings and the 
brightest achievements of his hero with the 
same siiperlative ascription, from practice in 
a rural journal, in the composition of de- 
scriptionsof interesting natural and abnormal 
productions — mammoth squashes, cabbage 
heads of uncommon development, dreadful 
accidents, multitudinous births, misbegotten 
monsters,, testimonial gifts of garden sauce 
(pro. sass) to the editor, fat lambs, majestic 
rams, prize bulls, swine who have carried to 
the ultimate the self-culture which is only 
the working of Nature's great law of the sur- 
vival of the fittest, which develops alike the 
best pork of commerce and the greatest Gen- 
erals. 

The same tradition holds tiiat his reverse 
style of stricture toward all of Gen. Grant's 
subaltern Generals came also from the jour- 
nalistic habit of critical animadversion upon 
the negative virtues of the contemporary ed- 
itor over the way. Whether this tradition 
was fetched through the method of the sci- 
entific and theological people, to reason from 
effect back to cause, or whether it is strictly 
biographical, can not be material, as the re- 
sult is the same; and this result is a work 



of great service to the student of the art of 
war in its highest reaches. 

The military art hath the peculiar property 
that it is most abstruse and technical in the 
elementary parts, as the school of the soldier, 
the section, platoon, company, and so on, 
and grows more simple — or rather more 
in the line of general knowledge and general 
aptitude — in the higher branches of grand 
tactics and strategy. Thus one may be scholar, 
scientist, statesman, or editor of a daily jour- 
nal, and yet not know how to do or command 
the facings, the manual of arms, the loading 
by twelve commands; how to give the com- 
mands to form line into column and column 
into line; how to give the orders or do the 
genuflections of that most abstruse part of a 
military training, the dress parade. 

But the practice of the higher branches, the 
tactics by which battles are fought, or the 
strategy which plans campaigns, embracing 
the whole theater of war, is set forth by 
generals and historians to the understanding 
of the common mind. This draws the line 
between the military things, which the "lay" 
reader or commentator may understand, and 
the military things which are understood 
only by those technically educated. 

Even Adam Badeau, who keeps to the view 
the impassable gulf between officers who 
were educated at the institute, and officers 
who were not, recognizes that tlie popular 
mind can comprehend the doings of stupend- 
ous strategy and grand tactics which he re- 
counts of Gen. Grant. When the military 
biographer himself sets forth exercises of the 
highest parts of military science for the ad- 
miration of the common people, it can not 
be presumptuous in the common mind to ap- 
preciate them. Thus doth the reviewer mod- 
estly, but firmly, assert his otlice. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

GRANT, AFTER A LONG MENTAL STRUCitiT.K, DETER- 
MINES TO ABANDON HIS PORT HUDSON PLAN 
AND TURN AGAINST VICKSBURG — THE DEBATE — 
BRACING TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STAN- 
TON — PRIVATIONS OF THE COMMANDING GEN- 
ERAL. 

With Grand Gulf in Gen. Grant's posses- 
sion, the way now lay open before him to 
carry out his Port Hudson plan. Tlie im- 



— 55 — 



pregnable rearintrenclinients which he fountl 
would enable him to hold against the enemy 
from Vicksburg, while waiting with part of 
his army besieged, for the Port Hudson part 
to go, view, conquer, and return, fetching the 
deliverer Banks with it. 

Nothing was now needed to put this plan 
on the high road to success but the invention 
of some means of supplying the army, the 
finding of some means to get the 20,000 men 
to Port Hudson, and to get them back again, 
and a few other details. For there were not 
means to transport them by the river, and if 
20,000 men were to start to march that dis- 
tance in the enemy's country, they would 
liardl}^ get there, and it was as unlikely that 
Banks could fetch his troops up to Vicksburg. 
This clear way, and Gen. Grant's long attach- 
ment to the Port Hudson plan, which was 
the cherished child of his own brains, made 
him very loth to give it up. 

Besides, one more new plan might be the 
last feather to break the back of the long suf- 
fering confidence of Halleck, Lincoln, and 
Stanton. A fortunate decision seems to 
make much argument unnecessary; but 
Badeau, out of his abundance, gives much 
argument against the Port Hiidson plan. 
Most of the reasons are of the impracticability 
of the plan, which were as obvious at Mil- 
liken's Bend as now, but which he represents 
Grant as unaware of till he reached Grand 
Gulf by the rear. In this it is likely that 
Badeau does Grant but scant justice; for the 
military necessity to get away from Vicks- 
burg by some way that should seem for the 
time to go forward, could not allow Grant to 
consider any impossible things that were sev- 
eral weeks off. 

Badeau classes the reasons against the Port 
Hudson plan as the negative, the reasons for 
going toward Vicksburg as the positive, and 
he has such a wealth of negative reasons that 
he omits the small ones, to wit: that Grant 
had not means to feed his army; nor to keep 
the part left at Grand Gulf from being cut off 
from its supplies, nor to get 20,000 men to 
Port Hudson without capture, or to get them 
back again. Among his negative rea.sons he 
gives the following two as especially decisive 
in efi'ect: 

First, "Grant was now fifteen miles [in 
fact ten] on the road from Grand Gulf eitl^r 
to Jackson, Black River bridge, or Vicksburg. 



He could not afford to delay, much less to re- 
trace his steps." 

Grant had not yet learned patience by de- 
lay; yet no one asked him to delay the march 
on Port Hudson. But Nature's strict econo- 
my ceases to nourish those parts which are 
disused. After Gen. Grant had constantly 
exercised his army in the movements of the 
Holly Springs campaign, the Lake Provi- 
dence, Chickasaw Bayou, and Steele's Bayou 
operations, and in a march of seventy miles 
to get away from Vicksburg — ever, like poor 
Joe in Bleak House, moving on — it had lost 
the use of the step retracing muscles. 

Second, he had at this "crisis" (mental) 
received a letter from Banks, stating that he 
could not be at Port Hudson before the 10th. 

Grant answered this letter on the 10th, 
.showing that he could not have received it 
earlier than the 9th. Inasmuch as Grant 
could not get 20,000 men to Port Hudson in less 
than a fortnight, if at all, it appears quite re- 
markable that in Badeau's subsequent view, 
indorsed by Grant, it was Banks' inability to 
be there before the 10th that made Grant re- 
solve to turn his back on Banks. 

This also helps to find the time when this 
mental conflict determined. Grant wrote 
Banks, May 10, the following apology, in 
which, however, he said nothing of Banks' 
being behind time: 

It was my intention on gaining a foothold at 
Grand (julf to have sent a sufficient eforce to Port 
Hudson to have insured tJie fall of that place, with 
your eo-operatioi!, or rather to have co-operated 
with you to secure that end. 

Meeting the enemy as I did, however, I followed 
him to the Big Black, and could not afford to re- 
trace my steps. I also learned, and believe the in- 
formation to be reliable, that Port Hudson is almost 
entirely evacuated. This may not be true, but it is 
the concurrent testimony of deserters and contra- 
bands. Many days can not elapse before the battle 
will begin which is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, 
but it is impossible to predict how Ions it may last. 
I would urgenll*- request, therefore, that you jom 
me, or send all the force you can spare, lo co-operate 
in the great struggle for opening the Mississippi 
Kiver. 

The great playwright has given touching 
expression to Sir John Falfstafi's knightly cha- 
grin when he had sent Bardolph to the mercer 
for a new sitit of satin bravei-y, with his own 
and Bardolph's names, and the mercenary 
dealer had sent back a request for better se- 
curity : 



— 56 — 



I had as lief they would put ratsbane in my 
mouth as offer to stop it with security. I looked a' 
should have sent me two and twenty yards of satin, 
as I am a true knisht, and he sends me security! 

Alike rueful must have beeu the feelings of 
Gen. Banks, who, for more than six weeks, 
liad been imminently promised 20,000 men 
by Gen. Grant, when in answer to a letter 
announcing his readiness for the co-operation 
lie received this request to drop Louisiana and 
the Mississippi and fetcli all his forces to 
Grant, "to co-operate in the great struggle for 
opening the Mississippi River." 

During the time in which Grant had been 
engaged in his Port Hudson plan, and 
had been promising 20,000 men im- 
mediately to Gen. Banks, he had 
been enjoying an active experience. His 
force was 30,000 men when he took command, 
December 11, 18G2, and he was assured of the 
co-operation of Grant at Vicksburg. The 
Confederates thought Louisiana our weak 
spot, and were active in West Louisiana and 
Texas, favored by a country which was al- 
most inaccessible. To hold New Orleans, 
with its many protecting forts and ap- 
proaches, required the larger part of his corps, 
so that his movable force was less than 14,000 
men, while the Confederate force at Port Hud- 
son was 18,000. Leaving the fort to the 
future, he had taken the field in the Atcha- 
falaya country with considerable success. But 
he was recalled by an urgent call from Ad- 
miral FarAagut to send a force to co-operate 
in recovering command of the river above 
Port Hudson. 

This had been lost by the activity of some 
rebel gunboats, which sallied out from branch 
rivers and bayous, and which had captured 
the ram Queen of the West, and the gunboat 
De Soto, from Grant's navy. The Admiral 
declared it necessary to run the Port Hudson 
batteries, now very formidable, and Banks 
sent his troops to the rear to co-operate. The 
naval operation was costly.* The frigates 
Hartford, Mississippi, Richmond, and Monon- 
gahela, and the seagoing gunboats Albatross, 
Genesee, Kiueo, Essex, and Sachem made tlie 
attempt. The Mississippi, the largest ship, 
was lost. Tlie Hartford and Albatross got by. 
Tlie rest dropped back variously hurt. And 
now Banks took the field again in West 
Louisiana, in co-operation with the navy, for 
which he was blamed by Halleck in his 
annual report, who thought that with his 



14,000 men he should have besieged the fort-^ 
ascertained positively, afterward, to have had 
16,000 men. 

Aided by some light draught gunboats, 
which had now come from Porter's fleet, he 
followed Gen. Dick Taylor to the Atchafa- 
laya, opened up that to the Red River, cap- 
tured Alexandria and Fort De Russy. seized 
two rebel steamers, and destroyed eight, and 
three gunboats. These operations were ac- 
complished by May 9, and now Gen. Banks 
was ready to co-operate with the 20,000 men 
promised by Grant to capture Port Hudson 
and open the Mississippi River. And now. 
May 12, he received Grant's letter of the 10th 
that, having succeeded at Grand Gulf, he 
could not setid him the long promised army 
corps; but applying an emollient to his dis- 
appointment by asking him to come with all 
his force and join him in the great operation 
to open the Mississippi River. 

In the military operations that are read of, 
when the two armies join issue, it is expected 
that the verdict will soon come. But Gen. 
Grant informs Banks that "many days can 
not elapse before the battle will begin which 
is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, but it is 
impossible to predict how long it may last;" 
as if it might be like freedom's battle, which, 
once begun, is bequeathed from bleeding sire 
to son. 

To make the way entirely clear to Banks, 
Grant gave him the valuable information 
that Port Hudson was evacuated. Subse- 
quently Banks found it sufficiently defended 
to resist an assault. Had Banks started on 
this chase he would have given up Louisiana 
and the Lower Mississippi to the Confederates. 
He had no means to transport his troops by 
the river, and the march by land would have 
been a march into captivity. 

So much for the negative reasons. But 
Badeau says "the positive ones were of 
greater force, as they always were with this 
commander." He "had won a victory" — an 
unwonted sensation; "had gained a foothold 
on the high land and on the east bank that 
he had been five months striving to obtain;" 
"his troops were encouraged, and the enemy 
demoralized;" he "felt the inspiration of 
success;" "it was his nature in war always to 
prefer the immediate aggressive;" so "he de- 
termined that night to detach no force 
a^j^iinst Banks, but to begin operations against 
Vicksburg." He wrote this to Banks, dated 



— 67 



the 10th. And now Badeau says the matter 
was determined; but even after this tlie 
movements seemed tentative. Badeau says 
they ''were in the nature of developments." 
Having finally cast off his Port Hudson 
plan, according to Badeau, as the snake eman- 
cipates liimself from his own skin, and de- 
termined to begin operations against Vicks- 
burg, the next thing was to plan the opera- 
tions. In this does Badeau take the reader 
into the highest reachesof strategy, wliich will 
come in the next chapter. But before passing 
too far the order of events, the record shouUl 
be brought up by giving the following dis- 
patch, which honors Secretary Stanton's head 
and heart and other viscera, and which proves 
that the Assistant Secretary of War's im- 
pressions at Grant's luxurious headquarters 
on one of the largest steamers of the chartered 
fleet, illuminated by the generous hospitalities 
of liis staff and circle of Generals, had been 
duly transmitted to his cliief : 

Hon. E. M. Stanton to C. A. Dana, Esq.— (Cipher 
Telegram.) 

Washington, D. C, May 6, 1863. 
Gen. Grant has full and absolute authority to en- 
force his own commands, and to remove any per- 
son wno by ignorance in action or any cause inter- 
feres with or delays his operations. He has tlie full 
contideuceof the government, is expected to en- 
force his authority, and will be firmly and heartily 
supported, but he will be responsible for any fail- 
ure to exert his powers. You may communicate 
this to him. 

The authority was plenary, but the time 
inopportune; for the removal of McClernand 
would reach the people on the heels of news 
of a victory in whicli he thought he com- 
manded. But this was now only a question 
of opportunity, and the Port Gib.son victory 
made it imperative. 

Personal incidents in the lives of great men 
are those whicii oftenest remind us that we 
may make our lives sublime. Badeau gives 
only its due prominence to an instance of 
Gen. Grant's submission to privation in this 
•'anomalous campaign." 

He narrates that "while lying af Hankin- 
son's Ferry the horses and personal luggage 
[he means baggage] of Gen. Grant and his 
staff arrived at headquarters. Up to this 
time he and his officers had messed with any 
General near whose camp they happened to 
halt, riding borrowed horses [borrowed, |a 
military term], and sleeping in the porches of 



the houses on the road. When he left Hard 
Times Grant took no baggage [he means lug- 
gage] with him but a toothbrush." 

This picture of Grant's privation has eli- 
cited much admiration. A commanding 
General with no luggage (or baggage) but a 
toothbrush, and messing arotind on other offi- 
cers! To avoid unwholesome thinking, B.\- 
DEAU mentions the important fact that he 
borrowed a shirt of the navy at Grand Gulf. 
Yet each common soldier had his knapsack 
with all his Inggage and baggage, which, like 
the immortal John Brown, he carried 
strapped upon his back as he went marching 
on; also his faithful companions, the musket, 
bayonet, and cartridge box with forty plump 
cartridges; likewise his haversack with three 
days' rations, which he was "ordered to make 
last five;" and although the weather was hot, 
yet so luxuriously were they provided that 
each carried on his shoulder an army 
blanket. 

They had all this baggage and luggage with 
them wherever they went, in their marching 
by night and fighting by day, and when they 
slept, which was not cramped by the "'galler- 
ies" of planters' houses, btit was under 
heaven's broad canopy. So luxuriously were 
the common volunteer soldiers cared for, 
while their Commanding General, who had 
left luxury's lap to serve his country on the , 
l)ay of a mere Major General, took n.o baggage 
(or Inggage) with him but a '■toothbrush," 
and liad no place to lay his head save in the 
houses borrowed of the planters by the way- 
side. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

% 

THE CAMPAIGiN ARRIVES AT THE STAGE OF BRILL- 
IANT STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS — THE DIRECT 
LINE TO VICKSBURG AND THE STRATEGICAL 
LINE — REASONS FOR THE LATTER — THE STRAT- 
EGICAL MARCH AWAY FROM THE ENEMY. 

This history has now reached that stage of 
the Vicksburg campaign in which the strat- 
egy and operations raised Gen. Grant's mili- 
tary fame to its zenith, and made him thence- 
forward the sun of our great army, round 
which all other Generals must revolve, and, 
in effect, tlie military dictator for the rest of 
the war. 

Up to this point a degree of monotony was 
unavoidable iu this history. Achievement is 



— 58 — 



essential to make the story of a campaign in- 
teresting. Adam Badeau remarl<s that all of 
Gen. Grant's swamp operations were fruit- 
less, save in their educating the Commanding 
General, and hardening and inspiring the 
troops. Education, although necessary, is not 
thrilling in narrative; but the campaign has 
now come to a stage of thrilling interest, in 
which a great opportunity, thrown in the 
Commanding General's way without his in- 
tention, inspired him to a series of operations 
which Gen. Halleck, instructed by Grant's 
bulletins, and Badeau, instructed by Grant's 
matured reflections, likened to the most 
brilliant, short, sharp, and decisive of Bona- 
parte's campaigns. 

A distinct idea of the field of operations 
is essential to the understanding of the stra- 
tegic movements now to be made. Attention 
to a few points of outline will enable the 
reader to carry it in mind as well as if he had 
the map before him. Hankinson's Ferry, 
now a bridge, on the Big Black River, was 
Grant's point of departure, and had been the 
place from which he dated as his headquar- 
ters since the 3d. 

From Hankinson's Ferry due north, over 
the upland, to Vicksburg is fifteen miles. 
From Vicksburg due east to Jackson, to which 
was a railroad, is forty niil#B. From Hankin- 
son's Ferry east-northeast to Jackson is forty- 
five miles. This boundary incloses the whole 
field of Grant's and Pemberton's operations. 
The outline is that of a long right angle tri- 
angle, the perpendicular side being from 
Hankinson's to Vickburg, the base side from 
Vicksburg to Jackson, the hypotenuse from 
Jackson to the ferry; or say like a wedge, 
supposing the slant to be all on one side, the 
butt being at the ferry and Vicksburg, and 
the straight side from Vicksburg to Jackson. 
The following diagram gives the shape and 
proportion of the field of operations: 

theater of the war. 



Vicksburg. 



Jackson. 




This is the theater of the war. The main 



natural feature crossing it is Big Black River, 
which, coming down southwest, crosses the 
railroad ten miles east of Vicksburg, and on 
down to Hankinson's Ferry, and to the Mis- 
sissippi at Grand Gulf. Five miles east of 
Big Black, on the Vicksburg & Jackson Rail- 
road, is Edwards' Station, soon to be historical. 
About seven and a half miles east of this is 
Champion Hill, soon to be called by the 
soldiers "the hill of death;" a little way east 
of this, Bolton Station; then, nearly nine 
miles east, Clinton; from there to Jackson is 
about nine miles. On diverging and converg- 
ing roads from Hankinson's to Jackson, along 
the hypotenuse, are Rocky Springs, Utica, 
Cayuga, Auburn, New Auburn, Raymond, 
and Mississippi Springs. The diagram is on the 
direct lines. The actual distance from Viclcs- 
burg to Jackson by the railroad is forty-four 
miles; from Hankinson's Ferry to Jackson by 
the common roads near fifty miles. From 
Hankinson's to Vicksburg, or to the railroad 
in the rear of Vicksburg, there need not be 
more than a mile or two variation from the 
direct line of fifteen miles. 

Grant's immediate base is at Hankinson's 
Ferry. His objective is Pemberton's army, 
covering Vicksburg. its line of communication 
being the railroad to Jackson. A march of 
fifteen miles from Hankinson's Ferry would 
bring Grant's army upon this railroad, and 
compel Pemberton to come out to fight a bat- 
tle for his communications or be shut up in 
Vicksburg without an etfoit. Badeau says 
Grant estimated Pemberton's force at 30,000. 
Grant was not subject to the military fault of 
underrating the number opposed to hiia. At 
Pittsburg Landing he sent word to Buell that 
he was attacked by 100,000 men. 

Of this estimated 30,000 Grant reported 
that he had engaged 11,000 at Port Gibson, 
and had "entirely routed" and "thoroughly 
demoralized" them. The route direct to 
Vicksburg from Hankinson's had the line of 
bluff on the one hand, which, ^vith the wet 
bottoms beyond, formed a rampart for the 
left flank ana rear, all the way to Vicksburg. 
On the other hand, the Big Black River of- 
fered a natural intrenchment for the right 
flank and rear, all the way. The route would 
be over a rolling country of plantations and 
roads, and with no serious natural obstacles. 

The route taking Warrenton by the roar, 
the Confederates would have to depart there- 
from as soon as the march began. At War- 



— 59 — 



renton Grant would strike the river a little 
way below the lower end of his canal across 
the tongue of land opposite Vicksburf?, where- 
by the wagoning of his supplies from Milli- 
ken's Bend and Young's Point would be re- 
duced to three miles, by a road now practica- 
ble. Tiius a march of ten miles to Warren- 
ton would fetch him back to his base of sap- 
plies and re-enforcements. This would relieve 
all the troops that were guarding the land 
route of sixty miles, round by way of Kich- 
mond to Hard Times, and would add these to 
his fighting force. 

The defeat of Pembkrton in a pitched bat- 
tle, while covering Vicksburg, might be ex- 
pected to carry with it the immediate fall of 
the place, without the dreadful labor and 
consuming of the army by a siege. Then 
Grant could turn his army east, scatter the 
ineffectual force at Jackson, and make that 
his base of operations. Gen. J. E. Johnston's 
narrative shows that he expected Grant to do 
this, and he said that Grant's occupation of 
Jackson was the loss of the State of Missis- 
sippi. It appears that at first Grant contem- 
plated the direct line; for he wrote Sherman, 
then at Grand Gulf, May 7: "If Blair was 
now up I believe we could be in Vicksburg in 
seven days." Blair had only two brigades, 
and was on the way from Milliken's Bend. 

To march, however, from Hankinson's 
Ferry, fifteen miles, upon the communica- 
tions of Pemberton's army, covering Vicks- 
burg, and decide the fate of the Confederate 
army and of Vicksburg in one battle, would 
be so direct and obvious that it could hardly 
be called anything higher than a grand tac- 
tical movement. It is what any General 
would do if he thought he could beat the 
opposing army. And in general, when a 
commander enters on an invading campaign, 
he thinks he can beat the enemy's army. 

It is such a direct and obvious movement 
as Bonaparte would have made, or Frederic 
the Great, but it would not be strategic in the 
highest degree. But to depart from a direct 
line of fifteen miles, and to march fifty miles 
to Jackson, lengthening it Dy zigzag marches 
to seventy, and then back, leaving the enemy 
covering Vicksburg — this is high strategy. 

This is that which raised Gen. Grant's 
military fame to its zenith. In explaining 
this strategy, Badeau takes the commonfmind 
into the uppermost realms of the military 
art. The general and overruling reason was 



in Grant's nature, as he has before stated: 
"It was his nature in war always to prefer 
the immediate aggressive." Therefore he 
went to Jackson and back, when the en- 
emy was in his immediate front. ButBADEAU 
has also an abundance of particular reasons. 

Badeau concedes tlie apparent advantages 
of the direct or tactical line, but he mentions 
a serious obstacle: "Apparently Grant's most 
natural course was to march direct upon 
Vicksburg, and at once begin the siege, or at 
least attack its garrison, should that come out 
to meet him. He was not more than twelve 
[ten] miles from Warrenton, and had only 
one formidable obstacle to encounter, the Big 
Black River, the line of which would prob- 
ably be taken by any enemy opposing him." 

The adage celebrates the short memories of 
truthful historians. After Adam Badead has 
had Grant for several days in possession of 
the crossing of the Big Black River, and after 
McPherson, on the 4th, had made a recon- 
naissance north" along the west side of the 
Big Black, to within six miles of Vicksburg, 
and had found no enemy, he restores the Con- 
federate army to the Big Black River, in 
front of Grant, as a "formidable natural ob- 
stacle" which Grant would have to encoun- 
ter with the Confederate array holding it, if 
he went by the direct road. 

The statement of this reason by Adam 
Badeau, approved by Grant, is an indication 
of the abundance of reasons Grant had for 
leaving a direct way of fifteen miles, and 
going around 150 miles to avoid the enemy at 
Vicksburg. The other reason is that Gen. 
Gregg was "collecting another force toward 
the east and north, of whose strength Grant 
was not well informed." Therefore he re- 
solved to *go east "to drive eastward the 
weaker one" before the two could unite. 
Then he would seize Jackson, destroy the rail- 
roads there, and thus would have "Vicksburg 
and its garrison isolated from the would be 
Confederacy." 

That no force arrived at Jackson or on the 
east till the 10th only distinguishes Grant's 
foresight in making the immediate objective 
of his plan a re-enforcement which might 
come on the east if he waited for it. That 
the Confederate forces at Vicksburg and Jack- 
son, having the inner line, could unite by 
moving half the distance which Grant 
marched to prevent them, might be a consid- 
eration in war as practiced in the old world; 



60 — 



but Adam Bapeau says that Grant's military 
methods were original; that "His mind, in- 
deed, was never much inclined to follow 
precedents, or to set store by rulee; he was not 
a])t to study the means by which other men 
had succeeded; he seldom discussed the cam- 
paigns of great commanders in European 
wars, and was utterly indifferent to precept 
or example whenever these seemed to him in- 
applicable." And if he was "not apt to 
study" these, they were always inapplicable. 

Therefore did Grant determine to leave 
Pemberton on his flank, and to leave to him 
the inner line, while he himself went to Jack- 
son to see if any troops were there, and to 
drive them eastward, then to return and 
gain a new base. The time when 
he determined upon this strategy is movable, 
like the time when he gave up the Port Hud- 
son plan, beginning with midnight of the 3d, 
and reviving on the 10th, and renewed again 
on the I3th. And if it shall appear that the 
plan was constructed after the'event, and that 
the movements followed Grant's great ])rin- 
ciple of not fettering himself by any plan, 
"always expecting to be governed by the emer- 
gencies that were sure to arise," is it any 
the less exalting to his genius? 

Can there be anyhigher effect of genius than 
to have "built wiser than you knew?" It 
shows an intuition transcending your own 
comprehension. If this be not genius, what 
is it? One need not have read Capt. Toby 
Shandy's narrative of his experience at the 
siege of Namur to find that history of battles 
by those who fought them is a progress of 
evolution. The poet or orator often has ideas 
above his comprehension. Gen. Grant, witli 
intuitional inspiration, may have made the 
several operations of this "anomalous cam- 
paign," "governed by emergencies that were 
sure to arise," and following his great role of 
letting his movements be governed by those 
of the enemy. 

But when, in subsequent years, after the 
halo of developing narrative had gathered 
about these events, Adam Badeau wove them 
all into the web of a great strategical plan, is 
it not natural that Gen. Grant should pre- 
sume that this was what he designed from the 
beginning? 

The great strategical movement upon Pem- 
berton's army and Vicksburg, fifteen miles 
to the front, by a march away to Jackson, is 
about to begin. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

grant AI.ONE — THE WHOLE WORLD OPPOSES HIS 
PLAN— LIKE ATLAS, HE STANDS UNMOVED — CUT- 
TING HIS BASE — THE MARCH AWAY FROM THE 

ENEMY. 

* 

Wa? history is prone to be tainted by the 
injustice of crediting secondary Generals with 
successes which were organized by the Com- 
manding General's mind. Happily this his- 
tory is free from such fault; for Adam Badeau 
narrates that the strateg,y of the operation 
against Pemberton at Vicksburg, by march- 
ing away to Jackson, was Grant's alone, and 
was entered upon contrary to the views of all 
his general officers, and contrary to Gen. 
Halleck's orders. There is great pathos in 
Badeau's description of Gen. Grant's lonely . 
state, at this crisis, bearing all the weight of 
his plan: 

So Grant was alone; his most trusted subordinates 
besou.^dit him to chan,'e his plans, while his supe- 
riors were astounded at his temerity and strove to 
interfere. Soldiers of reputation and civilians in 
high places condemned in advance a campaign 
that stitjiuod to them as hopeless as it was unprece- 
dented. If he failed, the country would concur 
with the government and the Generals. Grant 
knew all this and appreciated his danger, but was 
as invulnerable to the apprehensions of ambition as 
to the entreaties of friendship or the anxieties even 
of patriotism. 

The way in which he came to be thus 
alone, bearing like Atlas this dreadful load, 
is, first, by means of a dissolving view, in 
which the Port Hudson plan melts into the 
Vicksburg plan, and the objections of Sher- 
man and other military men and civilians to 
that are brought forward and hitched to this; / 
second, by ingeniously extinguishing time 
and space, so as to fetch forward one of Hal- 
leck's dispatches co-operative to the Port 
Hudson plan, and fitting it to the Vicksburg 
plan, and calling it a countermand. "And 
so Grant was alone!" But he who could 
steal from Grant the credit of the hypot 
enuse and right angle i)lan of the 
campaign of 150 miles against Pember- 
ton and Vicksburg, fifteen miles in front, is- 
a more contemptible wretch than he whO' 
steals the golden trash which is slave to every 
holder. 

So shadowy was left the military jiossession 
of the country nortli to tlie Oliio by Grant's. 
operations to open tiie Mississippi, that tele 



— 61 — 



grams had to be sent round by Grand Gulf 
and the wagon route of supplies by way of 
Richmond to Milliken's Bend, and thence by 
convoyed steamboat to Cairo, to reach the 
telegraph. Therefore, while Grant was 
vacillating between his Port Hudson plan of 
retreat and his opportunity to advance, Hal- 
LECK, in ignorance, was sending bracing co- 
operative dispatches to him and Banks. 
Adam Badeau fetches forward one of these, 
which was faithful to Grant's Port Hudson 
plan, in ignorance of any other, and evolves 
it into a countermand of his Vicksburg plan, 
and thereby achieves his lonely pathos. 

Adam Badeau views Grant's plan of opera- 
tion against Pemberton at Vicksburg, by the 
line of the hypotenuse to Jackson, and the 
base line back to Vicksburg, as the one that 
"presented the most absolute and splendid 
advantages; but it also presented difficulties 
and dangers sufficient to deter any but the 
most confident of commanders. To under- 
take it Grant must not only advance between 
two armies, either of which was a formidable 
opponent" (one of these armies was Gregg's, 
who by the 10th had a brigade), "and run the 
risk of their combining to crush him; 
but, more daring still, he would expose his 
only line of communication with the Missis- 
sippi to attacks from Pemberton. If he at- 
attempted to guard that line, he must 
weaken his moving column, so that it would 
be unsafe to cope with Gregg, now daily ex- 
j)ecting re-enforcements from the South and 
East." 

The General whose strategy leads him from 
the enemy's main army in his front to a 
Hank march fifty miles away does appear to 
expose his communications, likewise his rear. 
Therefore, says Adam Badeau: "He at once de- 
cided to abandon his base altogether, to plunge 
into the enemy's country with three days' 
. rations, trusting to the region itself for forage 
and supplies, and to the chances of victory to 
enable him to regain some point on the 
Mississippi, in spite of all the opposition of 
two hostile armies. * ■■■■ * The utmost 
celerity of movement was indispensable not 
only to his success, but to his salvation." 

That the General who marches 150 miles 
to fetch round to the objective fifteen 
miles in his front, needs celerity, 
seems undeniable; that when he marches 
fifty miles away from his base, and leaves the 
enemy's main army within fifteen miles of 



it, he exposes his communications, seems 
equally plain; and each enhances the won- 
derful strategy. But the words of the argu- 
ment just quoted convey that Grant's design 
at this time was -simply a raid, to destroy 
railroads and stores, and 'to regain some 
point on the Mississippi in spite of all the 
opposition of two hostile armies." This may 
explain some of the enigmatical movements 
in "this anomalous campaign." 

Gen. Grant's act of cutting loose from his 
base of supplies is that which gave the charm 
of ^romance to this campaign, as it did to 
Gen. Sherman's march to the sea. In each 
the achievement of marching away from a 
base of supplies was so dazzling as to eclipse 
the homely fact that it was a march away 
from the enemy. But the just measure of 
glory has not been giyen to Gen. Grant's 
cutting away from his base of supplies, not 
even by Adam Badeau. This is because of 
the misconceijtion that Grant's base of sup- 
plies was at Grand Gulf. 

If to cut his base to go fifty miles to Jack- 
son, to operate on Pemberton at Vicksburg, 
was a brilliant achievement, then the greater 
brilliancy of cutting his base at Milliken's 
Bend, sixty miles further away, can be ex- 
actly calculated. At that place is where Gen. 
Grant cut his base of supplies when he 
started on his Port Hudson plan. He ex- 
pected to carry his base along by the canal 
and bayou navigation, but this had sunk 
away. He cut no base of supplies at Grand 
Gulf; for he took all he could get, and waited 
from the 3d to the 10th for more. He took 
all the teams with him that he could get up 
by that time, and was followed subsequently 
by a train of 200 wagons more. At Milliken's 
Bend was-where the romantic feat of cutting 
loose from the base was performed, and the 
romantic objective of it was the retreat to 
Port Hudson. 

On the 6th of May Gen. Grant dispatched 
toHALLECK: "Ferrying land transportation 
(teams) and rations to Grand Gulf is detain- 
ing me on the Black River. I will move as 
soon as three days' rations are secured, and 
send the wagons back to Grand Gulf for 
more." While the main army was marching 
to the front, an army in the rear and a fleet 
of transports were hurrying forward supplies; 
yet now six days after the landing at Bruins- 
burg, and ten days after reaching Hard Times, 
Grant's troops, although,6pread out to "live 



— 62 — 



off the country," had not three days' rations 
ahead. 

In the same dispatch .he said: "Informa- 
tion from the other side leads me to believe 
the enemy are bringing forces from Tulla- 
homa. Should not Rosecrans at least make 
a demonstration of advancing?" It appears, 
by Gen. J. E. Johnston's report, that he and 
Gen. Bragg agreed in the opinion that, in the 
then attitude of Rosecrans, no forces could be 
taken from Bragg without losing Tennessee; 
therefore, that Rosecrans was rendering very 
effective co-operation to Grant, while his 
waiting gave time enough to fetch Bragg's 
forces against him, if they had been free. 

The great movement of celerity is about to 
begin, but has not yet begun. For some 
mysterious reason there is hesitancy. Says 
Adam Badeau: "On the 6th Grant ordered 
McPherson: 'Move one of your divisions to 
Rocky Springs to-morrow, leaving the others 
to occupy from your present headquarters to 
the ferry. On the approach of Sherman's ad- 
vance order up the second.' " "Accordingly at 
10 a. m. on the 7th" Logan's division moved, 
and was followed by Crocker's to Rocky 
Springs, five miles east of Hankinson Ferry, 
"where they remained in camp till the 9th. 
On the 8th Grant's headquarters were re- 
moved to Rocky Springs." 

Sherman's corps had reached Hankinson's 
on the 8th, having that morning drawn tliree 
days' rations at Grand Gulf. Says Badeau: 
"This day Grant announced to Halleck, 
'Our advance is fifteen miles from Edward's 
Station, on Southern Railroad. All looks 
well.'" Edward's Station is on the Vicks- 
burg & Jackson Railroad, and appears by the 
map to be twenty miles northeast of Rocky 
Springs. Badeau says in a foot note: "This 
estimate was incorrect. Rocky Springs is full 
twenty-five miles from Edward's Station." 
But the statement served well enough for the 
time, and gave to Halleck the idea of a vig- 
orous forward movement, while Grant was 
waiting for something. To discredit Grant's 
statements that were good for the time seems 
reprehensible in Adam Badeau. 

At this interesting point Badeau has one of 
the most miscellaneous of the miscellaneous 
turns which refrularly occur when the plan 
becomes involved, and when the reader's 
mind, strained by intense pursuit of the nar- 
rative, requires diverting. Inasmucli as when 
he resumes, a change of Grant's plan has to 



be told and explained, and as a history of all 
this, up to the next change of plan, would 
make this chapter too long, the opportunity 
is taken to end the chapter here, rather than 
have to do it in the middle of a thrilling 
stroke of strategy. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

badeau's harmonious ascriptions — a crisis in 
the strategy before it has moved — wait- 
ing for rations and cerebral develop- 
MENTS. 

All through Capt. Adam Badeau's three val- 
uable volumns run little alternating strains, 
as if on parallel cleffs of the music staff, com- 
plementing each other like the parts of a vocal 
duet. And as in the operatic duet the parts 
may seem to be disputing and challenging to 
mortal combat, yet they harmoniously blend, 
so Adam Badeau's strains may seem contra- 
dictory, yet they are one in the harmonious 
end. 

For example, one strain celebrates Gen. 
Grant's farsighted sagacity, which discerns 
the end from the beginning, and shapes 
every particular and detail to that end; the 
complementing strain sings that he did never 
fetter himself with precise plans, but "always 
expected to be governed by the emergencies 
that were sure to arise" — the principle which 
was the guiding star of the life of the dis- 
tinguished Wilkins Micawber. 

Again, one strain celebrates the minuteness 
of Gen. Grant's military mind, and tells how 
he gave orders not only to commanders of 
corps, but to their subordinates, the command- 
ers of divisions, brigades, and regiments, also 
the quartermasters, commissaries, and wagon 
masters, how detailed and minute these 
orders were, reaching to the most rudimentary 
parts, as well as to grand tactics, such as di- 
recting a Major General, in moving upon the 
enemy, to put his wagon train in the rear 
rather than in front; the blending strain sings 
that "Grant never gave express orders in ad- 
vance; it was his custom always to await the 
contingencies of a campaign ;'' "he contented 
himself beforehand with giving orders for the 
earliest movements," leaving the rest to be 
"governed by the movements of the enemy." 

In one strain Gen. Grant so orders every 
part in general and detail, and his command- 



— ea 



ing "in person" so directs and pervades every 
division, brigade, and regiment that each suc- 
cesful part is his own, and each part that is 
not successful is the blunder of a subordinate; 
in the counterpart he simply "'indicates the 
great features of a campaign," or "the princi- 
pal object of a battle," and leaves to each 
commander to choose his order of movement. 

In one strain, "it was his nature in war, 
always to prefer the immediate aggressive;" 
"his strategy was always that of bringing to 
bear upon a certain point all the force he 
could command; he did not necessarily select 
the weakest point, but rather that which was 
vital, and, therefore, likely to be best de- 
fended; but he threw his entire strength upon 
this point, and repeated the blows until all 
was ended;" in the contralto part he sur- 
passes all the great masters of the art of war 
bj' the surprising strategy of marching away 
from the enemy in his front, to hunt for fu- 
ture problematical detachments. 

In one strain Grant's rule of war is to dis- 
regard places, in order to make the destruc- 
tion of armies his objective; in the counter 
strain his greatest strategical and tactical 
achievements are in so directing his line of 
operations as to fetch the opposing army into 
its strongest fortified places. 

These are but examples of a long succession 
of these harmonious strains. To the unwonted 
reader they sound- inconsistent. So, to the 
uncultured, Wagner's overtures are dis- 
cordant, while to the cultured ear they are 
wonderful harmonies. In like manner he 
who is attuned to Adam Badeau's con.sistency 
will have ceased to be perceptive of contradic- 
tion. 

When Adam Badeau resumed the thread of 
his narrative, after the very miscellaneous 
turn at the end of the last chapter, a crisis 
had changed the complexion of Grant's 
strategy. He relates that: "At Rocky Springs 
Grant heard that the rebels were fortifying 
and concentrating at Edward's Station, about 
twenty-five miles off, on the Vicksburg & 
Jackson Railroad." What was a General to 
do in such a crisis? Badeau tells what Grant 
did. First "he determimed to change the 
relative positions of two of the corps." Mc- 
Clernand, on the right, was shifted over to 
the left, next the Big Black River; McPher- 
son, on the left, was shifted over to the right; 
Sherman still in the center. 

It" the reader pays not strict attention he 



will lose his mental grip on one of the finest 
pieces of strategy in "this anomalous cam- 
paign." Continues Badeau: "It was his in- 
tention now to hug the Big Black River as 
closely as possible with McClernand's and 
Sherman's corps, and strike the railroad with 
them beyond Edward's Station, somewhere 
between that place and Bolton, forty or fifty 
miles from Hankinson's Ferry. Meanwhile 
McPherson was to move by way of Utica to 
Raymond, thirty-five miles from the ferry, 
and thence into Jackson, twenty miles further, 
destroying the railroad, telegraph, and pub- 
lic stores there; he was then to push west 
and rejoin the main force." 

The ingenuity of this strategy, like the 
moral of Capt. John Bunsby'a observations, 
will appear in the application of it, thus: 
"By these dispositions Grant would avoid a 
battle with the main rebel army on the 
ground selected by Pemberton, * * * 
while at the same time he divided the enemy, 
interposing between Pemberton and the rebel 
forces at Jackson." Thus does Gen. Grant's 
historian lay bare the most abstruse parts of 
the art of strategy, so that the common mind 
can understandingly admire. 

Nothing can be plainer or more admirable. 
Grant, at Rocky Springs, deciding it unwise 
to attack the enemy where he is concentrated 
and fortified, at Edward's Station, in his front, 
moves McPherson away by the flank in front 
of the enemy, to Jackson, and divides his 
army, from the Big Black River to Jackson, a 
distance of forty miles, in front of the ene- 
my's center and strong position at Edward's 
Station, in order to "divide the enemy." 
Surely, according to Adam Badeau. the na- 
tion owes a statue to Pemberton. 

And now it appears that all this enlighten- 
ment, and all this plan, came to Grant after 
he moved to Rocky Spring;!, and heard there 
that Pemberton was fortifying and concentra- 
ting at Edward's Station, and that till now 
he had been following his great rule of fetter- 
ing himself by no plan, but expecting to be 
"governed by the contingencies that were 
sure to" turn up. And even now he told no 
one of his new plan. Badeau says he did not 
tell McClernand, because he "feared to trust 
him with an independent expedition, which 
the movement against Jackson seemed 
likely to prove, and, therefore, put him on 
the left." 

Nor did he tell Sherman and McPherson, 



\ 



64 — 



though BADEAt says that somehow they un- 
derstood it; '"the latter, especially, was 
aware that, if possible, he was to push on 
toward Jackson, though not without express 
orders." And it appears that Grant did not 
tell himself; for at this juncture Badeau di- 
gresses into the following glowing ascription 
to Grant's genius in keeping himself free 
from plans, and seizing things as they turned 
up: , 

"These" (i. e., express orders) ''Grant never 
gave in advance. It was his custom always 
to await the contingencies of a campaign. 
None of his plans were so precise that he 
could not vary them; all allowed for the un- 
certain and unexpected movements of the 
enemy. After the great features of a cam- 
paign, or the principal object of a battle, was 
indicated, and the position of the troups at 
the outset determined, he contented himself 
beforehand with giving orders for the earliest 
movements, always expecting to be governed 
afterward by the emergencies that were sure 
to arise. Many of his most notable successes 
were inspired at the moment." Therefore he 
told no one, not even himself, that he was 
aiming at Jackson, 

By this fine ascription, added to the descrip- 
tion, it appears that Grant, at Rocky Springs, 
on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of May, was waiting 
for the emergencies that were sure to arise." 

Predominance of the memory stunts the 
creative faculty, and would make war history 
dull. What reader can desire that Adam 
Badeau, revised by Grant, should be limited 
by plodding memory, when by emancipation 
from its fetters he can narrate on page 230 
this change of plan, and this elaborate new 
strategy, formed on the 8th, at Rocky Springs, 
because Pemberton had selected, fortihed and 
was concentrated at Edward's Station, and 
then can state in a foot note on page 241, this: 
"Pemberton did not arrive in person at Ed- 
ward's till the 14th, but his troops were there 
the day before." 

Badeau relates that Grant was practicing 
a stratagem to deceive McClernand in this 
new arrangment by shifting him from the 
right to the left, and informing him that the 
enemy's main army was at Edward's Station, 
and that that was the objective. He says of 
the Jackson plan: "McClernand was not in- 
formed of this intention at all. * ■■•• * 
McClernand was sure always to claim the 
most important position or command, but as 



he was really nearet thfe great bulk of iM 
rebel army, he had no reason to complain, 
supjDosing himself to be in the advance." 

The Commanding General who carries along 
a very complex strategy to deceive the enemy 
as to his movements, and has at the same 
time to practice deep stratagem to deceive the 
commander of his principal corps as to his 
movements and plans, shows a double genius 
for war, and, as Badeau observes of the bayou 
operations, "demonstrates the fertility and 
variety of devices developed during this an- 
omalous campaign." 

By turning forward to page 258 it will be 
observed that up to the 16th Grant supposed 
that Pemberton was still keeping guard over 
Vicksburg, and that his raid was based upon 
that idea, expecting, as was said, in telling 
the original plan on page 220, "to regain some 
point on the Mississippi, in spite of all the 
opposition of two hostile armies." 

After mature reflection upon the events of 
a campaign in which the instinct of genius 
was directed by "the emergencies which were 
always sure to arise," the great work of 
framing a comprehensive, foresighted, back- 
action, strategical plan by which all shall 
have come about as foreseen and foreor- 
ordained, is a task which requires a high 
order of talent; and even the highest is 
liable to get affairs into an intricate state. 

But this history follows Adam Badeau, 
indorsed by Gen. Grant; and as their plan of 
the strategy, which was the most brilliant 
feature of this campaign, hinged, from the 
9th, when Grant was at Rocky Springs, on 
Pemberton's being concentrated and fortify- 
ing at Edward's Station, that part can not be 
left out until the development of Badkau's 
history shall put it out. Therefore, for the 
present, Pemberton shall be where Badeau 
and Grant put him. 

Resuming the thread of his narrative, after 
this glowing episode to the military genius 
which takes things as they come, Badeau 
says: "McPherson marched on the 9th of 
May to a point seven miles west of Utica, and 
McClernand to the Big Sandy River." 
Utica is ten miles east of Rocky Springs. 
Seven miles west of Utica would be three 
miles east of Rocky Springs. To Big Sandy 
Creek is by a road that forks to the northeast 
three or four miles from Rocky Springs. On 
the evening of the 9th McPherson was di- 
rected: "March your command to-morrow 



— 05 — 



to water beyond tUica, provided you tiiid it 
within six or seven miles of the phice on the 
direct Raymond road." 

McClernani) was ordered May 9: "Move 
your command to-morrow on the telegraph 
road to Five Mile Creek. Instructions have 
been given to Gens. Sueeman and McPher- 
SON to move so as to continue on the same 
general front with you." This was pushing 
McCleknand to a line only ten miles from 
Edward's Station, where Grant had placed 
Pemberton, intrenched; the other two corps 
stretching off away from tlie enemy to south- 
east. Badeau makes the following explana- 
tion of the hesitancy of these movements in a 
campaign in which celerity to surprise and 
divide the enemy was declared essential to 
salvation: "All the movements thus far were 
preliminary merely, or of the nature of de- 
velopments, the necessary supplies and am- 
munition for the march not having yet ar- 
rived." 

The term developments is much used in 
military affairs, also in the sciences of phre- 
nology and of the origin of species. The use 
here is in the sense common to the three. 
These movements were not to develop the po- 
sition of the enemy, for Grant's plan was to 
shun that; not to develop his own army, for 
tliat had been developed in "living off the 
country," and had to be gathered up for a 
forward march; the waiting, therefore, as 
Badeau will presently show more phiinly, 
was to develop in the head of the Command- 
ing General an idea what to do next. Some 
movement of the enemy was necessary to 
this. 

At this juncture, however, the waiting for 
supplies made convenient the waiting for 
cranial developments. Badeau tells with 
admiration the energetic orders which Grant 
issued on the 3d and 4th to hurry forward 
supplies frona Milliken's Bend. On the 6th 
Grant had dispatched HALLECKthat he would 
move as soon as he got three days' rations. 
His army was living on a country which he 
said abounded in corn and cattle, and yet on 
the 9th he was still waiting to get three day.s' 
rations ahead. Since he landed at Bruinsburg 
the Confederates had now had nine days — 
since he passed below Grand Gulf eleven — 
to gather forces by their railroads, to unite 
with Pemberton. Luckily they had them not 
to bring, for Rosecrans was keeping Bragg. 
A march of ten miles from Ilankinson's 



Ferry to Warren ton would practically restore 
Grant to his base of supplies at Milliken's 
Bend. All the navy and transport fleet 
would follow him. The wagon part of his 
line of supplies across the tongue of land by 
his river-turning canal would be only three 
miles. Mahomet would not go to the mount- 
ain, therefore the mountain was coming to 
Mahomet in wagon loads around the bayou 
road of sixty miles to Hard Times, thence liy 
boats to Grand Gulf, thence by wagon over a 
single bad road ten miles to Hankinson'a 
Ferry, or twelve and fifteen miles to Willow 
Springs and Rocky Springs. This was the 
wonderful romance of cutting loose from the 
base of supplies to make an operation in 
which "the utmost celerity of movement was 
indispensable, not only to his success, but to 
his salvation." 

In this crisis of the celerity, while Grant's 
"movements are in the nature of develop- 
ments," waiting for something to turn up, is 
a favorable time to pause till the next chap- 
ter, which will positively and without re- 
serve launch into that course of brilliant 
'strategy and of celerity of operations which 
raised Grant's military fame to its zenith. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

THE REASONS FOR MARCHING AWAY FROM THE 
BASE OF SUPPLIES AND FROM THE CONFEDERATE 
ARMY — THE BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

Up to the 11th of May, says Adam Badeau, 
all the movements of Gen. Grant "were pre- 
liminary merely, or of the nature of develop- 
ments, the necessary supplies and ammuni- 
tion for the march not having yet arrived;" 
that is to say, he was marking time. He had 
landed at Bruinsburg April 30, and from that 
day the Confederacy divined his objective 
to be Vicksburg, and that Pemberton 
must be re-enforced. The battle of Port Gib- 
son was fought on the 1st of May, and now 
on the 11th his army was but fifteen miles 
from that place, in an operation in which he 
says not only success but salvation depended 
on celerity. 

His advance had reached Hankinson's 
Ferry, and secured that crossing of Big Black 
River, on the direct route to Vicksburg May 
3. A reconnaissance next day to within six 
miles of Vicksburg found no enemy. A 



— 66 — 



march of ten miles, which he could have 
made on the 4th or 5th, would fetch him to 
his base of supplies, and relieve the troops 
that were guarding the circuitous road of sixty 
miles to Hard Times, and the wagon transpor- 
tation along that road and on the road from 
Grand Gulf to Hanicinson's Ferry, on all of 
which a round trip could not be made in less 
than a fortnight. 

A march of ten miles on the direct line to 
Vicksburg would as effectually connect him 
with his supplies and re-enforcements as he 
had been at Millikin's Bend. It would have 
supported his troops by regular rations for the 
hardships of the camp, the march, and the 
battle. It would have given the means of 
taking care of the sick of the campaign and 
the wounded of the battle, instead of leaving 
the sick and the stragglers of the forced 
marches to the hands of the enemy, and the 
cruelty of fighting a battle with no means to 
care for the wounded, and where they must 
be abandoned to the enemy by moving on ; 
for this is one of the romantic features of a 
campaign which cuts loose from its base. 

A march of not more than five miles from 
this secure base would fetch Gen. Grant's 
army upon Pemberton's communications, 
and would force a battle which, in all mili- 
tary probability, would be decisive of the fate 
of that army and of Vicksburg. B.\deau, ap- 
proved by Grant, recognizes this, and has 
to fetch back Pemberton's forces to the 
possession of the Big Black at Hankinson's 
Ferry, to find a reason for Grant's not taking 
this course. This prompt march and joining 
of the issue would have enabled Grant to 
turn East, scatter all forces that might come, 
occupy Vicksburg, and thus eflectually hold 
the State of Mississippi, instead of making 
a mere devastating raid on that place. And 
Jackson, as a base, was of far more im- 
portance than Vicksburg. 

He had estimated Pemberton's force at 30,- 
000, and had reported to Halleck tliat he had 
routed and demoralized 11,000 of thisnumijer. 
Pemberton, keeping about 8,000 at Vicksburg, 
was able to bring into the held only about 
17,000 men. Probably in all Grant's army 
there was not, save Gen. Grant, an able 
bodied volunteer who was not confident of 
the result if led directly upon the Confeder- 
ate army. This was what every volunteer ex- 
pected and was e^ger for. The reason why 
Grant did not take tliis course is one of those 



things which are very hard to find oiat in 
Adam Badeau's history. Even with the ad- 
vantage of framing a plan of campaign years 
after the event, the true reason for this march 
away from the enemy could not be set forth, 
save in self-contradictions. 

Three reasons are given and contradicted: 

1. That on the direct route to Vicksburg, 
Grant would have to encounter the formi- 
dable obstacle of the Big Black River, with 
Pemberton holding it; whereas Badeau says 
that Grant held it from the 3d, and had 
reconnoitered across it to within seven miles 
of Vicksburg on the 4th. But, by making the 
march away to the east, Grant gave to Pem- 
berton this formidable line to meet him re- 
turning. 

2. That at Rocky Springs on the 8th, 9th, 
or 10th, Grant Knew that Pemberton was 
concentrated and fortifying at Edward's Sta- 
tion, eighteen miles east of Vicksburg; where, 
as Grant's orders on the 16th prove that up 
to that time he thought Pemberton was keep- 
ing guard over Vicksburg. In fact, as Grant 
found out, two days late, Pemberton's army 
arrived at Edward's Station on the 13th, and 
he on the 14th. 

3. That Grant left a direct line of fifteen 
miles, which would have brought him upon 
Pemberton, and marched east to divide Pem- 
berton from re-enforcements on tlie east; 
whereas this would be the very way to en- 
able Pemberton to make such a junction, be- 
cause this would relieve him from immediate 
fear for Vicksburg, and he and his re-enforce- 
ments could unite by marching not half so 
far as Grant would have to luaicli to separate 
them. 

These reasons, invented after the events, 
are contradicted by their context. Tiiis 
straining of invention seems to concede that 
the actor in "this anomalous campaign" 
could not explain why he embraced a great 
.opportunity by marching away from it. 

Others are offered, which are contradicted 
by the nature of things, and which do not 
allow to Badeau and his hero the possession 
of sound minds: 

1. That to guard his rear from being at- 
tacked by a problematical future force from 
Jackson, Grant, represented as then confront- 
ing Pemberton at Edward's Station, and fear- 
ful of attacking him, turned his rear to Vkm- 



— 67 — 



BERTON, and offered him every chance to at- 
tack his rear, while his army was too widely 
divided for support. 

2. That Grant's great objective in marching 
away from Pemberton to the east was to di- 
vide the enemy; whereas at tlie time when 
Badeau says he formed this plan there was 
no enemy on the east to be divided, and 
whereas his line of movement not only gave 
the enemy time and opportunity to unite, 
but widely separated his own army, in such a 
manner as. if Pemberton had been where he 
pretends, would have presented to him a 
great opportunity to attack Grant in detail. 

3. That Grant, by dividing and delaying 
his army to destroy railroads, w^as doing any- 
thing to help the only rational objective of 
his campaign, the beating of Pemberton's 
army, or the capture of Vicksburg. 

4. That Grant cut himself away from his 
base of supplies for any military purpose; 
whereas, on the contrary, the direct march 
upon the enemy would be a march back to 
his base, and the march away from his base 
was a march away from the enemy. 

0. That Grant would turn and march away 
from Pemberton at Edward's Station, for the 
reason that Pemberton was there prepared, if 
he expected to fight him on his return, when 
he would have had time to be much more 
prepared. 

6. That Grant, who had before him the 
opportunity to reach his base of supplies by 
a day's march, and resting on that, to join 
issue with Pemberton, in a clear field, would 
march aw'ay from that opportunity and that 
base, and expect to fight a battle with Pem- 
berton on his way back, in such position as 
Pemberton might choose, where Grant would 
liave no means to care for his wounded, and 
his rear would be exposed to the gathering 
Confederate forces. 

The consideration of these and many other 
things that are revealetl in Badeau's narrative 
makes the course which Gen. Grant took in- 
compatible with the object of attacking the 
Confederate army, if he be allowed a strong 
mind and good military sense. Badeau. re- 
vised by Grant, does not mention in any of 
his explanations of the movement to the east, 
that Grant intended to attack Pemberton. 
There is no sound of this till Grant, at Bolton, 
gathering by forced marches to head off John- 



ston in a race to the Mississippi, heard that 
Pemberton was advancing to attack him. 
On the contrary Badeau says: 

He at once decided to abandon his base altogether, 
to plunge into the enemy's country with three days' 
rations, trusting to the region itself for forage and 
supplies, and to the chances of victory to enable 
him to regain some point on the Mississippi, in 
spite of the opposition of two hostile armies. 

To regain "some point on the Mississippi!" 
To expect to fight Pemberton's army was to 
fight for Vicksburg, not to regain some point 
on the Mississippi. The expression "to regain 
some point on the Mississippi in spite of the 
opposition of two hostile armies," conveys to 
evade them and merely regain his supplies. 

All of Badeau's explanations leave unex- 
plained the object of this march away from 
supplies and support, and away from the ene- 
my, save that it was to destroy railroads. This 
explains the marching away from the base 
and the enemy, and explains many other 
things wiiich will appear further along. But 
the march upon the Confederate army and 
upon Grant's base of supplies was by one 
road, and that road he turned his back upon 
after waiting seven days for the Confederates 
to unite and re-enforce. On the other hand, 
the daringly romantic act of cutting away 
from his communications was to cut away 
from the enemy's army. 

Up to tne 11th the movements, Badeau 
says, "were preliminary merely, or of the 
nature of developments." On the 11th Grant 
"ordered McPherson, who was now beyond 
Utica, 'Move your command to-night to the 
next crossroads, and to-morrow with all 
activity into Raymond. •■• * * We must 
fight th§ enemy before our rations fail, and 
we are equally bound to make our rations 
last as long as possible.' " This history takes 
such fragments of Grant's orders as Badeau 
gives. Fight what enemy before the rations 
fail? He then expected no enemy at Ray- 
mond, and Badeau says he had decided to 
shun Pemberton. Yet this order conveys 
that the fighting was to be all done before the 
three days' rations had failed. 

The same order informed McPherson: 
"Sherman is now moving on the Auburn and 
Raymond road, and will reach Fourteen 
Mile Creek to-night. When you arrive at 
Raymond he will be in close supporting di.s- 
tance. I shall move McClernand to Four- 
teen Mile Creek early to-morrow, so tliat he 



— 68 — 



will occupy a place on vSherman's left. The 
Auburn road to Raymond diverged just be- 
j'ond Rocky Springs to the left of the Utica 
road, tlie one wliich McPherson had taken. 
The general course of both roads was north- 
east. McClernand was on another road 
further to the left, his left extending to the 
Big Black River. By these orders the general 
line of the front of the three corps would face 
a little east of north; McClernand's front 
would be only six miles from Edward's 
Station; the right of the line fifteen luiles 
from his left. 

On the 12th, at 3:30 a. m., Logan's division 
moved toward Raymond, followed by Crocker 
at 4. "At 11 o'clock Logan met positive re- 
sistance within two miles of Raymond. This 
was Gregg's brigade, which had arrived from 
Port Hudson. By this time Pemberton, 
whose main force had been till now west of 
Big Black River, covering Vicksburg. finding 
tiiat Grant was moving east, resolved to move 
his main army to the east of the Big Black, 
at Edward's Station, where Grant would 
have to attack him, if Vicksburg was his ob- 
ject. He ordered the movements on the 12th, 
and on the same day ordered Gregg to await 
his opportunity to attack Grant in the rear 
when Grant attacked at Edward's Station. 
This outlying part of the plan was not very 
formidable, unless, indeed, Grant made a 
great blunder when he countermarched Gen. 
Lewis Wallace's division of 8,000 men, and 
so kept it out of the battle, because it was 
coming in on the Confederate tlank and rear 
at Shiloh. 

Logan's division got into line of battle; 
Crocker's formed the reserve: 

Both sides of the road were occupied, and at 2 
p. m. the whole line was ordered forward. Scarcely 
imd the advance begun when the battle opened 
vigorously on the'center and left center, where un- 
der cover of woods and ravines the rebels had 
moved a large portion of their force. McPherson, 
however, outnumbered Gregg two to one, and be- 
fore Crocker's division had reached the field the 
enemy was beaten and in full retreat toward Ray- 
mond. 

Gregg retreated in good order, although 
Badeau demoralizes him as usual. McPher- 
son states his loss as 69 killed. 341 wounded, 
30 missing; the enemy's, 103 killed, 720 
wounded and prisoners. The troops entered 
Raymond at 5 p. m,, the enemy having gone 
on toward Jackson. Although it was a bat- 



tle of a division and another supporting di- 
vision against a brigade, estimated by 
McPherson at "between 4,000 and 5,000," and 
although Raymond was a place of no con- 
sequence, it figured in the bulletin all the 
same. Grant dispatched Halleck: "Ray- 
mond, Miss., May 14. — McPherson took this 
place on the 12th after a brisk fight of more 
than two hours." 

McPherson took the place! Not Logan. 
When McClernand's corps fought the battle 
of Port Gibson, Grant's dispatch was that 
"we" did it, and in his report he made this 
generous observation: "Where all have d(me 
so well, it would be out of place to make in- 
vidious distinction." 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

A change in the strategy — march aavay 

FROM THE ENEMY AGAIN TO PROTECT THE 
REAR — GEN. .1. E. JOHNSTON ARRIVES— THE 
CAPTURE OF .TACK.'iON. 

The unexpected fight at Raymond caused a 
change in Gen. Grant's plans. Says Adam 
Badeau: 

The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the 
rebels to Jackson, confirmed Grant in the idea that 
a strong hostile force was on nis right Hank, and he 
at once determined to move his entire army in that 
direction, deflecting McClernand and Sherman 
from the course he had previously ordered them to 
pursue. 

This appears to show that till now Grant 
had been acting upon his great rule of letting 
the movements of the enemy govern his. 
But this application of it wovild keep him 
moving on after any detached force that had 
fled, the same beyond Jackson as to Jackson. 
Badeau continues: 

McPherson alone might not have been able to 
dislodge Johnston from Jackson, which was strong- 
ly fortified; and the destruction of that place as a 
railroad center was absolutely necessary, in order 
to deprive the rebels of its use in concentrating a 
force to interfere with Grant's future operations. 

What future operations? The destruction 
of Jackson as a railroad center had no rela- 
tion to a battle with Pkmberton's army, nor 
with the immediate re-enforcing of that army, 
for the enemj'' could march as Grant's troops 
did; and if Jackson had been "strongly for- 



69 — 



tified," Grant, by this operation, would have 
achieved the brilliant strategy of placing his 
army, without supplies or communications, 
before a fortified place, which might hold him 
indefinitely, while lie had exposed his rear to 
an army which he feared to face. Whatever 
the "future operations" were wliich majie the 
destructionof Jackson as a railroad center abso- 
lutely necessary, they were nottlie destruction 
of Pemberton's army; for Grant had marched 
away from the most favorable opportunity 
for that, and he could now join battle with 
that army in an hour or two, if it were at 
Edward's Station. 

As before mentioned, Badeau says that at 
this time Grant was practicing a stratagem 
on McClernand, to make believe that he was 
moving on Edward's Station, while in reality 
he intended to send McPherson and Sherman 
to Jackson, and then have McClernand's 
corps to follow. Playing this stratagem, Grant 
continued: "You will then move to-morrow, 
to keep up this appearance, a short distance' 
on ly from where you now are, with the three ad- 
vance divisions, leaving the fourth, or 
Smith's, in about its present position." There- 
fore, says Badeau: "On the evening of the 
12th of May the Army of the Tennessee oc- 
cupied a line almost parallel with the Vicks- 
burg & Jackson Railroad and about seven 
miles south of it." 

McClernand had a sharp skirmish by 
Hovey's division, to gain Fourteen Mile 
Creek. Grant had not expected any enemy 
at Raymond, and had instructed the several 
corps commanders to keep in connection with 
each other. His headquarters were at Dil- 
lon's, near the center of the line, which, on 
the r2th, was fifteen miles long. Badeau re- 
lates that "Later on the 12t]i Grant said to 
McClernand, from Dillon's Plantation: 'Ed- 
ward's Station is evidently the point on the 
railroad the enemy have most prepared for 
receiving us. I therefore want to keep up 
appearances of moving upon that place, 
but want to get possession of less guarded 
points first.' " 

And now the campaign of celerity began. 
At a quarter past 9 on the evening of the 
12th he directed McPherson to "move onto 
Clinton and Jackson at daylight in the morn- 
ing." To go to Clinton was to diverge from 
tlie direct road to Jackson, eight miles to the 
northwest. Clinton is on the railroad, nine 
miles west of Jackson. Sherman's orders 



' were changed at the same hour: "After the 
severe fight of to-day at Raymond, and repulse 
of the enemy toward Clinton and Jackson, 
I have determined to move on the latter 
place, by way of Clinton, and take the Capi-. 
tal of the State, and work from there west- 
ward." 

And "work from there westward?" Does 
this sound of battle with Pemberton's army? 
or of a raid away from it? "McPherson was 
ordered to march at daylight to Clinton. 
'You will march at 4 a. m in the morning, 
and follow McPherson.' " Thus were two 
corps hurried off to Clinton. McClernand 
was ordered: "Start with three of your 
divisions as soon as possible, by the road 
north of Fourteen Mile C^reek, to this 
place (Dillon's), and on to Raymond." Thus 
were two corps sent northeast, and one south- 
east, and when these marches had been made, 
three of McClernand's divisions would be 
fifteen miles from the other two corps, with 
their rear exposed to Pemberton's army, 
which on that day reached Edward's Station. 
McClernand's report states that this day's 
march was the hardest of the campaign. And' 
it was to no purpose but to countermarch 
more rapidly. 

McClernand's fourth division was ordered 
back to Auburn, thirteen miles soutliwest of 
Raymond, "to await the arrival of trains now 
on the road, and Blair's division, to conduct 
them to the army." Blair's division, the 
last of Sherman's corps to leave Milliken's 
Bend, was escorting a train of 200 wagons 
from Grand Gulf. Thus was the army divided 
before Pemberton, now, in fact, arrived on the 
13th at Edward's Station (although Grant did 
not find it out till the 16th), and thus were 
two of Grant's three corps pursuing a Con- 
federate brigade, which had fled toward Jack- 
son, and the other was held divided as are- 
serve for the same operation. 

Says Badeau of the affair at Raymond: 
"Pemberton had been completely deceived 
by Grant's maneuvers; supposing the object 
of the latter to be Edward's Station, he re- 
mained at that place with the bulk of his 
force awaiting an attack." But this is illumi- 
nated by a foot note on the same page, 
showing that Pemberton did not make his 
dispositions to advance to Edward's Station 
till the 12th, and by another further along, 
that his army did not arrive there till the 
13th, and by the text further along showing 



— 70 — 



that Grant did not know till the Ifith that 
Pemberton had advanced to Edward's Station. 
Thus it appears that if any one was deceived 
it was not Pemrerton. 

Badeau says that through this deceiving of 
PeiMberton, Grant "divided the rebels and 
beat them in detail." He says also: "It 
was fortunate that Grant acted witii such 
promptness, for on the nisht of the 13th 
Johnston arrived at Jackson and took su- 
preme command of all the rebel forces in the 
State, and he was a man of far more genius 
and energy than his subordinate." It was 
very fortunate, therefore, that before the ter- 
rible Johnston had arrived, Grant, who had 
reached Big Black Bridge (late the ferry) on 
the afternoon of the 3d, where he had fifteen 
miles to his front tlie Confederate army's vital 
position, and ten miles in that way his own 
base of supplies, had acted with such prompt- 
ness and celerity that now on the ll^th his 
corps that was furthest to the right Jiad 
reached thirty miles, and driven a brigade, 
and his whole army had moved an average of 
twenty-five miles from Hankinson's, from 
'the enemy's army, and from his base of sup- 
plies. If so much had not been accomplished 
by "promptness and celerity" before John- 
ston came, it is fearful to contemplate, in the 
-light of Badeau, what might have been. 

McPherson arrived at Clinton on the after- 
noon of the loth, and went at destroying the 
railroad. He here found the before men- 
tioned orders from Pemberton to Gregg. 
"Sherman had arrived at Raymond before Mc- 
Pherson left the town." and now Grant 
changed his orders again and directed Sher- 
man, instead of following McPherson to 
Clinton, to "take the direct or southern road 
to Jackson. By night he had reached a posi- 
tion near Mississippi Springs, ten miles from 
Jackson." "During this day McClernand 
withdrew from his position near Edward's 
Station, where his pickets had been within 
two miles of Pemberton's army. One division 
of the 13th Corps was drawn up in line of 
battle, and behind this cover the remainder 
retired without embarrassment, the enemy 
discovering the movement too late to inter- 
fere." 

Tims did Grant expose one corps of his 
army to the near presence of the enemy 
whom he thought too strong for his whole 
army to cope with. Thus did he turn his 
rear to the enemy's superior army, according 



to Baoeau, in order to guard his future rear 
against a retreating brigade. Thus was he 
dividing his army before an enemy he deemed 
not prudent to attack, in order to divide the 
enemy. When McClernand came to with- 
draw his corps he found the enemy strong in 
his frgnt. But fortunately for Grant, Pem- 
berton had from the first resolved on a strict- 
ly defensive course, and was still adhering to 
it. And in all this Grant had "the confidence 
of his ignorance," for until the 16th he clung 
to his idea that Pemberton was west of Big 
Black River, keeping guard over Vicksburg. 

Johnston reached Jackson on the night of 
the 13th, and found there Gregg's and Walk- 
er's brigades, about 6,000 men. He expected 
Gist's and Maxcey's brigades next day to 
raise his force to 11.000. Had Jackson been 
"strongh' fortified," as Badeau says, a General 
could not have marched his army into a com- 
pleter trap than Grant's, without supplies, 
with a strongly fortified place in front and 
Pemberton in his rear. But Johnston decided 
that the intrenchments were weak, faulty in 
location, and the whole town commanded by 
surrounding hills; therefore all the defense 
tliat was made was to cover his withdrawal. . 

McPherson, moving from Clinton at day- 
light, met the Confederate outposts five miles 
out from Jackson, on the northwest, and push- 
ing on, found the enemy in position two and a 
half miles outside the city, northwest, where 
he prepared for action. Sherman, coming 
from Raymond, arrived on the southwest of 
the city. A gap of two miles was between 
the two lines. McClernand had now been 
marched about, so that one division was at 
Clinton, one at Mississippi Springs, one at 
Raymond, the other back at Auburn, the dis- 
tance from Auburn to Clinton being twenty 
miles, and from Clinton to Mississippi 
Springs fifteen miles. Thus was Grant di- 
viding his army to divide the enemy. These, 
says Badeau, together with Blair's and Mc- 
Arthur's divisions, still further away, "were 
all held in reserve" — the reserve of the opera- 
tion against Jackson, where Johnston had 
6,000 men, and was showing a front only to 
cover removal. 

At 11 o'clock McPherson ordered an ad- 
vance, the skirmishers met a strong fire, then 
a charge was ordered, and Crocker's division 
swept forward, drove t^e enemy out of the 
ravine, charged gallantly up the liill, when 
the enemy tied behind their works. The, 



— 11 — 



troops followed a mile and a half till they 
came in range of the artillery of the de- 
fenses of the city. Here two batteries were 
wlieeled into position, the line reformed, 
skirmishers thrown out, and officers sent for- 
ward to reconnoiter. All these operations 
had occupied three hours. 

Sherman, meanwhile, coming from Missis- 
sippi Springs, on the southwest, encountered 
no resistance save such as his skirmishers 
could drive, till after crossing a stream and 
emerging from the woods, "in front and as 
far to the left as could be seen, appeared a 
line of intrenchments; and the enemy kept 
up a brisk fire of artillery from the points en- 
filading Sherman's road." Grant was with 
Sherman, He sent a party to the extreme 
right to reconnoiter. This party not return- 
ing. Grant and his staff rode in the same 
direction, and found the way all clear into 
tlie town. The only remaining soldiers were 
some left to work the guns to the last mo- 
ment. 

McPherson's troops, about the same time, 
found that the enemy had left the place, and 
they moved forward into the town. McPher- 
soN sent Stevenson's brigade to cut off the 
retreat, but it arrived too late. Says Badeau: 
"McPherson considered Stevenson's delay 
unnecessary, and blamed his subordinate." 
But a march to cut off a retreat which had 
got away undiscovered, requires uncommon 
marching legs. 

The troops were in possession of the town 
by 3 o'clock, and raised the national flag over 
the State Capital. But, unhappily, it was 
only for a raid; whereas if they had been led 
upon the enemy's main army, instead of 
marching their legs off to sbun it, they could 
have come as conquerers, to stay, instead of 
to take flight, and from this base to possess 
the State of Mississippi. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

the battle of JACKSON — GEN. J. E. JOHNSTON's 
DIVERTING COMBINATIONS — GEN. GRANT's NEW 
PLAN — A RACE FOR THE MISSISSIPPI — UNPARAL- 
LELED COMBINED MOVEMENTS OF ALL ARMIES. 

Gen. Grant had started a disnatch to Gen. 
Halleck early on the morning of the 14th, 
stating: "I will attack the State Capital to- 
day." Says Adam Badeau: "This was the 



first report Grant had made since severing 
communication with the government." The 
same dispatch reported the capture of Ray- 
mond, which was the first action Grant had 
to report since the severing. 

From Jackson, May 15, Grant dispatched: 
"This place fell into our hands yesterday, 
after a fight of about three hours. Gen. Joe 
Johnston was in command. The enemy re- 
treated north, evidently with the design of 
joining the Vicksburg force. I am concen- 
trating my force at Bolton to cut them off if 
possible." The modesty of Grant's bulletins 
has been much admired. They simply stated 
the great event, leaving the rest to the imag- 
ination. And upon a mere statement of the 
great event, with the terrible Joe Johnston 
beaten, what imagination would conceive 
that Johnston had but 6,000 men, and was 
anxious only to get away, while Grant had 
two corps in the attack, and the other sup- 
porting? 

And what imagination so barren as to sup- 
pose that the modest announcement that he 
had captured Raymond, by a battle, meant 
no more in a military sense than the capture 
of any other mile of country road? 

In narrating the dispositions for the battle 
of Jackson, McPherson on the northwest and 
Sherman on the southwest, with a space of 
two miles between them, Badeau says Grant 
"made no effort to connect the wings, think- 
ing it more important to hold the southern 
road and prevent the escape of the garrison in * 
that direction." The success of this is stated 
four pages further along in this: "While this 
show of opposition was being made in Sher- 
man's front McPherson was held long enough 
for the main body of the enemy to escape by 
the Canton road, on the northern side of the 
town, by which alone Johnston could effect a 
junction with Pemberton." 

Thus doth Badeau make appear that 
Grant's tactics exposed the army by dividing 
it in front of an intrenched enemy, to accom- 
plish the object of forcing Johnston to with- 
draw in the only way by which he could join 
Pemberton. Yet he had before stated tliat 
Grant's great object in going away from Pem- 
berton to Jackson was to prevent any forces 
there from joining Pemberton. 

Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon Grant 
sent for his corps commanders, and gave ihem their 
orders at the Klate House. McPherson was to eu- 



— 72 — 



carap one division inside the intronchments, and 
the other between the battlefield and the city. 

Sherman was directed to occupy the line of rifle 
pits at once, and on the following day to destroy 
effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, 
and all uroperty belonging to the enemy. He set 
about his work in the morning (15th) and utterly 
destroyed the railroads in every direction, north. 
east, south, and west, for a distance in all of twenty 
miles. All the bridges, factories, and arsenals were 
burned, and whatever could be of use to the rebels 
destroyed. The importance of Jackson as a railroad 
center and a depot of stores and military factories 
was annihilated, and the principal object of its 
capture attained. A hotel and a church in Jackson 
were burned without orders, and there was some 
pillaging by the soldiers, which their officers sought 
iu every way to restrain. 



ordered Gen. Gist, who was arriving from 
Port Hudson, to the east on the railroad, 
forty or fifty miles from Jackson, and Gen. 
Maxcey, arriving with another brigade, to 
join Gist. He said in his letter to Pember- 

TON : 

This body of troops will be able, I hope, to pre- 
vent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions 
from the east. 

And as to the two brigades which had 
marched north witli liini, he said: 

And this one may be able to keep him from the 
country toward Panola. 

Thus was Grant's incredible genius for 




MAP OF THE FIELD OF THE WAR. 



This was the destruction of that which a ra- 
tional military course would have converted 
to the use of our army, and have made Jack- 
son a military center as important in its re- 
lations to Mississippi and Louisiana as Chat- 
tanooga to Tennessee and Georgia. It was 
also the destruction of that which it was the 
nation's interest to have preserved, if the 
object of the war was to restore the National 
Union.' But the military policy of shunning 
the Confederate army, to devastate places, 
made this campaign more like the ravaging 
of a horde of Tartars than the course of a war 
to save a nation. 

In all the delusions of the three parties to 
"this anomalous campaign," the astute Gen. 
J. E. Johnston seems to have been worst de- 
ceived. He could not believe that Grant 
had come to Jackson merely for a devastating 
raid; he supposed he had come to stay, and 
to make that a base of military operations. 
Consequently, when ha left the place he 



missing his opportunity converted to strat- 
egy which neutralized the astute Johnston. 
If he could have believed that Grant was on- 
ly upon a raid intending to avoid serious op- 
position, his course might have been widely 
different. Thus does genius build wiser than 
it knew, and thus was a wise soldier deceived 
by his unbelief that another could have so 
small a purpose for so great an army. 

Before Johnston had reached Jackson the 
Quartermaster in charge of the public prop- 
erty had begun to remove it. Johnston de- 
cided the place indefensible. The reasons 
were not stated in the reports of the time, but 
are given in Johnston's report of his aban- 
donment of the place upon the second raid, 
which was made by Sherman after the sur- 
render of Vicksburg. He says: 

These [the defensive works], consisting of a 
line of rifle pits, prepared at intervals for artillery, 
extended from a point north of the town, a little 
east of the Canton road, to a point south of the 



1^^ 



IrtWli, within % short distance of Pearl River, and 
covered most of the approaches west of the river, 
but were badly located and constructed, presenting 
but slight obstacle to a vigorous assault. •■• '■' '•■' 
Hills commanding and encircling the town, within 
easy cannon range, offered favorable sites for bat- 
teries. A crossfire of shot and shell reached all 
parts of the town, showing the position to be en- 
tirely untenable against a powerful artillery. 

Perhaps an artillery fire from field gun?, 
from the hills about Jackson, into the lieart 
of the town for two or three days, would not 
have been worse than to let Sherman inside. 
The detention ot Grant for two or three days 
before Jackson, if Johnston could have raised 
Pemberton from his defensive attitude, might 
liave sent Grant off precipitately in his re- 
turning raid. The commander who thought 
it imprudent to attack Pemberton alone, 
miglit be "demoralized" when he found Pem- 
berton attacking his rear, and 11.000 men 
holding a fortified place in his front. But 
liere again did Grant's proverbial luck save 
liim from his fatal devices. Johnston, think- 
ing Grant was making a campaign instead of 
a raid, and tliat he wanted .Tackson for a 
base, and would have it, "if it took all sum- 
mer," gave it up to liim without a struggle, 
and then set about cutting liini off from sup- 
plies. 

So .Tohnston marched north, while the com- 
ing Gist and Maxcey were directed to the 
east. Johnston marched six miles on tiie 
Canton road on the 14th, and tlicre en- 
camped. He sent dispatches to Pe.mberton 
announcing the fall of Jackson, and the dis- 
positions of Gist and Maxcey and himself, to 
prevent Grant from drawing supplies. He 
asked: "('an lie supply liimself from the 
^lississippi? Can you not cut him olf from 
it? And above all, should he be compelled to 
fa^l back for want of supplies, beat him." Tlic 
contrast between Johnston's words and do- 
ings is quite striking. He then expressed 
this opinion for future guidance: "As soon 
as the re-enforcements are all up, they must 
be united to the rest of the army. I am anx- 
ious to see a force assembled tliat may be able 
to inflict a heavy blow upon tlie enemy." 

Such an interest in the suljsequent proceed- 
ings was laudable, and his expressions as to 
tiie future course were valuable to Pember- 
ton. It gave him to understand tiiat a con- 
siderable part of the coming re-enforcements 
had l)een disposed so as to prevent Grant 
frum drawing supplies from the east, and 



that Johnston with the rest was doing tliat 
service on the north, and it declared for unit- 
ing the forces at some indefinite future. But 
while Johnston was marcliing away from 
Grant, he gave Pembertox valuable aid by 
exhortations to attack Grant, On the 15th 
Johnston moved north ten miles further to 
Calhoun Station. 

Gen. Grant got liold of one copy of John- 
ston's disjiatch to Pemberton, and itgave him 
an illumination. Says BAnEAu: "It was ap- 
parent now that a concentration of the rebels 
was imminent." In the lives of great Gener- 
als remarkable incidents are always happen- 
ing, which fetch them information in the 
nick of time to rescue from destruction. One 
of these now happened. It shows that strat- 
agem played a part as extraordinary as strat- 
egy in this "anomalous campaign." Badeau 
relates liow, "some montlis before these 
events," a loyal man in Memphis, anxious to 
serve the national cause, had been drummed 
out of tliat place by Hurlbut for uttering 
seditious language and communicating with 
the enemy." 

This patriotic person had been waiting his 
opportunity, and now he offered to carry 
Johnston's dispatch to Pemberton, which 
Badeau says was a dangerous task, Of course 
his offer was gladly accepted by Johnston, 
and so the man fetched the dispatch straight 
to Grant. By this far sighted provision 
Grant, whose march away from the enemy 
had been to prevent their concentration, was 
now illumined with tlie idea "that a concen- 
tration of the rebels was imminent." And 
now the most energetic orders were issued to 
concentrate the army and head off Johnston, 
who all tliis time was marching away to the 
nortii. Says Badeau: 

A(!cordiiiyly thiit afternoon \icPherson was di- 
reuied to retrace his steps, marching early in the 
inoniingon the Clinion road toward Bolton, about 
twenty miles west of Jackson, and the nearest point 
where Johnston could s.rike the niilnmd. Grant 
also informed McCleniaud of the capture of Jack- 
son, and ordered him to face 111! his troops toward 
Bolton: "It is evidently the design of the enemy 
to get north of us and cross the Big Black River, 
and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow 
him to do this. Turn all your forces toward Bolton 
Station, and make all dispatch iu getting there. 
Move troops by the direct road from wherever-they 
may be on the receipt of this order." 

Gen. Frank Blair had got to Auburn with 
his division of Sher.ma.n's corps, and a train 



~?4-. 



of 200 wagons. Auburn is fifteen miles south- 
east of Bolton. Blair, too, was ordered most 
energetically to move in the same direction : 

Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black, 
and pass down the peninsula between the Black 
and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your 
troons immediately to Bolton ; take all the trains 
with you. Smith's division and any other troops 
now with you will go to the same place. If practi- 
cable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your 
troops and train. 

This was tiie culmination of the splendid 
strategy of this campaign, and these its 
marches of greatest celerity. Grant, suppos- 
ing that Pkmukkton was still west of Big 
Black River covering Vicksburg, and that 
Johnston's movement was to join him, was 
issuing most energetic orders to concentrate 
liis army to outrun Johnston. He had marched 
away from Pemherton at Vicksburg to hunt 
for Pemberton's re-enforcements in the east. 
At length he liad found some. Behold, now, 
Orant's army, concentrating at Bolton by 
forced marches from the east, from the south- 
east, from the south, from the southwest, 
from distances severally of twenty, twelve, 
ten, and fifteen miles, to enter on a race with 
Johnston's 0,000 for the Big Black Biver. 

To coifiplete tlie military situation, Pem- 
berton, at last, on that day, had concluded to 
act upon Johnston's suggestions to move so 
as to cut oft' Grant from the Mississippi, and 
had begun to move southeast to attack his 
rear. Then was presented a scene which sur- 
passed all that tlie great Frederic or Bona- 
parte ever dreamed. Everybody was march- 
ing away from everybody, to every point of 
the compass. 

Gist and Maxcey, with 5,000 men, were 
marching fifty miles east of Jackson, to cut 
off Grant at Jackson from drawing supplies 
from the east. Johnston, with Gregg's and 
Walker's brigades (6,000), was marching 
away north for the same purpose. Grant, 
thinking Pemberton still west of Big Black 
River, was making forced n\arches to the 
northwest, to beat Johnston in a race toward 
Pemberton. Pemberton was marcliing south- 
east to attack Grant's rear, thinking him 
moving on Jackson. 

Following the method of the serial novel, 
this is a sensational place to end a chapter, 
with the promise of a crisis in the next. 



CHAPTER XXXJ. 

TO REALIZE THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE MASTEliS OF 
the art OF WAR — WHY A GENERAL IS GREATER 
THAN A MAN — .SPLENDID MILITARY COMBINA- 
TION BROKEN UP BY ITNTIMELY INFORMATION — 
ANOTHER GREAT STROKE OF LTTCK. 

Military authors have established the judg- 
ment that Bonaparte was master 5f the 
art of war. The common mind accepts this 
judgment^ but there is no realism in it. Com- 
paratively few study Bonaparte' .s campaigns 
in such a way as to understand his mastery of 
the art. Thus the common mind has no 
means of knowing how much greater is the 
genius which masters the art of war tlian can 
find adequate scope in other affairs. 

But when campaigns are planned, and bat- 
tles fouglit, in our own country and genera- 
tion, which military men, who have studied 
the great models, say rank with those of Bo- 
naparte, these give a practical demonstration 
of his achievements so that we can appreciate 
his genius, and so can measure the greatness 
of our own General who thus exemplifies the 
highest model. Thus when Gen. Halleck — a 
military author — ranks Grant's campaign 
about Vicksburg with that of Bonaparte 
atjout Illm, and Capt. Adam Badeau, ap- 
proved by Grant, accepts this so far as it goes, 
but adds that Bonaparte's first campaign in 
Italy is needed to complete the parallel; the 
one being a campaign great in results 
achieved by strategy without battles; the 
other a campaign great in direct and rapid 
marches to battles, then he whose happy for- 
tune was to live in the great civil war can 
have a realizing serise of tiie greatness of the 
genius of Bonaparte and of tlie General 
whose achievements parallel a combination 
of Bonaparte's greatest. 

The remark may be offered, on behalf of 
men in other walks of life, that no other pro- 
fession or art has such conditions to inspire a 
transcending state of mind as those which 
surround the Commanding General. War is 
the grandest game played by man, and it lifts 
the leader above himself. The mere fact that 
.")0,000 men are in his absolute command, to 
be sent to their death by his word, is alone 
enough to inspire a leader. How much more 
wlien through all this disciplined mass, or- 
ganized into a solid force, ready to be pre- 
cijiitated at his command, runs an heroic 



<0 



spirit which had led these young men to leave 
happj' homes to fight for country; when 
this .solid mass of heroes naturally looks up to 
its Commanding General as a supreme being; 
when upon his plans they spring promptly 
to the forted Anarch, and are only too eager 
to rush into the slaughterous combat; when 
literally the iives of .30,000 heroes, and all the 
brave deeds that heroism can do, are at his 
bock, and all their achievements are for liis 
glory! 

The military leader, therefore, is surrounded 
by influences which exist in no other busi- 
ness, and which ought to animate him with a 
genius transcending all that can be possible 
in other affairs. If it be true that man is the 
creation of the environment, the Command- 
ing General of an army of American volun- 
teers ought to be the greatest of heroes and of 
men. This reflection 'may solace those who 
think that inordinate honors are given to the 
jirofession of arms, and that there is injustice 
in conferring upon one man the honors and 
rewards for the achievements of all. In no 
war of history has the recognition been so 
entire that the success was gained by the 
genius of one man. Badeau's history, ap- 
proved by Grant, justifies this; for although 
Bonaparte was master of the art of war, it is 
allowed that he had the aid of a number of 
great Generals; but Badeau states that in this 
campaign, which all declare to be the most 
brilliant of Grant's military life, his plan 
was opposed by all his Generals and by the 
General in Chief, and that in his great Rich- 
mond campaign all his corps commanders 
had serious faults, and each one in turn was 
inadequate to his opportunity. Grant alone 
being entirely great. 

The end of the previous chapter was in the 
midst of an evolution of movements of armies 
as brilliant in strategic intelligence and exe- 
cution as the evolving colors of the kaleido- 
scope. Comparison can go no higher than 
the highest model, and it may be said boldly 
that the several movements and designs 
transcended any of the operations of Bona- 
parte or Frederic the Great. Gen. Joseph 
E. Johnston had given up Jackson to Gen. 
Grant. Thinking Grant had come to stay, 
Johnston had ordered 5,0(X) men fifty miles to 
the east to cut of!GRANT from supplies from 
that direction, and was marching fi,000 to the 
nortii to the same end. Gen. Grant, think- 
ing Pemberton still west of the Big Black 



River, covering Vicksburg, and that Johnston 
was moving to join him, was making forced 
marches from Clinton, from Jackson, 
from Mississippi Springs, from Ray- 
mond, and Auburn, west, northwest, and 
north to Bolton, to beat Johnston in a race. 
Pemberton, who had come to Edward's Sta- 
tion, was marching southeast to attack 
Grant's rear, thinking him still aiming at 
Jackson. 

How far tliey would have gone on these di- 
verging lines is a question for conjecture, for 
on the next day, the 16th, Pemberton was 
turned about by receiving Johnston's positive 
order, and Grant by one of those "emergen- 
cies wiiich are always sure to arise." Pem- 
berton had found a bridge gone from a rain, 
and a ford impracticable on his direct route, 
and had been forced to make a detour, 
whereby he had not got far in his day's march, 
and next morning he received Johnston's 
order, stating that he had left Jackson, and 
that the only way for them to unite was for 
Pemberton to march northward; so he coun- 
termarched. 

Grant had been turned about by one of 
those romantic incidents which are always 
happening in the histories of great Generals, 
bringing them rescuing intelligence in the 
nick of time. On the morning of the 16th tw-o 
railA)ad workmen were brought into his head- 
quarters who had passed through Pemberton's 
army, and, as appears, had been taken into 
Pemberton's confidence. Badeau narrates: 

At about 5 o'clock on this morning two men em- 
ployed on the Jackson & VicKsbiirg Railroad, and 
who had passed through Pemberton's army the 
night before, were brought into Grant's headquar- 
ters at Clinton. He was wakened at once to receive 
the news. The men stated that Pemberton was at 
Edward's Station, fifteen or eighteen miles off, with 
eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries of 
artillery. They estimated his whole force at 25,000 
troops, still advancing. 

This intelligence changed the face of things; 
the race with Johnston was abandoned, and 
now the energetic orders that had been given 
for concentration to run with him were di- 
verted to a movement to meet Pemberton, 
whose plan, these reliable men said, was to 
attack Grant's rear. To Sherman, who was 
still at Jackson, finishing his work, Grant 
dispatched: 

Start one of your divisions on the road at once 
with their ammimition wagons, and direct the Gen- 
eral commanding the division to move with all 



76 — 



possible speed until becomes up with our rear, be- 
yond Bolton. It is important that the greatest 
celerity should be shown in carrying out this move- 
ment, as I have evidence that the entire force of the 
enemy was at Edward's Depot at 7 p. m. last night, 
and was advancing. The fight may, therefore, be 
brought, on at any moment; wo should have every 
man in the field. 

The other division was to follow as quickly 
as possible. "This dispatcli reached Sher- 
man at ten minutes past 7, and liis advance 
division, Steele's, was in motion in one hour 
from that time." Tlie following order was 
sent to Blair, who had been at Auburn when 
ordered to hasten to Bolton: 

The enemy have moved out to Edward's Station, 
and are still pushing on to attack us with all their 
force. I'ush your troops on in that direction as 
rapidly as possible. If you are already on the Bol- 
ton road continue -so; but if yon still have a choice 
of roads, take the one leading to Edward's Depot. 
Paits your troops to the front of your train, except a rear 
guard, and keep the ammunition wagons infront of all 
others. 

The italics of admiration in this order are 
Badeau's, and he considerately explains: 
"This last injunction was very necessary, as 
Blair was obliged to reverse his command, 
which would bring the wagon trains in front." 
In the course of practical military education 
Gen. Grant had now reached the higher 
branches, and had learned that the wagon 
train in front is not the best formation for 
going into battle. But Gen. Grant had none 
of that class exclusiveness wliich would with- 
hold professional learning from a mere vol- 
unteer or "political General," so he freely 
communicated his developing military knowl- 
edge to Major General Frank Blair, who had 
entered upon active service at the very in- 
cipiency of the war. 

Adam Badeau ascribes very high qualities of 
clearness and particularity to Gen. Grant's 
army orders, and gives citations, of which 
this is an example. He refutes the current 
notion that Gen. Rawlins wrote Grant's 
orders or dispatches; he says "they were his 
own composition,'' and that "none of his 
stati' otHcers ever attempted to imitate his 
style," which may readily be believed. The 
minuteness of the orders which are cited as 
(■xaiu[)lcs, and the diffusion of their force on 
tit'iiK'utary details, enhances the wonder that 
<iiiA.\r's mind could also take in the general 
disi)ositionsi Badeau says that Grant's 



order book, of this campaign, is a great curi- 
osity; his sjtecimens support this ascription. 
From this note of admiration of the 
military genius exhibited in Gen. Grant's 
orders, Badeau continues his issuance of en- 
ergetic orders to meet the emergency that had 
arisen from tlie two railroad laborers: 

McClernaud was now directed to assume com- 
mand of Blair, and establish coram nnicaiion be- 
tween bim and Osterhaus at once, and to keep it 
up, moving forward cautiously. "Direct Maj. Gen. 
Blair to move with his division as soon as possible, 
moving on the same line by the first lateral road 
leading into the one on which Osterhaus is now 
marching." 

This was a mistaken direction, as the road 
for Blair to take, and which he did take, was 
the southern, Avhereas Osterhaus was on the 
middle road; but McCleknand and Blair 
were more clear in the matter of roads than 
Grant was in this flurry. 

At forty-five minutes past 5 McPherson was also 
ordered forward to the support of Hovey: "The 
enemy has crossed Big Black with tbe entire Vicks- 
burg force, lie was at Edwards Depot last night, 
and still advancing. You will therefore pass all 
trains and move forward to join McClernand" 
(Hovey's division.) "I have ordered your rear 
bri;;ado to move at once, and given such directions 
to other commanders as will secure prompt cou- 
ceaircUiou of your forces." 

Thus was McPherson also directed to put 
his trains to the rear. Continues Badeau: 
"Sherman had evacuated Jackson by noon of 
the 16th, paroling his prisoners, and leaving 
his wounded on account of the haste of tbe 
movement. He inarched twenty miles, reacli- 
ing Bolton witli his entire command the same 
day." 

This is one of the romantic features of a 
campaign which cuts its base. McPherson 
reported 228 wounded at Jackson. Sherman 
had to abandon these to the mercies of the in- 
habitants of a town which he had devastated. 
Their next movement would be either to the 
unhonored grave or to a Confederate prison. 
The parole of his prisoners counted for 
nothing. Under the cartel they were released 
by this. 

The situation, as now changed in conse- 
quence of the sudden illumination which 
Grant had received from the two railroad 
laborers, may l)e understood bj' a brief re- 
capituhitiun. 

When Grant ordered McPhkhkun's and 



_77 — 



Sherman's corps to Jackson, he reversed 
McClernand's position, and ordered tliree of 
liis divisions severally to Clinton, to Ray- 
mond, and to Mississippi Springs to support 
the two corps operating on Jackson, scatter- 
ing McClernand's corps in utter unconscious- 
ness that Pemberton was now in his rear at 
Kdward's Station.' The fourth division he 
ordered on the back track to Auburn, where 
was Gen. Frank Blair's division and a train 
of 200 wagons. This appears to have been 
preparatory to the return of the raid to Grand 
Gulf, after he had broken up the railroad and 
the "railroad center." 

But when Grant conceived the remarkable 
idea that JoHNSTO>' had got the start of him, 
aiid was moving west to beat him by crossing 
the Big Black River and joining Pemberton, 
whom Grant still supposed to be west of the 
Big Black, he ordered McClernand to gather 
up his scattered divisions by forced marches 
to Bolton. They had just made very severe 
marches northeast, southeast, and south to 
divide, and now they had to countermarch 
by forced marches from the several points of 
the compass to concentrate at Bolton. Thus 
went the operation which was governed by 
"tlip emergencies that were always sure to 
arise." 

OsTERHAi's' division of McClernand's corps, 
moving from Raymond, reached Bolton first 
at 'J:30 on the 15th. Hovey's division came 
up from Clinton soon after. At this time 
Grant's race with Johnston appears to have 
paused. McClernand's report says of the 
further operations of this day: 

Both divisions were disposed to meet any attack 
that might come from the enemy known to be in 
front. During the flay an active reconnaissance was 
pushed by Col. Mudd, Chief of Cavalry of my 
corps, up to the enemy's picicet lines, and at some 
points beyond. •■' ••■ * Every effort was made 
'■■■ •:= to acquire familiar knowledge of the 

ground and roads for seven miles west of Edward's 
Station. It was found, three roads led from the 
Raymond and Bjlton road to Edward's Station, 
■■:■■ designated the northern, middle, and 
southern roads to Edward's Station, and united 
within some two miles of that point. 

Night found Gens. Hovey, Osterliaus'. and Carr's 
divisions, in the order stated, at the entrance to 
these several roads, prepared to receive a threatened 
attack, or to move forward upon converging lines 
against Edward's Station, (ien. Smith's division 
came up during the night, and bivouacked north of 
Kaymond near Gun. Carr's. Gen. Blair's division 
of Gun. 8Iicnaan'« corps bivouacked at Raymond. 



This disposition of my coips but anticipated 
events. 

Gen. McClernand, in the above, speaks of 
dispositions to meet attack from an enemy 
known to be in front, but Gen. Grant did not 
know of any enemy in front, nor order any 
dispositions to that end; for, according to 
Bade.vu, he was thinking only of a race with 
JoHN.STON, and he supposed Pemberton still 
west of the Big Black River. 

But the lucky outcome of all Grant's blind 
stumbling, and of McClernand's vigilance, 
was that on the night of the 15th McCler- 
nand's four divisions rested on or near to 
three roads, which, about two miles apart, 
ran ^-est to Edward's Station, passing by and 
over Champion's Hill. Consequently, when 
Grant, at Clinton, got out of bed at 5 o'clock 
on the morning of the 16th, to receive infor- 
mation from the two railroad laborers that 
Pemberton had crossed Big Black River, 
reached Edward's Station, and was "still ad- 
vancing," intending to "attack his rear," Mc- 
Clernand's four divisions, and Blair's di- 
vision added, happened to be situated on the 
right roads for meeting Pemberton, either by 
waiting or advancing, 

Badeau prefers to have Grant receive by the 
extraordinary accident of the well informed 
railroad laborers, foTir days after the event, 
his first information that Pemberton's armj' 
had crossed the Big Black; and Badeau is con- 
firmed by Grant. But Gen. McClernand's 
report infringes on the romantic accident by 
this: 

During the evening of the Iptli I received a dis- 
patch from Maj. Gen. Grant advising me that the 
entire force of the enemy at Vicksburg had proba- 
bly crossed the Big Black, and taken position at 
Edward's Station, and ordering me to feel the ene- 
my without bringing on a general engagement, and 
to notify Gen. Blair what to do. 

But this still leaves to "the railroad laborers 
the communication to Grant that Pemberton 
was advancing on the south to attack his 
rear — a piece of information which, as will be 
seen, governed his tactics of the battle. 

McPherson had come up behind Hovey 
fronr Clinton. Sherman was coming by tlie 
.sameroad from Jackson. Thus, by a wonderful 
stroke of luck, the forced marching to all 
points of the compass, and the forced counter- 
marcluiig toward Bolton for a race with 
•Johnston, when stopped by Grant's new in- 
formation, found the army well situated to 



— 78 



meet the emergency that had arisen. The 
only drawback to Grant's good luck was that 
his stratagem in maneuvering :NrrCLERNANi) to 
the rear had fetched him to the front. 

On this day was fought the bloody battle of 
Champion's Hill. 



CHAPTER XXXir. 

FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND STRATEGY. 

The progress of events in this history has 
more fully developed the strategy of the cam- 
paign, and has laid bare the object of the 
march away alike from Grant's base of .sup- 
plies, from the Confederate army, and from 
Vicksburg. That the plan was adapted to the 
object is well shown by Badeau. The situa- 
tion was especially favorable. 

Grant's plan was "to ling the Black River 
as closely as possible, with :^[cCLERNAND and 
Sherman's corps," while working his way up 
to destroy the railroad between Big Black 
River and Jackson. By this demonstration 
with his left he expected to divert Pember- 
ton's attention to the guarding of the Big 
Black crossings all the way up from Hankin- 
son's to the railroad cro.*ing at Bovina Sta- 
tion, while he reached forward with his right 
to destroy the road. 

Then, still having Pemherton west of Big 
Black River, Grant could return and regain 
the river at Grand Gulf. Badeau says vaguely, 
"regain some point on the Mississippi;" but 
there was no practicable point on the river, 
above Vicksburg, short of IMeniphis. save at 
Walnut Hills, close by Vicksburg, where he 
might connect with the fleet by way of the 
Yazoo. But is it likely that Grant, having 
marched away from Pemberton's army and 
Vicksburg and his pwn supplies, when all 
were witliin his reach by two easy marclies, 
would expect to make for Walnut Hills on 
his return, where he Avould have to expect to 
light Pempekton's army in its strongest posi- 
tion, while his owm, after all the consuming 
of the march, would be witliout supplies, and 
if repulsed would certainly l)e captured? 

8uch a| supposition would suppose Grant 
ilestitute of military or other sense. But 
below Vicksburg, if cut oil' from Grand Gulf, 
he would "have a chance at Bruinsburg, and 
further below, When Grant thought John- 



ston moving north of him. "evidently to cross 
the Big Black, and pass down the peninsula 
between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers," he 
had cause for his alarm; for with such sup- 
port at hand, Pemberton could turn the ad- 
vantages of the line of the Big Black against 
Grant all the way down to Hankinson's. and 
would have the inner line by which to cut 
him oft" from Grand Gulf. 

The strategy had its designed effect on Pem- 
berton up to the 12th. He divided his army, 
guarding the crossings of the Big Black, and 
keeping a vigilant guard over Vicksburg. 
At length, lie thought that 'Grant was aiming 
at the railroad at Edward's Station, and be 
moved to that place, issuing his orders for it 
on tlie 12th, but still guarding further down 
the crossings of the Big Black. His letter to 
Johnston, May 12, from Vicksburg, defines 
the plan he M'as pursuing: 

The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force 
toward Edward's Depot, on Southern Railroad 
With my limited force I will do all I can to meet 
him. That will be the battlefield if 1 can carry for- 
ward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to se- 
cure the .safety of this place. Re-enforcements are 
arriving very slowly, only 1,500 having arrived as 
yet. I urgently ask that moi-e be sent; also Uiat 
3,000 cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. 
I urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy 
largely outnumber me, and I am obliged to hold a 
large force at the ferries on Big Black, lest he cross 
and take this place. I am also compelled to keep 
considerable force on either tlank of Vicksburg, out 
of supporting distance. 

Pemberton's report charges his inability 
t»o cut off Grant from the Mississippi 
soon after his landing at Bruinsburg, to the 
condition that he had ijcen stripped of caval- 
ry to send to Bragg against Rosecrans. How- 
ever this may be, it is another instance that 
the attitude of Rosecrans was giving impor- 
tant aid to Grant. Pemberton narrates his 
advance to Edward's Station, and says: "On 
the evening of the 12th I moved my head- 
quarters to Bovina to be near the scene of 
active operations. The command arrived at 
Edward's Depot on the 13th, and was placed 
in position, covering all the a[>proaches from 
the south and east." 

Grant's reconstructed strategy, in Bapeau's 
history, sets forward the movement of .the 
Confederate army to Edward's Station to the 
8th or 9th. In the narrative of the events of 
the time, however, Grant did not find- it out 



till the 16th, when the two railroad laborers 
brouj^lit him the intelligence. A Bonaparte 
maxim holds that a General who understaTids 
his trade will know the enemy's force, posi- 
tions, and intentions; but tliis is not essential 
in a plan which expects to be governed by 
"the emergencies which are always sure to 
arise." Tlie chartge in Gen. Graxt's plan by 
the emergency that the two railroad laborers 
letched him may be seen bj"^ referring back to 
Badeau's statement, jiages 239, 240, of what 
that plan was: 

The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the 
rebels to Jaek.son, conflrracd Grant in the idea that 
a strong hostile force was on his right tiank, and he 
at once determined to move his entire army in that 
direction, deflecting McClernand and Sherman from 
the course he had previously ordered them to pur- 
sue. ■■■ " •■■ Sherman's orders were changed at the 
samehour: "After the severe fight of to-day at Ray- 
mond, and repulse of the enemy toward Clinton 
and .Jackson, I have determined to move on the lat- 
ter place by way ot Clinton, and take the Capital of 
the State, and work from there westward." 

The intended "work" is shown by that 
which was done as soon as McPheksox struck 
the railroad, which was at Clinton on the 
13th, when, instead of pushing forward to 
the enemy, he "at once set about tearing up 
the railroad track and ties, bending the iron, 
burning bridges, and destroying culverts and 
telegraph poles and wires," in pursuance of 
the grand object of this operation, which 
Badeau says was to leave "Vicksburg with its 
garrison isolated from the would be Confed- 
eracy." 

Next to tlie present risk of tluit "immediate 
aggressive" course, which Badeau says was 
Grant's nature always, the great considera- 
tion which influenced him to leave a very 
promising opportunity to make a real cam- 
jiaign by hrst destroying Pemberton's army, 
and, on the contrary, to make a mere raid 
to destroy a raiload, was the intelligence 
which reached Grant while in a vacilliating 
frame of mind at Hankinson's Ferry, of the 
consternation caused in the South by Grier- 
son's cavalry raid from Memphis through 
Mississi])pi to Port Hudson. Says Badeal': 

At this time Giant learned the success of 
Grierson's raid, and the timely eftect it was pro- 
ducins on the Southern people. The rebel news- 
papers werS tilled with accounts of the damage 
done, and this really daring exploit, unexampled 
at that pi'iiOLi of tlie war, was magnified iuto pro- 



portions and importance greatly superior even to 
that which Grant had hoped. 

That GnANT "had ho})ed" much more from 
this tuan a temporary cutting of connnuni- 
catitftis, affecting impending military opera- 
tions, and that he had formed in his mind an 
idea that raids were great moral and material 
effects to end the war, is .set forth by Badeat, 
page 188, in narrating Grant's suggestion 
of this raid to Hurlbut at Memphis, Feb- 
ruary 13: 

This movement was also intended to act as a di- 
version to Grunt's new campaign [at that time 
the Yazoo Pass campaign], as well as to test the 
idea he entertained that the fortunes of the re- 
bellion were waning, its armies becoming exhaust- 
ed, and its supplies rapidly decreasing; that, iu 
fact, men and stores were alike drawn to the out- 
side, and the so called Confederacy itself was only a 
"hollow shell." 

He adds that this raid had "a moral effect 
upon tiie population altogether unprecedent- 
ed." Thus it appears that in Grant's mind 
raids were greater military operations than 
campaigns and victories. 

Thus does Badeau show the processes which, 
after Grant had gained the footing that had 
cost him six months of rapid consuming of a 
great army, made him turn away from his 
opportunity, and set out upon a raid. Thus 
was he going to march away from the Con- 
federate army, to prove that the Confederacy 
was a "hollow shell." Thus by feeding his 
own army in the Confederacy was he going 
to prove that its "stores were drawn to the 
outside." And so the Confederacy was to be 
brought to terms, not by overthrowing its 
armies, but by evading them, and making 
raids to demonstrate that its armies were in 
the front and not in the roar, and, therefore, 
it was a hollow shell. 

Tins raiding strategy makes clear Badeau's 
statement .that: "The utmost celerity of 
movement * •■■" * was indispensable not 
only to his success, but to his salvation," and 
therefore he cut loose from his base; for if 
Grant's plan had been to hght, first an army 
on the east, and then to turn on the one on the 
west, his line of operation would completely 
protect a line of supply, as in fact it did. 
This raiding idea explains Badeau's state- 
ment that: "Believing that he would not be 
allowed to make the campaign if he an- 
nounced his plan beforehand, Grant did not 



-^0- 



how inform the General in Chief of what he 
contemplated." Also that it was fortunate 
that there was no telegraph nearer than Cairo, 
for: "Had the General in Cliiei been able to 
reach his subordinate, the Viclvsburg . cam- 
paign would never have been fought;" that is 
to say, the raid would not have been made ; 
it had to be as clandestine in its start as it 
was in its military character. 

That Grant and Badeau subsequently 
thought that a raid on a railroad, and even on 
Jackson, was not the highest improvement of 
Grant's opportunity is shown by their pos- 
terior construction of a plan to take in the 
battle with Pemberton's army. Tliis necessity 
is that which has given to this part of Ba- 
OEAU's narrative its complex character. But 
this relieves Gen. Grant from the alternative 
supposition, which would be utterly incom- 
patible with his great genius, namely: that he 
made an exhausting march of his troops 
away from his own base and from Pember- 
ton's army when the way was open and near 
to both, expecting to attack him on his re- 
turn, at a time when Pemberton miglit be 
expected to hold the "formidable obstacle" of 
the line of the Big Black, and when Grant's 
rear would be in air, exposed to the gatiiering 
Confederate forces. 

Thus does the ac:ual strategy, which was a 
raid, relieve Grant from the alternative sup- 
position of a serious campaign on a plan 
which would be about as plain a plan to shun 
a victory, and lead an army to destruction, as 
ingenuity could well devise. The strategy of 
the raid worked successfully for a limited 
time. 

If followed up with celerity, it would prob- 
ably liave kept Pemherton west of the Big 
Black until Grant had returned to Grand Gulf. 
It was fora time hesitating in execution. Then 
the affair on the road to Raymond drew Grant 
away from his original plan. Then Pember- 
ton crossed the Big Black, and took a position 
which compromised Grant's return. Grant, 
still ignorant of this, had started on a race 
with Johnston. In the very act he was acci- 
dentally informed that Pemberton was march- 
ing to attack him in such a line as to cut off 
liis regaining the Mississippi. Thus by a 
wonderful stroke of luck, which at tlie time 
seemed to him a catastrophe, he was forced 
into a fight which redeemed his operation 
from the character of a raid, and converted it 
into a real campaign, in which, of course, his 



troops were victorious, as tliey would liaVt? 
been if led directly upon the enemy. This 
stroke of luck again delivered Grant from 
the fatality of his plan, and enabled Badeau 
to construct a strategy which from the begin- 
ning embraced all these events. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

situation of champion's hill — the surprises 
which brought pemberton and grant to 

issue THERE — THE HARD MARCHES OF THE EX- 
PEDITION — SPLENDID QUALITIES OF THE VOL- 
LTNTEERS — THE PART THAT OFFICERS PLAY IN 
BATTLE. 

A road running direct from Raymond west- 
northwest twelve miles to Edward's Station, 
for this operation is called the southern road. 
Champion's Hill is four miles east-northeast 
of Edward's Station. A road, called the mid- 
dle road, forks from tlie southern road a mile 
and a half from Raymond, running more to 
the northwest, till it has diverged about two 
miles, when it runs nearly parallel with the 
southern road across the ridge, then converg- 
ing to Edward's Station. 

From the middle road, four miles from 
Raymond, a road forks and runs nearly north 
to Bolton Station, where it comes to the road 
which runs west from Clinton to Edward's 
Station, which is called the northern road. 
This road runs nearly west from Bolton to 
the north end of the ridge called Champion's 
Hill, when it makes a turn to south, running 
up and along the ridge for a mile, then turns 
west, down tiie ridge, to a junction with the 
middle road from Raymond to Edward's 
Station. Baker's Creek has its rise east of 
Champion Hill, between the middle and 
northern roads, runs northwest across the 
nortiiern road and the railroad two miles east 
of Champion's Hill, fetches a circuit north of 
the hill to a southwest course west of the hills, 
and across the roads that run to Edward's 
Station. Confederate historians call the battle 
that of Baker's Creek. 

Pemberton, on the afternoon of the ISth, 
moved his whole force from Edward's Station, 
southeast by the Raymond road, to attack 
Grant's rear, to cut him off ffom Grand 
Gulf, supposing him to be still advancing on 
Jackson. Previous freshets had carried off 



— 81 — 



the bridge on the direct Raymond road, two 
miles east of Edward's Station, and a present 
rain had made tlie ford impassible. Pember- 
TON marched by the middle road till he had 
passed the creek on a bridge, and then he 
turned to the right, so as to striice the south- 
ern or Raymond road three and a half miles 
from Edward's Station. Here he rested for 
tlie night. 

Pemberton said that the divisions of Bowen 
and Stevenson had been on the march till 
past midnight, and the men . were fatigued, 
and as he desired to receive reports of recon- 
noissances in front, he did not issue orders 
to continue the movement early the next 
morning. At 6:30 o'clock he received a posi- 
tive order from Johnston as follows: 

Banton Road. Ten Miles From Jackson, May IS, 
186:5, 8:30 o'clock A. M.— Our being compelled to 
leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The 
oiuy mode by which we can unite is by your mov- 
ing directly to Clinton, and informing me, that we 
may move to that point with about 6,000. I have no 
means of estimating enemy's force at Jackson, 
'i'he principal oftii'ers here differ very widely, and I 
fear he will fortify if time is left him. Let me hear 
from you immediately, * " '■■ 

But McPherson had reached Clinton on the 
13th, and Hovey's division of McClernand's 
corps on the 1-ltb. On the 15th Hovey had 
moved west from Clinton to Bolton, and Mc- 
Pherson back from Jackson through Clinton 
to Bolton, in pursuance of Grant's per- 
emptory orders to McPherson and McCler- 
nand to concentrate at Bolton to head otF 
Johnston in a race for the Mississippi. Thus 
Johnston, in ordering Pemberton to move to 
Clinton to effect a junction, was in the same 
blissful ignorance of Grant's positions, move- 
ments or designs, that Grant was of John- 
ston's and Pemberton's. This part of tlie 
campaign was as if all the gods of war were 
playing at blind man's buft'. No mercy has 
been shown to Pemberton by either side; but 
to use Grant's expression, adapted to the 
situation, "Where all have done so well it 
would be out of place to nuilce invidious dis- 
tinction." 

Upon receiving this order, Pumberton says: 
"I irumediately directed a countermarch, or 
rather a retrograde movement, by reversing 
the column as it then stood, for the purpose 
of returning toward Edward's Depot to take 
the Brownsville road, and then to proceed to- 
ward Cliututi bv a route north of the rail- 



road." Nortii of the railroad he could keep 
clear of Grant's coluiuns, and this was now 
the only way by which he could join John- 
ston. But just as this reverse movement was 
beginning, the advance of A. J. Smith's divis- 
ion of McClernand's corps, moving west, by 
the southern road from Raymond, came upon 
the head of Pemberton's column, drove in its 
cavalry pickets, and opened with artillery, 
and a brisk artillery duel took the place. 

Pemberton tried to continue his retrograde 
movement, but the pressure of the divisions 
of Smith on the southern road and of Oster- 
haus on the middle road, compelled to form 
line of battle. The situation happened to *be 
fjivorable for forming his line, since he must. 
Behind him a road ran north from the south- 
ern to the middle road and to a junction with 
the road dver the ridge called Champion's 
Plill. A broken and wooded country in front 
of his center and right was a cover while 
making liis formation. Champion's Hill, 
and the road over it made a natural fortress 
for his left, its north end jutting out bold 
and steep. Loring's division was on the right, 
Bowen's the center, aud Stephenson's the left, 
holding the ridge. 

As lias been told. Grant's dividing, forced 
marching and forced countermarching of Mc- 
Clernand's corps, in strange ignorance that 
Pemberton had moved east of the Big Black, 
and his starting tlie several divisions, together 
with Blair's, on a wild chase for Johnston, 
had tlic (.'xtraordinary luck to bring these five 
divisions upon the three roads that run west 
to Edward's Station, passing around and over 
Champion's Hill, su that his surprise when 
the railroad laborers told liim that Pemberton 
was east of *he Big Black, and was advancing 
to his left and rear, found McClernand's 
corps in as fine positions as Grant could have 
devised if he had known what was going on. 

Hovey's division was on the northern road; 
Carr and Osterhaus took the middle road; 
A. J. Smith took the southern or Raymond 
road, on which also was Gen. Frank Blair's 
division, now, in Grant's strait, attached to 
McClernand's command. No delay seems to 
have been made by these several divisions in 
turning from a chase north to a march west 
to battle, and they were now in positions to 
Hank and envelop Champion's Hill, and cap- 
ture Pemberton's army, as Badeau shows fur- 
ther along. There must have been excellent 
marching fjualities and facility of maneuver 



— 82 



in all the troops of Grant's army, to have 
been moved with such flexibility and celerity 
to the phases of his changing mind. 

Not all of Grant's movements in this expe- 
dition had been made with celerity. There 
had been waiting enough near Hankinson's 
to give the Confederates time to re-enforce 
Pemberton from Bragg' s army, if Roskc'RANs' 
attitude had not prevented. Badeau calls 
the round march from Bruinsburg to Vicks- 
burg 200 miles. The main body of the array 
was about Willow Springs, and between that 
and Rocky Springs and Hankinson's, during 
the waiting, making the previous march not 
over twenty -five miles, and that after the new 
start 175 miles. As the distance by the roads 
is not more than 100 miles, this allows sev- 
entj'-five miles for the zigzag marching upon 
the changing plans. But .some of the march- 
ing was very hard. By singular fortune, 
most of the hardest marching was in move- 
ments which developing information showed 
to be unnecessary. Such was that of jSIcCler- 
nand's diverging divisions to support Sher- 
man and McPherson against .Tackson, which 
McClernand's report says was the hardest 
march of the campaign. Such was the forced 
marching of two corps to concentrate at Bol- 
ton. And Sherman on the 16th marched his 
corps twenty miles, yet to no use in the 
battle. 

The hardship of this marching was greatly 
increa.sed by the lack of the regular rations 
and the absence of all shelter; and its labor 
was increased by having to make expeditions 
to gather food. Yet there was no flinching; 
]5nt there was great hardship. Besides, the 
malaria of a life of six months in the swamps 
was not soon eliminated from the bones, if 
ever. This march had its continuous sinking 
of brave men to the sick list. 

A notable fact is that Bowen's report states 
that the men of Tracey's brigade, which 
reached the field of Port Gibson during the 
battle, "were completely jaded and broken 
down with continuovis marching;" that Gen. 
Baldwin's "troops were so utterly exhausted 
that he could not get up in time;" that Pem- 
herton's report states that after the march 
toward Dillon's the troops of two of the di- 
visions were so fatigued that he did not order 
the march resumed early next morning; that 
Johnston says, in his report of the time, 
when he was at Calhoun Station — which was 
a very crisis to Pemkerton — "The Brigadier 



Generals representing that their troops re- 
quired rest after the fatigue they had under- 
gone in the skirmishes and marches preceding 
the retreat from Jackson, •■■ * * I did not 
move on Saturday;" that thus all the Confed- 
erate troops were fagged by the marches, and 
yet there is no sound of flinching in our vol- 
unteers, nor sound of anj'^ allowance bj' Gen. 
Grant for their fatigue. 

Something more than a single directing 
brain is required to organize troops to such 
facility of movement, and such ability to 
stand hard marching on short rations, in 
carrying out the phases of genius, as evolved 
by the rising emergencies. Something more 
than one man's mind — great as it niay appear 
in these operations — is required to create tlie 
qualities of troops who can .stand such marches 
on insufficient food, with undiniinished spirit 
for the battle. There must in the flrst place 
be a foundation in the character, spirit, intel- 
ligence, and pluck of the soldiers; in the 
second place, officers of the same qualities, in 
whom the soldiers have confidence, all the 
way from Lieutenants to Brigadiers, and i)ar- 
ticulariy those officers who ai'e present with 
the men on the march and in the battle. 

A jjopular idea is that victories are made by 
a Commanding General, on a prancing horse, 
uttering, in the nick of time, an heroic sen- 
tence to the army, or else leading them at his 
horse's running speed into the eneniy's ranks. 
Battle pictures carry this idea. Battle sloi'ies 
keep it up. The way that honors for success- 
ful war are concentrated is upon this idea. 
Badeau's history is upon the same notion, va- 
rying only in form and detail. The Command- 
ing General can not carry out the details of 
organization and discipline; but when he is 
skillful and thorough in these general parts of 
tlie organization of an army which he and no 
one else can supervise, his spirit will infuse 
all the details of organization and discipline. 
On the other hand, when the general parts are 
neglected by the Commanding General, the 
slackness pervades all the branches. 

A striking instance of this neglect of the 
general formation of an army was seen at 
Pittsburg Landing, where the organization of 
the new regiments and brigades, under vol- 
unteer officers, was far better tliiin tiie gen- 
eral army organization, and, indeed, had to 
be made in the face of the neglect of all that 
part of organization and preparation which 
belongs to the Commanding General. Gen. 



Shkrman himself bore testimony to an ex- 
ample of the other sort, in his report, in 
M'hich he told that after waiting till about 
noon on the second day, while Buell's army 
on the left had begun the battle at daylight: 
"Here I saw for tli^p first time the well ordered 
and compact columns of Gen. Buell's Ken- 
tucky forces, whose soldierly movements at 
once gave confidence to our newer and less 
disciplined men." 

Gen. Sherman had to plead lack of disci- 
pline to excuse the disaster of the first day; 
yet in Grant's army on that field had been a 
number of troops as large as Buell's, who 
were not newer, and had seen as much 
service. The American volunteer took on 
discipline with aptitude, as soon as field 
operations showed him the bearing of it, and 
as soon as he came under a general organiza- 
tion which carried it out; and this without 
losing his intelligence, self-reliance, or spirit. 

War history has not another exhibition of 
so great a combination of these qualities of 
discipline and individual spirit and spontane- 
ous action as that when the Army of the 
Cumberland, ordered out of the line of in- 
trenchraents to make a demonstration to 
ascertain if Bragg was withdrawing from 
Mission Ridge, formed its lines in what the 
gazing Confederates thought a parade, and 
then, in the same manner of a parade, moved 
forward and swept the astonished enemy 
from the strong fortification of Orchard Knob, 
and from the whole intrenched line to right 
and left, acquiring a new base, and essentially 
changing the conditions of the battle which 
came two days after. 

Also when the same army, two days after, 
in perfect order but yet without orders, by a 
spontaneous movement, stormed Mission 
Hidge, and thus by an assault upon a place 
so difficult that a commander would not be 
justified in ordering it — an assault so incredi- 
ble to the Confederate Generals that they 
we^e taken by surprise, and whose very spon- 
taneousness made it irresistible, rescued the 
battle from Gen. Grant's plan, which, fatally 
mistaking the Confederate position, had ex- 
pended tlie greater force of his combined 
army in that which lie meant to be the 
decisive attack but which had entirely failed. 
These are examples of the high qualities of 
discipline and individual spirit and self-reli- 
ance which distinguished the American vol- 
unteers, and made them the best soldiers in 



the world. A veteran officer of the regular 
army, who liad served in two wars, testifying 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, said that in battle the only officers who 
can be any support to the soldiers are theofli- 
cers who are with them, first the company 
officers; that if the soldiers have confidence 
in the firm discipline of these, it is a strong sup- 
porting influence, but that, after all, the men 
of the ranks do the fighting, from their own 
qualities. Yet military biography will con- 
tinue to l)e written, as Adam Badeau has 
done it, and yet the honors of successful war 
will continue to be conferred, upon the idea 
of the battle pictures. 

This history has now reached the bloody 
Iiattle of Champion's Hill. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION's HILL. 

Gen. Pkmberton's dispatch to Gen. John- 
ston stated that his movement from Edward's 
Station was with 17,000 men. Through Adam 
Badeau's misty figures it appears that Gen. 
Grant had now concentrating upon Pember- 
TON from 40,000 to 45,000 men. McClernand's 
corps was in the advance, with Blair added 
to A. J. Smith on the southern, Osterhaus 
and Carr being on the middle, and Hovey 
on the northern road, the roads being abftut 
two miles apart, thus making a front of four 
miles, the several divisions being connected 
across a difficult country by lines of skir- 
mishers. 

Gen. Grant was at Clinton. Smith's divis- 
ion came first upon the enemy at 7:30 a. m., 
following up his skirmishers for half a mile, 
when an artillery exchange took place. This 
was with what had been the advance of Pem- 
berton, who was now reversing his movement; 
but this affair, which, to Gen. Smith's mind, 
showed that the enemy was falling back, 
helped to keep in Gen. Grant's mind the im- 
pression that the Confederate tactics were to 
turn his left to get into his rear. Osterhaus' 
report says that, hearing this firing at 7:30, 
and his cavalry patrols reporting that "Gen. 
Smith had engaged the enemy on the Ray- 
mond road, in order to co-operate with him, 
I advanced rapidly to a point where the road 
leaves the open fields and enters a** very 
broken section of timbered land, bejiinci 



84 — 



which the enemy was formed apparently in 
very strong numbers." 

This earl3' engagement on Grant's left and 
center had an important influence on his im- 
agination and conduct of the battle. Hovey's 
division, on the northern road, was in a less 
difficult counti-y. McPheeson's corps was 
following HoyEY. At 9:45 McClernand got a 
dispatch from Hovey that he had found the 
enemy strongly posted in front, that Mc- 
Pherson's corps was behind him, and asking 
whether lie should bring on the battle. Mc- 
Clernand informed Grant of the situation. 
Badeau states that Grant's previoiis instruc- 
tions to McClernand were that "When these 
dispositions were made he was to feel the 
enemj' with a heavy line of skirmishers, but 
not to bring on a general engagement unless 
certain of success.'' 

Of course McClernand, in an u-nknown 
country, before an enemy whose movement 
had surprised Grant, could be certain of suc- 
cess before he began. 

Pemberton had stopped to fight, in order to 
get away. He expected, as his report sliows, 
to retreat that night. Champion's Hill 
was nothing to him but a place for the day's 
defense, and was nothing to Grant. Sher- 
man was coming by a more northern road. 
To the north of Champion's Hill was an open 
country to the road in the rear of Pemberton's 
position. Also the southern road, on which 
were two divisions, ran to the rear of the 
ridge. The middle road ran through the Con- 
federate center. 

About 45,000 men were marching on 17,000 
by a way in which they could turn and en- 
velop the position, and either force the enemy 
to precipitate flight or to surrender. The 
situation was favorable in an extraordinary 
degree for achieving a great victory without 
slaughter. The sequel will show how it was 
improved. 

Badeau relates: "Hovey sent back word 
to McPherson that he had met the enemy in 
force, strongly posted on the northern or 
Bolton road." Whereupon "McPherson dis- 
patched to Grant: '1 think it advisable 
for you to come to the front as soon as you 
can.' " 

A foot note explains that "McPherson saw 
that a battle was imminent, and McCler- 
nand was the ranking oflftcer at the front," 
under whom he did not want to go into ac- 
tion. Therefore, he sent this urgent call to 



Grant, who hastened to the front. And now 
the situation changed, and there was exhib- 
ited the important part whicli a Command- 
ing General may play in a battle. 

McPherson's corps now moved up. Says 
Badeau: "Grant found Hovey's skirmishers 
near the enemy's picket^ The troops were 
rapidly getting into line, and Hovey could 
have brought an an engagement at any mo- 
ment." He gives this description of Cham- 
pion's Hill, and the Confederate line: 

The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on 
a high wooded ridge called Champion's Hill, over 
which the road to Edward's Station runs, making a 
sharp tutn to the south as it strikes the hills. This 
ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surround- 
ing country, and is the highest land for many miles 
around. The topmost point is bald, and gave the 
rebels a commanding jiosition for their artillery, 
but the remainder of the crest, as well as a pre- 
cepitous hillside to the east of the road, is covered 
by a dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred 
with deep ravines, tbrotiuh whose entanglements 
troops could jiass only witli extreme ditliculty. 

This describes a natural fortress. Further 
along he narrates that the deep cut road run- 
ning along tlie crest of the ridge, then turn- 
ing and running across and down to the 
west, made an intrenchment for the Con- 
federates when driven to and along the top. 

'To the north the timber extends a short distance 
down the .hill, and then opens into cultivated 
fields on a gentle slope toward Baker's Creek, al- 
most a mile away. The rebel line ran southward 
along the crest, its center covering the middle road 
from Raymond, while the extreme right was on the 
direct or southern road. The wliole line was about 
four miles long. 

Upon this description of this peculiar ridge, 
standing up like a promontory above the 
surrounding country, with open fields arouiul 
it on the north to the road to Edward's Sta- 
tion, and with the Raymond road turning it , 
on the south, making a strong natural fort- 
ress, which could easily be turned and sur- 
rounded, Badeau concludes: "Champion's 
Hill, on the rebel left, was evidently the key 
to the wliole position;" therefore was the 
place to be attacked. This is upon the rule 
of the art of war that if the enemy has taken 
position for battle, you must find at what 
point he is best fortified, and attack thete; 
for that is "the key to the whole position." 

Hovey's division was disposed for the attack on 
the Bolton road (on both sides of it), and reached 



85 



to the hillside and into the wooded ravine; two 
brigades of Logan's division were thrown to the 
right of the road, and almost to the rear of the 
enemy, while Crocker was still coming np in 
column on the road. But Grant would not permit 
the attack to begin until he could hear from Mc- 
C'lernaud. 

Grant liad licapd from McClernaxd, and 
had given him instructions. 

Says Badeau, of McClernand: . "Staff 
officers were sent to him at once to piish for- 
ward with all rapidity; but by the nearest 
practicable route of communication he was at 
least fko and a half miles off." The kind of 
orders "to push forward with all rapidity" is 
told: "At fifteen minutes past 10, Grant 
sent him written orders: 'Fr^om all informa- 
tion gathered from citizens and prisoners, the 
mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's di- 
vision. McPherson is now up with Hovey 
and can support him at any point. Close np 
all your forces as expeditiously as jjossible, 
but cautiously. The enemy must not be al- 
lowed to get to our rear. If you can com- 
municate with Blair and Ransom, do so, and 
direct them to come up to your supiDort by 
the most expeditious route.' " 

This proves that Grant ^was still acting 
upon the information given him that morn- 
ing by the two reliable railroad laborers, and 
that he thought that Pemberton's main force 
was moving ujion his left flank and rear bj^ 
the southern road. Upon this theory he in- 
formed McClernand, as above, that the mass 
of the enemy was south of Hovey, that is to 
say, in frontof McClernand's other divisions; 
that Hovey was well enough supported by 
McPher.son, and that McClernand, having 
the mass of the enemy on his hands, must 
move very cautiously, and .see that the eneiuy 
did not get around his left to his rear. 

The weight which this theory had on Grant's 
imagination is further shown by his orders to 
Ransom's brigade of Arthur's division of 
McPherson's corps, now coming up from 
Grand Gulf. Says Badeau: "Grant 
therefore directed Ransom to move his com- 
mand so as to join the forces north of him, 
by the first road leading northward. 'Enemy 
are reported as having sent a column to our 
left and rear; avoid being cut oil'.'" All of 
Grant's conduct of this battle was under this 
delusion as to the situation. The orders to 
McClernand were of a tenor calculated to put 
him on the defensive, or at the best to make 



him very cautious, And to tuun his attention 
to his left, to extend that, to prevent being 
outflanked, instead of pushing boldly for- 
ward, or extending northward to support 
HnvEY'. 

This wholly reversed a plan which McCler- 
nand had formed; for he says in his report 
that he rode to Grant's headquarters early 
that morning to ask that McPherson support 
Hovey: 

Urging, among other things, that if his corps 
should not be needed a.s a support, it might, in the 
event that I should beat the enemy, fall upon his 
flank and rear and cut him ofl'. Assurances alto- 
gether satisfactory were given by the General, and 
I felt confident of our superiority on the right. I 
went forward with the center, formed by Osterhaus 
and Carr. 

Thus did Grant order the battlcdcfensively, 
under the belief that he was in danger of be- 
ing taken in the rear, and cut oflf from return 
to Grand Gulf; and thus his attack on the 
Confederate left at Champion's Hill was to 
make a diversion from that danger. Badeau 
now begins the battle against the fortress of 
Ciiampion's Hill: 

Continuous firing had been Icept up all themorn- 
ing between Hovey's sKirmishcrs alid the rebel ad- 
vance, and by 11 o'clock this grew into a battle. 
At this time Hovey's divi.sion was deployed to 
move westward against the hill, the two brigades of 
Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the 
open field, facing the northern side of tlie ridge, .ind 
only about -100 yards from the enemy: Logan's front 
and the main front of Hovey's division being nearly 
at right angles with each other. 

As Hovey advanced his line conformed to the 
shape of the hill, and became crescent like, the con- 
cave toward the hill. McPherson [Logan] now 
posted two batteries on his extreme right, and well 
in advance: these poured a destructive enfilading 
fire upon the enemy, under cover of which the 
national line began to mount the hill. [No enfilad- 
ing fire could cover the movement of Hovey's 
crescent line up the end of the ridge.J The enemy 
at once replied with a murderous discharge of 
musketry ,"and the battle soon ragea hotly all along 
the line, from Hovey's extreme left to ihe right of 
Logan; but Hovey pushed steadily on, and drove 
the rebels back (JOO yards, till eleven guns and 300 
prisoners were captured; and ihe brow of the height 
was gained. 

When a division has stormed such a natural 
fortress, and has taken "the key to the whole 
position" by that which was equivalent to 
carrying strong intreuchments by assault, it 



— 86 — 



might naturally be expected that the Com- 
manding General, who was observing 
this, would have support at hand to carry 
this forward and make this "key" turn the 
whole position. Bat it was otherwise: 

The road here formed a natural fortification, 
which the rebels made haste to use. It was cut 
through the crest of the ridge at the steepest part, 
the Vjank on the upper side commanding all bejow, 
so that even when the national troops had appar- 
ently gained the road, the rebels stood behind this 
novel breastwork, covered from every fire, and 
masters of the whole declivity. Finding himself, 
however, m spite of this advantage, losing ground 
on a point so vitally important, the enemy now 
pushed re-enforcements rapidly; and when these 
arrived, rallied under cover of the woods, and 
poured down the road in great numbers on the 
position occupied by Hovey. 

For awhile Hovey bore the whole brunt of the 
battle, and after a desperate resistance was com- 
pelled to fall back, though slowly and stubbornly, 
losing several of the guns he had taken an hour be- 
fore. But Grant was watching the tight on the first 
spur of the hill undrrjiir, and seeing that the enemy 
was getting too strong for Hovey he sent in a 
brigade of Crocker's division, which had just ar- 
rived. 

Hovey's report relates the .same incident 
thus: 

Brigadier General Quinby"s division, commanded 
by (ien. Crocker, was near at hand, and had not yet 
been under fire. I sent to them for support, but, 
being unknown to the officers of that command, 
considerable delay ensued, and 1 was compelled to 
resort to Gen. Grant to procure the order for their 
aid. Col. Boomer, commanding 3rt Brigade of 
Quinby's division, on receiving the command from 
Gen. Grant,came gallantly up the hill ; Col. Holmes, 
with two small regiments— 10th Missouri and 17th 
Iowa— soon followed. The entire force sent 
amounted to about 2,000 men. 

Badeau continues: -'These fresh troops 
gave Hovey confidence, and the height that 
had been gained with fearful loss was still 
retained. The preponderance, however, was 
even yet in favor of the enemy." But 
Hovey's lack was more of battalions than of 
confidence, and he says: 

My division, in the meantime, had been com- 
pelled to yield ground before overwhelming num- 
bers. Slowly and stubbornly they fell back, contest- 
ing with death every inch of the lield they had won. 
Col. Boomer and 'Vil. Holmes gallantly and heroic- 
ally rushed with their commands into the con- 
flict, but the enemy had massed his forces, and 
slowly pressed our whole line with re-enforce- 
pients, backward to a point near the hiovf of the 
bill, Here a stubboui stand was made. 



To resume now Badeau's narrative at the 
point where Grant sent the re-enforcement: 

Meanwhile the rebels had made a desperate at- 
tempt on their left to capture the battery in Mc- 
pherson's corps which was doing them so much 
damage; they were, however, promptly repelled by 
Smith's brigade of Logan's division, which drove 
them back with great slaughter, capturing many 
prisoners. Discovering now tliat his own left was 
nearly turned, the enemy made a determined effort 
to turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that com- 
mander all his available force; and while JjOgan 
was carrying everything before him, the closely 
pressed and nearly exhausted troops of Havey were 
again compelled to retire. They had been fighting 
nearly three hours, and were fatigued and out of 
ammunition ; but fell back doggedly, and not far. 



Outnumbered, fatigued, and out of ammu- 
nition, too, is reason enough. Continues 
Badeau: 

The tide of battle at this point seemed turning 
against the national forces, and Hovey sent back 
repeatedly to Grant for support. Grant, however, 
was momentarily expecting the advance of Mc- 
Clernaud's four divisions, and never doubled the 
result. 

Still, more battalions to Hovey, outnum- 
bered andoutof ammunition, might be as use- 
ful at the moment as Grant's never doubting 
the result. 

But was Grant momentarily expecting 
this? Badeau continues: 

At thirty minutes past 12 he had again dispatched 
to McClernand: "As soon as your command is all 
in hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the 
enemy, and attack him in force, if an opportunity 
occurs. I am with Hovey and McPhcrson, and will 
see that they co-operate." 

So he was promising Mc(7lernand that he 
would see that Hovey co-operated; likewise 
McPhekson. And McClernand, after he had 
got his men well in hand — which they had 
been since daylight — was to throw forward 
skirmishers and feel the enemy, and "if an 
opportunity occurred," to attack him in force. 
He was to wait for his opportunity. 

Considering what was going on where 
Grant was, "under fire," his orders to Mc- 
Clernand seem almost too energetic and 
peremptory, indicating an undueexcitenicnt, 
or the glow of battle. Badeau says: "That 
commander, however, did not arrive." But 
as Grant, in answer to McClernand's inquiry 
whether McPherson would support Hovey 
and whetlier he shoulcl bring on the battle 



si — 



had sent the above order, following another, 
telling him that the mass of the enemy was 
in his (McClernand's) front, aiming to turn- 
his left, Grant could hardly expect him "to 
arrive." And now, Badeau continues: 

Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, 
now directed MePherson to move what troops he 
could by a left flank around to the enemy's right 
front on the crest of the ridge. The prolongation 
of Logan to the right had left a gap between him 
and Hovey, and into this the two remaining bri- 
urades of Crocker were thrown. The movement 
was promptly executed; Boomer's brigade went at 
and into the fight, and checked the rebel advance 
till Holmes' brigade came up, wnen a dash- 
ing charge wa.s made, and Hovey and 
Crocker were engaged for forty minutes, Hovey re- 
capturing five of the guns he had already taken and 
lost. 

Badeau by this has made two affairs of the 
.sending of Boomer and Holmes to Hovey's 
aid, of which Hovey makes but one. The 
muddle is explaiped by Crocker's report, 
which says that two regiments of Col. Sak- 
korn's Ijrigade were taken from the right to 
support Col. Boo.mer, and that Col. Holmes 
came after. Crocker continues: "At this 
critical moment Col. Holmes arrived in the 
lield with two regiments * » « and pro- 
ceeded * * * to the front, relieving Col. 
Bijomer, who by this time was out of ammu- 
nition." This situation on the left of Hovey, 
and nearest to Grant, was that which im- 
pressed him that "the position was in dan- 
ger;" that is to say, that his right wing was 
in danger of being turned by its left and 
cut off". 

Baheau continues: 

But the enemy had massed his forces on this 
point, and the irregularity of the ground prevented 
the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though baf- 
fled and enraged, he still fought with courage and 
obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national 
line was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the po- 
.sition was in danger. 

Tills seems a remarkable achievement of 
generalship, with 45,000 men at hand, against 
17,000, desiring only to retreat. And now 
comes another stroke of generalship. Badeat 
goes on : 

At this crisis Stevenson's brigade of Logan's 
division was moved forward at a double quick into 
a piece of wood on the extreme right of the com- 
mand, the brigade moved parallel with Logan's 
general line of taltle, charged across the ravines up 



the hill and through an open field, driving the 
enemy from an important position, where he was 
about to establish his batteries, capturing seven 
guns and several hundred prisoners. The main 
Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a 
southerly direction for about a mile, to the point of 
intersection with the middle^ or Raymond road, 
turns almost to the west again, running down the 
hill and across the valley where Lo^au was now 
operating in the rear of the enemy. 

At length the battle, after slaughtering men 
for hours in assaulting a steep and broken 
nill, naturally so strong a position that prac- 
tically it tripled the enemy's force, had stum- 
bled upon a clear way around the head of the 
ridge by which Pemberton could be turned 
and captured. Continues Badeau: 

Unconscious of the immense aavantage, Logan 
swept directly across the road, and absolutely cut 
off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's Station, 
without being aware of it. 

But at this juncture, the essential part play- 
ed by the Commanding General in this battle 
is agaiti to be exemplitied: 

At this very juncture. Grant, finding that there 
was no prospect of McClernand's reaching the field 
[McC. was following Grant's iustructious], and that 
the scales were still balanced at tlie critical point, 
thought liimself obliged, in order to still further 
re-enforce Hove_j' and Crocker in front, to recall 
Logan from the right, where he was overlapping 
and outflanking the rebel left. 

Had the national commander been acquainted 
with the country, he would, of course, have 
ordered Logan to push on in the rear of the enemy, 
and thus secure the capture or annihilation of the 
whole rebel army. But ihe entire region was new 
to the national troops [to Grant], and this great 
opportunity unknown. 

And now conies a singular incident, revers- 
ing the usual efi'ect. When Logan withdrew 
from this road, to march by a Iong*circuit to 
Hovey's left, then the Confederates became 
alarmed for the road, and gave up the tigtit. 
8ays Badeau : 

As it was, however, the moment Logan left the 
road, the enemy, alarmed lor his line of retreat, 
finding it, indeed, not only threatenea, but almost 
gone, at once abandoned his position in front. 

But there was a coincidence at the front: 

.\t this crisis a national battery [Badeau is too 
delicate to say of Hovey's division— in fact three 
batteries] opened from the right a well directed fire, 
aud the victorious troops of Hovev and Crocker 



88 



pressing on, the enemy once more gave way; the 
rebel line was rolled back for the third time, and 
the battle decided. 

But before this consummation an episode 
had come oit', which liad an important effect: 

Before the result of the final charge was known, 
Logan rode eagerly up to Grant, declaring that if 
one more aash could be made in front, he would 
advance in the rear and complete the capture of the 
rebel army. Grant at once rode forward in per- 
son, and found the troops that had been so gal- 
lantly engaged for hours withdrawn from their 
most advanced positions, and retilling their cart- 
ridge boxes. Explaining to them the position of 
Logan's forces, he directed them to use all dispatch 
and push forward as rapidly as possible. 

By this it appears that Grant was going to 
send LouAN back to the road from which he 
liad withdrawn him to re-enforce Hovey's 
left, and that he passed by commanding ofifi- 
cers, and mingled with the soldiers, and ex- 
plained the situation to them, and directed 
them to use all dispatch, and make another 
dash at the enemy. Badeau relates that then : 

He proceeded himself in haste to what had been 
Pemberton's line, exnectiiig every moment to come 
up with the enemy, but found the rebels had al- 
ready broken and fled from the field. Logan's at- 
tack had precipitated the rout, and the battle of 
Champion's Hill was won. This was between 3 and 
4 o'clock in the afternoon. 

The attentive reader of this interesting bat- 
tle narrative must here wonder what made 
the Confederates "break and fly from the 
field." Badeau's narrative makes, out that 
Grant had withdrawn Logan from his attack 
on their left and rear, and that Hovey's troops 
had withdrawn from their most advanced 
position, and, as appears, were not engaged 
at the time, as they were "refilling their 
cartridge boxes," and that Grant went among 
them and explained Logan's position, and 
directed them to mtike one more assault, and 
then himself rode in haste toward Pember- 
ton's line. 

Such a suspension of the attack, and such 
a retiring movement, does not usually cause 
tlie strongly placed adversary to break and 
run. The only explanation suggested of the 
cause of the sudden turn of the battle to 
victory at tliis juncture is Grant's riding in 
haste at Pemberton's line. This would make 
at least one instance in which the victory was 
won, according to the battle pictures, by a 
careering Commanding General riding furi- 



ously at the enemy's ranks. Perhaps, how- 
ever, by going back to the next preceding 
citation, and adding thereto^ Hovey's and 
Crocker's reports, and the fact that Logan 
continued to attack, an idea may be had of 
the cause of Pemberton's giving up the battle. 
By referring back to Hovey's account of 
what followed when he had been reenforced 
from Crocker's division, it will he seen that 
before the re-enforcement arrived his divis- 
ion had been forced to give ground, and that 
this continued thereafter till all had been 
driven back to the brow of tlie hill, where a 
stubborn stand was made. At tliis point 
Hovey relates that which was tlie turning 
point in this "key of the position:" 

The irregularity of our line had previously pre- 
vented me from using artillery in enfilading the 
enemy's line, but as our forces were compelled to 
fall slowly back, the lines became marked and dis- 
tinct, and about 'J::50 p. m. I could easily perceive, 
by the sound of firearms through the woods, the 
position of the respective armies. 

I at once ordered the ]st Missouri Battery, com- 
manded by Capt. Schofield. and the IGth Ohio Bat- 
tery under First Lieut. Murdock, to take a position 
in an open field, beyond a slight mound on my 
right, in advance of, and with parallel ranges of 
their guns with, my lines. About the same time 
Capt. Dillon'^Wisconsin Battery was put in posi- 
tion; two sections of the IGih Ohio Battery on the 
left, the Wisconsin Battery in the center, and Capt. 
Schofield's on the right. Through the rebel ranks 
these batteries hailed an incessant shower of shot 
and shell, entirely enfiladine the rebel columns. 

The fire was terrific for several minutes, and the 
cheers from our men on the brow of the hill told of 
success. The enemy gave back, and our forces 
under Gen. McGinnis, Col. Slack, Col. Boomer, and 
Col. Holmes drove them again over the ground which 
had been hotly contested for the third time during 
the day, five more of the eleven guns not taken 
down the hill falling a second time into our posses- 
sion. •■■ * * Thus ended the battle of Champion's 
Hill at about 3 p. m. 

But while this gives a reason for the retreat 
of the enemy which the common mind can 
understand, Adam Badeau's account of 
Grant's action at this crisis can be reconciled 
with it by taking in Crocker's report, which 
states that Col. Holmes' arrival at the front 
"relieved Col. Boomer, who by this time was 
entirely out of ammunition." It is probable, 
therefore, that it was to Boomer's men, while 
refilling their cartridge boxes, that Gen. 
Grant was explaining Logan's situation, 
while the rest of the line was dealing the fin- 
ishing stroke to the enemy's line. 



'— 89 — 



This explanation allows also for any etfect in 
the tinal scene, which niiglft have been 
wrought by , Gen. Grant's riding at Pkmber- 
TON'sline, if it liad still been there. 

The length to which this chapter has been 
drawn, rather than make a Dreak in the 
midst of the battle, constrains to defer to 
another the summing up of the character and 
results 'of this terribly slaughterous conflict, 
the theory and tactics which distinguished it, 
and the part of the rest of the line therein, 
together with a glance at the conduct of the 
Confederate side. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

THE INVETRED CONCEPTION UPON WHICH GRANT 
ORDERED THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL — 
FIGHTINti A BATTLE DEFENSIVELY AGAINST A 
RETREATING ENEMY — THE OTHER PARTS OF 
THE BATTLE — THE MURDEROUS NATURE OF 
THE ASSAULT ON THE RIDGE — HEROISM OF 
THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS OF THE LINE — 
THE DREADFUL LIST OF THE DEAD AND 
WOUNDED. 

AdamBadeau's narrative ignores the action 
in all that part of the line of four miles which 
was south of the point of the assault on the 
north end of the ridge, and he charges great 
delinquency on Gen. McClernand for not 
pressing the enemy and destroying his right. 
He says : 

A vigorous effort on the part of McClernand 
would have accomplished the defeat by noon. ■■' * * 
Or, later in the fii;lu, Logan could have beea kept 
in their rear, if McClernand haa come up in time, 
and with all their retreat cut off, the enemy might 
have been forced to surrender in mass. 

But Badeau's narration shows that when 
Grant reached the front at the north end of 
the ridge, he took charge of the battle and 
made a reverse change in McClernand's dis- 
positions; that his conduct of the battle was 
upon his idea that Fkmberton's main force 
was moving to McClernand's left and rear 
— whereas it was trying to get away in the op- 
posite direction ; that at 10:ir> he sent to Mc- 
Clernand this alarming order: "Close up all 
your forces as expeditiously as possible; the 
enemy must not be allowed to get to our 
rear;" to Blair a similar order, to Ransom 
this: "Pinemy are reported as having sent a 



column to our left and rear; avoid being cut 
oflt';" that even so late as 12:;i5, when Hovky 
was storming the ridge, he sent McClernand 
a dubious, vague, cautionary order, calculated 
to keep him on the defensive, and his chief at- 
tention to his extreme left and rear; and that 
at the beginning he had separated Hovey'm 
division from McClernand's command, and 
had countermanded his order to keej) in con- 
nection. 

While thus issuing alarming orders to his 
center and left, calculated to keep all that 
part of the line on the defensive toward the 
extreme left and rear. Grant promised tiii.H 
support: "I am with Hovey and McPherson, 
and will see that they co-operate." Thus was 
he seeing that, by assaulting the ridge, tliej' co- 
operated with McClernand in preventing the 
enemy's main force from getting l)y the left 
to Grant's rear. This is the only theory tliat 
is given to explain the assault on the ridge. 

By this strange misconception, it fell out 
that while Pemberton was fighting defen- 
sively to get a chance to retreat, Grant was 
ordering the battle defensively to prevent 
Pemberton getting around his left to his 
rear, and that he thought necessary to order 
the desperate assault on the north end of the 
ridge, to '"co-operate" with McClernand in 
preventing his left from being turned. And 
so, after Hovey's division had been engaged 
since 11 o'clock, in the dreadful slaughter 
which it suffered in storming the north end 
of the ridge, Grant at 12:30sent McClernand, 
two miles away, this vague, doubtful, timid, 
cautionary order, which McClernand's re- 
port says was in reply to a message he sent, 
describing the position of things, and asking 
if he should "bring on a general engage- 
ment:" 

As soon as your command is all in hand, throw 
forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and at- 
tack him ill force if an opportunity occurs. I am 
with Hovey and McPher.son, and will see that they 
co-operate. 

And lie was seeing tliat they co-operated. 
Hovey's and Logan's divisions had been co- 
operating for an hour in storming tiiat deadly 
ridge, and a thousand brave men had fallen 
in co-operating with Grant's fears that four 
miles to the south he was being taken by the 
rear. Fortunately, the country has Ada.m 
Badeau's account of this, approved by Gen. 
Grant, else it would not in' l)elieved. 



90 — 



McClernand's report narrates further that 
Gen. A. J. Smith, on the Southern road, sent 
an aid to tell him that the enemy was not 
moving to the left or rear, and that he com- 
municated this information to Grant, where- 
upon he received an order to attack. The 
precious time consumed by all this, when 
Gen. Smith was four miles from Grant, and a 
part of the country between was very diffi- 
cult, may be estimated. At length this infor- 
mation got Grant out of the alarmed de- 
fensive policy for his center and left, with 
which he was co-operating by consuming 
Hovey's and Logan's divisions in storming 
an almost impregnable hill. 

Grant's orders were enough to have neu- 
tralized McClernand's three remaining di- 
visions and Blair's; but all this time brisk 
skirmishing was going on, and artillery ex- 
changes and advances, along a front of four 
miles in a very difficult country, especially 
that on the middle road, and between that 
and Grant's position. Osterhaus and Carr 
were on this road, Carr in the reserve. Os- 
terhaus' report gives this description of the 
ground, mentioning also the force of his di- 
vision : 

With this force of 2,704 men, I entered upon one 
of the most difficult terrains [grounds] tor the pas- 
sage of trooDS which can be imagined. A chaos of 
ravines and narrow bills, sloping very abruptly into 
sink hole like valleys, diverge in all directions. All 
is covered densely by trees and brush, except the 
public road, which winds its track in bizarre curves, 
and follows the hills and valleys without permitting 
at any point an open view of more than fifty or 
100 yards. 

This was a country in which a small force 
could retard the advance of an army. It was 
a country for the exercise of skill in pushing 
on, or for pushing men into such a bush- 
whacking slaughter as Grant's in the thicket 
of the Wilderness. Osterhaus' report shows 
that the affair was managed with skill, and 
the Confederate line pressed back without 
heavy loss on the national side, the loss of 
Osterhaus' division being 110 killed, 
wounded, and missing. The fact that there 
was not a butchery is instanced by Badeau 
as proof that there was no action. Badeau 
says that "15,000 men thus lingered under 
his (McClernand's) command, in the vicinity 
of the field, though moving on roads con- 
verging to the front. The force opposed to 
him was probably not greater than 0,000 or 



7,000." Badeau conjures numbers on either 
side up and down to suit the occasion, un- 
mindful of the other relations. When he 
comes to dispute Pemberton's report of his 
force at this battle, he makes it great enough 
to have outnumbered the scattered forces all 
along the line. And Badeau ignores the rul- 
ing part that Grant had magnified this force 
to Mc'Clernand, and had put him on the de- 
fensive. 

In narrating Grant's riding alone at Pem- 
berton's line, Badeau tells an incident which 
shows that McClernand's central divisions 
were pushing on : 

Arriving now at the Raymond road, Grant saw 
on his left, and along the next ridge, a column of 
troops approaching, which proved to be Carr's 
division. McClernand was with it in person. To 
the left of Carr Osterhaus soon afterward appeared, 
with his skirmishers well in advance. 

This was timely in meeting Loring's divis- 
ion, which, at length, moving by a rear road, 
had come up to help Stevenson on the ridge, 
but, being too late, was trying to protect the 
retreat. 

The battle on Champion's Hill, on the 
Confederate side, was fought first by Steven- 
son's division, then re-enforced by one brigade 
from Bov/en's division, and then by the 
other brigade. Pemberton called on Loring 
for help, but Loring said he was hard pressed; 
when he did come it was too late. Gen. J. E. 
Johnston gives the opinion that Loring was 
sufficiently engaged in resisting McClernand. 
A loss in Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions 
of 355 killed, 1,07-1 wounded, of which twenty- 
nine officers were killed and 105 wounded, at- 
tests the stubbornness of the resistance, as well 
as the heroic valor of the men who fought 
this resistance and all the advantages of 
that strong position. 

Badeau, ignoring the rest of the line, says: 
"The battle was fought with McPherson's 
command and Hovey's division of the 13th 
Corps." Lest this might go to the credit of 
Hovey or McClernand, he adds: "Grant di- 
recting all ofHovEY's movements himself in 
the absence of McClebnand." He continues: 
"This hardest fought battle of the campaign 
cost him (Grant) 426 men killed, 1,842 
wounded, and 189 missing. Hovey alone lost 
1,200 men, one-third of his command. Mc- 
PHER.SON lost about 1,000 men." Perhaps 
none but a soldier can apprehend the nature 



91—- 



of the fighting, the effect on the mind, and 
the destruction of military organization by 
the loss of one-third of a division in a battle. 
Gen. Hovey's report expresses becoming 
feeling, and does justice to the soldiers and 
officers of this murderous assault: 

I can not think of this bloody hill without sadness 
and pride; sadness for the great loss of my true 
and gallant men ; pride for the heroic bravery they 
displayed. ■■'■ ■■'■ It was after the conflict literal- 
ly the hill of death; men, horses, cannon, and the 
debris of an army lay pattered in wild confusion. 
Hundreds of the gallani Twelfth Division were cold 
in death, or writhing in pain, and with large num- 
bers of Quinby's gallant boys lay dead, dying, or 
wounded, intermingled with our fallen foe. I never 
saw fighting like this. The loss of my division on 
this field was nearly one-ihird of my forces 
engaged. 

Gen. Hovey's report, alone, gives a list of 
the regiments and their commanders. In a 
nation where soldierly heroism is appreciated 
— where gratitude is not all expended on one, 
man, the naraesof alltheregirnentsengaged in 
the assault on Champion's Hill would be 
household words. Hovey mentions those of 
his division as if the volunteers and their im- 
mediate volunteer officers did the fighting 
which Badeau appropriates to Grant by the 
statement that "Grant directed all of Hovey's 
movements himself.' Both Hovey's report 
and Badeau's account show that Grant's 
directing did not extend to the duty of sup- 
porting him by ordering up assistance. 
Hovey's mention of his troops is here given 
in his own words: 

Of the 29tli Wisconsin, 24th and 28th Iowa, in 
what words of prai.se shall I speak? Not more than 
six months in the service, their record will com- 
pare with the oldest and best tried regiments in the 
field. All honor is due to their gallant oflicers and 
men, and Colonels Gill, Bryan, and Connell have 
my thanks for the skill with which they handled 
their respective commands, and for the fortitude, 
endurance, and bravery displayed by their gallant 
men. 

It is useiens to speak in praise of the 11th, 21th, 
34th, 46th,'and 47th Indiana, and 5Gth Ohio; they 
have won laurels on many fields, and not only their 
country will praise, but posterity will be proud to 
claim kindred with the privates in tbeir ranks. 
They have a history that Col. Macauley*, Col. 
Spicely, Col. Cameron, Col. Bringhurst, Lieut. Col. 
McLaughlin, and Col. Rayner, and their children 
will be proud to read. 

His report, in narrating tlie progress of the 
battle, tells also of the service of the 1st Mis- 



souri Battery, Capt. Schofield; the 16th Ohio 
Battery, Lieut. Murdock, and Capt. Dillon's 
Wisconsin Battery in the crisis of the battle. 
Also this of the brigade commanders: 

My brigades could not have been managed with 
more consummate skill then they were by Brigadier 
General McGinnis and Col. James R. Slack. Their 
services deserve the highest reward that a soldier 
can claim. " =•" ■' The division lost in killed and 
wounded fifty-fonr ofllcers, twenty-nine in the 1st 
Brigade, twenty-five in the 2d. 

The effective force of the division was 4,180; 
the losses 211 killed, 872 wounded, 119 miss- 
ing; total 1,202, in less than four hours. 

Logan's report, while not giving a list of 
regiments and officers, gives the same honor 
to the men of the ranksand their line officers. 
The loss of his division was 374 killed and 
wounded, thirty-nine missing; in Crocker's 
(Quinby's) division 662 killed and wounded. 

The aggregate loss in this assault of the 
ridge was 2,262. Badeau says: 

The losses were thus heavy frorn the nature of 
the ground. Grant was compelled to mass his men 
in order to charge, and in the ascent of the hill the 
fire from the rebel infantry into the serried ranks of 
the assailants was murderous. 

Inasmuch as this was the great battle which 
redeemed Grant's raid, and turned it into a 
campaign which raised his military fame to 
its zenith, and as such a battle should be an 
example for teaching the art of war, it is 
proper to examine the inquiry why Grant, 
with more than double the enemy's force, 
sacrificed 2,262 soldiers in a.ssaulting an al- 
most impregnable point, which had roads 
and an open country running around it, and 
from which the enemy wanted only to get 
away. 



CHAPTER XXXVL 

judgment on the battle of champion's hill, 
AS established by the matured conclusions 

SET forth by gen. GRANT AND HIS AUTHORIZED 

biographer. 

The battle of Champion's Hill was the first 
battle which Gen. Grant had commanded in 
person from its beginning, having all the or- 
dering of the army, and the choice of time 
and place, since his battle of Belmont. It 



— 92 



gives, the measure of progress of two years of 
the work of the practical education of a Com- 
manding General. 

The circumstances, conditions, and ideas 
of this battle are so well revealed by Apam 
Baiif:au's narrative, that a simple summing 
np of these constitutes a complete judgment 
on the generalship. By taking this the re- 
viewer can avoid all disputing criticism, and 
can let the whole question rest on the author- 
ity of the Commanding General and his au- 
thorized biographer. Their history sets forth 
the following facts and conclusions: 

1. Gen. Grant, up to the morning of the 
16th, was ignorant that Pemberton's army had 
cros.sed the Big Black River, while in fact it 
had advanced to Edward's Station on the 
13th; therefore all his railroad destroying 
and other diffusive operations were in the be- 
lief that Pemberton was west of Big Black 
River, keeping guard over Vicksburg. 

2. Gen. Grant, at 5 o'clock in the morning 
of the 16th, was surprised by the intelligence 
from two railroad laborers that Pemberton, 
with a force which these wonderfully in- 
formed persons estimated at 25,000, was at 
Edward's Station and advancing, with the 
"design to attack his rear," around his left. 

3. Gen. Grant was greatly alarmed by this 
intelligence, as was shown by the alarming 
orders he issued to Sherman, McPherson, Mc- 
Clernand, Blair, and Ransom. 

4. Gen. Grant's order and conduct of the 
battle, after he had come to the front, was 
upon hi.s idea that Pemberton's main force 
was moving southeast into his rear, while in 
fact Pemberton was trj'ing to retreat to the 
north. In this persistent delusion Grant 
ordered the battle to be defensive, with ex- 
treme caution, on the center and left, em- 
bracing, Badeau says. 15,000 men, and he 
ordered the assault on the head of Cham- 
pion's Hill as a co-operation in the defense of 
his extreme left and rear. 

5. Through open fields around the head of 
Champion's Hill was a clear way to a road in 
the rear of the ridge, which was the road of 
retreat from the hill, which, had Grant 
known, he need not have assaulted the hill, 
but could have "thus secured the capture or 
annihilation of the whole rebel army." 

6. Gen. Grant, having reached the front 



about 10 a. m., stillholdingtohisdelusion that 
Pemberton's main force was on the offensive 
to his (Grant's) left and rear, sent orders to 
McClernand to make his dispositions accord- 
ingly, and then he, without reconnoitering 
the open country around the north end of the 
ridge, in ignorance that it could easily be 
turned, without waiting for Sherman's corps, 
without waiting even till all of McPherson's 
had come up, ordered Hovey's division, sup- 
ported by Logan's, to assault the most diffi- 
cult point of the ridge. 

These conclusions are all set forth by Gen. 
Grant's authorized biographer, and are con- 
firmed by Gen. Grant's revision. The con- 
clusions of Gen. Grant and of his inspired 
biographer leave no room for dispute. They 
establish the judgment that the assault on 
Champion's Hill was unnecessary; that with- 
out any necessity of tne situation save the 
fancied one of Gen. Grant's delusion as to the 
enemy's movement, he sent the right wing of 
the army massed to an assault which must 
inevitably be to a great slaughter, and made a 
needless sacrifice of 2,262 brave volunteers, 
and a waste of the heroism of all, in conse- 
quence of a false conception of the situation, 
which was exactly the reverse of the true. 

A striking example is given of the stuff of 
which military heroes are made, when all the 
glory of the heroism of 15,000 soldiers, sent 
to the slaughter, and of 2,262 volunteers slain 
or mutilated, is placed upon the head of the 
Commanding General whose strange mistake 
ordered this needless sacrifice. To this point 
the reviewer, and the conclusions of the hero 
and his biographer travel together, and thus 
the unpleasantness of disputing judgment is 
avoided. 

But it must be remarked that this mistake 
as to the enemy's design does not give any 
rational meaning to the assault on the ridgi\ 
If the enemy had been on the offensive, as 
Gen. Grant thought, advancing upon his left 
to get to his rear, the consuming of liis right 
wing in assaulting the natural fortress of the 
north end of the ridge would be the most 
effective co-operation whic:h Grant could give 
to the enemy's purpose. If they had actually 
been flanking his left, he, being, as Badeai? 
represents, free from all incumbrance of a 
base or of communications, was in complete 
condition to turn their left liy the open coun- 
try around the head of the ridgp, called Cham- 



93 — 



pion's Hill. What he did would appear to be 
a co-operation with tlie enemy's purpose to 
turn his left, by himself destroying his right. 

Gen. Grant's apprehension of danger of be- 
ing taken in the rear was his controlling idea 
in ordering this action. It was persisted in, al- 
though when Gen. A. .7. Smith in the morning 
carae in collision "with the enemy they were 
falling back. The only explanation given by 
Badeau is that the two railroad laborers told 
Grant that Pemberton was moving to attack 
his rear. He narrates as a great blunder on 
the part of Pemherton, that he "proposed to 
fall on the communications of his antagonist, 
supposing these would be cut at Dillon's;" 
for he says: "What communications Grant 
now had were with Jackson, and his face was 
turned toward Yicksburg, when Pemberton 
set out to attack his rear at Dillon's;" but in 
this he forgets his account of the alarming 
changes which Grant made, and the alarmed 
orders which he gave, when, as he was hurry- 
ing all toward Bolton, he was told by the 
tramps that Pe.mbertox was moving toward 
Dillon's to attack his rear. 

Gen. J. E. Johnston makes the same point 
against Pemberton, calling his movement on 
Grant's communications absuid in plan, be- 
cause Grant had cut loose from communica- 
tions. But it is seen that when Grant heard 
tliat Pemberton was so moving, it gave him 
such alarm for the safety of his army as to 
control all his action, and cause him to sub; 
ject it to that which Badeau describes as al- 
most a defeat, and which did make a terrible 
sacrifice. Reflection will show tliat there was 
a more positive cause for this alarm than the 
word of the accidental railroad laborers, in 
Grant's situation, and in that state of the 
mind which is embraced by the military term 
morale. 

The^alarm was iiievitable from the nature 
of the raid, whicli had abandoned the base 
of su})plies and tlie line of retreat, and had 
trusted to getting back by avoiding any 
serious battle, when surprised by the fact that 
tiie- army wbicli it had avoided was advanc- 
ing to cut off its return. To be cut off was 
destruction. Even a di'uvvn Ijuttle would be 
danger of surrender. Bafjeau, in describing 
the plan, said it risked tlie loss of the whole 
army. No other reason can be given for 
(trant's marching away from both his base 
and from Pemberton's army, than that he 
did not feel able to attack it; and now, when 



far away from his base, he heard that that 
army was advancing across the line of his re- 
turn. 

If he thought, when on his base, he had 
reason for moving away from that army, how 
much greater reason had he for alarm when 
he thought that army was advancing to attack 
him by a line upon which defeat would make 
sure the destruction of his army. The situa- 
tion was enough to account for the loss of a 
self-possession which was not at any time 
founded upon an intelligent comprehension 
of the whole situation, but was rather from a 
slow apprehension. The shock must necessa- 
rily be very great when Grant, with his 
mind bent on concentration to the north to 
pursue Johnston, thinking Pemberton west 
of Big Black Pdver, suddenly heard that Pem- 
berton's whole army had crossed the Big 
Black, had reached Edward's Station, and 
was still advancing upon a line to cut off his 
return. 

Gen. Grant's order to McClernand, dated 
at 12:35 p. m., shows that the part which he 
was ordering Hovey and McPherson to take 
was to co-operate with McClernand in re- 
pelling Pe.mberton's imagined movement to 
Grant's left and rear. This is all the reason 
given for the Champion's Hill slaughter. In 
the same description he says: "To the north 
the timber extends a short distance down the 
hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on 
a gentle slope toward Baker's Creek, almost 
a mile away." This creek fetched a circuit 
and ran west of the hill to the south. He 
says further, the road which ran up the hill 
"turned almost to the west again, running 
down the hill and across the valley," and 
that when Grant recalled Logan he had 
"swept directly across the road, and absolute- 
ly cut off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's 
Station." 

He says further that if the opportunity of- 
fered by this road had been known to Grant, 
and embraced, he could have "thus secured 
the capture or annihilation of the whole 
rebel army." The only excuse which he 
gives is this: "But the entire region was new 
to the national troops, and this great oppor- 
tunity unknown." Thus, while the glory 
and reward of the victories of the national 
troops centered on Grant's head, the responsi- 
bility for his ignorance of the situation, 
which sent them to butchery, is diffused over 
"the national troops." 



— 94 



Troops under command have no means to 
acquire knowledge of the region they are op- 
erating in ; that is the part of the Command- 
ing General. He must he eyes and brains to 
the army. If he understands even the rudi- 
ments of his profession, he has an organization 
that acquires knowledge of the country which 
is the field of operations. The most ele- 
mentary teachings of the art of war are that 
a reconnaissance to ascertain the enemy's situ- 
ation, and the best line for operations, should 
precede an attack. It is the more vital when 
the enemy is found in a position which ap- 
pears at the first glance to be naturally very 
strong. 

The enemy was waiting in front of Grakt 
on an eminence that stood up above the sur- 
rounding country, and around which was an 
open country to a road at the rear, which was 
their way of retreat. Gkant could choose and 
did choose his time to attack. He acted as if 
he had ail the knowledge of the situation 
that he wanted. Badeau's account shows 
that if any sort of reconnaissance for infor- 
mation had been made it would have found 
that the hill could be easily turned. Conse- 
quently he shows that Gen. Grant neglected 
the simplest rudiments of the part of a Com- 
manding General when he sent this army of 
heroes to the unnecessary slaughter. 

As it it were fated by Gen. Grant's pro- 
verbial luck that he should leave nothing un- 
done that the mistakes of a Commanding 
General could do to destroy his army. 
Badeau relates that Grant, in the very crisis 
of the battle on the ridge, sent an order re- 
calling Logan from the right, where he had 
advanced across the enemy's road of retreat, 
to fetch him around to add to Hovey's left — 
an order which, if carried out, would have 
left the battle to be begun anew, under the 
influence of a repulse all along the line. 

By this omission of the simplest duties of a 
General, Gen. Grant not only made this sac- 
rifice of his own soldiers, but he permitted 
the bulk of Pemberton's army to escape, to 
subject the volunteers to the consuming 
work of a siege, and the further repeated 
slaughter of assaulting the recuperated ene- 
my in fortifications. Such was the costly 
course of the practical education of a General. 
But while thus costly to his soldiers, it had 
the remarkable fortune to him that his hon- 
ors were increased in proportion to tiie un- 
necessary sacrifice of his heroic men. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

the losses and gains of the battle — tactics 
of the pursuit — giving the enemy free 
passage to vicksburg — heroic charge of 
the volunteers at big black bridge. 

Among the other brilliancies of general- 
ship of the battle of Champion's Hill, Badeau 
states this: 

Only the celerity of the movements which have 
been described prevented the jmiction of the rebel 
armies; for as has been seen, Pemberton was actu- 
ally moving to join Johnston when Grant came up 
and attacked liim. 

And the way that Grant's celerity came to 
prevent it, was that he thought Pemberton 
was moving southeast to his rear, in an oppo- 
site direction from Johnston. 

Gen. Pemberton's report says: 

Had the movement in support of my left been 
promptly made when first ordered, it is not improb- 
able that I might liave maintained my position, and 
it is possible that the enemy might have been 
driven back, though his vastly superior and con- 
stantly increasing numbers would have rendered 
it necessary to withdraw during the night to save 
my communicatibn with Vicksburg. 

This confirms the judgment summed up 
from Badeau's statements — namely, that the 
assault was an unnecessary sacrifice, and that 
Pemberton's army might then and there have 
been captured, and all the consuming of men 
by the siege have l)een saved. 

Gen. Pemberton's re])ort states that Steven- 
son and BowEN had both told him they could 
not hold their positions, and "large num- 
bers of men were abandoning the field on 
Stevenson's left" before he ordered the re- 
treat, which was to the Raymond road, over 
Baker's Creek; and that "although a large 
number of men had sh'atnefuUy abandoned 
their commands, and were making tlieir way 
to the rear, the main body of the troops re- 
tired in good order." His report states his 
loss as 1,429 killed and wounded, 2,195 
missing. Badeau, with a pen more deadly 
than musketry, says "the enemy's loss was 
estimated at between 3,000 and 4,000 in killed 
and wounded." 

In the enemy's advantage of position their 
loss shows the stubborn character of the 
fighting. HovEY reported 300 prisoners taken 
under fire, and 400 after the battle, and eleven 
guns under fire; Logan, eleven guns under 



— 95 — 



fire and 1,300 prisoners. Hovey's Division, and 
one brigade of McPherson's corps, remained on 
the place, which the soldiers christened "The 
Hill of Deatli," to care for the dead and 
wounded, and were none too many for that 
dreadful duty; the rest started in tlie pursuit, 
but were too tired to go far that night. 

McCleknand's other divisions came to the 
front in the pursuit, but the retreating army, 
as was always the case, was able to go as fast 
as the pursuing. At the crossing of Baker's 
Creek, Loring chose to part company with 
the rest of Pembeeton's army without a for- 
mal farewell. He made a detour to the south- 
west, and after much straggling reported at 
Jackson with 5,778 men. Gen. Stevenson 
says he arrived about sunset at tlie ford on 
Baker's Creek, and found there Bowen's di- 
vision, and they held the ford, although the 
enemy was crossing further up the creek, 
waiting for Loring to come; but not only did 
become not, but .one of his brigades, which 
was near, moved of. He abandoned twelve 
guns. 

Bowen and Stevenson resumed their re- 
treat, crossing the railroad bridge (now 
planked) at Big Black after midnight. Pem- 
BERTON says '"the entire train of the army was 
crossed without loss." Badeau, as usual, 
says "the rout of the rebels was complete." 
The divisions of Carr and Osterhaus reached 
Edward's Station about 8 p. m., and at 3:30 
in the morning of the 17th resumed the pur- 
suit. In six miles they came upon 4,000 Con- 
federates strongly posted at the east end of 
the bridge over Big Black River. The posi- 
tion was strongly intrenched. Pemberton 
says the object in holding it was to enable the 
still looked for Loring to cross. 

The river at this place makes a bend like a 
horseshoe, the open part to tlie east. Across 
this open part ran a bayou, which formed a 
natural ditch to the rifle parapet a mile long. 
Trees and brush growing in the bed of the 
bayou had been felled to obstruct the way. It 
was defended by eighteen guns and 4,000 men, 
as many as could be used at the parapet. 
Along the front were cleared fields from 400 
to 600 yards in width, across which open and 
level space an assaulting column would have 
to move. Carr's division, with Lawler's 
brigade ou its right, invested tiie place on the 
right, O.STERHAUS' division on the left. Gen. 
Smith's division came up and joined the left. 
They found it a difficult jjlace. Osterhaus 



was wounded early, and had to transfer the 
command to Gen. A. E. Lee. 

Gen. Sherman had left Jackson on the 16th, 
marching twenty miles to Bolton that day 
and night, and starting again at 4:30 next 
morning for Bridgeport, two and a half miles 
north of Edward's Station. Blair, after the 
battle of Champion's Hill, had been ordered 
to join him by way of Edward's Station. Says 
Badeau: "This arrangement brought Sher- 
man's whole corps together at the most favor- 
able position for crossing the Big Black River, 
and turning the enemy's left flank." But 
Gen. Grant seems not to have thought of any 
movement for turning the enemy, so long as 
they held a fortified place to be assaulted; or 
of cutting off their retreat to Vicksburg; for 
his tactical aim seemed to be to give them a 
free passage into Vicksburg. 

Pemberton says: "So strong was the posi- 
tion that my greatest, almost only, apprehen- 
sion was a flank movement by Bridgeport or 
Baldwin's Perry, which would have endan- 
gered my communications with Vicksburg." 
Further along he says: "The enemy by flank 
movement on my left by Bridgeport, or on 
my right by Baldwin's or other ferries, might 
reach Vicksburg almost simultaneously with 
myself, or perhaps interpose a heavy force be- 
tween me and tliat city." Thus did he show 
what an opportunity was opened to Grant 
by Pemberton's attempting to hold a position 
on the Big Black. 

Badeau quotes this as evidence that "the 
rapidity and strangeness of Grant's maneu- 
vers had evidently affected the imagination 
of his antagonist," as if, after Pemberton had 
witnessed Grant's assault on Champion's 
Hill, his imagination must be affected in- 
deed if he thought that Grant would under- 
take any flanking or cutting off movement, 
so long as in his front there was a fortification 
for assault. Thus were the troops of Care's 
and Osterhaus' divisions left to attack this 
strong fortification. There was no lack of 
alacrity on their j)art. 

A brisk interchange of artillery and mus- 
Ketry was kept up during most of the fore- 
noon, with but little change of the situation- 
save that Gen. Lawler, on the right, had 
moved these regiments and a battery inte a 
copse of underwood north of the ra'ilroad, 
about 300 yards in front of the parapet, ex- 
tending from tlie road to the river. At length 
it became evident that other tactics must be 



— &6 — 



used, and an assault was resolved on. As this 
was made by Lawyer's bi-igade, the account 
is taken from his report. The heroic character 
of this charge, and its exhibition of the quali- 
ties of the volunteers and of volunteer officers 
calls for a more particular and iust narration 
than Badeau gives: 

Durine; the greater part of the forenoon a heavy 
but ineffectual musketry tiring was kept up by the 
enemy upon my men, briskly responaed to by our 
sharpshooters. Late in the forenoon, finding it Im- 
possible to press fuither forward along the river 
bank toward the enemy, as I had intended, Col. 
Kinsman, 23d Iowa Volunteers, proposed to charge 
at once the enemy's works, and drive them out at 
the point of the bayonet, and asked my consent 
to the same. Foreseeing that a charge by a single 
regiment, unsustained by the whole line, against 
fortifications as formidable as those in his front 
could hardly be successful, ■■' '■■ '■■ -i determined 
that there should be a simultaneous movement on 
the part of my whole command. 

Accordingly, the 2lst Iowa Volunteers, Col. Mer- 
rill, was ordered to charge with the 23d, the 11th Wis- 
consin Volunteers following close upon them as a 
support, and the22d Iowa, Col. William M. Stone— 
which had in the meantime cros.sed the field and 
taken position on the river bank on the right of the 
11th Wisconsin— was ordered to move out into the 
field and act as a reserve force. Two guns of the 
Peoria Battery, and one 20 pounder Parrott, be- 
longing to the 1st Wisconsin Battery, were in po- 
sition in the field actively at work upon the enemy 
and doing good service. 

In addition orders had been sent to the 49th and 
69th Indiana Volunteers— two regiments which had 
been sent from Osterhaus' division to my support 
early in the forenoon — to send forward at once two 
companies of skirmishers to attract the attention of 
the enemy from the movement on the right, and as 
soon as the charge should be commenced, to move 
pron^.ptly forward to its support. Orders were fur- 
ther given that the men should reserve their fire 
until upon the rebel works. Finally the regiments 
that were to leaa the charge were formea, with 
bayonets fixed, in the edge of the woods on the 
river bank. 

All things being in readiness, the command for- 
ward was given by Col. Kinsman, and at once his 
noble regiment sprang forward to the works. The 
21st, led on by Col. Merrill, moved at the same in- 
stant, the llth Wisconsin closely following. Through 
a terrible fire of musketry from the enemy in front 
and a galling fire from his sharpshooters on the 
right these men dashed bravely on. Kinsman fell 
dangerously wounded before half the distance was 
accomplished. Struggling to his teet he staggered a 
lew paces to the front, cheered his men forward, 
and fell again, ihis time to rise uo more, pierced 
through by a second ball. 

Col. Merrill, the brave commander of the 21st 
Iowa, fell wounded early in the charge, while gal- 



lantly leading his regiment against the enemy. Im- 
mediately Lieut. Col. Glasgow placed himself at 
the head of the 23d, and Maj. Van Anda led on the 
21st. Undismayed by the loss of their Colonels 
* ■' * the men of the 23d and 21st Iowa, and the 
1th Wisconsin Vohmteers pressed onward nearer 
and nearer to the rebel works, over the open field, 
500 yards, under a wasting fire, and up to the edge 
of the bayou. Halting there only long enough to 
pour into the enemy a deadly volley, they dashed 
forward through the bayou filled with water, fallen 
timber and brush, on to the rebel works with the 
shout of victors, driving the enemy in with con- 
fusion irom their breastworks and riflepits, and 
entering in triumph the rebel strongliold. 

Hurrying forward the 49th and C9th Indiana and 
22d Iowa Volunteers, I sent the two Indiana regi- 
ments to the support of my left, and ordered the 
Iowa regiment to move against the extreme left of 
the enemy's works, where they, several hundred 
strong, still held out, while the llth Wisconsin Vol- 
unteers was directed to occupy the ground between 
the enemy and the bridge, and thus cut off their 
retreat. The movement was successful. The rebels 
broke and fled before the 22d Iowa, and fell an easy 
prey to the llth Wisconsin Volunteers. Those of 
the rebels who were lot captured hastened to make 
good their retreat over the bridge. 

As the result of this successful charge we may 
with justice claim that it gave our army entire po.s- 
session of the enemy's extended line of works, and 
with them their field artillery, eighteen pieces iu 
ell; a large quantity of ammunition, thousands of 
small arms, and 3,000 prisoners. * •" * But this 
brilliant success was not accomplished without 
considerable loss; fourteen killed, and 185 wounded 
in the space of three minutes, the time occupied 
in reaching the enemy's works, attest the severity 
of the fire to which my men were subjected. 

The total loss in this battle was twenty-nine 
killed, 242 wounded. 

Gen. Lawler niakes special mention of regi- 
mental and company officers, and closes with 
this handsome tribute to the men of the 
ranks: 

Finally I can not close my report without ex- 
pressing my admiration for the brave men of the 
ranks, to whose steadiness and determinea courage 
is in a great measure due the glory of the brilliant 
and decisive victory of Big Black River Bridge. To 
them I return my warmest thanks. 

Lest this affair should reflect any credit 
on the general commander, McClernand, 
Badeau minutely remarks: "Lawler had re- 
ceived no orders to make his gallant charge. 
He and his men deserve all the credit of its 
success." Grant was too far away to ap- 
propriate it. 

Tlie charge routed the Confederates. Pem- 



^97 



BKRTo.N saj^s "it soon became a matter of sauve 
qui peut." There was, besides the railroad 
bridge, which the enemy set on fire, a bridge 
made of a dismantled steamboat turned 
athwart the stream.^ Many of the fugitives 
were unable to gain either bridge, and rushed 
into the river, in which some were drowned. 
Many surrendered; This was the last stand 
made, and the unlucky Pemberton and his 
troops, now pretty thoroughly "demoralized," 
wended tl^eir way, with much straggling, but 
unmolested, to Vicksburg. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

PKMBERTON RETREATS INTO VICKSBURG — DE- 
MORALIZATION OF HIS TROOPS— SHERMAN'S 
FRESH CORPS ARRIVES IN FRONT OF VICKSBURG 
NEXT MORNING — SHERMAN HALTS — THE OB- 
JECTIVE A SIEGE — GRANT AND BONAPARTE — 
THE STRONGHOLD OF VICKSBURG. 

Gen. Pemberton's report states that after the 
rout at the battle of Big Black River Bridge 
the condition of his army was sucli, besides 
tbe liability to be .flanked and cut off from 
Vicksburg, that nothing remained but to retire 
tlie army within the defenses of Vicksburg, 
*'to reorganize the depressed and discomfited 
troops." The retreat was not harassed. Mc- 
Pherson and McClernand were detained 
building bridges. Sherman had reached 
Bridgeport by noun of the 17th, where Blair 
had already arrived. Blair had the only 
pontoons, and was laying tliem. Two divis- 
ions passed over that night. 

Pemberton's forces readied Vicksburg on 
the night of the 17th. Badeau gives a de- 
scription of their condition, referring to "a 
rebel narrative of the siege by H. S. Abrams:" 

Late on a Sunday night tli£ main body of the 
vanquished forces began pourinz into the town. 
Neither order nor discipline luid been maintained 
onthenuirch: tlie man were scailered for miles 
nlong the road, declarinK their rt-adiness to desert 
rather than ^erve a^ain under Pemberton. Tlie 
planters and populalion of the country, fleeing 
from the presence of the victorious enemy, added 
to the crowd and the contusion; and the inhab- 
itants of the city awoke in terror to find their streets 
thronged with fugitives — one vast uproarious mass, 
in which, with shrinking citizens and timid women 
and children, were mingled the remnants of Pem- 
berton's dismayed and disorganized army. .\nd 
these were the troops that were now the reliance of 
Vicksburg. 



According to Pemberton's report this pic- 
ture is much overdrawn, bat it gives Grant's 
idea of the conditioii of the forces when thoy 
reached Vicksburg. Upon the heels of this 
demoralized army came Gen. Sherman with a 
fresh corps that Had not been in any of the 
fighting: 

Starting at break of day on the 18th, Sherman 
pushed rapidly on, and by half past 9 o'clock the 
head of his column had struck the Benton road, 
three and a half miles from Viclcsbnrg. He thus 
commanded the Yazoo River, interposing a superi- 
or force between the rebels in the town and their 
forts on the Yazoo. His advance now rested un- 
til the whole command should close up. 

The Confederates had already abandoned 
the batteries on the Yazoo bluiTs. Here came 
off this interesting scene: 

Grant was with Sherman wheu his Column struck 
the Walnut Hills. As they rode together up the 
the furthest height, where it looks down on the 
Yazoo River, and stood upon the very bluffs from 
which Sherman had been repulsed six uionths be- 
fore, the two soldiers gazed for a moment on the 
long wislied for goal of the campaign -the high; dry 
ground on the north of Vicksburg, and the base 
of their supplies. Sherman at last turned abruptly 
round and exclaimed to Grant: "Until this mo- 
ment I never thought your expedition a success. I 
never could see the end rleariy until now. But 
this is a campaign : this is a success, if we never 
take tlie town." 

"This is a campaign!" A stroke of that 
which seemed alarming adverse fortune liad 
lifted the expedition from a raid away from 
the enemy to a campaign upon tlie enemy; 
and now it was a campaign, even if tliey 
never took the town, but merelj'^ reached the 
supplies. Badeau is magnanimously com- 
miserating to Sherman, as a zealous subordi- 
nate, but as aiwaj's apprehensive, and as 
needing Grant's directing mind and confi- 
dence. He excuses Sherman by the plea that 
he "had seen the dangers of this venturesome 
campaign so vividly that his vision was 
dimmed for beholding success." In a foot 
note, page 282, he furtlier pleads that "Sher- 
man had not been present at any of the vic- 
tories of this campaign except Jackson 
[where lie said Sherman did none of the 
fighting], he therefore had not felt that splen- 
did confidence svhicli only those who engage 
in successful battle know." 

On no rule of Gen. Grant's tactics did he 
place so niucii stress as that, wlieii the enemy 



98 



were beaten and retreating, Was the time to 
throw in the utmost energy, to pursue and 
destroy them. He complained bitterly of 
RosECRAKS for that, after his hard fought re- 
pulse of Van Dorn at Corinth he did not 
desti-oy him in the pursuit. He told Halleck 
and Stanton to hold on and not promote 
Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, after tlie battle of Nash- 
ville, until he saw whether Thomas was ener- 
getic in the pursuit. Badeau reflects on 
Thomas for not in person following the pur- 
suit from Mission Eidge. 

Where the line of retreat is open, the re- 
treating army can march faster than the pur- 
suing, and in such a country as ours, where 
pursuit is confined to roads, in most cases 
through woods, a small rear guard can ob- 
struct the pursuing army. Nothing ever 
came of these pursuits that compensated for 
the fatigue and loss of soldiers, already ex- 
hausted by the battle and its preceding labors 
and nervous strain. Grant's pursuit had not 
harassed Pemberton's troops. But liei-e the 
"remnants of Pemberton's dismayed and dis- 
organized army" had retreated into a town 
where thej'' could retreat no further; and here 
was a corps of fresh soldiers, and Grant and 
Sherman "in person." 

Now, if ever, would seem to be the time to 
push into Vicksburg, while the troops were 
dismayed and disorganized, and the whole 
town was in a panic. But at this crisis these 
great Generals indulged in a mutual admira- 
tion scene, and pronounced this a real cam- 
paign, even if they never took the town. And 
so this corps waited all the rest of the day, 
while the disorganized and dismayed Con- 
federates were recovering their organization, 
courage, and confidence, and were strengthen- 
ing their intrenchments and placing their 
guns. 

At this point Gen. Grant's biographer, as 
if the campaign had gloriously terminated in 
getting the Confederate army into a place 
whose fortifications quadrupled its force, and 
restored its morale, pauses in the history to 
sound a pean to the brilliancy of the strategy, 
and the splendor of the results, and to com- 
pare this with two of Bonaparte's brightest 
campaigns, rather to Bonaparte's disparage- 
ment. In a foot note he remarks how the 
history of Bonaparte was repeating itself in 
Grant. In the text he notes that the repeat- 
ing was with several improvements, original 
to Grant: 



The following extracts from Napoleon's procla- 
mation to his soldiers after his first great Italian 
campaign illustrates how curiously history repeats 
itself: "Soldiers! in a fortnight you have gainea 
six victories, taken tw*nty-one pairs of colors, fifty- 
five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and con- 
quered the richest part of Piedmont; you nave 
made 15,000 prisoners, and killed or wounded more 
than 10,000 men. " '- » Destitute of everything, 
you have supplied all your wants. You have gained 
battles without cannon, crossed rivers without 
bridges, made forced marches without shoes, biv- 
ouacked without brandy, and often without bread. 
The republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty 
alone, could have endured what you have endured. 

>:-• .:= >:•. The two armies wliich so lately attacked 
you boldly are fleeing affrighted before you; the 
perverse men who laughed at your distress, and re- 
joiced in thought at the triumphs of your euemiea, 
are confounded and trembling." 

Badeau says that in this operation Grant 
"separated forces twice as numerous as his 
own," thus proving that in the hands of the 
truly great the pen is mightier than the sword. 
Not content with showing that Grant's strat- 
egy was unparalleled, he goes on to make out 
that the "rebel movements" were so blunder- 
ing that no skill in strategy or tactics was 
needed by tlie national commander to beat 
them. 

He repeats his tale of Grant's great strata- 
gem in deceiving ' Pembkrton at Edward's 
Station on the 10th, by turning away toward 
Raymond, forgetting that he has told that 
Pemberton did not move to Edward's Station 
till the 13th, and that Grant was surprised by 
intelligence of it on the 16th. 

But this strange operation of going away 
from the enemy and from his supplies upon 
a raid, and all the hardships of the forced 
marching, with short rations, a distance 
which Badeau makes out to be 175 miles, all 
the fighting in the unmeaning operations at 
Raymond and Jackson, and the unnecessary 
sacrifice at Champion's Hill, had restilted in 
giving the enemy an impregnable place to 
protract the resistance, and to subject our 
troops to the dreadful laburs of a siege in the 
hot season in that unhealthy region, and to 
further sacrifice by vain assaults, ordered 
upon the calculation that volunteers were 
cheap, and that generalship was enhanced by 
their lavish consumption. The time l)ad not; 
yet come for glorification of the generalship. 

The general mind has no conception of the 
severity of the labors imposed on a besieging 
army, and of the incessant dangers of a serv- 



99 



ice which has none of the inspiration or hon- 
ors of a battle. The siege of Vicksburg was 
against an intrenched line of eight miles, 
along ridges fronted by ravines with steep de- 
clivities. The besieging line of intrench- 
ments was ten miles. Justice to the troops 
engaged in this siege, and largely consumed 
in it, requires a description of the ground, 
which will give an idea of the difficulties to 
wliich Grant had brought his army, as if this 
was a triumph of strategy. Badeau takes it 
from the report of the engineers: 

The Kround upon which Vicksburg stands is sud- 
posed by some to have been originally a plateau, 
four or five miles long and about two miles wide, 
and 200 or 300 feet above the Mississippi River. This 
plateau has been gradually washed away by rains 
and streams, until it is transformed intoa labyrinth 
of sharp ridge-! and deep irregular ravines. The 
soil is fine, and when cut vertically by the action 
of the water, remains in a perpendicular position 
for years, and the smaller and newer ravines are 
often so deep that their ascent is difficuU to a foot- 
man. The sid( s of the declivities are thickly 
wooded, and the bottoms of the ravines never 
level, except when the streams that formed them 
have been unusually large. 

At Vicksburg the Mississippi runs a little west of 
south, and all the streams that enter it from the 
east rnn southwest. One of these empties into the 
river five miles below the city, and the dividing 
ridce that pentir-ites two of its branches was that in 
whicli the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. 
On the northern side of the town the- line also ran 
along a dividing ridcre between two small streams 
that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg; 
these ridges are generally higher than any ground 
in their immediate vicinity. 

Leaving the Mississippi on the 'northern side of 
Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the river, the 
line stretched back two miles into the interior. 
crossed the valleys of two small streams, and 
reached the river again below at a point where the 
bluff falls bade from the Mississippi nearly a mile. 
Tlere the works followed the bluff up the riA'er for 
a mile Or more, so as to give fire toward the south 
on any troops that might attempt an attack from 
that diicction by moving along the bottom land be- 
tween the bluff and the Mississippi. 

The whole line was between seven and eight 
miles. =■' ■■' « It consisted of a series of detached 
works on prominent and commanding point.-i, con- 
necttd by a eontinuous line of trencli or rifle pit. 

* * '■• They were pl.-iced at distances Of frorn sev- 
enty-five to 600 yards from each other. * '■' '" 
The ravines were the only ditches, but'no others 
were needed, trees being felled in front of the whole 
line, and forming, in many places, entanglements 
which, under fire, wore absohitely impassable. 

* * * The difficuU nature of the ground * * * 



rendered rapidity of movement and unity of effort 
in an assault impossible. 

North of the railroad the hills are higher, 
the wood denser, and the line iiaturally 
stronger, but south of that road, although the 
ridges were lower and the country cleared, 
"the ground was still rough and entirely un- 
fitted tor any united tactical movement," and 
the artificial works were stronger. 

The whole aspect of the rugged fastness, bristling 
with bayonets, and crowned with artillery that 
swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was 
calculated to inspire new courage in those who 
came •■' =■" * from their succession of disasters in 
the open field. Here, too, were at least 8,000 fresh, 
troops who, as yet, had suffered none of the demor- 
alization of defeat. 

Yet, to have maneuvered Pemberton's 
demoralized troops into this impregnable 
place, and into this re-enforcement of near 
8,000 men, is to Badeau a great achievement 
of Grant's generalship, setting him above 
Bonaparte. For this had he marched away 
from the enemy, when a march fifteen miles 
to the front would have restored him to his 
base of supplies, and have forced Pemberton 
to join issue with him in the open field. And 
this issue the volunteers of Grant's army 
would have met with alacrity and entire con- 
fidence. 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 

THE FIRST ASSAULT — THE REPULSE — THE ART OF 
STORMING INTRENCHMENTS. 

Gen. Grant, on the 19th, ordered a general 
assault on the works of Vicksburg. Reordered 
the corps commanders to "push forward care- 
fully and gain positions as close as possible to 
the enemy's works, until 2 o'clock p. m.: at 
that hour they will fire three volleys of artil- 
lery from all the pieces in position. This will 
be the signal for a general charge along the 
whole line." This method of assaulting forti- 
fications has the merit of giving due notice to 
the defenders, and of taking no advantage of 
them by unexpected movement. 

An interval of thirty-six hours behind 
strong works, spent in restoring discipline, 
placing guns and strengthening works, may 
radically change the condition and spirit of a 
beaten army That which Badeatt describes 
as a horde of stragglers as they poured into 



100 — 



Vic'ksburg at niidnif^ht of the 17th was in a 
very different condition when Grant, with 
Sherman's corps, had paused in the vicinity of 
the worlvs from the morning of tlie 18th till the 
afternoon of the 19th. Baueau says: "When 
Sherman's troops rushed up, thinking to 
march easily into Vicksburg, they found not 
only the ramparts were difficult, but the de- 
fenders had got new spirit, and were once 
more the men wlio liad fought at Donelson, 
and Shiloh. and at Chami)ion's Hill." 

Badeau deems necessary to find excuses 
for the assault, and to claim that, although it 
was repulsed, it got compensation for the sac- 
rifice of men in the gain of knowledge of the 
situation. He says: "The troops were buoy- 
ant with success and eager for an assault, and 
their commander believed himself justified in 
an attempt to carry the works by storm." 
The troops were as buoyant and eager on the 
morning of the ISth, when it may reasonably 
be supposed that Pemberton's troops had not 
recovered from such a state of dismay and 
disorganization as Badeau describes; and the 
eagerjiess of troops to assault neither excuses 
the loss of the favorable time by the Com- 
manding General nor relieves him from the 
responsibility of ordering it without intelli- 
gence. 

Badeau pleads furtlier that Gen. Grant 
thought the enemy completely demoralized. 
From this it appears that he was unconscious 
tJiat the morale of troops may be quickly re- 
stored by the protection of strong fortifica- 
tions, before whicla a following army hesi- 
tates. Also that "he underestimated Pember- 
ton's numbers, supposing them to be about 
12.000 or 15,000 effective men." If so, he 
baited Sherman's fresh corps, which must 
have been as much as 12,000, before about an 
equal number of beaten troops. But Grant 
estimatetl Pemberton's ntimber when it was 
advancing on him at 25,000, and he would 
liardly reckon that Pemberton had left 
Vicksburg without a garrison. 

The compensating gains in knowledge by 
the assault were these: 

Butalthou;;b unsuccessful, the operations ot this 
day were important to Grant. The nature of the 
fciiemy's works and their approaches, the character 
of tlie ground, and the unusual obstacles by which 
It was eucuinbered, together with the policy of the 
defense, all bficame known; while the national 
lines were advanced, positions for artillery selected, 
and the relations of the various parts of the aruiy 



were fully established and nnderhtood. It wa.s 
clearly seen, from the knowledge thus obtained, 
that to carry the works of Vicksliur^: by storm was 
a more serious uiidertaRing than had been at first 
supposed. 

So much progress gained in the work of 
the practical education of a Commanding Gen- 
eral, at a cost of only some 600 or 1,000 volun- 
teers, seems beggarly cheap. By sending a 
line of brave men upon a line of intrench- 
ments. to be shot down under conditions 
where they could not get tnore men into the 
assaulting jinp than the enemy had behind 
the works to oppose them. Gen. Grant had 
acquired that knowledge of the situation 
which a previous reconnaissance could have 
found. He had also learned "the policy of 
the defense," and that it was to defend. 

He had also learned by this cheap lesson 
"that to carry the works of Vicksburg by 
storm was a more serious tmdertaking than 
had been at first supposed." Further along 
will appear that tlie same lesson in the same 
conditions had to be repeated at a larger cost 
of volunteers. 

Badeau describes the conditions and the 
assault- 
There was slight skirmishing on various parts of 
the line from early morning, and everywhere the 
troops were deployed and put into position. * '■■' * 
At the appointed hour Blair advanced in line, but 
the ground on both sides of the road was so im- 
practicable, cut up in deep chasms, and filled with 
standing and fallen timber, thai it was impossible 
for the assaulting parties to reach the trenches in 
anything like an organized conditon. 

The IStli United Slates Infantry was the first to 
strike the works, and plan led its colors on the ex- 
terior slope; its commander, Capt. \\ashinston, was 
mortally wounded, and seventy-seven men out of 
250 were either killed or wounded. Two volunteer 
regiment.s reached the same position nearly as soon, 
and held their ground, tiring unon every head that 
presented itself above the parapet, but failed to 
effect a lodgment or even penetrate the line. Other 
troops also gained positions on the right and left, 
close to the parapet, but got no further than the 
counterscarp (the outer slope of ihe bank). Steele's 
division, on Sherman's extreme right, was not close 
enough to attack the main line, but carried a num- 
ber of outworks, and captured a few prisoners. 

Thus was begun atid ended the assault. 
Parts of the line clung for some time to the 
outer slope of the parapet, in a mere murder- 
ous exchange, with no other possible result. 
or fell back to rear cover, keeping up a scat- 
tering fire until night covered their with- 



— 101 — 



drawal. The nature of tlie ground was such 
that it was impossible to bring troops upon 
the works in any solid formation. There 
could be no massing of a column for assault, 
nor for its support. In the least difficult 
places it was an assault in line, and in most a 
much broken line, and this against a line of 
at least equal number, covered by intrench- 
ments. All the conditions which make an 
assault of works possible were absent; ali 
that make it imiiossible were conspicuously 
present, and could be as well known before as 
after the assault. 

The assault was to be general, but McPher- 
sok's corps did not arrive in front of Vicks- 
burgtill after nightfall of the 18th, and it had 
to move forward and find positions along the 
ravines and ridges on the 19th. Badeau says 
of tliis corps: 

The roughne.«s of the country prevented any de- 
cided advance, except by Ransom's brigade, wliich 
made a brief but unsuccessful aUeinpt to carry llie 
works in its front. MeCler;iand, having more 
ground to march over than either of the others, 
was still at early dawn four miles from Vicksburg: 
but liis troops were deployed at, once, batteries 
were put in position, and opened on the rebel line, 
and by 2 o'clock the whole corps was advanced us 
close to the enemy's works as the irreiiular ground 
woula allow. 

Thus doth it appear that Gen. Grant or- 
dered a general assault of the Vicksburg forti- 
fications wlien only one of his three corps had 
got near enough to reconnoiter them; when 
McPherson's corps had yet to approach and 
explore for positions in very difficult ground, 
and when the other corps was four miles 
away. Meanwhile Gen. Grant was giving 
the enemy due warning by his demonstra- 
tions for half a day of what was coming. 
Badeau states the result with innocent un- 
consciousness of its obvious reflection: 

The extreme steepness of the acclivities, the 
strength of the works, and the vigorous resistance 
everywhere made, all rendered necessfiry to move 
with circumspection ; so l hat without anyfaul t or hes- 
itation on tlie part of eiilier troops or commanders, 
nli;ht had overtaken the national forces before 
tliey were really in a condition lo obey the order of 
firant, except at the i.oinl wOt-re Shereman had 
reached the works, but failed lo make any serious 
impression. 

Such is the power which a Commanding 
General possesses over the lives of his soldiers! 
Such tiie supremacy which military organiza- 



tion gives to the mind of one man, over the 
better minds of hundreds of other officers! 
Adam Badeau's account is sufficient to show 
that the assault was ordered in a situation 
which made it certain to be a vain slatighter. 
And Adam Badeau's account is approved by 
Gen. Grant. 

The part of McCuernand's Corps, however, 
was not so insignificant as Badeau represents. 
McClernand's report states that his command 
was in readiness at 4 a. m., and by 6.30 had 
reached a long hill, between which and the 
enemy's line of works was a creek and a 
series of deep hollows, and many ridges run- 
ning out from the enemy's works to the nar- 
row valley of the creek. From this hill he 
opened artillery fire, engaged the Confederate 
skirmishers, and moved forward across the 
creek to the hills on the other side. 

"By 2 o'clock, with great difficulty my line had 
gained half a mile, and was within 800 yards of the 
enemy's works. The grotmd in front was une.x- 
plored, and commanded by the enemy's works, yet 
at the appointed signal my infantry went forward 
under such cover as my artillery could oflfer, and 
bravely continued a wasting conflict until they had 
approached within 5U0 yards of the enemy's lines, 
and exiiaustion and lateness of the evening intermit- 
ted it. An advance had been made by all the corps, 
and the ground gained firmly held, but the enemy's 
works were not carried. A number of brave officers 
and men fell, killed or wounded, and among the 
latter Gen. Lee, who had signalized his brief com- 
mand witb equal activity, intelligence and gal- 
lantry." 

Gen. Grant made no report of this opera- 
tion at the time. He vaguely mentions it in 
his general narrative dated .July 6. Badeau 
simply says: "No report was made to Grant 
of the losses of this assault. They were esti- 
mated by him at fewer than 500." Gen. 
Grant's reports rarely mentioned his losses. 
He had a munificent spirit in his expenditure 
of men which did not stoop to such reckon- 
ing. An affair which demanded that troops 
should march into certain destruction, and 
which killed and wounded, according to 
Grant's belittling estimate, 500 volunteers, 
seems to have been thought unworthy of any 
report. Sherman tells very briefly the assault 
in his report of May 24 to Grant. Gen. Blaik 
lumps his losses in this with those of the as- 
sault of May 22. 

According to Gen. Grant's authorized his- 
torian, to have found out the several things 
of the situation, which he itemizes, which in- 



— 102 — 



telligent reconnaissance and scouting could 
have found out as well, and -which it is the 
business of a Commanding General to find out 
before ordei'ing an assault, was worth tlie 
sacrifice of 500 volunteers; wortli all the dis- 
couragement to the troops whicli is inevitable 
from an heroic assault repulsed. And with 
this was the greater discouragement of intelli- 
gent soldiers and their officers, in the conscious- 
ness that they had been blindly sent to 
the massacre by an order to do that which 
ordinary military sense would have known to 
be impossible. 

The art of war is not so poor that it has no 
means of finding out whether an assault is 
pr,acticable save by a vain slaughter. The 
conditions which make an assault of works 
practicable are well underslood. Nobody ex- 
pects a line to carry in trench men ts held by an 
equal line. The Commanding General who 
orders this, orders a sacriiife of his own men. 
The rule is accepted that a line of breastworks 
triples or quadruples the defensive force of 
the line of soldiers; a higher parapet still 
more. To make an assault practicable, the 
assaulting column must be massed so as to 
overcome by sheer numbers this advantage. 
It must be so supported that no losses which 
the defenders can inflict while it is passing 
over the iiitervenin;; space can reduce it be- 
low the required preponderance of numbers. 

It is expected that an assaulting column 
■will lose heavily in a short time. It must be 
so massed and supported that it can stt-nd this 
loss, and by its impetus can come quickly to 
a hand to hand issue. And as it pours over 
the works it must be supported by a larger 
column to meet any gatiiering resistance. 
Thus when assaults are ordered on military 
rules, although a severe loss in the head of 
the column is inevitable, yet in general the 
casualties in a successful assault are not great 
in number. 

But an assault of strong intrenchments 
which can be approached only through very 
difficult ground, which requires- the assault- 
ing troor>s to file into line, ifnd to assault in 
line, and even in a much broken line, is a 
sheer sending of soldiers to the sacrifice, and 
this is known as well before. as after. This 
blind assault was the beginning of that course 
of generalship which sent a veteran, disci- 
plined, and heroic army against intrench- 
ments to be slaughtered in one dull succes- 
sion, without strategit or tactical skill, until 



the number thus butchered without a single 
success made the most appalling list that 
modern war has known, save in the retreat 
from Moscow. 



CHAPTER XL. 

THE SECOND ASSAULT — FURTHER PURSUIT OF 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION BY THE SLAUGH- 
TER OF BRAVE VOLUNTEERS — A GRAVE DISPUTE 
BETWEEN GENERALS. 

Gen Grant's biographer states that the suf- 
ficient compensation for the sacrifice of men 
in the assault of the 19th was the knowledge 
gained of "the nature of the enemy's works 
and their approaches, the character of the 
ground, and the unusual obstacles by which 
it was encumbered, together with the policy 
of the defense." Gen. Grant proceeded to 
improve this acquirement of icnowledge by 
ordering another assault on the 22d, under 
the same conditions, save that McPherson's 
and McClernand's corps got into their posi- 
tions before it began. 

During the 20th and 21st the army was 
getting into places, opening communications 
between the several corps and with the river 
for supplies, securing and distributing rations 
and other necessaries, of which it had become 
destitute, bringing up means of shelter, which 
it had not seen since leaving Milliken's Bend 
in INIarcii, and getting such other supplies as 
were required by its greatest necessities. The 
hosi)ital and stores at Grand Gulf were moved 
up to Warrenton, which was convenient to 
the base at Milliken's Bend; Warrenton, 
which Grant could have reached by a day's 
march from Hankinson's Ferry, was now 
made the base of supplies for the left wing of 
the army, and so continued tlirough the siege. 
Skirmishing was going on with the enemy's 
outposts during these two days, but without 
any near approae^h to the fortifications. 

Vicksburg was not yet invested. The length 
of its circuit of works is stated by Badkau as 
eight miles. When invested he says the in- 
vesting line of wc>rks was twelve miles. The 
three corps, at the time of the assault of the 
22d, had a front of not more than four miles. 
There was an Of)en space of four miles between 
McClernard's left and the river below Vicks- 
burg; also a gap between McPherson's and 
McClernard's corps. The army was without 
any covering works. Grant was giving Plm- 



— lOS — 



BEKTO!^ the same opportunity that he gave the 
Confederates at Donelson, when he extended 
his line around that place, without cover, for 
two days, exposing it to a sortie by an equal 
force. 

Gen. Grant ordered a simultaneous attack 
to'begin at 10 a. m. Admiral Porter brought 
down his mortar boats and gunboats and kept 
up a bombardment and cannonade from noon 
of the 20th, through the 21st, day and night, 
till the assault began. It had no perceptible 
effect on the defenses, bat it drove the citi- 
zens to dig caves in the hills lor shelter. 
Skirmishers and artillery began all aloijg the 
line of the army at an earlj"- hour. Vicksburg 
was encircled with a storm of fire, but it does 
not appear to have hurt the fortifications or 
their defenders. All of the army artillery was 
of field guns, save six thirty-pounder Parrotts 
in McClernand's corps. It was not near the 
works, and, except these Parrott guns, it 
made no perceptible breach. 

Badeau gives a })articular account of the 
attack by Sherman's corps, adopting Sher- 
man's narrative in his report. He gives this 
as an example of the rest, and it briefly shows 
what the soldiers were required to do. Sher- 
man's main attack was by the Graveyard road, 
which ran along an inferior ridge across great 
ravines toward the line of intrenchments; 
but as it approached the works it turned to the 
left, running parallel with them for some dis- 
tance, closely swept by musketry from the 
parapet. Says Badeau: 

Its general direction was perpfjndicular to the 
rebelline; but as it approached the worUs it bent 
to the left, passing alon;? tlie ed^e of the ditch of 
the enemy's bastion, and enterius at the slioulder of 
the bastion. The limber on the sides of the ridgo 
and in the ravine liad been felled so that an assault 
at any other point in front oi the 15th Corps was al- 
most impossible. The rebel line, rifle trench as 
well as small works for artillery, was higher than 
the ground occupied by the national troops,and no- 
where between the Jackson road and the Mississippi 
on the north could it be reached without crossing 
a ravine a hundred and twenty feet beiow the gen- 
eral level of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity 
whose natural slope was ' everywliere made more 
difficult by fallen trees and entaaglemenlsof stakes 
and vines. 

Such was the situation for an assault. A 
ravine 120 feet deep, with steep sides, tangled 
with felled trees, and stakes, and vines, to be 
crossed to reach the enemy's parapet, which 
crowned the higher bunk. This ravine, crossed 



by a single road, on an inferior cross ridge; 
this road, enfiladed by the guns of the bastion, 
and as it neared the works turning. so as to be 
swept broadside by musketry at short range. 
No other way bj' which to approach the works 
to make other attacks, or to support an at- 
tack by this road, than by crossing this great 
ravine, and climbing the acclivity, through 
the entanglement of fallen timber, to scale 
the parapet in the face of a line of infantry 
behind it, as strong as the storming line could 
be under sucii conditions. 

To send brave men to the assault, under 
such conditions, was to send them to certain 
failure and certain death. Military sense 
could know this as well before as after. But 
volunteers were cheap. A volunteer "storm 
ing paj-ty" of 150 men carried boards and 
poles to cross the ditch, followed at a small 
interval by Swing's brigade; this by Giles 
Smith's and then Kilby Smith's, making 
Blair's division. At the minute the storm- 
ing party dashed forward on a run, followed 
by the 30th Ohio in ttie lead of Ewixg's 
brigade, the artillery meanwhile playing on 
the bastion which commanded this road. At 
the rig'it point a double rank of the enemy 
rose up behind the parapet in every part that 
commanded the road, and poured a concentric 
fire on the head of the column which con- 
sumed it. 

Says Gen. Sherman in his report: 

It halted, wavered, and sought cover. The rear 
pressed on, but the fire was so terrific that very- 
soon all sought cover. The head of the column 
crossed the ditch of the left lace of the bastion and 
climbed upon the exterior slope, where the colors 
were planted, and the men burrowed in tlie earth 
to shield themselves from the flank fire. The lead- 
ing brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that 
point, the next brigade of Giles Smith was turned 
down a ravine, and by a circuit to the left found 
cover, formed line, and tlireatened the parapet 
about 300 yards to the left of the bastion; and the 
brigade of Kilby Smith deployed on the off slope 
of one of tiie.spurs, where, "ilh Ewing's brigade, 
they kepi up a conslant fire against any object that 
presented itself above the parapet. 

Thus the leading brigade had sought near 
cover from this concentric fire which con- 
sumed the head of the column, and the other 
two had turned off into the ravine for cover, 
from which the only way to renew the at- 
tempt to storm the works was by climbing 
the acclivity through the obstructions, and 
then scaling the parapet behind which its 



^104 — 



doable rank of defenders was secure. Enough 
had been done to demonstrate the impossi- 
bility of the attempt; enough to vindicate the 
valor of the soldiers; enough of sacrifice of 
brave men for naught. But the murderous 
contest was not to stop here. Gen. Shee- 
man's report continues: 

About 2 p. m. Gen. Blair reported to me that none 
of his brijjades couhl pass the point of the road 
swept by the terrific Are encountered by Ewing's, 
bill that Giles Smith had got a position to the left, 
in connection with Gen. Ransom, of McPhersou's 
corps, and was ready to assault. I ordered a con- 
stant fire of artillery to be kept up to occudv the 
attention of the enemy in our front. Under these 
circumstances Ransom's and Giles Smith's brigades 
charged up against the parapet, but also met a 
stagijering fire, before which they recoiled under 
cover of tlie iiiUside. 

B.\DKAu .says of tnis second attack: 

The ground over which they passed is the moat 
difficult about Viclcsburg. Three ravines cover the 
entire distance between the Graveyard and Jackson 
roads, and opening into one still larger, rendered 
this portion of the line unapproachable, except for 
individuals. Nownere between these points could 
a company march by a flank in anything like order, 
80 broken is the ground, and so mucli was it ob- 
structed by the slashing which had been made by 
felling forest timber and the luxurious vines 
along the sides of the ravines * * * 

The troops pushed on, and in the blazing sun 
sought to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like 
the column of Ewing, they became hopelessly 
broken up into small parties, and only a few, more 
. daring than the rest, succeeded in getting close 
enough to give the rebels any serious cause for 
alarm. But these were met by a staggering fire, and 
recoiled under cover of the hillside. Many a brave 
man fell after ne had passed through the difficulties 
of the approacn and reached the rebel line. The 
foremost were soon compelled to crawi behind the 
logs and under the brows of the hills, where they 
waited for single opportunities to bring down the 
enemy as he showed himself along the parapet or 
in the rifle trench. 

Gen. Steele's brigade, which was Sher- 
man's right, had a less difficult country to 
cross, but a cleared valley instead of the pre- 
cipitous ravines, exposed his troops "for three- 
quarters of a mile to a plunging fire from 
eveij-^ point of the adjacent rebel line. The 
distance to pass under fire was not less than 
400 yards, and though the. obstacles to over- 
come were less, the exposure to fire being 
greater, made the result here the same as the 
assault on Sherman's left. By 2 o'clock it 
was evident that the national forces could not 



reach the rebel fortifications at any point in 
Sherman's front in numbers or order suf- 
ficient to carry the line, and all further 
operations were suspended." 

The line of works in front of McPherson's 
corps followed the line of the high ridge 
nearly north and south; "they were strongly 
constructed, and well arranged to sweep the 
approaches in each direction." The only 
road to them "was completely swept at many 
points by direct and cross fires." In Logan's 
division Leggett's brigade was on the road, 
supported by John E. Smith's brigade; Steven- 
son's brigade in the ravines and on the slopes 
to tiie south. At the appointed time all 
moved forward. Badeau tells the result: 

Their order of battle, however, was weak from the 
nature of the ground— columns of regiments not 
greater than a platoon front, battalions by the 
flank, in columns of fours, or regiments in a single 
line of battle, supported by troops iu position, and 
covered by skirmishers. 

Notwitstandins; the bravery of the troops, they be- 
came broken and disorganized by the difficult na- 
ture of the ground, and the Are of the enemy from 
trench and parapet; and they, too, were compelled 
to seek cover under the brows of the hills alons 
which they had advanced. John E. Smith was 
thus checked by the crossfire of artillery command- 
ing the road. '■' * * Stevenson was somewhat 
protected by the uneven nature of the ground. 
* '•= '•• His advance was bold, and had nearly 
reached the top of the slope in his front, but being 
only in line, and, therefore, without any great 
weight, unsupported by columns or heavy bodies to 
give it confidence or momentum, it also failed. 

Quinby's division was McPherson's left. 
Badeau says: "Quinby's troops moved out, 
but the enemy's line in their front being a 
strong re-entrant [turning by an angle in- 
ward] no great effort was made by them. At 
this time they were simply useful from the 
menacing attitude they held." Neither Mc- 
Pherson nor any of his Generals made any 
report of this assault; at least none was for- 
warded to the War Department. The reason 
will appear further along. 

McClernand's corps held the left of the line 
— first A. J. Smith's division, then Carr's, 
then Hovey's. Badeau's description makes 
the ground of the same difficult character, 
deeply cut up by ravines, but less encumbered 
with timber, save in Hovey's front. McCler- 
nand's report says: 

Five minutes before 10 o'clock the bugle soundea 
the charge, and at 10 o'clock my columns of attack 



— 105 — 



moved forward, and within fifteen minutes Law- 
ler's and Landrura's brigades had carried the ditch, 
slope, and bastion of a fort. Some of their men 

* >;< i< rushed into the fort, finding a piece of ar- 
tillery, and in time to see the men who had been 
serving and supporting it escape behind another 
defense commanding the interior of the former. 
All of this daring and heroic party were shot down 
except one, who, recovering from the stunning ef- 
fect of a shot, seized his muslcet and captured and 
brought away thirteen rebels, who had returned 
and fired their guns. 

This captor was Sergeant Jos. Griffith, 22d 
lo^a. who for this was proiiioted by Gen. 
Grant to be First Lieutenant. 

The colors of the 130th Illinois were planted upon 
the counterscarp of the ditch, while those of the 48th 
Ohio and 77th Illinois waved over the bastion. 
Within fifteen minutes after Lawler's and Laud- 
rum's success, Benton's and Burbridge's brigades 

* =;• •:• carried the ditch and slope of another 
heavy earthwork, and planted their colors upon the 
latter. '■■ '■' •'• Capt. Wnite, of the Chicago Mer- 
cantile Battery, carried forward one of his pieces by 
hand quite to the ditch, and, double shotting it, 
fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun in it ready 
to be discharged, and scattering death among the 
rebel cannoneers. A curtain connected the works 
forming these two points of attack. 

Here, he says, "for more tlian eight long 
hoars they maintained their ground with 
deathlike tenacity." Osterhaus' and Ho- 
vey's troops, forming the column of assault 
on the left, had more difficult ground to pass 
over, and a longer march under fire. They 
"pushed forward under a withering fire upon 
a more extended line until an enfilading fire 
from a strong redoubt on their left front 
and physical exhaustion compelled them to 
take shelter behind a ridge. "•■■ ■■• * Their 
skirmishers, however, kept up the conflict." 
The enemy now massed troops to drive the 
four brigades from the points tRey had 
gained in the works, and McClernand sent 
to Gen. Arthur, who was coming up from 
Warrenton, asking for help, also to Gon. 
Grant, advising him of the situation. 

As this part of the affiiir runs into an uri- 
happy dispute, in which it is alleged by Gen. 
McClernand that because of Grant's tardi- 
ness in supporting him he lost the ground in 
the enemy's works from which Vicksburg 
might then have been taken ; and on the 
other hand it is alleged by Gen. Grant that 
Gen. McClernand claimed to have carried 

[On page 100, for "outer slope of the bank," read 
"outer side of the ditch."] . 



important points in the enemy's works, 
which in fact were not important, and that 
thereby he caused the principal part of the 
sacrifice of men, the controversy is too great 
to be taken up in this chapter. 



CHAPTER XLI. 

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE SECOND ASSAULT ON 
VICKSBURG — VOLUNTEERS CONSUMED BY JEAL- 
OUSIES OF GENERALS. 

After the assault by Sherman's and Mc- 
Pherson's corps had failed, and while thatof 
McClernand's corps was persisting, an un- 
happy controversy was made by Gen. Grant, 
which he alleges doubled the sacrifice of men, 
without any chance of gain. Inasmuch as 
the sacrifice in this affair is admitted by 
Badeau to be 3,000, and was, in fact, nearer 
4,000, a blunder which caused one-half so 
many is worth} of historical examination. 

Gen. McClernand's report states that 
within fifteen minutes of the time when the 
troops moved forward at the signal, Lawler's 
and Landman's brigades had carried the ditch, 
slope, and bastion of a fort; that some of the 
men rushed in to the fort, the occupants taking 
flight, but returning and shooting down all 
but Sergeant Griffith, who brought away thir- 
teen of the enemy, surrendered to him. Ba- 
deau states that sixteen surrendered to Grif- 
fith, to escape the fire from both sides, the 
Confederates in the rear, the Nationals on 
the outer parapet, and that four of the sur- 
rendered were shot by the enemy as they 
were following Griffith to the Union lines. 

McClernard's report states further that 
simultaneously "Benton's and Burbridge's 
brigades rushed forward and carried the ditch 
and slope of another heavy earthwork, and 
planted their colors upon the latter,'" and that 
Capt. White, of the Chicago Mercantile Bat- 
ter j'^, "carried forward one of his pieces by 
hand quite to the ditch, and double shotting 
it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun in 
it ready to be discharged, and scattering 
death among the rebel cannoneers," and that 
"a curtain connected the works forming these 
two points of attack." 

Badeau's history, indorsed by Gen. Grant, 
states a >carrying of a part of the intrench- 
ments substantially as is stated by Gen. Mc- 
Clernand, but savs it availed nothing; because 



— 106 — 



these were coiuinanded by other works in the 
rear. The Confederate official reports refute 
the supposition of commanding works in the 
rear, and show that they regarded their line 
as dangerously broken. Gen. Grant, on that 
night, wrote Gen. Halleck, "We have posses- 
sion of two of the enemy's forts." In his 
letter two days later he accuses McCi.ernand 
of misleading him as to the facts. Gen. 
Grant's testimony, therefore, may be set aside 
as neutralizing itself. 

This was a possession of two forts or re- 
dans in the line of fortifications, and of a 
rifle parapet connecting them, which now 
turned them against the enemy. It was such 
an entrance as makes an assault of fortifica- 
tions successful if properly supported. That 
it could not be properly supported by heavy 
following columns was because of Gen. 
Grant's plan for the operation, which ordered 
simultaneous assaults all along the line, and 
the line was attenuated by being drawn out 
as much as four miles. Stonuing a place 
lield by an array of 18,500 men, none of these 
storming lines could have been supported if 
it had entered the place. 

McClernand's corps had lost heavilj^ in bat- 
tles since crossing the river. With this, and 
sickness and detachments, including the 
most of Hovey's division left behind 
at Champion's Hill, the number now 
before the works was not above 
10,000. It had to extend beyond the point of 
safety to guard against flanking on the left, 
between which and the river was a space of 
four miles. Gen. Grant's order was to assault 
simultaneously all along the line. It was 
made in this attenuated manner by McPher- 
son's corps, behind wliich Grant stood, and 
by Sherman's corps. McClerxand's corps fol- 
lowed the same fatal order, and was all 
engaged. McClernand's position during the 
attack was at the Parrott six gun battery, 
which had breached the line which his troops 
carried. He sent to Gen. Grant this note, 
dated 11 a. m.: 

I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is 
massing on me from right and left. A vigorous blow 
by McPherson would make a diversiou in my 
favor. 

Gen. Grant's report says he received this at 
12, and that he responded in this remarkable 
manner: "I directed hira to re-enforce the 
points liard pressed from such troops as lies 



had that were not engaged." This was the same 
as to direct him that if he wanted re-enforce- 
ments he might re-enforce himself. But Mc- 
Clernand had not directly asked re-en- 
forcements, but had suggested that a vigorous 
blow by McPherson would prevent the ene- 
my's massing on him from right and left, 
McPherson's and Sherman's attacks having 
ceased. Gen. Grant narrates that as soon as 
he had sent this remarkable answer, he made 
this remarkable movement: "I then rode 
around to Sherman." 

The reply which McClernand received -was 
this, dated 11:50: "If your advance is weak, 
strengthen it from your reserves or other parts 
of the line." This is interesting as an exam- 
ple ot the great mind which a Commanding 
General can bring into the conduct of a bat- 
tle, but it had little relevancy to McCler- 
nand's need or suggestion. Gen. Grant's re- 
port states that: "The position occupied by 
me during most of the time of the assault gave 
me a better opportunity of seeing what was 
going on in front of tlie 13th Army Corps 
than I believed it possible for tlie commander 
to have." If so it seems strange that he 
should leave so sightly a place upon receiving 
such a call from McClernand. 

Grant's position was a mile and a quarter 
from this action; McClernand^ at a battery 
which had breached these works; but if Grant 
had the superior view which he alleges, then, 
while this conflict was going on, while the na- 
tional flag was on the parapets of two forts in 
the line, and the attack from McPherson's 
and Sherman's corps had ceased, or was only 
keeping up a skirmishing fire, when he re- 
ceived this appeal from McClernand he an- 
swered it with a rebuff, and then rode away 
in an opposite direction, as if to put himself 
as far as he could from McClernand's call. 

Gen. Sherman, in his Memoirs, relates: 

After our men had been fairly beaten back from 
oil' the parapet, and had got cover behind the 
spurs of ground close up to the rebel works. Gen. 
Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left his 
horse some distance to the rear. I pointed out to 
him the rebel works, admitted that my assault had 
failed, and he said the result with McPherson aud 
McClernand was about the same. 

He could speak advisedly for McPherson, 
but having left his view of McClernand's ac- 
tion when the national flag was flying on the 
enemy's works, which was the sure sign of a 



— 107 — 



desperate conflict raging, and when McCler- 
NAND had appealed to him for support, he 
could not say advisedly that the assanlt of 
McClernand's corps liad failed; he could 
only state his own determination in the 
matter. 

Gen. Grant's report states that just as he 
had reached Sherman: 

I received a second disvmtch from McClernand, 
stating positively and unequivocally that he was in 
possession of and still held two of the enemy's 
forts; that the American flag then wavea over 
them, and asking me to have Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson make a diversion in his favor. 

Gen. Sherman says in his Memoirs, the 
writing was "to tlie effect that 'his troops had 
captured the rebel parapet in his front.' that 
'the flag of the CTnion waved over the strong- 
hold of Vicksburg,' and asking him (Gen. 
Grant) to give renewed orders to McPherson 
and Sherman to press their attacks on their 
respective fronts, lest the enemy should con- 
centrate on him (McClernand)." 

By these quotation marks Gen. Sherman 
assumes to give McClernanhj's words. Sher- 
man's report told it in this manner, increasing 
the captured forts to tliree: 

Gen, McClernand's report to Gen. Grant read that 
he had taken three of the enemy's forts, and that 
his flags floated on the slronghold of Vicksburg. 

Gen. McClernand's real dispatcii, as at- 
tested, was as follows: 

We have gained the enemy's inlrenchmunts at 
several points, but are brought to a stand. I have 
sent word to McArthur to re-enforce me if he can. 
Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a 
part of his command at this point? P. S. I have re- 
ceived yonr dispatch. My troops are all engaged, 
and I can not withdraw any to re-enforce others. 

Then followed this: 

We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have 
part possession of two forts, and the starH and stripes 
are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to 
be made all along the line. 

Tliis seems difterent from "stating positively 
and unequivocally that he was in possession 
of two of the forts," as Gen. Grant's report 
says, or that he had "taken three of the 
enemy's forts, and that his Hags waved on 
the stronghold of Vicksburg," as Gen. Sher- 
.man's report says. And Gen. McClernand's 
statement that he had "part possession of 



two forts," and the further decorative state- 
ment that "the stars and stripes are floating 
over them, "is abundantly supported by the 
reports of the officers engaged in the assaults, 
and is substantially admitted by Badeau's 
narrative. 

Grant's report makes the remarkable argu- 
ment that this partial possession of the works 
"could give us no practical advantage unless 
others to the right and left of it were carried 
and held at the same time;" which is to say 
that in storming fortihcations, to carry one 
part is of no consequence unless all are car- 
ried at the same time. This, like all the or- 
dering of this affair, is an original theory in 
the art of storming fortifications. 

Gen. IGrant's report goes on to state that 
from where he had been he could not see Mc- 
Clernand's "possession of the forts, nor ne- 
cessity for re-enforcements, as represented in 
his dispatches, and I expressed doubts of their 
correctness." But, he continues: 

I could not disregard his reiterated statements, 
for they might possibly be true; and, that uo possi- 
ble opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold 
should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, 
I ordered Quinby's division '■■ '■' to report to 
McClernand. ••■ * * I showed his dispatches to 
McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of 
the necessity of an active diversion on their part, to 
hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The 
diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and 
resulted in the increase of our mortality list fully 
50 per cent., without advancing our position or 
giving us other advantages. 

Gen. Sherman narrates in his Memoirs: 

Gen. Grant said, "I don't believe a worn of it," 
but I reasoned with him that this note was official, 
and must be credited, and I offered to renew the 
assault at once with new troops. He said he would 
instantly ride down to McClernand's front, and if I 
did not receive orders to the contrary by 3 o'clock 
p. m.. I might try it again. Mower's fresh brigade 
was brought up under cover, und some changes 
were made in Giles Smith's brigade, and punctually 
at 3 o'clock p. m., hearing heavy firing down along 
the line to my left, I ordered the second assault. 
It "A'as a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful 
and bloody. The same thing occurred with 
McPherson, who lost in this second assault some 
most valuable officers and men without adequate 
result. 

Meanwliile what had become of Gen. Grant, 
who had started for McClernand's position 
to prove his dispatches false? It appears that 
he did not go there, but returned to his posi 



— 108 — 



tion at McPherson's center, for he relates 
that he showed McClernand's dispatch to 
McPherson, and his subsequent dispatches to 
McClernand are dated "Field Signal Sta- 
tion." Gen. McClernand, in a letter to Gen. 
Halleck reviewing Grant's report, gives the 
following dispatches which he received from 
Grant after the events narrated above: 

From Field Signal Station. 

To Gen. McClernand : 

McArthur advanced from Warrenlon last night. 
He is on your left. Couceutrate with him, and use 
his forces to the best advantage. 



From Field Signal Station'. 

To Gen. McClernand: 

Sherman and McPherson are pressing the enemy. 
If one portion of your troops are pressed re-enforce 
them from another. Sherman has gained some suc- 
cesses. 

This instruction that "if one portion of 
your troops are pressed," the comraander 
should re-enforce them from another portion 
that is not pressed, shows the fineness to 
which the art of war has been brought by a 
government military institute; also tlie im- 
portant part which a Commanding General 
may perform in communicating great mili- 
tary instruction to his corps commanders in 
the crisis of battle 

Grant's next dispatch was the following: 

May 22— 2: 30 p. M. 
General: I have sent a dispatch to yon saying 
that McArthur left Warrenton last night: was 
about half way to the city this morning at 1 a. m. 
Communicate with him, and use his forces to the 
best advantage. McPherson is directed to send 
Quinby's division to you if he can notefTect a lodg- 
ment where he is. Quinby is next to your right, 
and you will be aided as mnch by his penetrating 
into the enemy's lines as by having him to support 
the columns you have already got. Sherman is 
getting on well. 

Gen. McClernand had not asked for re- 
enforcements from any save McArthdr's 
diyision, then coming up from Warrenton. 
Grant's dispatch, next above, shows that he 
proposed to first send Quinby's division to the 
assault, and, if that failed, to send it to sup- 
port McClernand. Yet in making his case 
against McClernand he alleges that the 
attempts had all failed, and had shown that 
it was impossible to storm the Confederate 
works. But it appears that he changed his 



mind, and did not order QriNBY' to the as- 
sault, but sent him to support McClernand. 

This remarkable conduct of Grant in rid- 
ing away from McClernand's call, and in 
vacillating between riding back to McCler- 
nand's position to prove his dispatches false, 
or ordering a renewal of the assault without 
that, had consumed time which would have 
made his re-enforcements to McClernand of 
no avail in any possible event. 

Gen Grant next received the following 
answer from McClernand, dated at 3:15 
p. m. : 

I have r,eceived your dispatch in regard to Gen. 
Quinby's division and Gen. McArthur's. As soon 
as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possi- 
ble dispatch, and doubt not that I will force my 
way through. I have lost no ground: My men are 
in two of the enemy's forts, but they are com- 
manded by rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners 
have been taken who intimate that the rear is 
strong. At this moment I am hard pressed. 

But time was flying during this discordancy. 
Quinby's division did not reach McClernand's 
position till near night; McArthur's not till 
next day. Says McClernand's report: 

Col. Boomer's and Siinborn's brigades of Gen. 
Quinby's division, much exhausted, came up, but 
before either of them could be fully applied— in- 
deed before one of them was entirely formed— night 
set in, and terminated the struggle. Col. Boomer 
early fell while leading his men forward, lamented 
by all. Meanwhile the enemy, seeing Quinby's 
division moving in the direction of my position^ 
hastened to concentrate additional forces in front 
of it, and made a sortie, which was repelled. About 
8 p. m., after ten hours' continuous fighting, my 
men withdrew to the nearest shelter and rested for 
the night, holding by a strong picket most of the 
ground they had gained. 

But a history of this assault would be in- 
complete without a glance at the Confederate 
reports. These give some light on the subject 
of this controversy. 



CHAPTER XLII. 



ORCiANIZED SLAUGHTER OF HEROIC VOLUNTEERS 
— ATTEMI'f TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY — 
CRIMINATION TO COVER THE REAL AFFAIR. 

The Confederate officers had views of the 
importance of the lodgment of a part of Mc- 
Clernand's corps in their line of fortifica- 



109 — 



tions. Gen. Pemberton's report says: It was 
of vital importance to drive them out. Gen. 
Stephenson's report ht^s this: 

The work was constntcled in such a manner that 
the dilch was commanded by no nart of the line, 
and the onlj' means by which they conld be dis- 
lodged was to retake the angle by a desperate 
charge. '■■ '■'■ ■■'■ A more firalUnt feat than this 
charge has not illustrated onr arms during the war. 

Brigadier General Lee was in the immediate 
command of that part of the line, but died 
•without making a report. Col, Dockery, 
commanding a brigade of the reserve, says: 
"While on the way to Gen. Moore's lines, a 
courier from Brigadier General Lee to Gen. 
Green reported that Gen. Lee's line had been 
broken by the enemy." Col. Waul, of the 
Texas Legion, who organized the foree which 
retook the works, saj's: 

Alive to the importance of the position, Gen. 
Lee Issued and reiterated orders to Col. Shelley, 
commanding the 23(1 Alabama, and Lieut. Col. 
Pettus, commanding the Jfitn Alabama, who occu- 
pied the fort, to retake it at all hazards, offering the 
flags to the commands capturing them. After sev- 
eral vain attempts they refused to volunteer, nor 
could the most strenuous efforts of their chlvalric 
commander urge or incite them to the assault. 

Gen. Lee then directed the Colonel of the legion 
to have the fort taken. He immediately went 
there, taking with him one battalion of the legion 
to aid or support the assailants, if necessary, in- 
forming Capt. Bradley and I^ieut. Hagan, who re- 
spectively commanded the companies that had pre- 
viously been sent as a support to the garrison. 
These gallant officers not only willingly agreed, but 
solicited the honor of leading those companies to 
the assault. * * * Three of Col. Shelley's regi- 
ment also volunteered. - This feat, consid- 
ered with the accompanying circumstances, the 
occupation by the enemy, the narrow pass through 
which the party had to enter, the enfilading fire of 
musketry and artillery they had to encounter in 
the approach, the unwillinsness of the garrison, 
consisting of two regiments, to volunteer, and per- 
mitting the flags to float for three hours over the 
parapet, the coolness, conrase, and intrepidity 
manifested, deserve highest praise for every officer 
and man engaged in the hazardous enterprise. 

Gen. Grant's accusation admits that if Mc- 
Clernand's troops had gained such a lodg- 
ment in'the fortifications as he reported, then 
it was Grant's dut\''to order the attack re- 
newed by tlie other two corps, although he 
knew that it would only repeat their sacrifice 
against impregnable works. To the "lay- 
man" the thought is suggested whether this 



is the art of war. If McClernand's troops 
had taken this part of the intrenchments, 
then Gen. Grant takes to himself the re- 
sponsibility for ordering a repetition, of an 
assault which he then knew would be a 
slaughter without carrying any works at that 
part of the line. This Confederate testimony 
supports McClernand in all that he reported, 
and more. 

Gen. Grant's accusation of McClernand 
caused him to bring the testimony of the of- 
ficers that led the attack, and of their imme- 
diate commanders, to prove that all thfe pos- 
.session of the intrenchments that he claimed 
was gained. The testimony is from officers of 
many battles and gallant charges. It is 
abundant to prove that Gen. McClernand re- 
ceived official dispatches of this progress from 
the officers engaged, besides being in a posi- 
tion from which he could see the operation; 
that all the possession that he reported to 
Grant was gained, and more, and that the 
officers who led the assault which carried 
these works thought the way open to A''icks- 
burg, if they had been supported in force. 

This historical review need not give this 
testimony. The statement that it is conclu- 
sive is entitled to acceptance, when it is fully 
confirmed by the 'Confederate official reports, 
unbiased by this dispute, which show that a 
part of the line of fortifications which had 
been held by two regiments was in possession 
of the national troops for more than tliree 
hours; that the Confederate regiments which 
had been driven from this part of the 
fortifications could not be rallied to retake 
them, as Col. Waul says, "Permitting the 
(Xational) flags to float for three hours over 
the parapet." 

The official reports of Confederate officei-s, 
and the testimony of the National officers 
actually engaged, show that McClernand's 
report to Grant was within the reality of Ids 
occupation of the intrenchments. Gen. 
Grant concedes that if McClernand's troops 
had such a lodgment as he reported, then it 
w-as his (Grant's) duty to sijpport it by a re- 
newal of the assault by Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson, which he says doubled the losses for 
the day, and/ in another way of stating it, 
makes the cause of most of the loss. As the 
situation is proved to be just as McClernanu 
reported to Grant, does not Grant's admission 
that this new assault would be necessary in 
such a situation, take to himself the respoiisi- 



— no — 



bility for ordering it, or at least share it with 
McClernand? 

To the attentive reader it is obvious tliat 
this crimination is to cover up the real mat- 
ter. What meaning was there in this assault 
of a strongly fortified line, if when any part 
was carried and the way opened, it could not 
be supported by masses so as to enter? Could 
it be supposed that this simultaneous attack 
along a line of at least four miles would 
simultaneously walk over the works, and 
that then the Confederate army would throw 
down its arms? Upon no other expectation 
could Gen. Grant assume that the storming 
of a fortified place by simultaneous attacks 
from a line stretched out more than four 
miles, in a very rough country, and utterly 
unable to strengthen one part from another, 
could be successful. 

Did Gen. Grant think now as Badeau rep- 
resents that he did in the first assault, of which 
he says: "When Sherman's troops rushed up, 
thinking to march easily intoVicksburg, they 
found not only the ramparts were difficult, 
but the defenders had got new spirit, and 
were once more the men who had fought at 
Donelson. and Shiloh, and at Champion's 
Hill" For "Sherman's troops" read Gen. 
Grant; for the troops knew better; but Gen, 
Grant had tried this "walkover" once. 

In assaulting a fortified place, it is thought 
that the great part is to effect an entrance, 
and that when this is gained success is in 
hand; but it appears that in Gen. Grant's 
method of storming, to gain an entrance on 
one side is nothing, for his line is too thin to 
adequately support it anywhere. 

Did the possession of the enemy's line, 
which McClernand reported to Grant, make 
further success practicable by such support as 
McClernand called for, or by the renewed 
assaults which Grant ordered? Conceding 
that McClernand held ali that he reported, 
did that make possible a further success by 
his corps, which justified Grant in ordering 
the other corps to repeat an assault on impreg- 
nable works, and repeat the sacrifice of men, 
merely to make a diversion to support Mc- 
Clernand? Gen. Grant assumes that it did. 
Gen. Sherman takes the same sanguinaiy 
view. These two great soldiers appear to 
think the chance of technically making Mc- 
Clernand responsible, suflScient for the send- 
iTig of these fated volunteers to the slaughter. 

Both these great soldiers concede that what 



McClernand called for and more, and the as- 
saults which they ordered, knowing they 
would double the bloody business, were right, 
if McClernand held what he reported. That 
he did hold it is proved beyond honest dis- 
pute. This makes Gen. Grant responsible for 
the operation which he ordered as a diversion 
to support McCi«ernand. It makes him at 
least as responsible as McClernand; for he 
knew the situation. It makes him responsible 
in chief for doubling the sacrifice of men, 
after he knew that the works in front of 
Sherman and McClernand could not be car- 
ried; for McClernand could not have known 
this, nor could he fairly be held to require, 
for diversion, an attack so real as to double 
the sacrifice of men. 

Is the art of war so poor as this work of 
dogged butchery? Is there any theory of war, 
as taught at the military institute, which re- 
quired two-thirds of the army to be sent again 
to the sacrifice before impregnable fortifica- 
tions, to make a diversion for the other third, 
because it had effected a lodgment in a part of 
the works which it could not support by a 
force sufficient to enter the place? Gen. Grant, 
if he may be accredited with a mind up to 
the ordinary level, knew the whole situation. 
He knew that from a line so extended as his 
army was, no column of attack could be sup- 
ported with force adequate to enter the place 
when it had opened the way. 

He knew that McArthur was not near, and 
that McClernand could get no additional 
force adequate to enter the place at the time 
when he ordered the assault repeated. He 
knew that several hours would be spent while 
(^uiNBY was moving to McClernand's posi- 
tion. He knew that Vicksburg was held by 
an army which from the center could re- 
enforce any part of its line, or could mass for 
a battle inside the fortifications, and that if 
any further success had been possible by 
prompt support of strong force where the as- 
sault had opened the way, or by other opera- 
tions for diversion, it had been made impossi- 
ble by the waste of hours, during which the 
Confederate array had abundant time to con- 
centrate to recover their broken line, while 
he was riding away from the sounti of the 
battle. 

Vicksburg was not simply a fort, held by a 
limited garrison, enveloped by overwhelming 
numbers, its strength consisting chiefly in its 
walls, and lost as soon as these were entered; 



— Ill— 



it was an army intrenched with a circuit of 
strong fortifications along its front of eight 
miles, having the advantage of a sliort inner 
line, by which its reserves could be massed 
for any point, while Grant's army was ex- 
tended oil a great circuit, from which con- 
centration and mutual support were imprac- 
ticable. 

Upon the testimonj^ of Confederate and 
National officers it may be said that if the 
successful storming of the works by parts of 
Lawlee's and Landrum's brigades could have 
been promptly supported by a heavy force, it 
could have entered the place, and that this, 
following up the panic stricken regiments 
that had been driyen from the works — the at- 
tack being at the same time pressed on the 
other parts of the line — would have been very 
dangerous to Pemberton's army. Its com- 
plete success may be said to be as probable as 
military undertakings can generally be, when 
the chance is regarded as sufficient to justify 
the attempt; but it must also be said that in 
the dispositions which had been made of the 
army previous to this attack, and in the way 
that Grant ordered it to be made, it was im- 
possible to support any successful column 
adequately to enter the place, after it had 
opened the way. 

On the other hand, there is as much cer- 
taintyascan visually be foregathered in in- 
telligent military undertakings, that when' 
the momentum of this attack had been ex- 
pended by reaching the works, and McCler- 
NAND was unable to presently support it by a 
heavy force, the time had gone by when the 
success could be carried further by anything 
which it was practicable to do. Still more 
inevitable was this failure when hours had 
passed, and the attack by the other two corps 
had long ceased, leaving the Confederate 
General free to direct his reserves to this 
quarter. 

Lieut. Col. Stone, commanding the 22d 
Iowa, which entered the works, says: "Had 
we been re-enforced at any time before 12 m. 
by a fresh brigade, I have no doubt that the 
whole army could have gone into Vicksburg." 
As he received a wound at that time, he was 
unable to say further. This, however, means 
that the way was open for the whole army to 
go into Vicksburg. But the army was not 
there to enter, and its dispositions were such 
that no adequate force could be massed to 
enter anywhere. The ordering of the assault 



sup})Osed that the whole line of four miles 
would march over tlie line of works. 

Tlie conduct of Gen. Grant is the strangest 
part of this atTair. While the battle was 
going on in the enemy's intrenchments, 
which he says he could see, and when he had 
been informed byMcCLERNAND of the situation, 
he rode away, leaving the action suspended 
where he was, and going to Sherman, where 
it was also suspended. If McClernand's fur- 
ther success had been otherwise possible, this 
conduct of the Commanding General made it 
impossible. If lie had not determined the 
event, he could soon have judged for himself 
what should be done l)y riding to McCler- 
nand. The distance to that part of the line 
where tlie battle was raging was no greater 
than to Sherman's part, where it had ceased. 
But the Commanding General, as if refusing 
to know McClernand's situation, as if he 
had determined the event in his own mind, 
rode away from the battle, leaving these 
troops to be sacrificed, as if for succeeding in 
a desperate assault when Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson, in his own presence, had failed. 

Is it possible that any one having such 
knowledge of the general situation as lay be- 
fore the Commanding General's eye could 
believe that another attack of the fortifica- 
tions by Sherman's and McPherson's corps, 
after 3 o'clock p. m., could enable McCler- 
nand's troops to enter Vicksburg? Whatever 
chance there was of success was determined 
by Gen. Grant's riding away from McCler- 
nand's call while his troops were in the Con- 
federate works, and keeping the rest of the 
army inactive for several hours. His order of 
another assault upon the fortifications after 
that was the sending of a gallant army to the 
slaughter, to no intelligent purpose, and with 
no possibility of gain. 

This crimination is only a diversion from 
the real affair of the organized fatality of this 
assault. If a successful assault of those forti- 
fications had been possible, it was made im- 
possible by the disijositions of the army to in- 
vest so great a line, for which its numbers 
were inadequate, and by the order to assault 
from such an extended line a fortified army. 
This made it impossible to adequately support 
any column which should enter the fortifica- 
tions. Grant and Badeau admit that the 
storming of the works was impossible, but 
Badeau pleads that Grant could not know 
this till he had tried the second time — could 



— 112 — 



not know the strength of the works, the diffi- 
culties of the approach, nor that the Con- 
federate soldiers would fight so well. This 
seems a plea of niilitary incorapetencv for the 
Conunanding General. 



CHAPTER XLIII. 

THE COMMANDING GENERAL CONCEDES THAT THE 
VOLUNTEERS DID ALL THAT HEROISM COULD DO, 
BUT SAYS THE UNDERTAKING WAS AN IMPOSSI- 
BILITY— HIS EXCUSES FOR HIS FATAL ORDER — 
INFALLIBILITY OF MILITARY SCIENCE. 

Gen. Grant's formal report of the opera- 
tions of the Vicksburg campaign, dated July 
6, gave credit to' the soldiers for the gallantry 
of the attack, and stated that the failure was 
because the strength of the fortifications, the 
difficulties of the ground, precluding any ap- 
proach in strong columns, and the number of 
the defenders, made a successful assault im- 
possible, and that the result would have been 
the same if his own army had been ever so 
much greater. 

He wrote: "The assault was gallant in the 
extreme on the part of all the troops, but the 
enemy's position was too strong, both natu- 
rally and artificially, to be taken in that way." 
This does justice to the valor of the troops, 
and exonerates them from responsibility for 
this sacrifice of the army for nothing. He 
continues: "At every point assaulted, and all 
of them at the same time, the enemy was able 
to show all the force his works would cover." 
Thus the defenders could show a stronger line 
behind the rifie parapet and batteries than 
the assaulting army could bring up to them, 
through the difficult approaches. 

He also argued by the following that 
greater numbers on his side could not have 
changed the result: "Each corps had many 
more men than could possibly be used in the 
assault, over such ground as intervened be- 
tween them and the enemy. More men 
could only avail in case of breaking through 
the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie." 
Forasmuch as they did not break through the 
enemy's line, he regards it of no consequence 
that more men were not there to avail. This 
seems to show a sagacity in the ordering of 
the assault which had foreseen that it would 
nowhere enter the line of fortifications, and, 
theretore, had wasted no energy in providing 
force to follow it up. 



Gen. McClernand's report, which was made 
earlier, stated that two of his assaulting col- 
umns did break through the enemy's works, 
and that he had not adequate force to make 
this entrance avail. But Gen. Grant's report 
was made to refute that. It showed also that 
the ordering of the assault, and the disposi- 
tions of the army were upon the conclusion 
that the enemy would make no sortie, and 
therefore men v.'ould not be required to meet 
that. Fortunately the enemy did not, save 
that the force which had been gathered to re- 
take the works in McClernand's front, and 
the further force which he says was concen- 
trated because of Quinby's movement, did 
make a sortie which caused considerable loss. 

The average citizen has profound venera- 
tion for the military art. He is taught to be- 
lieve it a system of absolute theoretical prin- 
ciples, which are taught at the military in- 
stitute, by which the graduate can forecast 
military operations with an approximation 
to the exactness of science, and without 
which education no amount of experience in 
war can make a soldier other than an empir- 
ical bungler, whose success, if he ever makes 
any, is a matter of chance. To shake popu- 
lar beliefs is always evil ; for not alone is the 
particular tradition shaken, but this tends to 
weaken popular faiths in all things. 

But the average citizen, reading Gen. 
Grant's award to the gallantry of the sol- 
diers in this assault of his ordering, and his 
unqualified declaration that the natural and 
artificial strength of these fortifications 
was such that a successful assault was im- 
possible, and that tlie result could not be 
otherwise if he had had ever so many^ more 
men, is constrained to inquire whether mili- 
tary science has no other means of finding out 
that fortifications are impregnable to assault 
save by sending an army upon tliem to be de- 
stroyed. 

Such fortifications are not hidden. This 
was a line of eight miles, along the highest 
projections. In a great part of the way they 
crowned the steep banks of deep ravines, 
which enabled the constructors to dis- 
pense witli the outer ditch. They were 
further strengthened by redans, lunettes, and 
redoubts at the angles, and at places to com- 
mand any ground that was practicable for 
an approach in formation. This line of 
fortifications was the most conspicuous feature 
in that region. Under cover of parallel 



— 113^ 



ridges and of the thickets in tlie ravines, 
scouts and reconnoitering officers conld ob- 
serve the works. 

Could not military science judge wliether 
it was practicable to carry these fortifications 
by storm? Could the military art do no 
better than to sacrifice near 4,000 heroic vol- 
unteers, to find out what could be told by an 
intelligent reconnaissance"'' Was it necessarj'^ 
to order assaults all along the line of four 
miles, to try the strength of the works? If 
this be so, is the art of war, as taught at the in- 
stitute, the infallible science that is popu- 
larly^believed? If this be the only way to 
find that fortifications are impregnable to 
assault, is there such an unassailable height as 
is assumed between the officer of the special 
schooling and the officer of general educa- 
tion, general capacitj', and of as much ex- 
])erience in war? 

Badeau says that "Grant had in his varioiis 
columns about 30,000 men engaged." Gen, 
Pemberton's report states that at the begin- 
ning of the siege he had 18,500 effectives. 
["To man the entire line I was able to bring 
into the trenches about 18,500 muskets."] 
Grant's army was extended as much as four 
miles. This extension, and the nature of the 
country, made it impracticable for one army 
corps to support, another. The reports show 
also that neither of the three corps was so con- 
centrated tliat in case of any part entering the 
works, it could be adequately supported to 
advance. 

The previous disposition of the army for the 
attack, and the ordering of it from a line so 
extended, against a line of fortifications 
which covered an army, was upon the plan 
that the assaulting lines were to march over 
them simultaneously. After Gen. Grant had 
tri«d this, he amply declared that they were 
impregnable. Had generalship no other way 
to find out this? Can it be said, upon his own 
account, that even by this terrible sacrifice he 
had proved that the enemy's line could not 
be broken by assaults in the manner that 
fortified places are usually assaulted, by 
massing at one or two points, and masking 
these by other demonstrations? 

Reports of both Confederate and national 
officers show that the enemy's line was 
broken in "MoClernand's front. The pre- 
vious dispositions of the army and Gen. 
Grant's order of the assault show that it 
was impossible to support this adequately to 



enter the place. Gen. Grant said tliis posses- 
sion of the Confederate works was of no use 
unless others to right and left were carried. 
This still further shows that the ordering of 
the assault all along the line was upon tlie 
theory that the whole line was to simulta- 
neously march over tlie fortificatious. after 
a cannonading fanfare, which made no im- 
pression save to give notice of what was com- 
ing. 

Gen. Grant's biograplier makes a formida- 
ble array of excuses for the ordering of tliis 
a.ssault. 

1. He felt that a resolute assault from the ad- 
vanced positioiLS obtained on the 19th would suc- 
ceed, if made with proper visor and co-operation. 

Previously, in stating the compensations got 
for the sacrifice by the assault of the 19th, 
the principal item was this: "The nature of 
the enemy's works, the character of the 
ground, and the unusual obstacles by' which 
it was encumbered, together with the policy 
of the defense, all became known." That 
knowledge was obtained by the sacrifice of 
something less than 1,000 men; but now 
something less than 4,000 had to be sacrificed 
to obtain the same knowledge. 

2. He believed * * - he could reach the rebel 
works in suflicient oKder and with weight enough 
to break through before any serious loss could be 
inflicted by the enemy. 

This is the way he improved the knowl- 
edge gained by the first assault. But he fouijd 
that he conld not reach the works with any 
heavy columns, nor, as Baijeau says, make 

"any tactical movement." 

% 

3. In addition to these tactical considerations, it 
was known that Johnston was at Canton, witli the 
troops that had escaped from Jackson, re-enforced 
by others from the East and South : that acces.sions 
were daily reaching him, and that every soldier the 
rebel government could gather up in all its terri- 
tory would doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's 
support. In a short time he might be strong enough 
to aUack Grant in tlie rear, and possibly, in con- 
junction with the garrison, raise the siege. 

The alleged grand strategy of Gen. Grant's 
march away from Pemberton's army at Vicks- 
burg, and from his base of supplies, both of 
which could be reached from Hankinson's 
Ferry by a march of fifteen miles, was that 
in this way he could scatter all forces that 
could be gathered on the east, seize Jackson, 



— 114 — 



destroy the railrouils that center tliere, and 
thus, said Badeau: "Troops as well as stores 
would be cut oft', and Vickshurg with its gar- 
rison isolated from the rest of the would he 
Confederacy." 

This movement away from the enemy and 
the objective ulace, to first make impossible 
any aid from the east, so as to pen up Pkm- 
BERTON in Vickshurg and have his own. way 
with him, was the whole of the grand strategy, 
as reconstructed after the event. It was upon 
this that Bakeau, approved by Grant, de- 
clared that this movement equaled a combi- 
nation of Bonaparte's first Italian campaign, 
and of his 'campaign about Ulm. Yet now 
only three days after his rapid march had 
reached Vickshurg, he determined that this 
desperate assault of impregnable fortifications 
was necessary because Jonxsrox might <iuickly 
be upon him. 

If, when he had reached Hankinson's Ferry 
on the'3d of April, and on the 4th had recon- 
noitered to within six miles of Vickshurg, 
and he could have connected -with his base 
of supplies by a march of ten miles to War- 
renton, and within fifteen miles could have 
forced Pemberton to fight in the open coun- 
try or lose his communications and be shut 
up, he had taken this course, he could not 
be more in danger of Johnston or of any other 
interference from the east* than he now pleads 
as an excuse for this sacrifice of his army by 
assaulting impregnable fortifications. 

In fact, Johnston did not reach Jackson 
till the 13th of April, and then he had but 
6,000 troops. Thus it appears ;by Baceau's 
auologies that Grant's grand strategy of march- 
ing away from the objective and from his 
supplies, defeated itself, and that in his view 
Johnston was now more dangerous, after all 
of Grant's forced marching of his army, on 
short supplies, to extinguish him before 
tackling Gen. Pemberton and Vickshurg. 

4. Possession of Vicksburg, on the contrary, 
would enable Grant to turn upon Johnston and 
drive him from the State; to seize all the railroads 
and practical highways, and effectually secure all 
territory west of the Toinbigbee River before the 
season for active campaisiiing ill this hititude 
should be past. 

This is a further showing that the grand 
strategy had begun the campaign wrong end 
first. These were the grand advantages that 
were before Gen. Grant when he reached 



Hankinson's Ferry, and which he marched 
away from, and marclu^d his army a month 
further into the sickly season, and then com- 
passed the dreadful labor and hardship of a 
siege, when it was ])robable that the issue 
would have been decided by a battle in the 
field, if he had marched directly upon Pem- 
berton's army. At last the grand strategy has 
to confess that it turned everything wrong 
end first. 



5. Finally the troops themselves were impatient 
to possess Vickshurg. * * ••• The temper of the 
army, after its triiuuphant march, was such that 
neither oflicers nor men would have worked ui the 
trenches with any zeal until they became m'tain 
that all other means had failed. So, al- 

though Grant certainly expected to sueceedf he 
felt now as he did at Belmont, that there was a 
moral as well as a military necessity for the as- 
sault. The spirit of the men demanded it, and lo 
this spirit every real commander will defer; or 
rather, with this spirit liis own will be *;ure to be 
in unison. 

So the useless and bloody assault has to be 
charged to tiie soldiers, as was the Command- 
ing General's ignorance of the country at 
Champion's Hill. Near 4:,000 of them must 
be killed and wounded to take down their 
spirit enough to make them work in the 
trenches, and for moral effect. Doubtless the 
blood letting was sufticient' for their spirit 
and morale. Between butchery and digging 
siege trenches, thej' chose the trenches. The 
volunteers had no voice; but the country 
knows what they were, and how high their 
intelligence. They knew of one bloody as- 
sault, and the skirmishers knew these fortifi- 
cations. Does aniy one suppose them such 
senseless machines that they did not know 
that this order was to send them to destruc- 
tion without any hope of success? 

McClernand says the order of the assault 
"was deemed not only by me, but by all my 
general officers who spoke to me upon the 
subject, as unfortunate, and likely to bring 
disaster upon us rather than the enemy." 
He says that on the previous day, when 
Grant announced his purpose to assault, he 
volunteered the suggestion of a "concentra- 
tion of our forces against one or two points, 
and not the dispersion of them into a multi- 
tude of cohimns," and that Sherman's re- 
mark was "that it was a question of how 
many men he was willing to lo.se." This is 
characteristic of Gen. Sherman's theory of 



— 115 — 



war, but if does not show that he approved 
the attempt. Yet the accounts all show that 
officers and men went to their death with 
the same pluck as they would if they had 
thought this a sane military undertaking. 
Badeau's apologies continue: 

6. The only possible chance of breaking through 
such defenses and defenders was in massing the 
troops, so that the weight of the columns shonld be 
absolutely irresistible. But the broken and tangled 
ground, whereoften acompany could notadvanceby 
flank, made massing iliipossible; and this could not 
be known in advance. 

Thus, after Gen. Gkaxt had made one as- 
sault for information of the works, and had 
been before Vicksburg three days, he could 
not know, before this second assault, that the 
nature of the ground in front of the fortifica- 
tions made the massing of columns of assault 
impossble. This plea of ignorance of so 
simjile a matter, and one which involved the 
destruction of his army, is calculated to shake 
popular faith in the infallibility of military 
science, as taught at the institute. 

Furthermore, he was excusable because he 
did not suppose the Confederate troops would 
fight. Badeau, in reciting the gain of in- 
formation by the assault of the 19th, itemizes 
that "the policy of the defense had now be- 
come known." It was obvious that the poli- 
cy of the defense was to defend. He says 
also of that pursuit of information : "When 
Sherman's troops rushed up, thinking to 
marcli easily into Vicksburg, they fouiul not 
only the ramparts were difficult, but the de- 
fenders had got new spirit, and were once 
more the men who had fought at Donelson, 
and Shiloh, and at Cluimpion's Hill." But it 
appears that Grant had to learn the policy of 
the defense lay another lesson, for Badeau 
says he could not have known beforeliand 
that the Confederates would hght, and he 
dates back to Big Black Bridge, thus: 

7. The reljels, too, liad not shown (in the week 
preeeaing the assault any of the determination 
which they dispUiyed behind their earthen walls at 
Vicksburg; the works at Big Blacfc River also were 
impregnable if they had been well defended, and 
Grant could not know beforehand that Pember- 
ton's men had recovered their former mettle any 
more than he could ascertain, without a trial, how 
inaccessible were the .aeclivities, and how pro- 
di:4ious the difficulties whicii protected these invig- 
orated soldiers. 

This list of excuses confesses the fatal order- 



ing of the assault, and it states so many of the 
essential things which Gen. Grant did not 
know of the situation that it leaves but a nar- 
row margin for the essential things which he 
did know, when he spread out his army and 
sent it in thin formations against a.line of for- 
tifications which he says was impregnable to 
any assault. This has a tendency to ccui- 
found the popular idea of the infallibility of 
military science, and to impeach the popular 
practice of giving all the glory and rewards 
for the victories and slaughter of the volun- 
teers to the Commanding General. All this, 
however, fails to show that by an intelligent 
reconnaissance, concentration, and a properly 
ordered assault the army could not even then 
have carried Vicksburg by storm. 



CHAPTER XLIV. 

THE LOSSES BY THE ASSAULT — ROMANCE OF WAR 
BULLETINS — THE WAY POPULAR HISTORY OF 
THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN WAS MADE — LEAV- 
ING THE WOUNDED TO DIE AND THE DEAD UN- 
BURIED. 

The casualties in Sherman's and .MiI'uek- 
son's corps by the assault of the 22d are not 
shown by the official reports. McClernand's 
report gave his as 1,487. Subsequently Mc- 
Pherson's letter to Grant, complaining of 
McClernand's congratulatory order to his 
command, mentioned the loss of his corps in 
the assault as 1,218. Sherman's corps had 
been less reduced than the other two by 
battles, and he describes his assault as heavy, 
resolute, and repeated. 

Reckoning Sherman's loss as great as ^Ic- 
Pherson's, would make the total 0,92;'.; if as 
great as McClernand's, the total 4,192. On 
that evening Gen. Grant wrote the following 
dispatch to Gen. Halleck, in which the in- 
telligent reader will have an idea of the rela- 
tion which Gen. Grant's war bulletins bore 
to the events: 

Vicksburg is now coninletely invested. I have 
possession of Maine's Blutf and the Yazoo, conse- 
qyently have supplies. Today an attempt twas 
made to carry the city by assault, but was not en- 
tirely successiul. We hold possession, however, of 
two 01 the enemy's forts, and have slcirmishers close 
under all of them. Our loss was not severe. Tlie 
nature of the ground about Vicksburg is such that 
it can only be taken by a siege. " ■' '■ What 
sfjall I do Willi tile prisoners I have? 



— 116 — 



In the liand which writes war bulletins the 
pen is mightier than the array's assault. 
"Vicksburg completely invested!" Between 
his left and the river below Vicksburg was a 
space of four miles. The attenuation of the 
army for the assault had not even tlie excuse 
that it was in order to invest the 
place. Badeau says the investment was not 
completed till the 11th of June. In like man- 
ner Gr.vnt wrote this, of the skipping advance 
of his apjjroaches, which had not yet begun : 
"The approaches are gradually nearing the 
enemy's fortifications. Five days more 
should plant our batteries on their i)arapets." 
The following month of hard labor by a great 
army did not plant thebatteries in dangerous 
proximity to their parapets. 

The assault "not entirely unsuccessful!" 
But "we hold i^ossession of two of the 
enemy's forts." This seems to reinstate 
McClernand's troops in the two forts, for this 
bulletin only, which, for other inirposes, he 
denied that they had entered. "Have skir- 
mishers close under ail of them!" Badeau 
says of the ena of the action : 

"The hillsides were covered with the slain, 
and with unfortunates who lay panting in 
the hot sun, crying for water which none 
could bring them, and writhiiig in pain that 
might not be relieved." 

. And there they lay for three days, the dead 
to rot unburied, and the heljiless wounded to 
die because the Coftfederate works and outer 
pickets and sliarj>shooters commanded the 
ground, and Grant would not ask permission 
to succor the wounded and bury the dead. 

.Something near 4,000 killed and wounded, 
yet this bulletin told the country that "our 
loss was not severe." The greatest (juality of 
this great soldier wa.s his imperturbability in 
the slaughter of his own soldiers. What 
thought the intelligent volunteers of the 
severity of the loss, whose comrades were 
thickly stre%vn, dead and wounded, l.)efore the 
enemy's intrenchments, the dead unburied, 
the wounded abandoned, "crying for water 
which none could bring them, and writhing 
in pain that might not be relieved?" Were 
they so imbruted that they had no feeling, 
when they knew that this sacrifice was a 
blunder of generalship? 

This bitlletin was the othcial rcjioi-t that 
would first go t<j the country, and would make 
popular history, which the truth could never 



overtake. This i.i the way that- war history 
was made in the Vicksburg campaign. 

Two days later, on the 24th, Gen. Grant 
wrote a revised version of the assault. In 
this he stated the loss at 1,500 — less than half 
the truth; but he charged it to McClernand. 
He gave this fine definition of the result: 
"Our troops were not repulsed from any 
point, but simply failed to enter the works of 
the enemy." 

He continued: "At several points they got 
up to the parapets of the -enemy's works, and 
planted their flags on the outer slojie of the 
embankment, where they still have them." 
Not repulsed, but siiuply failed to enter! 
Their Hags still -on the enemy's parapets, two 
days after the assault, but still he was unable 
to succor the wounded or bury the dead. He 
continues: 

The loss on our side was not very heavy at first, 
but receivHig repeated dispatctjes from Maj. Gen. 
McClernand, saying that he was hard pressed on 
his right and left, and calling for re-enforcemeuts. I 
gave him all of McPherson's corps but four brigades, 
and causea Sherman to pres-i the enemyon our right, 
which caused us to double our losses for the day. 
They will probably reach 1,500 killed and'vvounded. 
Gen. McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the 
facts, and caused much of this loss. He is entirely 
unfit for the position of corps commander, both on 
the march and on the battlefield. Looking alter his 
corps gives me more labor and iiiiinitely more un- 
easiness than all the i-emainder of my department. 

That jSIcClernand's corps gave Gen. Grant 
great trouble and uneasiness, and greatly oc- 
cupied his mind, in all the Vicksburg ojjera- 
tion, beginning in the Holly Springs move- 
ment, is sufticiently obvious in Badeau's nar- 
rative; but it appears that in this particular ac- 
tion. Gen. Gr.\nt had no trouble or uneasiness 
about McClernand, for when he sent a mes- 
sage that he was engaged in the enemy's 
works and "hotly pressed," Grant rode away 
in an opposite direction, where the action 
had ceased. The rest of this leport was a 
narration of iiis achievements by the interior 
movement and of those now in his hands, 
which, as they were written by the same liand 
that wrote the dispatch concerning the as- 
sault, were not diminished in the telling. 

For two days the dead and dying of Grant's 
heroic soldiers of the assault lay on the 
slopes before the Confederate works, and he 
made no sign. He could not bury the dead 
nor care for the wounded witlu>ut (ien. Pe.Mt 



— 117 — 



berton's permission, and to ask this would 
•disclose to the country a situation quite dif- 
ferent from that in his bulletin. At length, 
on the 2'nh, Gen.- Pkmberton sent this note: 

Two days liaviiif; elapsed since your dead and 
wounded have been lyins? in our front, and as yet 
no disposition on your part of a desire to remove 
ihera being exhibited, in the name of humanity, 1 
have tlie honor to propose a cessation of hostilities 
for two ana a half hours tliat you may be enabled 
to remove your dead and dying men. If you can 
not do this, on notification from you that hostilities 
will be suspended on your part for the time speci- 
) lied, 1 will endeavor to have the dead buried, and 
the wounded cared for. 

To this Gen. Grant replied at y:.SO p. m. 
ai)pointin*j> (i p. m. as the time for the cessa- 
tion of hostilities. Badk.\u, in a foot note, 
defends Grant against Pembkrton's imputa- 
tion of inhumanity, for he say.s the impossi- 
bility of relieving tho.se wounded "was oc- 
<asioned by Pemberton's troops." He says 
also that this suffering of the wounded was 
only the fate of war: 

'I'lie wounded sntt'er frightfully after every 
battle, and the party which is repedert is always 
unable to bestow attention on those whom it leaves 
on the field. 

But Grant's re})ort to Halleck denied that 
the a:5sault was repelled; he said it only 
failed to enter the works, and was still at the 
threshold. 

Babeau does not allow humanity to Gen. 
Pemberton in this proposal to permit Grant 
to care for his wounded aud bury his dead; 
lie conveys that Pemberton had another ob- 
ject in it — namely, to escape a pestilence bred 
l)y the stcuchof these dead Union volunteers. 
He says: 

For two days the uiibinied corpses were left 
festering between the two armies, when the stencil 
beciime so intolerable to the garrison that Pember- 
ton was afraid it mighi breed a pestilence. He 
llierefore prooosed an armistice. '■' "^^ 

(ieii. I'KMHicirroN liad another stratagem in 
tiiis, and this I'cveais a line stratagem on 
(Ji;a.\t's ])art. Continues Badeau: 

The offer was promptly accepted, and the rebels 
also availed themselves of the opportunity to carry 
off the dead hoises and mules that lay in their 
front, and were becoming very offensive to the be- 
sieged. These were the animals that Pemberton 
bad turned foose from the city, and driven over the 



lines from want of forage. They were ^hot where- 
ever they were seen by the sharpshooters from the 
besieging army, that the stench arising from their 
putrefaction might annoy the enemy. 

As it turned out, however, the stink was the 
solace of Grant's wounded soldiers, left to 
die amid this carrion, and to add thereto the 
sten(d) of their own rotting. As three days 
had elapsed since the action ceased, the 
caring for the wounded liad been 
much reduced. Gen. Pemberton had before 
issued an order that the ammunition in the 
cartridge boxes of the Union dead should be 
carefully gathered in. From this it may be 
presumed that they were also strii>]H'd under 
cover of night. 

But the wounded could not be brought 
away nor the dead buried withoiit the ene- 
tny's permission. To Gen, Pemberton it was 
a matter of war etiquette that the side which 
needed such permission .should ask it. To 
Gen. Grant, to ask it would admit to the na- 
tion in his rear that the Confederates held the 
battleground, and would reveal a situation 
very different from that represented by his 
bulletins. Thus this abandonment was his 
military necessity, and humanity to his own 
heroic volunteers had to give way to his own 
jiecessity in order that the history of the 
Vick.sburg campaign might be rightly written 
in the jmblic mind. 



CHAPTER XLV. 

THE SIEGE — IMMEDIATE FEAR OF .IOHNSTON IN 
THE BEAR — SACRIFICING OTHER OPERATIONS TO 
RE-ENFORCE GRANT — THE DREADFUL LABORS OK 
THE SIEGE. 

Two bloody assaults having satislied (ien. 
Grant that the fortihcations of Vicksbutg 
could not be stormed, he put his army to tlie 
work of investing the place, and of approach- 
ing it by trenches, saps, and mines, and tlie 
other engineering works of a siege. The 
Confederate line of works, Badeau says, was 
eight miles long, and the national intrenclied 
line twelve miles, and he says Grant had now 
about 40,000 men. 

The present force was inadequate to the in- 
vestment. There was still a space of four 
miles between Grant's left and the river, 



— 118 — 



through which Gen. rEMBERTOX might have 
escaped, or have debouched upon Graft's 
left, while the army, yet unintrenched, was 
80 extended in a rough region that mutual 
support of its several corps was impracticable. 
But Gen. Pemberton's experience had sub- 
dued his spirit. Besides, from the beginning 
he had resolved on a defensive course. His 
movement to attack Grant's rear at Dillon's, 
was b'ecause of Johnsto^j's urgency, and 
against his own views. And now, when 
Johnston took the military ground that the 
place was of little consequence, and that he 
should let that go and save the army, Pem- 
herton took the opposite view that the place 
was the essential thing. In this he coincided 
with the ideas of Grant, Halleck, Lincoln, 
and Stanton. 

The army was poorly eiiuipped for a siege 
of such immense labor. It was much worn 
by the hardships and privations of the march, 
and had suffered heavily by battles and sick- 
ness, liarge re-enforcements were needed to 
invest the place, and to fortify their own lines 
against sorties. Generals Hurlbut and Pren- 
tiss were ordered to strip Grant's department 
to send forward '"every available man that 
could possibly be spared." And now Gen. 
(Jrant, whose great strategy in marching 
away from Vicksburg and Pemberton's army 
to Jackson was to finally extinguish all inter- 
ference from the east, began to sound the 
alarm that Johnston was threatening him in 
the rear, which he kept up to the end of the 
siege. 

Admiral Porter sent "a brigade of am- 
phibious and useful troops at his disposal, 
known as the Marine Brigade, to deliark at 
Haine's Bluflf, and hold the place until re- 
lieved by other forces." 

A division from Hurlbut, under Brig. (4en. 
Kimball arrived June 3. On the 8th Brig. 
Gen. SooY Smith arriyed witli a division, and 
was i>laccd at Haine's BluH'. Says Badkait: 

Herron's division [from the ",\rmy of the 
Frontier"], the strouge.st in the combined army, 
arrived from Schofield's command on the Uth of 
June; and by the wise prevision of the General in 
Chief two divisions of the ;)th Corps, under Major 
General Parke, were diverted from tlieir march to 
East Tennessee [from Biiruside's command], and iir- 
rived before Vicksoiirg on llic 14tii ul Uie same 
month. 

Tints, responsive to Grant's unceasing 
alarms, did Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln 



strip other departments, and cripple more 
important operations to increase Grant's 
army for the siege which had been his own 
tactical objective. 

Thus was the long wanted movement into 
East Tennessee — whose occupation now m co- 
operation with Rosecrans' Chattanooga cam- 
paign, -was of much greater military impor- 
tance than Vicksburg, suspended at a time 
when it was essential to the true military 
movement down the center of the Confed- 
eracy. And while thus contracting Grant's 
lines in the northern part of the Confederacy, 
and giving up important places to the enemy* 
possession, and suspending a co-operating 
movement which was essential to Rose- 
crans' campaign, in order to carry out a siege 
of a single place, Stanton treated all of 
Rosecrans' calls for troops and arms and cav- 
alry as excuses for delay, and at length de- 
clared that he would not give him another 
man, and ordered him peremptorily to march. 

So far was carried this policy of giving up 
all to make sure the taking of this place, that 
Gen. Banks was ordered to drop all and come 
to the help of Grant, which, had he done, 
would have lost the lower river and Louis- 
iana — a military possession of tenfold more 
importance than Vicksljurg. 

Gen. Lanman's division arrived on the 24tli 
of May, and was placed defensively' on the 
Hall's Ferry and Warrenton roads, south of 
the place. Herron's division arrived on the 
Uth of June, and took possession on the left. 
Then Lanman moved up, and to the right, 
connecting with McClerxand's left, "and for 
the first time the investment became com- 
plete." 

The plan of the siege was to w'ork up to the 
fortitications by meansof trenches and under- 
ground ajiproaches. into near positions, for 
another general assault; this from a line 
which Badeau says was twelve miles, and 
against a line of eight miles. Like 
the assaults, tlie besieging approaches were 
along the whole line, and the object of them 
another assault along the whole line. The 
mind can have but a faint conception of the 
immensity of the work of siege approaches 
against a line of fortifications of eight miles, 
in a region of singular diiriculties to the be- 
siegers, of which Gen. Grant wrote to Hal- 
leck: "The position is as strong by nature 
as can possibly be conceived of, aiul is strongly 
fortilied." 



119 — 



The l)esieging army is also heaieged. Ex- 
tended in a circuit to invest a place wnich is 
held by an array, it is exposed to sorties from 
tlie center; therefore it must be intrenched all 
along its line, and must be ever vigilant. 
Thus the besieging army has double labor, 
intrenching itself and trenching upon the 
]>laoe. The trench approaches have mostly to 
bo done by night. In general the conditions 
of such works are unhealthy, and the hard- 
ships great, but these were unexceptionally 
so in the ravines about Vicksburg, where the 
tiery heat of the sun by day, the damp- 
ness of the nights, the scarcity of water, and 
.the most irksome labor, told heavily on the 
health and spiritsof the Xorthern volunteers. 

They did not realize so vividly as Bai)e.\u 
the grandness of the strategy whose objective 
was Ii siege, and had made an exhaustive 
march on a circuit to achieve this consum- 
mation. Adam Bakeau airs a vocabulary of 
siege terms in describing the manner of the 
work, as if he hadJately learned them. The 
details (^f the work are not necessary to this 
historical review, which concedes all the mag- 
nitude of the labor which Badeau asserts, and 
also its uselessness, and, in a great degree, 
aindessness, save as a preparation for another 
general slaughter, which, hai)pily, was saved 
by the shortening of Pembekton's supplies, 
and by his idea that he could get lietter terms 
by giving to Grant the theatrical coup of a 
surrender on the 4th of July. 

In these siege appi'oaches all along the line, 
the whole army was encamped in the near 
I'uvines, so as to be "as close to the enemy's 
works as shelter could be found; most of the 
camps were within 600 yards of the rebel 
parapet." This proximity made the fire of 
l)ickets and sharpshooters incessant. Roads 
had to be opened in the rear for supplying 
the several parts of the army, and inner 
roads and covered ways to connect the sev- 
eral camps. Timber had to lie cleared away 
for digging the approaches. In the list of 
mighty labors Badeatt mentions eighty-nine 
I latteries, not all in the first line, but ad- 
vanced frf)m time to time. He describes 
the conslructionof these as complete in detail, 
with all the technical terms thereunto be- 
longing. 

These batteries were connected by a line of 
riHe trench, which was advanced with them. 
These were constantly occupied by sharp- 
sliooters duringihe daylight, and by guards 



and advanced pickets during the night. Also, 
wherever an advanced cover for a man could 
be found a sharpshooter was placed. Alike 
for the style of the works and the style of tlie 
biographer, these specimens are quoted: 

The style of the work in the batteries was varied, 
depending on tlie maleriiil tliat coulrl be obtained 
at the time. In .some cases the lines were neatly 
revetted with gaoioiis and fascines, and finished 
with snbstantial plank platforms; while in others 
a revetting of rough boards or cotton bales^ was 
u.sed, and the pbitforms were made of timber from 
the nearest Kin house. 

The embrasures were sometimes revetted with 
cane, and sometimes lined with hides taken from 
beef cattle. ••■ ••■ ••' In all close batteries the gun- 
ners soon found the necessity of keeping the em- 
brasures closed against rifle balls by plank shut- 
ters, sometimes swinging from a limber across the 
top of the euibrasure, sometimes merely placed in 
the embrasure, and removed in tiling. In close ap- 
proaches the sap was generally revetted with 
gabions, empty barrels or cotton bales, but some- 
times left entirely unrevetted, for when the enemy's 
fire was heavy, it became difficult to prevent the 
working parties from sinking the sap as deep as five 
or even six feet, when, of course, revetting became 
unnecessary. 

Material for gabions was abundant, grapevines 
benig chiefly used, though ttiis made the gabions 
inconveniently lieavy, the vines being too large! 
Cane was also used for wattling, the joints being 
crushed with Wooden mallets, and the rest of the 
cane split and interwoven between the stakes of the 
gabion. The caue made excellent fascines, and 
was frequently used in this way. At first some 
difficulty was found in making saprollers which 
should be impervious to minie balls, and yet not 
too heavy to use on the rougli ground over which 
the sap must run. Two barrels, however, were 
placed head to head, and the saproller was then 
built of cane fascines, wound around this hollow 
core. . 

This extract from nnich. of the same sort 
shall suffice to show the elaborate details of 
the siege works, and the author's aptitude 
with the terms. Tlicse were the lighter parts; 
the main work was the digging. Thus did all 
these labors and the daily game of single kill- 
ing go on along this line of twelve miles. At first 
the Confederates opposed the works witli ar- 
tillery; butsoon they ceased, partly to husband 
their ammunition, and partly because famil- 
iarity gave them an idea that there was no 
present danger from the approaches. After a 
time the opposition by musketry tire slack- 
ened, the besieged having a short supply of 
percussion caps. Says Baoeai": 



120 



The aim of the rebels seemed to be to await an- 
other assault, losing in the meantime as few men 
as possible. This indi (Terence to Grant's approach 
became, at some points, almost ludicrous. The be- 
siegers were accustomed to cover the front of their 
night working parties by a line of picliels, or by a 
covering party, and while these were not closer 
than a hundred yards, the enemy would throw out 
his picliets in front. At one point the rebel pickets 
entered into a regular agreement with those of the 
besiegers not to Hre on each other at night, and as 
most of the work in a siege is done at night, this 
arrangement was eminently satisfactory to the 
working parties. •*. 

On one occasion the picket officer was directed to 
crowd his pickets on the enemy's, ;0 as to allow the 
working party to push on another parallel. In 
doing this the two lines of pickets became inter- 
mixed, and, after some discussion, the opposing 
officers arranged their lines by mutual corapromise, 
the pickets in places not being ten yards apart, and 
in full view of each other. 

This gives the Confederate soldiers' idea of 
tlie danger of Grant's siege approaches. Nor 
is there anything to show that tliey under- 
rated it, or had any reason to fear the result 
ol another general assault from these nearer 
lines. 

Thus was the army expended in this dread- 
ful work along a line of twelve miles, in a 
burning sun by day and in the damps of the 
ravines by night, in the most uphealthy con- 
ditions, and in the most dispiriting labors 
that can be imposed on gallant soldiers; all 
, of which, save the intrenching of themselves, 
were to be useless, and all of which were for 
an ultimate aim which would be another vain 
.slaughter. Save that the besieged army may 
he short of provisions, its hardships are less 
than of the besiegers. Its intrenching is 
mostly done. Its line of fortifications occu- 
pies the high ground ; and its holding of them 
is in a less unhealthy situation than that of 
the besiegers. 

The following description of the condition 
of the besieged, .save the nuitter of food, and 
save that the labor of the besiegers was vastly 
greater, needs but little modification to de- 
scribe that of the devoted volunteers of 
GR.VNx'sarmy : 

The privations and exposures of the men were 
telling on their health and spirits. The miasmatic 
e.xhalations of the swamps, rising through the hot 
atmosphere of June, envelopea and penetrated 
their weary frames, exhausted by the long series of 
disastrous marches and ince.ssant bivouacs. '•' '•'' '' 
Their numbers were reduced by casualties, but far 
more by disease. Thousands were tossing and 



groaning in the hospitals, with none of the deli- 
cacies and little of the attention that the sick re- 
quire [The women of Vicksburg did not neglect 
the sick soldiers]; while those in the trenches were 
hardly better otf. 

Scorched by the sun, drenched by the rain, be- 
grimed with dirt, for water was far off, and time 
more precious still, " '■' * those weary, but 
heroic, rebels defended the citadel whose fall they 
believed would be tne fall of the Confederacy. 
Those vvho fought them the hardest could not, .tnd 
did not, fail to recognize their splendid gallantry 
and thorough devotion to an unrighteous cause. 

That this description is alike applicable to 
Grant' .s better fed, but more severely worked 
and more unhealthily situated army, is oh-, 
vious from the inevitable couditions, and is 
further shown by Gen. Grant's statement to 
Gen. Halleck, even after the army had been 
inspirited by the capture of Yicksburg, ' that 
it was now greatly exhausted, and "entirely 
unhtfor any duty requiringmucii marching.'' 



CHAPTER XLVI. 

oen. grant's alarm for his rear — to give t'P 

LOUISIANA FOR VICKSBURG — THE MIGHTY WORKS 
OF PICKAX AND SPADE — GEN. .IOHNSTON'S IN- 
ability — immobility of his subordinates 
— grant's objective strictly local. 

Gen. Grant's strategic march away from 
Yicksl)urg and the Confederate army, to 
scatter any gathering forces on the east, so 
that he might have Pemberton's army '"iso- 
lated from the would be Confecieracy," had 
entirely failed in its purpose, as has been 
seen; for according to Badeau not only did 
the fear of Johnston in his rear constrain him 
to sacrifice his army in a vain assault ou the 
Yicksburg intrenchnients, but he was in con- 
tinual apprehension of this, and was not at 
any time re-enforced enoitgh to quiet his un- 
easiness. 

On the 25th he wrote Gen. Rank.s, asking 
hira to come and help take Yicksburg. On 
the 31st he wrote Halleck this alarming 
statement: 

It is now certain that .Tohnston has already col- 
lected a force from 20,000 to 25,000 strong at Jack- 
son an<l Canton, find is usuig every effort to in- 
crease it to 40.000. With this he will undoubtedly 
attack Haine's Bluff, and compel me to abandon 
the investment of the city, if not re-enforced belorw 
he can get here. 



— 121 — 



On the same day be received a letter from 
Banks asking for 10,000 men to help him take 
Port Hudson, to which he answered that with 
this number, or even half so many taken 
away: "I should be crippled beyond redemp- 
tion." 

Halleck telegrajibed June 2: 

Yours of the 24111 is received. I will do all I can 
to assist you. I have sent dispatch after dispatch 
to Baulcs to join you. Why he does not I do not 
understand. His separate operating on Port Hud- 
son is in direct violation of his instructions. If 
possible send him this dispatch. My last dispatch 
from him was May 4. 

Banks had invested Port Hudson, whose 
possession was as important to the possession 
of the Mississippi River as Vicksburg, to say 
nothing of all Louisiana, which this order 
virtually required him to abandon. Itaj^pears 
fortunate that communication with B.\nks 
was so remarkabl}^ infrequent. Grant, how- 
ever, sent him Hai.leck's dispatch. 

Another instance of the alarm which 
Grant's fears of Johnston created at Wash- 
ington, and of the jolted state of the heads 
there, is shown in Lin'coln's telegram to Grant, 
as follows: 

WASms-GTON, D. C, 6:30 P. M., June 2, 1863. 
Are you in communication with Gen. Banks? 
Is he coming toward you, or going further off? Is 
there or has there beeu anything to hinder his 
coming (Jirectly to you by water ? 

In fact there had been nothing to hinder, 
save that even the armed ships could not pass 
the guns at Port Hudson, and that to come 
was to abandon Louisiana. June 3 Grant 
telegraphed this: "Johnston is still collect- 
ing troops at Canton and Jackson. Some are 
coming over the railroad, and all the country 
is joining his standard." 

June 8, Grant dispatched to Halleck. "It 
is rejiorted that three divisions have left 
Bragg's army to join Johnston. Breckin- 
ridge is known to have arrived." Gen. J. E. 
Johnston's narrative shows that Breckin- 
ridge's division and 2,000 cavalry were all 
that he received from Bragg's Army of the 
Tennessee, making 8,400, or 7,939 "effective." 
His report shows that his force during the 
siege was not raised beyond about 24,000 men, 
and these greatly crippled by the want of 
transportation. In Johnston's report is a note- 
worthy statement of the time prior to his com- 
ing to Pemberton's help, and to Gen. Grant's 



emerging from the swamps west of the Mis- 
sissippi. He states that from the time of his 
arrival at Tullahoma "until the 14th of April 
Gen. Pemberton's reports, all by telegraph, 
indicated that the efforts of the enemy would 
be against Gen. Bragg rather than himself, 
and looked to the abandonment of his at- 
emptsat Vicksburg." 

Johnston cites this from Pemberton: "I 
am satisfied Rosecrans will be re-enforced 
from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to 
Tullahoma." His report shows also that he 
decided, as he telegraphed the Secretary of 
War: "To take from Bragg a force which 
would make this array tit to oppose Grant, 
would involve yielding Tennessee." For 
himself he decided that Bragg's holding of 
Tennessee against Rosecrans was more im- 
portant tlian to raise the siege of Vicksburg, 
but in reply to the urgency of the War De- 
partment, he threw on it the responsibility 
of reversing this judgment. He said in a 
telegram of June 12: "It is for the govern- 
ment to decide between this State and Ten- 
nessee." 

This gives the relative importance which 
Gen. J, E. Johnston placed on Vicksburg, 
and on the line then threatened by Gen. 
Rosecrans. It shows, also, the important 
part which Rosecrans' position and attitude 
exercised on the Vicksburg operation. 
Xeither Grant nor ttie Washington authori- 
ties appreciated these military elements. 

To prevent Johnston's approach from the 
east, expeditions were sent as far as Big Black 
River to destroy all bridges, and everything 
that could be of use to an army. Gen. Blair, 
with 12,000 men, was sent up the Yazoo. The 
expedition "moved along the Yazoo about 
forty-tive miles," destroying on its return "all 
stock, forage, roads, and bridges," thus "pre- 
venting Johnston from moving upon Vicks- 
burg in that direction, and from drawing 
supplies from the region between the two 
rivers." 

On Blair's return another force was sent 
up to watch the crossings of the Big Black 
River from Bridgeport, and complete the de- 
vastating of the country. Grant's order said: 
"It is important that the country be left so 
that it can not subsist an army in passing 
over it. Wagons, horses, and mules should 
be taken from the citizens, to keep them from 
being used for the Southern army." Grant 
dispatched to Halleck "I will make a 



122 — 



•waste of all the coxintrj' I enn betwoen the 
two rivers." 

Trouble now began on the west side of the 
Mississippi, where Grant still had a base of 
supplies at Milliken's Bend, and a post at 
Richnaond, and where he had to keep forces 
to prevent the Confederates from re-enforc- 
ing and supplying Vicksburg from that side. 

On the 7th of June a Confederate force, 
which Badeau states as 3,000, attacked Milli- 
ken's Bend, which "was successfully de- 
fended by black and white troops under Brig. 
Gen. Dennis, ably assisted by the gunboats 
Choctaw and Lexington." Grant re-enforced 
Dennis with a brigade, with orders to drive 
the enemy beyond Richmond. A subsequent 
dispatch from Grant to Halleck, dated June 
27, disclosed an attempt of military philan- 
thropy to the colored people, which was dis- 
astrous to them. It contained this pregnant 
mention: "I may have to abandon protection 
of the leased plantations from here to Lake 
Providence, to resist a threatened attack from 
KiRBY Smith's forces." 

The reader can take in the full purport of 
this. The plantations which the owners had 
abandoned bad been leased to the colored 
people as if they were secure in the protection 
of the army. These were now left to the ten- 
der mercies of their masters, aided by Con- 
federate troops. Yet, after this experience, 
Gen. Sherman repeated the same cruel be- 
nevolence on the Savannah River. 

Apprehensive that he might be forced to 
raise the siege, Gen. Grant prepared Haine's 
Bluff as a place from which, as Badeau says, 
the National forces "could still concentrate 
for a new effort either against the city or its 
means of supply. The orders were to fortify 
ii so that it could be held against a sudden 
movement by 10,000 men, and be capable of 
giving protection to at least 40,000.'* 

This fortification required a line of several 
miles of rifle trench, and tive batteries on 
commanding points. Grant informed Sher- 
man on the 11th that if Haine's Blutf should 
be besieged, "you will be detached tempo- 
rarily from your command here to take com- 
mand of Haine's Bluff." This contemplated 
the singular predicament of besieging Vicks- 
burg, and besieged at Haine's Blulf. 

On the same day Grant said: "It is evident the 
enemy have brought large re-enforcements from 
Bragg's army, and I can not think it is with any 
other design than to raise the siege of Vicksburg." 



He had now 10,000 or 12,000 men at Haine's BlufiT. 
but ordered both McPherson and Sherman to hold 
part of their forces in readiness, In case that place 
should be besieged. 

He also gave "detailed instructions" to 
McClernand to govern him in such an emer- 
gency. "On the 22d positive information was 
received that Johnston was crossing the Big 
Black River, and intended marching imme- 
diately on Grant." Gen. Grant thereupon 
formed an army of the rear from the several 
corps, which amounted to nearly half of Gen. 
Grant's army, and placed Sherman ip com- 
mand. But this was not enough, and this 
army of the rear was set at work in a like 
colossal labor to fortify a line to the Big 
Black River, which is ten miles from Vicks- 
burg. Says Badeau: "A line of works was 
now constructed from the Yazoo to the Big 
Black River, quite as strong as those which 
defended Vicksburg, so that the city was not 
only circumvallated, but countervallated, as 
well." 

A circumvallating line of intrenchments of 
twelve miles, pushing its approaches along 
the whole line by trench and sap and mine 
and new batteries, constructed with all of Ba- 
DEAu's vocabulary of technical terms! A 
"countervallating" line of fortifications of 
several miles at Haine's Bluff! Another 
countervallating line of intrenchments of 
ten miles to Big Black River, "quite as strong 
as those which defended Vicksburg." Thus 
merrily went the pickax and the spade, in the 
work of the siege which had been the ob- 
jective, and in the fear of Johnston, who in 
the first instance was to be finally disabled 
from interfering with Vicksburg by Grant's 
preparatory march to Jackson. 

Still was Grant in a state of alarm. Says 
Badeau : 

Grant's position, however, was at this time 
peculiar, if not precarious. He was again between 
two large rebel armies; besieging one, he was him- 
self threatened with a siege by the other; while if 
both combined to assault him from different sides, 
it seemed quite possible that the garrison of Vick- 
burg, that splendid prize for which he had been so 
long struggling, might even yet elude his grasp. 

Meanwhile what was Johnston doing? The 
forces which had been divided at Jackson had 
been united; also Loring's division, by the 
23d of May. By the 4th of June Breckin- 
ridge's division and some other troops had 
arrived, raising his force, according to his 



— 123 — 



report, to "about 24,000 infantry and artil- 
lery and 2,000 cavalry," this force "deficient 
in artillery, in ammunition for all arms, and 
field transportation." "The draft upon the 
country had so far reduced the number of 
liorses and mules that it was not until late in 
June that draft animals could be procured." 

Johnston, Bragg, and the Confederate Gov- 
ernment decided that to take troops from 
Bragg, in the then attitude of Roseckans, 
would be to yield up Tennessee. The Con- 
federacy had not the forces in any other 
quarter to re-enforce Johnston to cope with 
such an army as Grant now had. To 
strengthen his army to rescue Pemberton, 
Johnston sent orders to Gen. Gardner to 
evacuate Port Hudson and join him, but this 
was not obeyed. On the 23d he received a 
dispatch of the 21st from Gardner, that he 
was threatened by the movement of Banks, 
and asking re-enforcements. Thereupon John- 
ston repeated his orders for the evacuation, 
saying: "You can not be re-enforced. Do not 
allow yourself to be invested. At every risk 
save the troops, and, if practicable, move in 
this direction." This dispatch did not reach 
Gardner, Port Hudson being now invested. 

When Gen. Pemberton had been compelled 
to fall back to Big Black River Bridge, he in- 
formed Johnston of his disaster and of his 
apprehension that he would be compelled to 
fall back still, and that if so, his position at 
Snyder's Mills (Haine's Bluff) would be un- 
tenable. He added: "I have about sixty 
days' provisions at Vicksburg and Snyder's. 
I respectfully await your instructions." 
Johnston replied on the same day, the 17th: 

If Haine's Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no 
vahie, and can not be held. If, therefore, you are 
invested in Vicksburg you must ultimately surren- 
der. Under such circumstances, instead of losing 
bfith troops and place, you must, if possible, save 
the troops. If it is not loo late, evacuate Vicksburg 
and its depeudencies and march to the northeast. 

Tliis was military judgment as to the value 
of VicksbuT^, and prescience as to the result. 
THut Gen. Pemberton took a different view of 
the value of Vicksburg. and he had already 
retired with its lines when he received this 
order, which he says came to him about noon 
of the 18th, while engaged with several gen- 
eral officers in an inspection of the intrench- 
nients, and that at the saiue moment the en- 
fj my was reported to be advancing by the 



Jackson road. But of the propriety of this 
order he says: 

The evacuation of Vicksburg! It meant the loss 
of the valuable stores and munitions of war col- 
lected for its defense, the fall of Port Hudson, the 
surrender of the Mississippi River, and the sever- 
ance of the Confederacy. 

Pollard says that Pemberton had confi- 
dential instructions from President Davis, 
upon which he disobeyed Johnston's order, 
Pemberton continues, in his report: 

I believed it in my power to hold Vicksburg. I 
knew and appreciated the earnest desire of the 
government and people that it should be held. 
■;< ^v .;•. j^g long ago as the 17th of February last, in 
a letter addressed to his Excellency, the President, 
I had suggested the possibility of the investment 
of Vicksburg by land and water, and for that reason 
the necessity of ample supplies of ammunition, as 
well as of subsistence, to stand a siege. My apolica- 
tion met his favorable consideration, and additional 
ammunition was ordered. 

Thus had Gen. Pemberton decided before- 
hand that it would be better to risk his army, 
invested in the place, on the chance of 
the siege being raised from without, than 
to let go the place and save his army. 
Pemberton wrote Johnston on the 18th, that 
he had laid his instructions before a council 
of war of all his general officers, and that 
"the opinion was unanimously expressed that 
it was impossible to withdraw the army from 
this position with such morale and ma- 
terial as to be of further service to the Con- 
federacy." 

Thus were Gen. Johnston and his be- 
leaguered subordinates playing at cross pur- 
poses, he holding that the interior was the great 
objective, and the army more important than 
places, and striving to concentrate that; they 
holding that places were the vital part, and 
permitting themselves to be shut up in them, 
and so losing both the army and the places, 
and laying open the interior. In this they 
seemed to think themselves supported by a 
power higher than Gen. Johnston. From the 
time when Gen. Pemberton retreated into 
Vicksburg, and announced his decision to 
stay until the siege should be raised from 
without, and Gen. Johnston's order to Gen. 
Gardner to evacuate Port Hudson, found 
him invested by Gen. Banks, Johnston's ex- 
pectation did not rise higher than a move- 
rnei]t against the besieging army at Viclss 



124 — 



burg, co-operative with one by Pemberton to 
fight his way out. But his correspond- 
ence with Pemberton was uncertain, and that 
commander does not appear to have had any 
positive idea of co-operating in such an 
attempt. The decision which he and his 
Generals made on the 18th, that it was im- 
possible to withdraw the army from Vicks- 
burg with such morale and material as to be 
of further service to the Confederacy, had 
much more reason now that the place was in- 
vested. 

The action of Pemberton and Gardner 
made Johnston's relief of either Vicksburg or 
Port Hudson impracticable at the beginning, 
and the arriving additions to Grant's army 
made it more hopeless as time went on. In 
no other way than by moving Bragg's army 
in mass could the Confederacy make John- 
ston strong enough to raise the siege of Vicks- 
burg. As to an attempt to relieve Port Hud- 
son, Johnston's report says: 

The want of field transportation rendered any 
movement for the relief of Port Hudson impossible, 
had a march in that direction been advisable. But 
such a march would have enabled Grant (who had 
now completed his strong lines around Vicksburg) 
to have cut my line of communication and de- 
stroyed my army, and from the moment that I put 
my troops in motion in that direction the whole of 
Middle and North Mississippi would have been 
open to the enemy. 

In this, as in the rest of Gen. John.ston's 
reports, it will be observed that he took a 
radically different view of the objective and 
scope of Gen. Grant's operation from that 
taken by Grant. Johnston supposed that 
Grant's objective was to take and occupy 
Mississippi, and that his taking of Vicksburg 
was only as a means to that end. Hence he 
spoke of it from the beginning as an opera- 
tion which embraced the State. This idea 
governed his dispositions of his troops when 
Grant took Jaclcson. His military mind 
could not comprehend that all this mighty 
operation had no aim beyond the place of 
Vicksburg, and that it intended nothing in 
the interior but devastating raids. He re- 
sisted the pressure from the Richmond gov- 
ernment, to sacrifice his little army in a 
desperate attempt to save Vicksburg, because 
he regarded the interior as of more import- 
ance; and because, as a military man, he sup- 
posed that the interior was the real objective 
of the Vicksburg campaign. 



CHAPTER XLVII. 

development of the grand strategy of the 

situation — SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR GRANT's 
alarm for his rear — WHAT PROTECTED HIM 
FROM DESTRUCTION BY BRAGG's ARMY — WH.iT 
MIGHT HAVE BEEN IF THE WAR HAD A PLAN — 
THE END OF GEN. m'CLERNAND — A HAPPY 
DELIVERANCE. * 

Gen. Grant's authorized biographer states 
that when he began the work of the siege, 
after the second assault, he "had now about 
40,000 men for duty." Tliis means the num- 
ber present for duty, which is in general 
much less than the number on the muster 
rolls. 

Additional forces continued to arrive. 
Badeau mentions 21,000 from Grant's de- 
partment; "Herron's division, the strongest 
in the combined army, from Schofield's com- 
mand," and two divisions of the 9th Corps, 
''diverted from their march to East Tennes- 
see." By this time, says Badeau, "Grant's 
force amounted to about 75,000 men;" but all 
these corps, added to 40,000 effectives, must 
have made considerably more than this num- 
ber. Gen. J. E. Johnston's report gave 24,000 
infantry and 2,000 cavalry as his whole force 
after he had received^ all the troops that it 
was thought prudent to draw from Bragg's 
army. Gen. Pemberton, after he had retired 
within the Vicksburg lines, stated to Gen. 
Johnston that his whole efiective force for 
manning the lines was 18,500. 

It appears that Grant's effective force was 
at any time as great as that of Johnston and 
Pemberton combined. His situation must 
have been very faulty if their separation by 
his army made them more dangerous. By 
the middle of June Grant's force was t^tice 
as great as that of both Johnston and Pem- 
berton. Yet his alarm for his rear did not 
cease, nor the dreadful labor which this im- 
posed on the troops, in fortifying for defense, 
and in pushing forward sap, mine, trench, 
and batteries preparatory to another assault 
along the whole line. 

This alarm was not without sufficient rea- 
son, and the reason exhibits the false mili- 
tary position into which Grant had brought 
his army, by abandoning the interior, and 
taking his army around to the edge, where it 
was isolated from all other operations; 
where, instead of co-operating, it demanded 
that other operations be suspended or crippled 



— 125 — 



to help him besiege a .single side place; where 
it gave up to the Confederacy all the com- 
munications and resources of the interior, 
and all the advantage of uniting tliese armies 
to fall upon him wiiile thus held indefinite- 
ly at bay. 

The hideous humor of the conduct of the 
war, and of the relative value placed on 
military operations, and of the history made 
at that time, has a broad illustration in the 
circumstances that Grant had succeeded by 
what was thought a most brilliant movement 
in placing his army in an isolated position, 
where he saw that if Bragg should come it 
would be routed; that Gen. Rosecrans' posi- 
tion, which he held against the urgency of 
(trant, Halleck, and Stanton, was that 
which saved Grant's operation from failure, 
and enabled him to capture Vicksburg, and 
so become the aiitocrat of the army. 

All this is clearly shown by Grant's inces- 
sant alarm because of Bracjg's army, and by 
Gen. J. E. Johnston's statement that the atti- 
tude of Gen. Rosecrans was tliat which pre- 
vented the Confederate chieftains from draw- 
ing forces from Bkagg's army, to raise the 
siege of Vicksburg. All this proves the mili- 
tary discernment of Gen. Rosecrans, who re- 
sisted, when Grant and Halleck and Stan- 
ton, in their panic, wanted to push him for- 
ward unprepared, in order to relieve Grant. 
He showed that it would risk both armies, 
and this is evident. Outside of Vicksburg 
were forces which if united would greatly 
outnumber his. If he liad pushed forward 
and met a reverse, the united Confederate 
Army could then turn and crush Grant. 

But while he had not a force large enough 
for an advance, the Confederates thought his 
advance imminent. Tiius secure in his tlireat- 
ening position he held Bragg's army, and 
thereby delivered Grant from a perilous situa- 
tion, and enabled him to end a destructive 
campaign in the siege and capture of a place 
which was magnified to the making of his 
military and political fortunes. 

But Gen. Grant's military vision was 
focused on a side place. In his single idea 
that all should be concentrated on that, he 
could not perceive that Gen. Rosecrans was 
protecting him from Br\gg's army. His con- 
sciousness of the isolated and faulty situation 
to which he had brought his army by leaving 
tbe interior, to head off McClernand, allowed 
no cessation to his fear of Bragg and .John- 



ston, to his calls for help, and his defensive 
works. Starvation was doing the work foi 
him, but because of this alarm from th( 
interior he thought he could not wait for this 
and he was intending another assault fron 
the whole line, under conditions which mad( 
success no more probable than before. 

This Confederate recognition of the lini 
which was vital to the Confederacy, and o 
the importance of the position and objectivi 
of Gen. Rosecrans, gives an idea of wha 
might have been had Gen. Grant beei 
in the interior, where his army wai- 
supporting or co-operative to Rosk 
CRANs' campaign. From the 130,000 men ii 
Grant's department in the fall of 18G2 h 
could have formed an army greater than th 
Confederacy could combine in the West. Th 
government could easily have given Ro.sp 
crans another adequate army, and the t\v 
could have made a campaign to the gul; 
Such a campaign down the interior woul 
have made Vicksburg untenalilc and of n 
consequence. 

What a wonderful course of cross purpose 
was that which made the several operation 
in the several departments as if they wei 
antagonistic: as if the objective were not s 
much success as to prevent another depar 
ment commander from succeeding; whic 
permitted Gen. Grant, in a departraer 
which had 1.30,000 men, to withdraw his arm 
from a line to the heart of the Confederacj 
and from all support and co-operation wit 
any other military operation, and to isolat 
and neutralize it down the Mississipp 
crippling all other operations in the West fr 
a year, making the conditions which brough 
disaster to another isolated army, cor 
suming an incredible number of volui 
teers, giving up territory, places, and con 
munications in Tennessee which had bee 
the objective of a previous year's campaigi 
and achieving nothing of any decisive effe( 
in ending the war! 

This was the way that a million and a ha 
of men had to be called out to put dow 
the rebellion, which would have yielded i 
decisive evidences of military superiorit; 
-This was the way that the country was sul 
jected to the consumption and devastation ( 
civil war for four years, when such numbei 
and such troops, if the conduct of the wr 
had been directed by a comprehensive plar 
could have ended it in 1862. This was th 



126 — 



■way that patriotic volunteers, the most gal- 
lant soldiers the world ever saw. who were 
pushed into incessanthardships and slaughter, 
as if they were of no value, were robbed of 
the glory which they so dearly earne4, bj' 
military incompetency, not in their imme- 
diate officers, but in the great chiefs, who 
assumed to know all of the art of war, but 
whose ideas of its general conduct could rise 
no higher than detached departments and de- 
vastating raids or disjointed campaigns upon 
local places. 

During the dreadful work of the siege, to wit, 
on the 18th of June, the ax which Gen. Grant 
had held suspended over the neck of McCler- 
NAND, by warrant of Secretary Stanton's tele- 
gram of May 6, was let fall, and Grant re- 
moved him from the command of the 13th 
Corps, and appointed Gen. Ord in his place. 
Thus was Grant's principal objective of the 
Vicksburg campaign at last acliieved. The 
attentive reader will remember that while 
Grant was at Hankinson's Ferry, he received 
through Mr. Charles A. Dana, Assistant Sec- 
retary of War for observation in the field, a 
cipher telegram authorizing him to remove 
any officer who stood in his way, and the 
reader will readily comprehend that this re-" 
markable plenary authority did not come 
without much intriguing of Gen. Grant 
against McClernand. 

The time, however, was inopportune. Mc- 
Clernand's corps had just made a most 
arduous march from Milliken's Bend to Hard 
Times, scattering the Confederate detach- 
ments, and building a road for the rest of the 
army; had then made the forced march to 
Port Gibson, and beaten the enemy, which 
secured the success of the Vicksburg opera- 
tion. As it was Grant's first success since 
Donelson, and as it would not be easy to 
keep McClernand's name from going to the 
country with it — although Grant never men- 
tioned it — the news of his removal from com- 
mand would not seem to the country a fitting 
accompaniment. 

But as the campaign went on the conditions 
grew more unfitting. Badeau relates that 
Grant designedly shifted the army round so 
as to put McClernand from the right to the 
left while McPherson and Sherman moved on 
.Tackson, but this brought McClernand to the 
front, when the two tramps informed Grant 
that Gen. Pemberton had crossed the Big 
Black and was coming to attack hini, Tn 



this way one of McClernand's divisions came 
first to Champion's Hill, and although Grant 
sent it to the slaughter as if that were his ob- 
jective, it gained a victory. Tlien, through 
Grant's wonderful luck, McClernand's corps 
came upon the enemy's strong position at 
Big Black River bridge and carried it by 
storm, which was the most brilliant action of 
the whole campaign. 

By another stroke of Grant's wonderful 
luck, McClernand's troops alone made a 
lodgment in the Vicksburg fortifications in 
the assault of the 22d, and the intelligence 
of their partial success so alarmed Grant 
that he rode off" to the other end of the line. 
All this kept putting the opportunity for re- 
moving him further away; but at last Mc- 
Clernand made it with his pen — another ex- 
ample that, in the hand of a great General, 
the pen can do that which the sword has 
failed to do. McClernand issued a congratu- 
latory address to his command, recounting 
its deeds in the Bonaparte style, and this was 
printed in some newspapers in the North. 

Badeau narrates the affair with great 
solemnity, and it was conducted with the 
solemnity and form of a rehearsed plan. He 
says. 

On the 17th of June Gram reoeived formal and of- 
ficial communications from both Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson, couched in the strongest and most indig- 
nant language, and complaining of a congratulatory 
order issued by McClernand to his corps on the 30th 
of May. 

The address was in the Bonapartish style 
which military men in general affect, but it 
did not in fact overstate the doings of the 
corps. As a wliole these had been distin- 
guished. 

Gen. Sherman's letter alleged that the pub- 
lication of this address was a violation of the 
order which forbids the publication of all 
official letters and reports. The particularly 
offensive part is in the following: 

On the ■22d, in pursuance of the order of the Com- 
mander of the department, you assaulted the 
enemy's defenses in front at 10 o'clock a. m., and 
within thirty minutes had made a lodgment and 
planted your colors upon two of his bastion.". This 
partial success called into exercise the highest hero- 
ism, and was only gained by a bloody and protracted 
.struggle. Yet it was gaintd. and was tlie first and 
largest success achieved anywhere along the whole 
line of our army. 

For nearly eight hours, under a seoiching sun 
ftud defstj'ucljve fire, you firmly held your footing, 



— 127 — 



ft,nd only withdrew when the enemy had largely 
massed their forces and concentrated their attack 
upon you. How and why the general assault 
failed, it would be useless now to explain. The 13th 
Army Corps, ackiiowledgius; the good intention of 
all, would scorn indulgence in weak regrets and 
idle recriminatious. According justice to all, it 
would only defend itself. 

If, while the enemy was massing to crush it, as- 
sistance was asked for by a diversion at other points, 
or by re-enforcement, it ouly asked what in one 
case Gen. Grant had specitically and peremptorily 
ordered: namely, simultaneous and persistent at- 
tacks all along our lines until the enemy's outer 
works should be carried; and what, in the other, 
by massing a strong force upon a weakened point, 
would have probably insured success. 

This was too much; yet the reflection was 
not on Sherman and McPherson and their 
tro:)ps, but on the Commanding General. It 
even arraigned the ordering of the assault. 
Perhaps Gen. McClernand expected that this 
would finish his command. Perhaps he 
thought, inasmuch as his corps had been the 
advance in most of the labors, marches, and 
battles since leaving Milliken's Bend, and had 
not been mentioned in Grant's bulletins, save 
to deny to it any credit in this assault, and to 
charge most of the slaughter on him, while 
Grant was incessantly making charges against 
him in an underhand way to Halleck, that 
he would now have his say for once, and get 
it before the country, whatever the conse- 
quences. Who can deny that in fair play 
something was due to himself, and still more 
to the soldiers of his command, who were 
put under the ban of the Commanding Gen- 
eral because he and his army circle were 
resolved to break down McClernand? 

The letters of Sherman and McPherson 
were very indignant, and showed much per- 
sonal hostility to McClernand, but their in- 
dignation was not pertinent to the real 
offense, which was to Grant rather than to 
them. Badeau relates that Grant sent to 
McClernand a peremptory demand for a copy 
of the congratulatory order, and thereupon 
removed him from command, stating this to 
Halleck as the cause, and adding: "I should 
have relieved him long since for general un- 
fitness for his position." Thus was the army 
relieved of an internal conflict which occu- 
pied Grant's mind rather more than the 
Confederate enemy. Thus were the other two 
corps relieved from the bad example of the 
presence of a ranking commander of an army 



corps who was not of the Military Institute. 

The reviewer can shed no tears over the 
removal of Gen. McClernand. It was neces- 
sary that he should go. His rank placed his 
troops under a cloud, which their successes 
only darkened. Notwithstanding his good 
fortune in action, in all this operation, be- 
ginning at Arkansas Post, the general result 
of his appointment to a high command had 
been unfortunate. His river expedition had 
demoralized Gen. Grant in a campaign in 
the interior, and had drawn him from the 
true military line to the disastrous river op- 
eration, to prevent McClernand. A cam- 
paign was sacrificed in order to beat him. and 
the consequence was the consumption of a 
great army in the Mississippi swamps, and 
an operation which was the inversion of all 
military rules, which made Vicksburg at last 
a barren victory. 

One of his divisions had fallen by separa- 
tion under the immediate command of Gen. 
Grant at Champion's Hill, and he had seen 
what came of it. In Gen. Grant's bulletins 
no credit could be gained by McClernand's 
troops while he was in command. His re- 
moval was therefore a military necessity; the 
successes of his corps, in which it had been 
singularly fortunate, made the necessity 
only the more imperative. 



CHAPTER XLVIII. 

continuation of the siege — THE ART OF 
SIEGE MIN[NG — THE DEATH HOLE — TACTICS OF 
BUTCHERY — THE ART OF WAR TO LOSE THE 
MOST MEN — THE DREADFUL BOMBARDMENT — 
STARVATION — THWARTED EXPEDITION TO RE- 
LIEVE VICKSBURG FROM THE WEST SIDE — 
JOHNSTON AT LAST GETS READY TO MOVE — THE 
END AT HAND. 

By the 30tb of June 220 guns were in posi- 
tion against the Vicksburg fortifications. 
These, however, were nearly all field guns, 
and the elfect of tfieir fire on the intrench- 
ments by day was quickly repaired by night. 
One battery of heavy guns on the right was 
furnished and manned by the navy. 

In McClernand"s corps was a battery of six 
30-pounder Parrott guns. An attempt was 
made to put in battery the guns of the sunk- 
en gunboat Cincinnati, near the river above 
the town, when "it was hoped that the town 
might be reached from this point and much 



— 128 — 



damage done," but although much digging 
was done to prepare this battery, the want of 
sling-carts to transport the guns through the 
bottom delayed its completion until the 
capitulation. The Confederate forces made 
but little use of their artillery to resist the 
siege approaches, and the musketry "was 
sparingly used in comparison with that of 
the besiegers." "The aim of the rebels 
seemed to be to await another assault, losing 
in the meantime as few men as possible. 
This indifference to Grant's approach be- 
came at some points almost ludicrous." 

The Confederates reckoned that they could 
repulse another assault as before, and that 
the raising of the siege from the outside, or 
starvation on the inside, would settle the 
affair befoi'e Cte.^nt's digging became danger- 
ous. Ammunition was not scarce with them, 
save percussion caps for muskets. Various 
devices were used to smuggle in these. But 
while little damage was done to the fortifica- 
tions or their defenders by the investing 
batteries, great damage was done to the town 
by the bombardment from mortar boats of 
tlie navy, which were made fast to the 
further side of the tongue of land opposite 
Vicksburg. These sent their shells into the 
niiddle of the city, driving the inhabitants to 
caves for shelter. Seven mortars were drop- 
ping their bombs into the populous part of the 
town day and iiight, to wliich were sub- 
sequently added heavy guns in position. 

On the 25th of June an extensive mine, on 
the Jackson road, in McPherson's front was 
fired. It extended thirty-five feet from the 
starting point, and branched into three, in 
all which 2,700 pounds of powder were placed ; 
this backed by cross timbers and sand bags. 
Gen. Gkaxt's tele^jram to Halleck gave this 
result: 

Yesterday a mine was sprung ander the enemy's 
most commanding fort, producing a crater suffi- 
cient to hold two regiments of infantry. Our men 
took immediate possession and still hold it. The 
fight for it has been incessant, and thus far we have 
not been able to establish batteries in the broach. 
Expect to succeed. 

This and Badeau's more detailed narrative 
give an idea of the aim of mining in this 
siege, from which it appears that the object was 
not to malve a practicable opening for assault 
and entering the place, but to make a crater, 
commanded by a high and unscalable bank 
on the enemy's side, into which to send our 



troops with a rush, to be butchered in a hud- 
dle, with no expectation of results, save to 
kill a few of the enemy in exchange for 
many. Says Badeau: 

The crater was cone shaped, and entirely ex- 
posed to field projectiles or loaded shells thrown 
by hand ; but McPherson's men rushed into this 
gulf, lighting and throwing grenades in return. 
The enemy, however, from his higher position, 
could throw ten shells to their one, and in nearly 
every case could see to direct them with deadly ef- 
fect; ir.deed, the rebels had only to lay the lighted 
missiles on the parapet and roll ihem down. 

No systematic attempt could be made to carry 
the enemy's work, or to take possession of his para- 
pet and run boyaux [trenches] along the exterior 
slope, yet all night long parties of men, lifty, sixty, 
or eighty at a time, stood in the crater, along its 
sides, not shaped into banquettes [meaning with 
no cover], and fired at the enemy they could not 
see; for after the first hour the rebels ceased to ap- 
pear on the parapet at all, contenting themselves 
with the use of grenades. After awhile feathered 
grenades were given to the National troops, and 
thrown inside the line with some effect, but many 
of these failed to explode, and were hurled back by 
the rebels with terrible results. 

Boxes of field ammunition were also brought out 
by the enemy, who lighted them by portfires and 
threw them by hand into the crater. Nearly every 
one took effect, killing and wounding sometimes 
half a dozen men. The crater was called by the sol- 
diers "the death hole," but the ground that had 
been gained was held through all the horrors of the 
uight. 

The "lay" reader has to inquire if the ob- 
ject of siege mining is to make a death hole 
for our own soldiers, and whether this sending 
our own volunteers into a slaughter pit, for 
the chance that for ten of them one of the 
enemy may be killed, is war. 

This hole of death is an example of a system 
of butcher tactics which became chief in the 
war, and came to be received as the art of war. 
It was a brutal reckoning that wliereas the 
North could raise three soldiers to the South's 
one, the sacrifice of our three to their one was 
progress in the war. The common idea of 
generalship became degraded to these tactics 
of "death holes," and "hills of death," and 
of sending gallant volunteers to the slaughter 
against intrenchments, thinking a commander 
great in ratio to his destruction of his own 
men. Strategy, tactics, and maneuver were 
contemned, and he became greatest who 
pitched his army into the slaughter, without 
skill, and then pitched in again in the same 
blind manner until his armv was consumed. 



— 129 — 



The most prominent historian of the war 
gave to this horrible system the name of "the 
tactics of attrition." It came to be set forth 
as a principle of the art of war that it was a 
matter of killing so many men, and that the 
side which had most men had most to be 
killed, and it made little difference how it 
was done. Gen. Sherman expressed this with 
interesting candor in his reasons, in the 
United Service Magazine, for the unguarded 
state of the army at Pittsburg Landing, and, 
in his memoirs, for the assault at Kenesaw, 
and again in his address at the meeting of the 
Society of the Army of the Potomac at Hart- 
ford, June 8, 1881, when he justified the opera- 
tions of Gen. Grant from the Hapidan to 
Cold Harbor by this princii>le: 

War Is an awful game, and demands death and 
liesiruclion. A certain amount of fighting-— of kill- 
ins— had to be done, and the banks of the Rapidan 
and Mattapony were as good a place for it as those 
of the James and Appomattox. 

But if war is only a matter of unskilled 
Imtchery, why have a military institute to 
teach it? And if this be all of war, is there 
an impassable gulf between the professional 
and the volunteer? Can we expect to always 
have such conditions in our wars that we can 
afford to sacrifice three of our soldiers to do 
for one of the enemy, and therefore can af- 
ford to contemn all the art of war. 

Having failed to make the mine practica- 
l)le for anything but "the death hole," another 
mine was begun, which was exploded on the 
1st of July. This appears not to have had 
any aim save to kill any Confederate soldiers 
that happened to be near at the explosion. 
The Confederate report says a ton of powder 
was fired in this. Badeau says: 

The result was the demolition of an entire redan, 
leaving only an immense chasm where the rebel 
work had stood. The greater portion of the earth 
was thrown toward the national forces, the line of 
least resistance being in that direction. The rebel 
inierior line, however, was much injured, and 
many of those manning tlie works were killed or 
wounded. But no serious attempt to charge was 
made, ihe result of the assaulis on the 2oth having 
been so inconsiderable. 

Gen. Benjamin F. But/jcr might find some 
satisfaction for the ridicule which educated 
officers heaped upon his Fort Fisher powder 
ship, in this mining by Gen. Grant's direc- 
tion, whose first great performance was to 



make a "death hole" where the safe enemy 
could butcher Grant's soldiers, and the next 
was to see the earth fly. But this appears to 
have been thought the art of war in a siege, 
or Badeau continues: 

From this time forward the engineers were kept 
constantly and busily employed mining and coun- 
termining on different portions of the line. 

Gen. Grant reported to Halleck on the 
27th that Johnston expected 10,000 re- 
enforcements from BragCi. This was a mis- 
take. Johnston was inactive correspondence 
with the Richmond government, which was 
urging him to act, while he was protesting 
that he had not more than half the force 
necessary, and that to make the attempt on 
Grant's army with such a force would be de- 
struction. And he said: "The defeat of this 
little army would at once open Mississippi 
and Alabama to Grant." Johnston could 
not believe that Vicksburg was the sole ob- 
jective of all of Grant's mighty campaign; 
he supposed that he wanted that for a base 
from which to occupy Mississippi. 

Gen. Pemberton sent to Johnston that he 
ought not to attempt anything with less than ' 
40,000 men : this in co-operation with Pem- 
berton' s forces. It was, in fact, impractica- 
ble to arrange such co-operation, for it re- 
quired correspondence in time, and corre- 
spondence was slow, difficult, and uncertain. 
Johnston's whole force was about 26,000 men, 
but it was lacking in equipment and trans- 
portation. When he came, all the military 
materials were at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. 
"Artillery had to be brought from the East, 
horses for it, and field transportation pro- 
cured in an exhausted country; much from 
Georgia, brought over wretched railroads." 
Thus he said: "I have not the means of 
moving." 

Gen. Johnston had written Gen. Pember- 
ton on the 14th of June that all he could at- 
tempt would be to save the garrison, and 
that to do this exact co-operation was indis- 
pensable; that "by fighting the enemy sim- 
ultaneously at the sanie'point of his line you 
may be extricated;" that his own communi- 
cations could best be preserved by operating 
north of the railroad, and asking him to state 
what point would be best for him. Gen. Pem- 
berton answered this on the 21st, proposing 
that, with due notice, Johnston should move 
by the north of the railroad, drive in the 



— 130 — 



enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight 
next morning engage mm heavily with 
skirmishers, occupying him during the entire 
day, and that on that night he, Pembertox, 
would move by the Warrenton road to Hau- 
kinson's Ferry. 

He further required Johnstox to send to 
Hankinson's a brigade of cavalry, with two 
field batteries', to build a bridge there and 
hold that ferry; also to hold Hall's and 
Baldwin's ferries to cover his crossing at 
Hankinson's. By this Johnstox was to attack 
on the north, where were the intrenchments 
of Haine's Bluff, and to the Big Black River, 
while Pemberton moved out to the south. 
And this required j^retty strong detachments 
from Johnston's forces to keep Pemberton' s 
way clear over the Big Black River. Gen. 
Johnston answered this on the 22d, stating 
that Gen. Richard Taylor had sent Gen. E. 
K. Smith to co-operate with Pemberton on 
the west side of the Mississippi, to throw in 
supplies, and to cross with his forces, if ex- 
pedient and practicable. He added: 

I will have the means of moving toward the 
enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a di- 
version in your favor; and if possible, communi- 
cate witli you, though I fear my force is too small 
to effect the latter. * <= * If 1 can do nothing, 
rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to 
cross the river at the last moment, if you and Gen. 
Taylor can communicate. 

Gen. Pemberton's report relates that about 
the 30th of May the meat ration was reduced 
one-half, but that of sugar, rice, and beans 
was largely increased, and chewing tobacco 
was impressed and issued to the troops. 
"This had a very beneficial influence." By 
the 12th of June, says Gen. Pemberton: 

.\bout this time our provisions, particularly of 
meat, having become nearly exhausted, Gen. Stone- 
man was instructed to impress all the cattle iu the 
city, and the chief commissary directed to sell only 
one ration per diem to any officer. He was also 
iustructea to issue for bread equal portions of rice 
and flour, four ounces of eacii. 

By this the reduction of the bread ration 
one-half came on top of the reduction of tlie 
meat ration. 

On the 15th he wrote Johnston: "Our men 
have no relief, and are becoming much 
fatigued, but are still in pretty good spirits. 
I think your movement should he made as 
soon as possible. * * * We are living on 



greatly reduced rations, but I think sufficient 
for twenty days yet." To the mortar bom- 
bardment were now added several very heavy 
guns, in position on the peninsula, the fire of 
which, Pemberton says, was very destructive. 
On the 19th he wrote: "I hope you will ad- 
vance with the least possible delay. My men 
have been thirty-four days and nights in 
trenches without relief. * * * We are 
living on greatlj^ reduced rations. What aid 
am I to expect from you?" Under date of 
June 22, his report says: 

About this time, our stock of bacon having been 
almost exhausted, the experiment of using mule 
meat as a substitute was tried, '■' '■'■' * and I am 
gratified to say it was found by both officers and 
men not only nutritious, but very palatable, and in 
every way preferable to poor beef. 

By the latter part of June, says Baoeait, 
taking from a Southern narrative of the 
siege : 

I 

Flour was S5 a pound, or Sl.OOO a barrel, rebel 
money; meal, $140 a bushel; molasses, jflO and $12 
a gallon; and beef (very often oxen killed by the 
national shells and picked up by the butchers), was 
sold at $2 and $2 50 by the pound. Mule meat, sold 
'at $1 per pound, was in great demand. Many fami- 
lies of wealth had eaten the last mouthful, and the 
poorer class of non-combatants was on the verge of 
starvation. 

There was scarcely a building that had not been 
struck by shells, and many were entirely demol- 
ished. A number of women and children had been 
killed or wounaed by mortar shells, or balls, and all 
who did not remain in the damp caves or hillsides 
were in danger. 

The hospitals, which were now a large 
feature, had to take their chances with the 
other liouses in the unceasing bombardment. 
Starvation was swiftly bringing the surrender 
of a place which was impregnable to all of 
Grant's ill ordered assaults, saps, mines, and 
batteries. Gen. Pemberton, on the 22d, wrote 
Johnston suggesting that he should propose 
terms to Geriv Grant for the surrender of tlie 
place, but not of the troops. He added that 
his men were much fatigued by being con- 
stantly in the trenches, and were living on 
very reduced rations, but still, if there was 
hope of ultimate relief, they would hold out 
for fifteen days longer. 

The difficulty of communication may be 
seen in the date of Johnston's answer to this 
— the 27th. He said: 



— 131 



Gen. E. K. Smith's troops have been mismanagerl, 
and have fallen back to Delhi. I have sent a special 
messenger urging him to assume direct command. 
The determined spirit you manifest, and his expect- 
ed co-operation, encourage me to hope something 
may yet be done to save Vicksbnrg, and to postpone 
both the modQs of extricating the garrison. Xe20- 
tiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, 
should they become necessary, must be made by 
you. It would be a confession of weakness on my 
part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. 
When it becomes necessary to make them, they 
may be considered as made under my authority. 

The bearer of this dispatch was captured. 
Forasmuch as Gen. Johnston had now no 
expectation of an increase of his own force, 
this encouragement that Vicksburg might at 
last be saved depended on Gren. Richard 
T.\ylor's sending a force to break the invest- 
ment west of the river, and throw in sup- 
plies. It is reasonable to suppoee that with 
these the defense might have been prolonged 
indefinitely, and a very large diversion of 
Grant's forces to the west side made 
necessary. But Gen. Banks had Port Hud- 
son now' in the same strait as Grant Vicks- 
burg, and Gen. Taylor was trying to relieve 
that place. Thus divided between the two, 
he relieved neither. This gives a further 
illustration of the strange military idea of 
Grant, Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln, that 
Banks should abandon the Lower Mississippi, 
and come and help Grant besiege Vicksburg. 
Had he done so, not only would Louisiana 
and the Lower Mississippi have been lost, 
but it is unlikely that Vicksburg would have 
been taken. 

Gen. GR.A.NT, in his letter to Halleck, ex- 
plaining why he could not protect the leased 
plantations west of the Mississippi, stated: 

Beside.s the gun boats, negro troops, and six regi- 
ments of white troops, left west of the Mississippi 
fiiver in consequence of these plantations being 
there, I sent an additional brigade from the invest- 
ing army, and that at a time when government 
was straining every nerve to send me troops to in- 
sure the sucsrss of the enterprise against Vicksburg. 
All this has not been availing. 

But it appears that the colored troops, 
chiefly, repulsed an attack on his base of sup- 
plies at Milliken's Bend, and that this force, 
which he calls detaclied because of the 
leased plantations, defeated a promising ex- 
pedition in the niok of time, for throwing 
.supplies into Vicksburg. 

Gen. .ToHNsTON states that on the 'iMth, hav- 



ing procured the necessary supplies and field 
transportation and artillery equipment, and 
a serviceable floating bridge, the army was 
ordered to march next morning toward Big 
Black River. He says "the effective force 
was a little above 20,000 infantry and artil- 
lery, and 2,000 cavalry." Reconnaissances, 
"to which the 2d, 3d, and 4th of July were 
devoted," convinced him that no attack was 
practicable north of the railroad; he therefore 
"determined to move on the morning of the 5th 
by Edward's depot to the south of that road." 
On the 3d a courier from Gen. Pemberton ar- 
rived, having left Vicksburg on the 28th of 
June, He had been so near capture as to 
think necessary to destroy his dispatches. 
Johnston sent back by him to Pemberton the 
following, dated the 3d: 

Your dispatches of 28th were destroyed by mes- 
senger. He states that Gen, Smith's troops were 
driven back to Monroe. This statement and your 
account of your condition make me think it 
necessary to create a diversion, and thus enable you 
to cut your way out, if the time has arrived for vou 
to do this. Of that time I can not judge — you must, 
as it depends upon your condition. I hope to at- 
tack the enemy in your front on the 7th, and your 
co-operation will be necessary. The manner and 
the proper point for you to bring the garrison out, 
must be determined by you, from your superior 
knowledge of the ground anddis\ribution of the 
enemy's forces. Our firing will show you where 
we are engaged. If Vicksburg can not be saved, 
the garrison must. 

An operation, requiring such exact and 
prearranged co-operation, between forces 
widely separated by the opposing army, and 
whose interchanges of intelligence were so 
slow and uncertain, was impracticable. The 
bearci; of this dispatch was captured. Mean- 
while that was going on between Grant and 
Pemberton which made Johnston's move- 
ment unnecessary just as he had gotten ready 
to begin. 



CHAPTER XLIX. 

preparing for another assault — the capit- 
tfl-\tion — the play of unconditional sur- 
render — marring a great event by small 
personal motives — the petty dispute — the 
terms of capitulation — .strategem to de- 
MORALIZE PEMBEKTON's TROOPS. 

By the 1st of July the trenching had 
reached such a stage that Badeau says "little 



— 132 — 



farther progres« could be made by digging 
alone, and Grant accordingly determined to 
make the final assault on the morning of the 
6th of July." Not that the "siege approaches" 
had reduced, or expected to reduce, any part 
of the fortifications, but that the trenches 
would enable "columns of fours" to debouch 
at points near to the enemy's works. 

As before, the assault was not to be by mass- 
ing troops on particular points, but was to be 
a general line attack on the fortifications, or 
as much of a line as could be made by de- 
bouching from the trenches in columns of 
fours. Badeac narrates communications be- 
tween the pickets which showed that the 
Confederate soldiers expected this assault 
with confidence. Whether this was to be the 
final assault was problematical. But assum- 
ing it to be certain, Badeau includes among 
the terrors now hanging over Vicksburg the 
ancient custom of giving license to mercenary 
troops ujjon the disarmed soldiers and the in- 
habitants of a town taken by assault. He 
goes on : 

To crown all, after a few more contractions of the 
coil, another mighty assault would bring the enemy 
immediately beneath the walls, when, covered by 
their works, and more numerous than the besieged, 
the assailants, in every human probability, would 
storm the town, and all the unutterable horrors to 
which fallen cities are exposed might come udou 
the devoted fortress. 

But although Baueah was revised by Gen. 
Grant, this must be taken as a flight of 
rhetoric; for it is not likely that he had any 
thought of making the rapine, slaughter, and 
ravishment of the inhabitants of Vicksburg, 
nor even the slaughter of the garrison, the 
prize of the soldiers in a successful assault; 
and even if he had, the volunteers would not 
have accepted such a reward. 

In the middle ages the mercenary troops 
were given unbridled license in a town taken 
by assault, after a formal demand for sur- 
render had been refused. The British still 
practice this in their wars in Asia. But it is 
no part of civilized warfare, and is a shame to 
England. The imagination must be truculent 
which can suppose that the volunteers would 
have given rage to the passions of killing, pill- 
age, and '■the unutterable horrors" on the de- 
fenseless inhabitants, or on the overpowered 
soldiers of Vicksburg, if that place had iseen 
taken by storm. Gen. Pemberton, having about 
18,000 soldiers in the lines, and the fortifica- 



tions unbroken, had good ground to believe 
that he could repulse an assault as before, atid 
to decline a summons to surrender. Under 
the circumstances such a refusal would be no 
reason for savage measures, if Grant had car- 
ried the place by storm. But no- mention is 
made that Grant intended even the formality 
of a summons to surrender. 

Gen. Pemberton's report narrates: "By 
the 1st of July I became satisfied that the 
time had arrived when it was necessary either 
to evacuate the city and cut my way otit, or 
to capitulate upon the best attainable terms." 
He therefore addressed a communication to 
each of the division Generals, Stevenson, 
Forney, Smith, and Bowen, reanesting them 
to inform him as to the condition of their 
troops, and their ability to make the marches 
and undergo, the fatigues necessary to accom- 
plish a successful evacuation. The substance 
of the answers was that the troops were not 
in condition for such marching, and for the 
fighting which might be expected, and that 
the attempt would result in the destruction 
of a large part of the troops that made it. 

Thereupon. July 3. Gen. Pemberton ad- 
dressed to Gen. Grant the following: 

General: I have the honor to propose to you an 

armistice of hours, with a view to arranging 

terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this 
end, if agreeable to yon, 1 will appoint three com- 
missioners to meet a like number to be named by 
yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may 
find convenient. I make this proposition to avoid 
the effusion of blood, which must otherwise be 
shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able 
to maintain my position for a yet indeliuite period. 
This communication will be nanded you under a 
flag of truce Dv Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen. 

To this, in the course of two huurs, was 
sent the following answer: 

General: Your note of this date is just received, 
proposing an armistice for several hours fortiie pur- 
pose of arranging terms of capitulation through 
commissioners to be appointea, etc. The useless 
effusion of blood you propose stopping by tliis 
course can be ended at any time you choose by an 
unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. 
Men who have sliown so much endurance and 
courage as those now in Vicl;sburg will always chal- 
lenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure 
you will be treated with all the respect due to pris- 
oners of war. I do not favor the proposition of ap- 
pointing commissioners to arrange terms of capit- 
ulation, because I have no terms oi;lier thau those 
indicated above. 



133 — 



The greatness and dignity of this affair was 
now belittled by motives of personal vanity 
and popular clap-trap, which caused a trucu- 
lent demand that was not in earnest, a piti- 
ful dispute in the small ettbn to put upon 
Gen. Pembkrton the liumiliation of asking a 
reopening of negotiations after this refusal of 
all terms save unconditional surrender. The 
incitement to this may be seen by a reference 
to a previous surrender. 

When Gen. Gk.vnt returned from Commo- 
dore Foote's gunboat, and found that for half 
a day a furious battle had been raging by a 
sortie of the army of Fort Donelson, and 
that more than lialf of his army had Deen 
driven back, he sent this word to Commodore 
FooTE. whose boats had all been disabled in 
attacking the fort the day before: 

A terrible foiifiici ensiR'd iii luy .ab-seiice, wiiicli 
lias demoralized a portion of my commana, and I 
think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats 
do not appear it will reas.surc the enemy, and still 
further demoralize our troops. I must order a 
cliarge to save appearances. 1 do not expect the 
gunboats to go into aciiou. 

Before his army had l>een hurt he had dis- 
l>alched Gen. Hai.leck that he would have to 
intrench, for he said: "I fear the result of 
an attempt to carry the place by storm with 
new troops." 

Feeling this way before the disaster, the sit- 
' nation now looked badly. But Gen. C. F. 
S.MiTJi formed a storming force of Gen. L.\u- 
man's brigade, resolved on something more 
than to save appearances. He led it in per- 
son, iinimating the "new troops" by his ex- 
ample, and tiiey carried by storm a part of the 
f(jrt wliich was the key to the position. Here 
tliey ancl their gallant veteran commander lay 
on the frozen ground without slielter, tire, or 
overcoats through the long night. In the 
morning Gen. Bi^ckxer hoisted the white 
ilag, and sent a messenger to Gen. Gkant, 
proposing an armistice till 12 o'clock and the 
appointment of commissioners to arrange 
terms of capitulation. To refuse tliis per- 
emptorily was j)roper; fur (trant could not 
know that the time would not be used 
as a ruse in. order to mass troops to drive out 
the assaulting force. He now rose with the 
occtision, and sent back this answer: 

No terms except unconditional and immediate 
surrender can be accepted. I propose to move im- 
mediately upon your works. 



Gen. Buckler's situation — his two supe- 
riors having fled with all the troops that 
could get away in the night — was such that 
he was compelled to surrender uncondition- 
ally. In the great rejoicing over this great 
victory. Gen. 3r.vnt's answer to Buckner was 
celebrated as if it, and not Gen. SMiTii'i lead- 
ing and Gen. Lauman's brigade, had made 
the capture. That the surrender was uncon- 
ditional was tliought to be more than the vic- 
tory. The initials of Gen. Grant's name be- 
came popularly interpreted as Unconditional 
Surrender Graxt. Secretary Staxton, then 
wrestling with the much preparing Gen. Mc- 
CleliiAN, wrote a letter to the editor of the 
New York Tribune, in a strain of great re- 
ligious exaltation, conveying that the whole 
art of war was contained in Grant's answer 
to BtJCKNEit, saying: 

We iflay well rejoice at the recent victories, for 
they teach us that battles are to be won now, and 
by us, in the same and only manner that they were 
ever won by any people, or in any age since Joshua, 
by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, 
under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be 
the true organization of victory and military com- 
bination to end this war, was declared in a few 
words by Gen. Grant's message to Gen. Buckner : 
"1 propose to move immediately on your wor'ivS." 

Therefore did the vanity of playing a part 
up to the popular name of Unconditional 
Surrender Grant lead him to make this per- 
emptory refusal to negotiate for the capitula- 
tion of a place which he had twice assaulted, 
with great slaughter of his soldiers; whose 
fortifications were intact, and which had 
18,000 men to defend them, and while he 
thought that the threatening situation on 
both sides of tlie Mississippi compelled him 
to assault again, with the certainty of repeat- 
ing the slaughter of the 22d of June, and 
with no certainity of any other result. 

The nature of this refusal of terms can 
be appreciated by reflecting on the 
probable consequences if Gen. Pemberton 
had taken Gen. Grant at his word, and he 
had sent his troops to death in another as- 
sault. Does not Badeau's history place Grant 
in the situation of choosing the further sacri- 
fice of his own soldiers, in ordar to play up to 
his popular sobriquet? Then followed an un- 
seemly dispute over the unseemly question 
who it was that made the proffer of further 
negotiation, or of a mediation to get Gen. 



134 



Grant to relent his implacable temper. Ba- 
DEAu's version is this: 

Bowen was received by Gen. .\, J. Smith, and ex- 
pressed a strong desire to conversu with Grant: this, 
however, was not allowed; he then suggested that 
it would be well if Grant and Pemberton could 
meet. Grant, therefore, sent a verbal message that 
if Pemberton wished to see him, an interview could 
be had between the lines, in Mcpherson's, at 3 
o'clock that afternoon. 

He sent this verbal' message with the above 
written answer. Thus was tlie demand for 
unconditional surrender coupled with the 
written promise of generous treatment, and 
with a consent to see Pkmberton to talk over 
the matter. 

Badeau's narrative of the interview fetches 
this great affair down to a play of bluff. 
.Grant went to the place of meeting, between 
the lines, with Gens. Ord, McPhee.son, Logan, 
and A. J. Smith, and several of his staff; 
Pemberton with Gen. Bowen and Capt. 'Mont- 
gomery. Badeau narrates: 

The two Generals shook hands, and Pemberton 
inquired what terms of capitulation would be 
allowed him. Grant replied: "Those that had been 
expressed in his letter of this morning;" where- 
upon Pemberton haughtily declared: "If this were 
all, the conference might terminate, and hostilities 
be resumed immediately." "Very well," said 
Grant, and turned away. 

According to Badeau's narrative Gen. 
Grant thus chose to send his army to another 
assault upon these fortifications rather than 
grant any terms of capitulation, and he, b^- 
his peremptory manner, cut off all further 
negotiations. Gen. Pembekton's version is 
different; but Gen. Grant, who revised 
Badeau's narrative, is ejititled to his version, 
whatever the reflection. Badeau goes on : 

But Gen. Bowen then proposed that two of the 
snborainates present should retire for consultation 
and sugge.-!t such terms as tliey might thinly proper 
for the consideration of their chief.s. Grant had no . 
objection to this, but would not cou.sider himself 
bound by any agreement of his .subordinates. He, 
himself, must decide what terms were to be al- 
lowed. Smith and Bowen accordingly went a little 
way apart, while Grant and Pemberton walked up 
and down between the parapets conversing. 

Even by Badeau's account it thus appears 
that Gen. Graft's refusal to consider any 
terms but unconditional surrender had now 
limbered down to a consent to let commis- 
sioners consult about conditions. 



Gen. Pemberton's report narrates that he 
understood from Bowen that Grant desired a 
personal conference, but upon arriving on 
the ground : 

I soon learned that there was a mutual misun- 
derstanding in regard to the desire for this inter- 
view, and therefore informed Gen. Grant that if he 
had no terms to propose other than were contained 
in his letter, the conference could terminate, and 
hostilities be resumed immediately. After some 
further conversation, he (Grant) proposed that Gen. 
Bowen and Cajjt. Montgomery, ana two of his staff 
officers, Maj. Gens. McPherson a"fid Smith, should 
retire, consult, and suggest such terms as they 
thought proper for our cotisideration. After 
some conversation between these officers, we 
parted, with the understanding that Gen. Grant 
would communicate with me by 10 o'clock, and 
about that hour the following letter was received. 

Here is a flat difference as to who proposed 
the personal interview, and who proposed 
the commissioners of conference, and Gen. 
Pemberton's statement has the corroboration 
of the result, which is wholly contradictory 
to the ground which Badeau says that Grant 
took. Gen. Pemberton, in 1875, wrote a letter 
to Col. John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia, 
giving his version of the interview. This 
states that the misunderstanding as to Grant's 
having expressed a desire for an interview 
was his, and was satisfactorily explained: 
that after Grant had repeated that he had no 
other terms but his first, and Pemberton had 
declared that the fighting would go on, it was « 
Grant that proposed a conference, and that 
they parted, Grant consenting that as he had 
rejected Pemberton's proposition, it was his 
part to make one, and agreeing to send one 
that night. 

Badeau's further narrative seems to corrob- 
orate PexMBERTon in tliis. He says: 

After .some discussion it was agreed that Grant 
should send his terms to Pemberlon before 10 
o'clock that night. '■■ " '■■' Grant returned to his 
quarters', and, for the only time in his life, held 
what might be called a council of war. He sent for 
all his corps and division Generals on the city front, 
and received their opinions as to the terms which 
should be allowed to Pemberton. 

It would not accord with Badkvu's measure 
of Grant's great mind if l)e did not in tliis 
take a view greatly higher than his subordi- 
nates. It pleases Badeau, approved by 
Grant, to represent Gen. Grant in this as im- 
placal)le toward the Vicksburg army, and as- 
demanding severer terms of surrender than 



— 135 



other men could rise to. Accordingly, he 
says : 

With one exception (Gen. Steele), they suggested 
terms that Grant was unwilling to sanction, and 
their judgment was not accepted. The following 
letter was written instead, ;ind forwarded to Pem- 
bertou. 

But Grant's letter was so different from his 
original demand as to make that appear a de- 
feated attempt to play the bully. It offered 
these liberal terms: 1. To march in one 
division as a guard. 2. All officers and men 
to be paroled, and to march out, all to have 
their clothing, officers their side arms, field, 
staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. 
3. Any required amount of rations and cook- 
ing utensils to be taken from their own stores, 
and thirty wagons for transportation. 

Tiiese terms were generous, but not too gen- 
erous under the circumstances. But to start 
in insolently with the refusal to talk of any 
terms but unconditional siirrender, and then 
to come down to this proposition, was to 
thrust into a great military event the tactics 
of the Cheap John auctioneer. Pemberton 
received this at 10 o'clock p. m. of July 3, 
and in the same nightseiitan answer, accept- 
ing the terms in the main, but asking these 
amendments: 1. The garrison to march out 
at 10 o'clock on the 4th, and surrender 
by stacking arms in front of the works, then 
Grant to take possession. 2. Officers to retain 
personal property. 3. Rights and property of 
private citizens to be respected. 

The manner in which Pemberton proposed 
to make the surrender was much more spec- 
tacular than that of Grant's propositions. It 
was as if he thought a scene of laying down 
arms would make it n\ore imposing. Grant 
accepted this, but declined any enlargement 
of the private property allowed to officers, or 
to bind himself as to the private property of 
citizens. Gen. Pemberton gave as his reason 
for proposing to surrender on the 4th of July 
that he thought "the vanity of our foes" 
would lead them to give better terms for a 
capture which would be such a celebration. 
It appears that both sides were expediting the 
negotiations all night to this spectacular end, 
and by 8 o'clock a. m. of the 4th, Pemberton's 
formal acceptance was received by Grant, 
the surrender to be made at 10 o'clock. 

But Badeau narrates that during the live- 
long night Unconditional Surrender Grant 



was not limiting himself to a negotiation of 
conditions with Gen. Pemberton, but was at 
the same time carrying on a negotiation 
through the Confederate pickets to corrupt 
Pemberton's troops. He says: 

During that n,ight Grant sent instructions to Ord 
and McPiierson to put discreet men on picket, and 
allow them to communicate to the enemy's pickets 
the fact thnt in case of surrender both officers and 
men would be paroled and allowed to return to 
their homes. 

Not only paroled by him, but discharged 
from Confederate authority. 



CHAPTER L. 

the surrender — GRAND ENTRY OF THE NATION- 
\AL TROOPS — THE GENERAL's BULLETIN — THE 
TROPHIES — THE NOT VALID PAROLE — THE NUM- 
BER PAROLED — HOW IT WAS SWELLED — THE 
MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTURE OF 
THE PLACE. 

At 10 o'clock on the 4th of July, 18G3, a 
ceremony took jilace which, to the volunteers 
who had survived this dreadful campaign, 
must have seemed the reward of their hard- 
ships, which, to the chiefs, brought glory and 
promotion, and whose announcement caused 
extravagant joy throughout the country. 
The defenders of Vicksburg marched outside 
of their lines and stacked their arms, while 
the national volunteers stood on their para* 
pets in silence, ob.serving the ceremony. 

This triumph had cost the national volun- 
teers dearly, and in the course of the whole 
campaign, sickness, wounds, and death had 
deprived of the view of this closing scene a 
larger number than the surrendered. The ca- 
pitulation was a severe mortification to the 
Southern troops, but no dishonor. They had 
yielded to starvation that which superior 
force had tried in vain to take, and they had 
received honorable terms. The place which 
had been the object of all the hardships, sac- 
rifices, and heroism of a great army for nearly 
a year was now gained. 

Gen. Logan's division then entered the 
town. Badeau says it was entitled to this 
honor of being first, because it "was one of 
those which had approached nearest to the 
rebel works," and "had been heavily engaged 
in both assaults." The column marched to 



136 



the Court House, upon which the 48tQ Illinois 
placed its flacj. Gen. Grant and staff rode at 
the head of the column. "He went direct to 
one of the rebel headquarters,'" and entered, 
and, Badeau says, was coldly received. He 
had an interview with Pemberton. Badeau 
says that Pemberton now requested Grant to 
supply the garrison with rations, and when 
Grant asked him how many would be needed, 
Pemberton replied: "I have 32,000 men." 

Grant then rode to the landing to exchange 
"congratulations with Admiral Porter on the 
flagship, but returned to his old camp at 
dark." His quarters were not removed to 
Vicksburg till the 0th. That night he an- 
jiounced the capitulation to the government 
in these words: "Theenemy surrendered this 
morning. The only terms allowed is their pa- 
role. This I regard as a great advantage to us 
at this juncture. It saves probably several 
days in the capture, and leaves troops and 
transports ready for immediate service." 
Grant had now become convinced that the 
conditional was better than the unconditional 
surrender, 

A week was taken in making the paroles 
and other arrangements, and then the garri- 
son, except the sick, marched out into the 
Confederacy. Gen. Halle<'k sent to Grant 
the following, July 8: 

I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg 
vvithouc actual delivery to a proper agent, as re- 
quired by the seventh article of the cartel, may be 
construed into an absolute release, and th.at these 
men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the 
enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these 
prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you vvill 
retain ihem until further orders. 

Before this was received, Badeau says, the 
prisoners had left Vicksburg. Upon this 
point Badeau makes a plea that Grant was 
"obliged to parole and discharge his prison- 
ers" by the terms of the cartel, and he quotes 
these terms as if proving it; but they prove 
that paroles were not to be held valid by 
either side unless the prisoners were reduced 
to actual possession, and were then formally 
delivered up to the other, at stated places, 
and to the authorized agent. One of these 
places was Vicksburg; but as Grant had 
captured that, there was no Confederate au- 
thority there to which to deliver his prison- 
ers. 

Unquestionably Gen. Halleck's statement 
of the conditions of the cartel was correct. 



and his view that if the Confederate authori- 
ties should hold strictly to the terms, tbey 
could place these paroled men in the ranks 
without exchange. The common report of 
the time was that this was done, and that 
among the forces gathered to resist the march 
of Gen. RosECRANs were many of the paroled 
Vicksburg array. This is a matter which is 
not easy to find out at this time. It could 
not be expected to be found in Confederate 
reports, and Badeau's treatment of this parole 
question is a plea of defense, and the defense 
is the false plea that "Grant was therefore 
obliged to parole and discharge his prisoners" 
by the cartel. 

The number of men surrendered is stated 
bj-^ Badeau as 31,600, but he says "the num- 
ber actually paroled was 28,892;" that "709 re- 
fused to be paroled, and were sent North as 
prisoners." To make up the rest he estimates 
that "many hundreds died in the hospitals be- 
fore the paroling could be completed, and 
over 1,000 escaped, or concealed themselves, 
or, disguised as citizens, avoided being pa- 
roled." But the number actually paroled 
was 28,892, and the conditions were such as 
to make a parole desirable, instead of a thing 
to avoid. Badeau states the captures as 105 
field guns and sixty-seven garrison guns. 

The history written by Charles A. Dana 
and Grant's Chief Engineer, Wilson, says: 
"The rebels surrendered 21,000 efTective men. 
and 6,000 wounded in hospital, besides over 
120 guns of all calibers." Captured guns are 
cherished trophies, but more when captured 
on the field of battle than when surrendered 
by starvation, The difference between the 
surrender of men paroled and the number 
j stated by Gen. Pemberton in his report as his 
effective force at the beginning of the siege, 
namely, 18,500. and in his dispatch to Gen. 
J. E. Johnston after the two assaults, namely, 
18,000, needs remark. Badeau takes the 
number which he says Pemberton stated to 
Grant as requiring rations, and from that he 
calculates back that Pemberton pursued a 
course of understating liis force at Edwards' 
Station and Champion's Hill. 

A lumping statement of numbers, how- 
ever, made for rations to the hungry, may 
have been a liberal one. Badeau has to guess 
at the unknown to make out 31,600, after he 
has stated all that were paroled. To suppose 
that Pemberton would make a false report of 
his force to Gen, Johnston, when he was 



137 



anxious for Johnston to co-operate for his re- 
lief, would be unreasonable; also, a false re- 
port of his force would be swiftly challenged 
by Johnston and the War Department. At 
the beginning he stated his effective force as 
about 18,500. Subsequently he stated 'his 
losses during the siege as about 1,000. But it 
will be supposed, as a matter of course, that 
all the citizens and sojourners in the town 
who were able to bear arms were made to 
help the defense. 

Badeau, taking from "a rebel narrative of 
the siege," describing the retreat of Pember- 
ton's army into Vicksburg after the rout at 
Black River Bridge, says: "The planters and 
population of the country, fleeing from the 
presence of the victorious enemy, added to 
the crowd and the confusion." Every man 
in the Confederacy, between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty-five, was under conscrip- 
tion, and if permitted to be at home to work 
his farm or attend to other business, he was 
detailed to this. The men over this age were 
enrolled as "State troops." With all this 
Pemberton could place in the trenches every 
man in Vicksburg able to bear arms. 

In the answers of Pemberton's Generals to 
his questions whether their troops were in a 
condition to make the attempt to fight the 
way out of Vicksburg, Maj. Gen. M. L. 
Smith wrote: "There are al)out 3,000 men in my 
division, including State troops." In another 
part of the letter he mentions the regulars as 
2,000. He said: "Out of the 3,000 only 
about 2,000 are considered reliable in case we 
are strongly opposed and much harassed." 
With the enrollment of all the men in 
Vicksbufrg who were able to bear arms, it is 
reasonable to suppose that Pemberton could 
increase his number of 18,500 effectives to 
21,000 nominally in arms wlien he sur- 
rendered. 

Besides, the service of the Confederate 
troops, since the national army had emerged 
from the swamps, had been severe, their losses 
in battle large, and they endured the hard- 
ships of campaigning with less stamina than 
the Northern volunteers. Such a list of sick 
and wounded aa might reasonably be calcula- 
ted would account for the number stated by 
Dana's history, as "21,000 effective men," in- 
cluding "State troops," and "over 6,000 in 
hospital," thus leaving the correctness of 
Pembketon's report that he had 18,500 effect- 
ive men when first besieged in Vickaburg. 



These 18,500 regular troops who were effect- 
ive when Grant began the siege, deducting 
their losses during the siege, were the effective 
regular force lost to the Confederacy by this 
siege and capture. Besides this was the large 
number of sick and wounded of the regular 
force, of whom the number stated by Dana as 
6,000 was probably no exaggeration, making 
between 2-f,000 and 25,000 of the regular Con- 
federate soldiers. The capture of the sick 
and wounded did not diminish the present 
Confederate strength, and they were a burden 
to us; but as many as survived would count 
in exchange. 

Pollard, the Southern historian, whose 
general candor is conceded by Greeley's his- 
tory, says: "The numbers which surrendered 
at Vicksburg were 27,000 men, with three 
Major Generals and nine Brigadiers, upward 
of ninety pieces of artillery, and about 40,- 
000 small arms. Weakness from fatigue, 
short rations, and heat, had left thousands of 
the troops decrepit. Six thousand of them 
were in hospitals, and many of them were 
crawling about in wjiat should be convales- 
cent camps." 

Citizen.?, armed for the defense, and State 
troops, made up the rest to tlie number stated 
by Dana and Wilson as 27,000, or to the num- 
ber stated by Badeau as actually paroled, 
namely, 28.892. It was Gen. Pkmberton's duty 
to return for parole all that liad borne arms in 
the defense, and the parole was sought for. 
Such of the planters and business men as 
were under the conscription, but were de- 
tailed lo attend to their business, were glad 
to be paroled, because it was an indefinite 
furlough to them. The citizens and State 
troops desired it for the same reason. The 
Confederate soldiers wanted it because it 
relieved them from the terrible duty in the 
field, and seemed a promise of visiting their 
homes. 

These conditions, aided by the present des- 
titution and government rations, combined 
to enlarge the paroled list to a number 
greatly beyond the effective force surren- 
dered, and to make the captures on the 
national side far greater than the loss of 
effective forces on the Confederate side. Tiie 
authorities at Washington seemed to judge 
military results by the inventory of the sur- 
rendered, and to think a capture of a town 
by the work of starvation, after a campaign 
of two seasonS; a greater military result than 



138 



a victory in a pitched battle, such as that of 
Gettysburg, which effectually disabled Lee's 
hitherto invincible army as an offensive 
force, while the Confederate army in the 
West had yet to be encountered in the field. 

The importance of the capture of a place, 
however, is not to be measured by its tro- 
phies in guns and flags, nor even by the num- 
ber of soldiers surrendered. They who con- 
sider the object of war will hardly say that 
the capture of these men and guns was a suf- 
ficient military object for the occupation of 
all the force of Grant's department for two 
campaigning seasons, and all the consuming 
of men and means thereby. No military 
power could afford to make war upon such 
terms. The importance of the taking of 
Vicksburg was not in the number of men or 
guns surrendered, but in its military position, 
as a commanding place lost by the adversary, 
or as a commanding place gained by us for 
further operations. 

If the capture of Vicksburg had neither of 
these military consequences; if its loss did 
not lay open the Confederacy to a further 
campaign from this point of vantage; if it 
was not to us a base for a line of operations 
to the heart of the Confederate power in the 
western zone of the war, then the Vicksburg 
campaign would have no military meaning, 
and the capture not only would not be worth 
a tithe of the immense cost in men and other 
resources, but it would not redeem the course 
of disaster which had abandoned an interior 
campaign on a true military line, to bury an 
army in the Mississippi swamps. Further 
along we shall see the military consequences 
of this capture of a place which was thought 
' to have fatally dismembered the Confederacy. 



CHAPTER LI. 

THE SURRENDER OF PORT HUDSON — A VICTORY IN 
SPITE OF ORDERS — SHERMAN'S MARCH ON JACK- 
son — vicksburg the finality of the cam- 
paign — the way kept open for johnston to 
retreat — devastation — the isolation of 
grant's army at vicksburg. 

Gen. Banks had been prosecuting the siege 
of Port Hudson with great energy, and the 
garrison had been reduced to extremit_v. 
Hearing of the surrender of Vicksburg, and 



finding no promise of relief from either Gen. 
J. E. Johnston on the east, or Gen. Richard 
Taylor on the west, Gen. Gardner surren- 
dered on the 8th of July. And now, says 
Badeau: "The attempted Confederacy was 
cut in twain, and, in the forcible language of 
Lincoln, 'The father of waters rolled un- 
vexed to the sea.' " 

The capture of Port Hudson was the com- 
pletion of an intelligent and successful 
operation west of the Mississippi, which was 
vital to the possession of Louisiana and of all 
the lower river. It had been carried out 
with a comparatively small force. Banks 
had but about 10,000 men to besiege Port 
Hudson, held by over 7,000, and he was more 
imminently threatened by Gen. Richard Tay- 
lor than Grant was by Gen. J. E. Johnston. 
The possession of Port Hudson was as im- 
portant to the "cutting of the Confederacy in 
twain," and the unvexed flow of the father 
of waters, as Vicksburg. The siege had been 
pushed with the utmost energy and by two 
assaults, and the garrison was nearly ex- 
hausted. 

Gen. Gardner surrendered 6,408 men, of 
whom 455 were officers. In the brief campaign 
west of the Mississippi, and in ihfs conclusion 
at Port Hudson, Gen. Banks' troops had cap- 
tured 10,584 men, 73 guns, 6,000 small arms, 
three gunboats, eight other steamboats, be- 
sides cotton, cattle, and other supplies. And 
now this strong fort was taken, which com- 
manded the navigation of the Mississippi as 
much as Vicksburg did. Instead of having 
now to begin the work of taking Port Hud- 
son, which would have been the case if Grant 
and the Washington authorities had had 
their way in calling Banks off to help Grant 
tak^ Vicksburg, with probably the work of re- 
covering Louisiana to begin anew, Louis- 
iana was firmly in our possession, the last Con- 
federate stronghold on the Mississippi cap- 
tured; the Confederacy had suffered a heavy 
loss of men and munitions and supi)lies; the 
"Confederacy was cut in twain, and tlie father 
of waters rolled unvexed to the sea, and 
Banks was ready for an operation which the 
administration was now very anxious to 
enter upon in Texas. All this had given es- 
sential cooperation to Grant's taking of 
Vicksburg. Yet all this success was slighted 
by the Washington authorities, and Badeau 
treats it as a consequence of Grant's capture 
of Vicksburg, 



— 139 



Before Pemberton had proposed negotia- 
tions, Sherman had been placed in command 
of the army of the rear, formed to resist John- 
6TON. On the night of the 4th, Grant ordered 
Ord and Steele to join Sherman, making 
about 40.000 men, and ordered him: ''Drive 
Johnston from the Mississippi Central Rail- 
road; destroy the bridges as far north as 
Grenada with your cavalry, and do the 
enemy all the harm possible." In another 
order he said: "I want you to drive Johnston 
out in your own way, and inflict on the 
enemy all the punishment you can. I will 
support you to the last man that can be 
spared." 

These orders gave Gen. Grant's view of the 
objective of the Vicksburg campaign, and of 
the military value of the capture of that 
place. They showed that it had not been 
sought as a commanding base for further 
operations, but that the mere occupation of 
Vicksburg was the ultimate object of the 
whole campaign, which contemplated noth- 
ing further in that quarter save devastating 
raids. All of Gen. J. E. Johnston's course 
proves that his limited mind could not rise 
to the height of Grant's generalship; for he 
thought that Grant wanted Vicksburg as a 
base for operations to possess the State of 
Mississippi. 

He was incapable of believing that Grant 
could spend such a force merely to /capture a 
town. Believing that he intended this as a 
base for an interior movement into the very 
heart of the Confederacy, and the navigation 
of the river having before been lost, through 
Fabragut's fleet and the running of the 
Vicksburg guns, he held that the place was of 
little military importance to the Confederacy, 
and that the great necessity was. to save the 
army to protect the interior from the invasion 
which he supposed would follow the capture 
of this place. 

Thus did these two greatest military men 
of their respective sections — the one regarded 
as the greatest strategist and tactician of the 
Confederacy, the other as the greatest General 
of the nation, and rated by his authorized 
biographer as greater than Bonaparte— take 
opposite views of the objective and opportu- 
nities of Grant's campaign ; Johnston tliink 
ing that the great operation was to follow the 
capture of Vicksburg; Grant making that 
his final objective. 

Johnston fell back to Jackson, before which 



place Shermax arrived on the 9th. Johnston's 
narrative says of the fortifications, which had 
been made under Pemberton's orders: 

These works, consisting of a very light line of 
rifle pits, with low embankments at intervals to 
cover field pieces, extended from a point nortli of 
the town, and a little east of the Canton road, to 
one son th of it within a short distance of Pearl 
River, and covered the approaches to tlie place west 
(^ the river. These intrenchments were very badly 
located and constrncied, and offered very slight 
obstacle to a vigorous assault.; 

Reports of Johnston's olTicers led him to 
believe that the want of water would compel 
Sherman to make an immediate assault, and 
he disposed of his troops to meet that. But 
he says: "Instead of attacking as soon as it 
came up. as we had been hoping, the Federal 
army intrenched and began to construct bat- 
teries." He continues: 

Hills within easy cannon range, commanding and 
encircling the town, ofifered very favorable sites for 
Federal batteries. A crossfire of shot and shell 
reached all parts of the town, showing that the 
position would be untenable under the fire of a 
powerful artillery. Such, as it was ascertained, was 
soon to be brought to bear upon it. 

On the 11th Johnston telegraphed President 
Davis that it was impossible to 'hold the 
place against a siege, and that unless the 
enemy attacked he must, or else abandon 
the place, and that to attack would expose 
the army to destruction. Gen. Sherman 
narrates in the memoirs: 

We closed our lines about Jaclsson; my corps 
(15th) held the center, extending from Clinton to 
the Raymond road; Ord's (13th) on the right, reach- 
ina Pearl River below the town, and Parke's (9th) 
the left, above the town. On the 11th we pressed 
close in. and shelled the town from every direc- 
tion. One of Ord's brigades (Lauman's) got too 
close, and was very roughly handled, and driven 
back in disorder. Gen. Ord accused the commander 
(Gen. Lauman) of having disregarded his orders, 
and attributed to him personally the disaster and 
heavy loss or men. He requested his relief, which 
I granted, and Gen. Lauman went to the rear, and 
never regained his brigade. He died after the war, 
in Iowa,' much respected, as 'before that time he 
had been universally esteemed a most crallant and 
excellent officer. 

Gen. Johnston's narrative tells this affair as 
on the 12th. The "memoirs" paid little heed 
to accuracy in dates or other facts. John.ston 
says: 

On the 12th, besides the usual skirmifihing, there 



— 140 — 



was increased fire with artillery, especially by bat- 
teries near the Canton road, and those immediately 
to the south of that to Clinton. The missiles fell in 
all parts of the town. An assault, though not a 
yigorous one, was made in Breckinridge's front. It 
was quickly repulsed, however, by the well directed 
fire of Slocomb's and Cobb's batteries, and a flank 
attack by the skirmishers of the 1st, 3d, and 4th 
Florida, and 47th Georgia regiments. 

The enemy lost about 200 prisoners, the same 
number killed, many wounded, and the colors of 
the 28th, 41st, and 53d Illinois regiments. The at- 
tacking troops did not advance far enough to be ex- 
posed to the fire of Breckinridge's line. 

On the 13th the Federal lines had been so ex- 
tended that both flanks rested upon Pearl River. 
Col. A. C. Fuller of Lieut. Gen. Pemberton's staff, 
arrived from Vicksburg, and informed us of the 
terms of the capitulation. » ■> * He stated 
also tliat at the time of the surrender about 18,000 
men were reported fit for duty in the trenches, and 
about COOO sick and wounded in the hospitals. And 
the estimates for rations to be furnished to the 
troop? of the garrison by the United Slates Com- 
mis ary Department were based on a total of 31,030 
men. 

Johnston learned from his scoxits on the 
14tli that a large ammunition train had left 
Vicksburg by the Jackson road. On the 15th 
he telegraphed President Davis that the 
enemy had begun a siege, which he could not 
resist. A cavalry attempt to intercept the 
train failed. The state of the batteries indi- 
cated that all \vould open oh tiie town on the 
17th; tlierefore .Tohnston evacuated the place 
on the night of the 16th. He says: All public 
property, and the sick and wounded, except 
a few not in condition to bear removal, Jiad 
been carried to the rear, to Brandon, and be- 
yond. The army marched to Brandon by 
two roads, destroying behind it the bridges 
by which it crossed Pearl River. 

Johnston gives his loss in Jackson as 
seventy-one killed, 504 wounded, twenty-five 
miissing. Belated soldiers wlio left the town 
at 7 or 8 o'clock informed him that appar- 
ently the enemy had not then discovered its 
evacuation. 

Sherman continues his narrative thus: 

The weather was fearfully hot. but we con- 
tinued to press the siege day and night, using 
our artillery pretty freely, and on the morn- 
in? of Jti'.y 17 the place was found evacuated. 
Gen. Steele's division was sent in pursuit as far 
as Brandon (fourteen miles), but Gen. Johnston had 
carried his army safely off, and pursuit in that hot 
yreather would have been fatal to my commaad- 



Johnston's narrative tells this: 

Two divisions of Federal infantry and a body of 
cavalry drove our cavalry rearguard through Bran- 
don on tlie 19th, and returned to Jackson on ttie 20th. 
The object of the expedition seemed to be the de- 
struction of the railroad bridges and depot, to 
which the outrage of setting fire to the little town, 
and burning the greater part of it, was added. 

Gen. Sherman, with a force which, effect- 
ively, was more than twice as great as John- 
ston's, and with all of Grant's army to draw 
from, had found Johnston facing him at 
Jackson. He had consumed seven days in 
intrenching and in an aimless, tentative kind 
of "close pressing," which exposed his troops 
to a sortie; had gotten considerably hurt by 
the flanking of one of his divisions; he was 
gathering ammunition for shelling the town, 
when at last Johnston marched out by the 
east where all was open. 

The whole operation by this superior force 
was as if the place were the objective, and 
the tactics to have Johnston leave it. Mean- 
while Sherman was literally carrying out 
Grant's order: "I want you to drive John- 
ston out in your own way, and inflict on the 
enemy all the punisiiinent you can." In 
stead of disposing of his army to capture 
Johnston's, or to bring it to battle in the 
field by marching upon its communications, 
he was encouraging it to depart, and was de- 
voting his chief energies to the work of de- 
stroying property. Says Badeau: 

The work of railroad destruction went on vigor- 
ously, while regular parapets of eartti and cotion 
were constructed in front of the lines. * "•' * 
Meanwhile Stierinan sent out expeditions to the 
right and left, destroying the railroads in every 
direction— cars, locomotives, turntables, and shops, 
as well as tracks and bridges. '^" '^' * Some of his 
troops traversed as far as sixty miles, marking their 
whole route with devastation. 

Of the evacuation he tells: 

All night Sherman heard the sound of wagons, 
but nothing that indicated evacuation, for the 
picks and shovels were at work till midnight; 
butat dawn of nay it became evident that the en- 
emy had withdrawn across Pearl River. All the 
material of war had beeu removed in advance of 
retreat, by means of the railroad running east. 

Of the work of Sherman" at Jackson. John- 
ston narrates: 

The Federal army remained only five or six days 
at Jaukson, but in that short time.it destroyed al^ 



— 141 



of the town so closely built that fire could com- 
municate from house to house; its rear guard left 
the place for Vicksburg on the 23d. 

Badeau says with more comprehensiveness: 
"He remained two or tliree days completing 
the work of destruction." 

Summing up the grand results, Bapeau 
says: 

They drove Johnston f-ftv miles, and left him in 
full retreat; they destroyed the great arteries of 
travel, which alone could enable him to reassemble 
troops and molest Grant's possession of the Missis- 
sippi, and they so exhausted the country through 
which they passed that no army could exist there 
again, during that season, without hauling its sup- 
plies. The campaign was a fitting supplement to 
the conquest of the Mississippi, and, indeed, was 
necessary to perfect the achievements of Grant. 
Sherman's whole loss was less than 1,000 men. 

Sherman's tactics had kept open the way 
of Jotnston's retreat, with all the material 
of his army. He had made his grand object- 
ive the destruction of a railroad center whose 
occupation by our army, Gen. Johnston said, 
would have brought the fall of the State of 
Mississippi. He had destroyed a place antl 
material which a rational and comprehen- 
sive military plan would have converted to 
our means. All of his destruction was, in 
fact, of resources available to us. He had de- 
vastated a fruitful country, leaving it deti- 
tute, as if it were not our own, and we were 
not carrying on war to restore the Union, but 
were a horde of Tartars invading civilization. 

All this was in pursuance of a plan which 
made tlie possession of Vicksburg the finali- 
ty; all this devastation to make the Confed- 
erates unable to fetch troops to molest Grant 
in Vicksburg. Having facilitated Johnston's 
withdrawal with his army and material; 
having made a desert, and called it war. Gen. 
Sherman says he returned, reaching camp on 
the 27th near the Big Black River, "with the 
prospect of a period of rest for the remainder 
of the summer." Thus was Grant's arm}', 
after it had achieved its objective, as com- 
pletely isolated from all other armies, and as 
completely neutralized as to any co-opera- 
tion or influence on other operations as when 
it was involved in the swamps west of the 
Mississiv>pi. In respect to all interior cam- 
paigns, it had simply changed places with 
Pembeeton's army. 



CHAPTER LII. 

a gallant officer elected scapegoat — THB 
VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN ARRIVED AT ITS ULTIMATE 
OBJECTIVE — CUTS ITSELF OFF FROM ALL SE- 
QUENCE — THE CONFEDERACY CUT IN TWO AND 
ITS BACKBONE BROKEN— GRANT SITS DOWN TO 
WAIT FOR IT TO DIE. 

The last previous chapter mentions the per- 
emptory dismissal of Gen. Lauman, of Iowa, 
from the command of his brigade, by Gen. 
Sherman, at the demand of Gen. Ord, who 
charged him with the blame for the loss suf- 
fered by his brigade by a flank attack of the 
enemy, while the whole line was pressing 
upon the intrenchments of J.\ckson. Gen. 
Lauman's high services, although only a vol- 
unteer General, warrant the reviewer in no- 
ticing this arbitrary execution, which termi- 
nated a distinguished military career in dis- 
grace, at the hour ot triumph. 

It was Gen. Lauman's brigade that re- 
deemed Grant's disaster at Fort Donelson, 
and got him promotion by an assault which 
carried one part of the fort, and made the 
other untenable. This was after Grant had 
waited with his army for the gunboats to take 
the fort, and they had all been disabled in 
the attempt; after he had dispatched Gen. 
Halleck that he should have to intrench and 
enter upon a "protracted siege;'' for, says he: 
'•I fear the result of an attempt to carry the 
place by storm with new troops." And he 
was intending to wait for the fleet to go back 
and repair and return. 

Also, this storming of the fort was carried 
by Lauman's brigade after the Confederate 
armyjiad made a sortie, which had driven 
back the entire right wing of Grant's army, 
and then Wallace's division, in a fierce 
battle which raged from dawn till noon, 
while Grant was absent on Commodore 
Foote's gunboat. It was made after Grant 
had sent word to Commodore Foote that a 
fierce conflict bad demoralized a portion of 
his command, and that if the gunboats did 
not appear, it would "reassure the enemy, 
and still further demoralize our troops," and 
that "I must order a change to save appear- 
ances." 

Under all these "demoralizing" and dis- 
astrous conditions did Lauman's brigade 
make the assault, which not only saved ap- 
pearances, but redeemed the disaster, saved 



— 142 — 



the Commanding General, and set him afloat 
on the flood tide to fortune. It is unnecessary 
to say that such soldierly work is not done 
without that previous organizing and train- 
ing which give to soldiers confidence in them- 
selves, in each otlier, and in their officers. 
Such work is not done by "raw troops," and 
this brigade had been ripened by discipline 
and service 

If Gen. Grant, who, before his army was 
hurt, distrusted its ability to carry the tort by 
storm, and who, after his army had been 
badly hurt, ordered the attack only to save 
appearances, was glorified tcf the skies, be- 
cause the assault succeeded, what should be 
the measure of merit to Gen. Lauman, who 
trained the troops that stormed the fort, and 
who, with Gen. C. F. Smith, led them into 
the enemy's works? The soldierly qualities 
of this brigade, which enabled it to do this 
work of veteran troops, had not been ac- 
quired without a good soldier for a com- 
mander, nor without much service. 

This service had continued through all the 
discouragements and hardships of the Vicks- 
burg campaign, and now in the hour of 
triumph this gallant officer was sent to the 
rear in disgrace. What was the special fault 
of Gen. Lauman in an operation which, with 
twice Johnston's force, had permitted him to 
retire at his leisure, after having inflicted a 
sharp punishment? Gen. Sherman had 
stretched his army from the river above Jack- 
son to the river below, and was "pressing in," 
whatever that may be. He narrates in his 
memoirs: 

On the 11th we pressed close in, and shelled the 
town from every direction. One of Ord's brigades 
(Lauman's) got too close, and was very roughly 
handled and driven back in disorder. Gen. Ord 
accused the commander, Gen. Lauman, of having 
disregarded his orders, and attributed to him per- 
sonally the disaster and heavy loss of men. He re- 
quested his relief, which I granted, and Gen. Lau- 
man went to the rear and never regained his bri- 
gade. He died, after the war, in Iowa, much re- 
spected, as before that time he had been universally 
esteemed a most gallant and excellent officer. 

Gen. J. E. Johnston's narrative, which is 
given in the previous chapter, tells this affair 
as on the 12th, which was the third day 
after Sherman had arrived in front 
of the Jackson lines, and shows that 
Lauman's brigade(|was struck in flank 
by four regiments. As there is on file 



no report of Ord or Sherman of the Jackson 
operation, this is the sum of the information 
given to the public on this case of summary 
execution upon a distinguished volunteer 
officer. Gen. Lauman died unheard, and 
nobody but Gen. Ord knows what were the 
orders which Gen. Lauman disregarded.- 

The dangerous operation of spreading an 
army around a fortified place held by an 
army is not a new thing in war, although 
our commanders appear to have had to learn 
it by dear experiment. Gen. Grant experi- 
enced it at Fort Donelson, in a disaster which 
Lauman's brigade turned into a crowning 
victory to Grant. Gen. Sherman experienced 
it at Atlanta, where his loose tactics exposed 
successively two wings of his army to 
attack by superior force where he could not 
sitpport them, and where it was only by 
heroic fighting against sup)erior numbers that 
his array was saved from destruction. He 
was engaged in a like dangerous operation at 
JacksoUj with tactics equally loose, and 
whose object is not made clear by his narra- 
tive, and was probably as vague in the orders. 

The fact that Lau-man's brigade was struck 
in flank and rear, so that about 200 of his men 
were forced to surrender, serves to show that 
Sherman's pressing line was not continuous. 
In the previous operation against Jackson, 
by McPherson's and Sherman's corps, when 
the riglit and left were extended to the same 
points south and north of the town, Badeau 
states that there was a gap of two miles be- 
tween the two corps. The extent of this line 
must have been as much as five miles. It is 
not easy to understand how Lauman's bri- 
gade could be taken in flank and rear in such 
force, and that too before it had reached the 
enenay's line — which Johnston's narrative 
shows to be the case — if there had not been a 
great gap in Sherman's pressing line. 

He says on the 11th we pressed close in and 
shelled the town from every direction; again: 
"We continued to press the siege, using our 
artillery pretty freely." and so on till the 
17th, when they found that Johnston had de- 
parted. What was the object in pressing 
close in along this extended line? Was it 
not tentative to see if there was a weak spot 
where an assault might make a lodgment, or 
if a pressure all along the line would not ex- 
pedite Johnston's departure? The place wa.'* 
not besieged, for it was not invested. All on 
the east was open, and Sherman was pressing 



143 — 



oa the west to induce Johnston to go. Mean- 
while Sherman had sent back for heavier 
artillery and ammunition for shelling the 
town. 

In this pressing close in by a line of four or 
five miles, which probably had e:reat gaps, 
which did not intend a serious attacK, it may 
have been difficult for a subordinate General 
to know just how strong a pressure he was 
to make, and Gen. Ord's orders may have 
partaken of the vague and tentative quality 
of this operation. Naturally Gen. Laum.\n, 
In case of doubt, would take the most enter- 
prising course, although that would be the 
opposite of the way that Ord solved doubt at 
luka. But this extended pressing-in opera- 
tion was a very dangerous one, and exposed 
the superior army to be fatally struck by a 
sortie from the fortified place. 

The loss to Lauman's brigade was a small 
matter for that army, compared to what it 
was exposed to by such a way of operating 
against an army in a fortified camp. The 
arbitrary dismissal of Lauman looks like the 
appointment of a scapegoat, which might not 
be confirmed by inquiry. The confounding 
of all the properties of merit and justice in 
our war. by the infallibility and absolute 
power allowed to a certain class, and the irre- 
mediable disabilities kept upon all the rest 
of the army, has an exemplification in this 
summary disgrace of so distinguished an of- 
ficer as Gen. Lauman, at the demand of Gen. 
Ord, for alleged disregard of orders which in 
the indefinite nature of the operation could 
not be made definite, and because his brigade 
happened to be the one hurt by the enemy 
in a dangerous operation which exposed the 
army to such sorties as at Donelson and At- 
lanta. 

But suppose Gen. Lauman did err, was it a 
thing unheard of in Gen. Grant's campaigns? 
If lie erred, it was forward, not backward, aa 
Grant and Ord at luka, and, therefore, 
his error ought to be the more pardonable. 
Was it military propriety to dismiss such an 
officer unheard at the demand of Ord"^ Was 
it for Gens. Grant and Sherman to pronounce 
such a sentence on a distinguished soldier, 
after their experience of the danger of spread- 
ing out an army before a fortified place at 
Donelson, and before their experience of the 
same at Atlanta, at Petersburg, and Rich- 
mond? Was this charge of pressing too far 
forward, in an operation whose generalship 



exposed the army (o destruction, so fatal a 
fault that Gen. Grant could not pardon it in 
the officer whose brigade had rescued him 
from disaster, and set him on the high road to 
all his fortunes? 

With the surrender of Vicksburg, the driv- 
ing of Johnston's army beyond Jackson, the 
destruction of that place and of the railroads 
in all directions, and the devastation of 
the country, to the end of making it a desert 
in which an army could not find subsistence 
in operating against Grant at Vicksburg, the 
campaign of Grant's army ended. The pos- 
session of the river, which was declared to be 
acquired by the surrender of Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson, was the ultimate mili- 
tary objective. The destruction of Jackson 
•and of the railroads, and the devastating of 
the country, was Grant's decision against 
making Vicksburg and Jackson a base for a 
campaign to the interior, and it voluntarily 
destroyed the means for such a campaign. 

Gen. Sherman returned and encamped be- 
tween Big Black River and the Mississippi, 
and a Confederate cavalry division followed 
to the east bank of Big Black River, and re- 
mained in observation. The capture of 
Vicksburg had no military sequence. Sher- 
man says in the memoirs: "Grant's army 
had seemingly completed its share of the 
work of war, and lay, as it were, idle for a 
time." The military powers of all the earth 
must wonder at the magnitude of the war re- 
sources of a nation which could thus afford to 
have one great army rest at Vicksburg, as if 
its share of the work of the war were done, 
while in the interior of the West another 
army, lesser in number, and having to pro- 
tect a long railroad line of supplies, was mak- 
ing a campaign from Murfreesboro to Chatta- 
nooga, and the Confederate forces east and 
west were thus left free to concentrate against 
it. 

But there were military figures of speech 
which were potent in the war. One of these 
was the backbone of the rebellion, 
which we kept on breaking; which was de- 
clared broken at Donelson, and again at Cor- 
inth, and which was now pronounced finally 
broken by the surrender of Vicksburg. An- 
other was that by getting possession of the 
Mississippi we had cut the Confederacy in 
two. It was held that the Confederate mili- 
tary body could no more live than the animal 
body, when cut in halves. At any rate, the 



— 144 



campaign had reached its ultimate, and had 
no sequence, and if the Confederacy refused 
to die when its back was broken and it was 
cut in two, it was a contumacy so contrary to 
nature that military tactics could not be ex- 
pected to provide against it. 

Gen. J. E. Johnston, however, argued to his 
government that when our armed ships 
passed Port Hudson the Confederacy lost 
control of the navigation ot the Mississippi ; 
still more when our gunboats ran tne bat- 
teries of Vicksburg, and that that place had 
thus ceased to have any great military im- 
portance. Thus had the Confederacy in fact 
been cut in twain long before. The extent of 
the river and its multitude of branches made 
the preventing of the crossing of troops and 
supplies impossible. Thus in Hood's cam- 
paign against Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, in De- 
cember. 1864, do we read of Gen. Grant's ap- 
prehension that the trans-Mississippi Con- 
federate forces would join Gen. Hood, as one 
of the reasons for his order to supersede Gen. 
Thomas for delay. 

And now, forasmuch as in one part of the 
severed Confederacy Price and Marmaduke 
continued in vitality in Arkansas, so that 
Grant had to send 5,000 men to re-enforce 
Gen. ScHOFiELD on that line, and Gen. Rich- 
ard Taylor in West Louisiana, became very 
active, in the face of Gen. Banks, re-enforced 
by the 13th Corps (late McClernand's), and 
was able to hold West Louisiana and Texas 
till the end of the war, against two formidable 
expeditions; and, in the other severed part, 
Bragg gathered a superior force against 
RosECRANs' advance, while Grant's army 
was reposing on its completed work, it ap- 
pears that the Confederacy unconscionably 
refused to recognize the moral results of 
the tactics of the campaign, but continued 
to show the same vitality when cut in twain, 
and with its back broken, and that it was on 
our side that the energy and strategy of this 
great army had been so completely expended 
that the campaign had no sequence. 



CHAPTER LHL 

THE FINISHED CAMPAIGN — DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
ARMY — ITS ISOLATION FROM THE THEATER OF 
THE WAR — GRANT WANTS TO MOVE ON MOBILE 
— SINGULAR NOTION OF CONCENTRATION ON 

VITAL POINTS GRANT ORDERED TO RE-ENFORCE 

BOSECRANS, AND THEN TO TAKE COMMAND — 
BEGINS WITH A GRACEFUL ACT. 

As soon as Gen. Grant had pronounced the 
Vicksburg campaign finished, he proceeded to 
divide up his army, and to send a part to 
Gen. Banks, 5,000 men to Missouri, to send 
back the 9th Corps to Burnside, in East Ten- 
nessee, and to dispose of the rest for garrison- 
ing the river, and for rest from its hard 
labors. In this dispersing, which usually is a 
sad finale to a General, he showed an alacrity 
as if this were the sealing of the completion of 
the campaign, or as if apprehensive that his 
worn out army might be ordered to another. 

Such apprehension might be reasonable, for 
the military propriety of Grant's army's co- 
operating with RosECRANS by a movement 
from Vicksburg and Jackson, or of part of it 
being; sent to re-enforce Rosecrans, then 
seeking to bring Gen. Bragg to action, was so 
evident as to suggest itself to the whole coun- 
try. Gen. Grant, before the capture of Vicks- 
burg, had been generous in promises to Gen. 
Banks to send him troops as soon as he had 
taken that place. A few days after the sur- 
render, although Port Hudson iiad also sur- 
rendered, and Gen. Banks' present strait was 
over, Gen. Grant, says Badeau, "offered to 
send him 'an army corps of as good troops as 
ever trod American soil; no better are found 
in any other.' " 

Badeau states that immediately after the 
capture of Jackson, Grant sent to Banks 
Herron's division, whose number he now 
gives as 4,000. When it reached Vicksburg to 
complete the investment, he said it was the 
largest division in the combined army. 
Subsequently he sent Ord's corps, the 13th, 
lately McClernand's. Sherman's narrative 
says: "Ord's corps (13th) was sent down to 
Natchez and gradually drifted to New Or- 
leans and Texas." As to the disposition of 
his own corps Sherman says: "It being mid- 
summer we did not expect any change till 
the autumn months, and accordingly made 
ourselves as comfortable as possible." 

On the 18th of July Grant announced to 



145 — 



ITai.i.ix'ic I lie capture of Jack.sou and tho 
completion of tbe Vicksburg campaign, and 
.suggested this: "It seems to me now that 
Mobile should be captured, the expedition 
starting from some point on Lake Ponchar- 
train. There is much sickness in my com- 
mand now, from long and excessive marching 
and labor." II-alleck answered: "Before 
attempting Mobile, I thiiik it will bo best to 
clean up a little. Johxstox should be dis- 
l)osed of, also Trice and ^NIakmaulke, so as to 
hold line of Arkan.sas River.'' 

Sherman had reported to Grakt, and 
Grant to Halleck, that Jounston had been 
disposed of; tliat "He is now in full retreat 
east. Sherman says most of his army must 
l)erish from the heat, lack of water, and gen- 
ci-al discouragement;'" but Halleck did not 
understand this easy method of destroying 
armies by bulletin, and lie assumed that 
.Ii>iiNSTu>''s army was still to be disposed of. 
.Viul although the capture of Vicksburg and 
L'oit Hudson was said to have possessed tlie 
.Mississipi>i, and thus to have cut the Confed- 
eracy in two, Halleck assumed that no mil- 
itary consequences were to follow, bnt that 
.loHXSTON in one-half, and Trice and Mar- 
MADUDE in the other, had yet to be disposed 
of in the usual wa}'. 

Halleck continued, as quoted t)y l>AnEAi": 

Tills will enable us to withdraw troops from 
Missouri. Vicksburg and Port Hudson stiould bo 
repaired so as to be tenable by small garrisons; 
also, assist Banks in clearing out Western Loui.si- 
ana. When these things are accomplished there 
will he a large available force to operate either on 
Mobile or Te.-cas. Navy is not ready for co-opera- 
tion: should Sumter fall, then ironclads can be 
seiu to assist at Mobile. 

rpiiu tills, T> uiRvr niakc:^ ihc rcinns-k-alilc 
cuimiicntary : 

Tuis .strategy w.-is in iiccorc.ancc witli lliillcck's 
lial)it of scattering liis forces an(i energies upon 
comparatively unimportani objects, leaving the 
great and decisive aims to ue accomplished last. He 
.seemed to be unable to appreciate the fact that if 
the main objects of the war are gained, the lesser 
ones were sure to follow; or even the purely mili- 
tiiry maxim that strategic points of the highest 
confsequence should be first secured. 

^ Thus it doth appear that to withdraw 

Grant's army from the interior, and devote 
it for nearly a year to the capture of Vicks- 
burg, which had no tactical or strategical 
sequence, and then to take it around by sea 



to capture ^Mobile, separating it as widely as 
possible from the great interior campaign 
then on foot, was concentration upon tlic 
main objects and great strategic points. To 
the reviewer these great Generals appear to 
be able rivals in the tactics of avoiding co- 
operation of the armies, scattering forces, and 
devoting energies t.i comparatively unim- 
portant places. 

Badeau states that "on the L'-tth of July 
Grant renewed his suggestion : 'It seems to 
mo that jNIobilc is the point deserving the 
most immediate attention,' and on the 1st of 
August he telegrapiied to H.vlleck: 'Mobile 
can be taken from the Gulf Department with 
only one or two gunboats to protect the de- 
barkation. I can send the necessary force. 
With your leave I would like to visit New 
Orleans, particularly if the movement against 
New Orleans is aulliorized.' " The permis- 
sion was not granted, nor tiie movement 
authorized; but trRANT soon after went to 
New Orleans, ostensibly to confer with Gen. 
Banks about the Ued River expedition, and 
Badeau states that from there he renewed his 
solicitation for the movement on ilobile. 

As the campaign of Roseceans progressed. 
Gen. Grant seemed to grow more urgent to 
talco his army to a remote point. The authori- 
ties at Washington, however, had resolved 
I that Gen. Rosecrans .shoirld be left to his 
j chances with such force as he had, and were 
not intending nor dcsirinir to re-enforce him, 
although his forward movement was attenu- 
ating his forces to guard his lengthening line 
of supplies. As to Gen. Banks, they were de- 
sirous that he should move -with a strong 
force into Texas, lest the French Emperor 
should lue tempted to add that to the empire 
lie was founding in Mexico. 

While Grant v. as urging Halleck to per- 
mit an expedition to Mobile, he was also 
stating that his army was too much worn out 
for any other movement. Thus says Badeau, 
quoting Grant's dispatch to Halleck: 

The troops which had been engaged in the vari- 
ous operations of the campaign and siege of Viclcs- 
burgwere now greatly exhausted, and "entirely un- 
fit forany duty requiringmuch marching," but" by 
selecting any duty of immediate and prerssing im- 
portance," said Grant, "it could be done." 

Thus their e.xhaustion was .so peculiar that 
it unfitted them for any marching campaign 
in the interior, but did not unfit them tor an 



-14U-. 



expedition further into a tropical climate in 
midsummer, with the probability of another 
siege. 

True, the 13th Corps, which had borne as 
much of the hardship and sickness of the Mis- 
sissippi swamp operations, and of the fight- 
ing, the labors, and dangers of all the cam- 
paign and the siege as anv other, was sent off 
on a very severe marching campaign at mid- 
summer in the malarial lowlands of West 
Louisiana, which was about as hard an ordeal 
as troops exhausted by previous hardship and 
labor could be subjected to; but it is probable 
that a penance was still owing by them for the 
sins of their late commander. 

Badeau states that at New Orleans Grant 
renewed his solicitation on the 25th of Sep- 
tember, and again a complaining solicitation 
on the 30th, and that Halleck answered him 
again on the 13th of October, stating that 
'•there were certain reasons which I can not 
now explain, which prevented such an at- 
tempt." Yet Badeau states also that on the 
22d of September. Grant, who had then re- 
turned to Vicksburg, received Hallkck's dis- 
patch of the 15th, ordering this: "All the 
troops that can be spared in West Tennessee 
and on the Mississippi River should be sent 
without delay, to assist Gen. Eosecraxs on 
the Tennessee River. * * * Information 
just received indicates that a part of Lee's 
army have been sent to re-enforce Bragg :" 
also that on the 28th he wrote Halleck: "I 
am now ready for the field, or any duty I 
may be called on to perform." 

At last the Washington authorities had 
awakened to the situation, which had been 
inevitable to the common sense, which was 
that the brunt of the war was left to fall on 
Gen. RosECRANs; that east of the mountains 
no operation was going on to prevent the re- 
enforcement of Gen. Bragg from Lee's army 
by the short inner line; that in the west Gen. 
Grant's great army had been taken out of the 
theater of the war, and was wielding no co- 
operative aid or influence, and was too remote 
to bring succor before the crisis of the cam- 
paign ; while all Middle and W^est Tennessee 
and Kentucky, save where occupied by Rose- 
cRANs' forces, was open to Confederate raids 
up to the Ohio River. 

The authorities at Washington awoke to 
that which was before evident, but awoke too 
late. Nor was the sending of Longstrekt's 
corps from Lee to Bragg the first reason why 



they should not have permitted an army to 
lie isolated and idle at Vicksburg, while 
RosECRANS was making the campaign from 
Murfreesboro into the heart of the South, 
where all knew that the Confederates would 
use every ettbrt to concentrate forces to de- 
feat him. Halleck's first telegram was 
September 13. So shadowy had become the 
military possession in Grant's department, 
north to the Ohio, that there was no telegraph 
nearer than Cairo. The dispatch was brought 
thence by steamer, and Badeau tells this 
strange incident: "The messenger to whom 
this package was intrusted failed to deliver it 
promptly." 

This dispatch was: "All of Major General 
Grant's available force should be sent to 
Memphis, thence to Corintli and Tuscumbia. 
to co-operate with Gen. Rosecrans." Strange 
that the messenger to whom this package was 
intrusted neglected to deliver it till the 25th. 
Badeau says it was delayed ten days between 
Cairo and Memphis. As related above, Hal- 
leck telegraphed again on the 15th, and 
Badeau says this was received at Vicksburg 
on the 22d. The first troops embarked on 
the 27th. The battle of Chickamaiiga was 
fought on the 19th and 20th. On the 3d of 
October Grant received a request from Secre- 
tary Stanton to come to Cairo and report 
from there by telegraph. 

Conscious of what was in the wind, Grant 
departed immediately with all his staff 
and headquarters. At Cairo fie received 
a telegram from Stanton to proceed with 
staff, etc., for immediate operations in tlie 
field, to the Gait House at Louisville, Ky., 
where he would meet an officer of the War 
Department with instructions. At Indian- 
apolis he met Secretary Stanton with an 
order creating a new military division, em- 
bracing all between the AUeghanies and the 
Mississippi, except such as was occupied by 
Gkn. Banks, and placins Grant in command, 
subordinating the Department of the Cum- 
berland, commanded by Rosecrans, and the 
Department of the Oliio, commanded by 
BuRxsiDE. The history of Grant by Dana 
and Wilson states that his request, on being 
appointed to this command, was that Rose- 
crans should be removed from command of 
the Army of the Cumberland, and Gen. 
George H. Thomas put in his place. There 
came a time when he was even more desirous 
to put Gen. Thomas out of the way. 



147 — 



CHAPTER LIY. 

the great expectations of the trade that 
followed the flag — the way it fed the 
exemy — the fathek of waters becomes a 
channel of supply to the confederacy — 
the fond vision of reconstruction — gen. 
Sherman's statesmanship — a sudden awak- 
ening. 

In the popular rejoicing over the capture 
of VicltsburK, and the generous magnifying 
of that military achievement, there was a 
larfje ingredient of thrift, in tiie expectation 
that it would open the way to trade in the 
South. INIuch cotton had been kei)t in tlie 
South by the obstructions to its export; the 
war had greatly raised the price of cotton, and 
the Xorth liaa an abundance of goods and of 
products which the people of ihe South 
greatly needed. 

The trade was very profitable; the more so 
because the nece.ssity for iiaving military pro- 
tection, and the assistance of army trans- 
l^orts and teams, made it in the nature of a 
privilege to the favored. Always were a 
suthcient number of persons whose com- 
mercial character rose above the prejudices of 
the war. to go between the belligerent parties 
in carrying on this trade, and it found means 
of softening military commanders to it, and 
of procuring favors in the way of protection 
:iik1 transportation. By December, 1802, the 
ureenbaek price of cottou had risen to sixty- 
eight cents a pound: by Decen\ber, 1863, to 
eighty-four cents; in 1805 it reached $1 20. 
The j)rice of tobacco rose enormously. These 
.•irticles being inconvertible within the Con- 
federate lines, and being converted to such 
value by reaching the national lines, there 
were fortunes to be quickly made by those 
who could get favors from theTreasurj- agents 
and from military commanders, ;ind large 
nicans for corrupting these. 

'J'here was a popular sentiment of the time, 
in the form of words that "trade follows the 
tlag." which had a noble, national, and patri- 
otic sound, nuiking trade the sealing of the 
restoration of States to ihe Union, Secretary 
Chase emphasized this line sentiment; the 
agents of the Trcasuiy Department were in^ 
siructed to advance it, and were not loth; 
and so a horde of traders followed the flag, 
and it came about that with the establish^ 
ment of the army at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, 
s^tucl >.'atchez, flicro was a, lar^e influx ol' tm* 



ders, desirous to complete the work of re- 
storing that region to the Union. That enter- 
prising and cosmopolitan people, the Israel- 
ites, found themselves the chosen race in 
this, as always, alike by their commercial 
genius, their exemption from national preju- 
dices, anil their domicile on both sides, hav- 
ing equally the confidence of both parties. 

Badeau says that Gen. Grant was from the 
first opposed to this trade, and that he 
demonstrated to the administration that it 
furnished supplies to the enemy, and enabled 
them to continue the war. He argued that 
whereas more than lialf the cotton was the 
property of the Confederacy, as soon as we 
permitted our traders to buy, tiiis Confeder- 
ate cotton would become nominally the 
property of whatever jiersons were allowed 
to trade in it, and thus it would bring sup- 
plies directlj' to the Confederate Government. 
But Badeau says that Grant was overruled, 
and that trade was opened, first within cer- 
tain lines, and sub.sequently without any 
military limits, the trader giving a bond and 
receiving a uermit. 

Grant said: 

li tiaile IS o>>eiie(t uiidfr any tjeiienil rule, all sorts 
01 dishonest luen will engaije in it. taking any oath 
or obligation necessary to sccnre the privilege. 
Smnggling will at once commence, as it did at 
Memphis, Helena, and every other place where 
trade lia.s lieen allowed within llie disloyal .States, 
and the armed enemy will be enabled to procure 
from Nonhern msuUeis every Hrilcle they require. 

BAiiiiAi. says that it .sk came about; trade 
was 0{)ened, "and the consequences ))i'edicted 
by GiiANT followed rapidly." Thus was the 
singular consequence that the capture of 
Viclv.-sbur.ir and the recovery of the Misissippi 
Iliver, which had cost so many lives and so 
much treasure, became a source of supplj' to 
the enemy. 

Gen. Grant could I'efer wilji emphasis to 
his previous observation of the corrupting 
influence of this trading with the enemy, for 
in the first Vicksburg campaign, called the 
Holly Springs campaign, when he was at Ox- 
ford, Miss., he found a necessity to issue the 
following general orders: 

lA.j 

Headqc AivriiRs ;:^Tii .\.hmy Corps, ) 
Drpaut-vent of the Te.vnessee. 

OxFQRp, Miss,, I»ec, 17, IS-ii, ) 
General Order No. 12. 
1, TUe Jcwis, as » C'1r=s vJolMlng erwy fsgulrtUwM 



148 — 



of trade established by the Treasury Department, 
are hereby expelled from the department. 

2. Within twenty-four hours from the receipt of 
this order by post commanders, tliey will see that 
nil this class of people are furnished with passes, 
and required to leave; and any one returning after 
such notification, will be arrested and held in close 
confinement until an opportunity occurs of sending 
them out as prisoners, unless furnished with per- 
mits from these headquarters. 

By order of Maj. Gen. U. S. Gkant. 

(Ofticial.) 

John C. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant General. 



[B.] 
Headquarters, Holly Springs, Dec. IS, 1802. 
General Order No. 8. 

By theorder of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, all Jews are 
hereby expelled from the Department of the Ten- 
nessee. The Provost JNIarshal will at once give this 
notice to all Jews of this post, and see that they are 
provided with passes to leave the department; and 
all found here after the lapse of twenty-four hours 
will be arrested and placed in close confinement. 
No passes will be given to these people to visit, head- 
quarters of the Army of the Tennessee for the pur- 
pose of making personal application for trade per- 
mits. By order. R. c. Munrity, 

Col. sth Wis. Vol. In., Com'g Post. 

Capt. N. G. Lane will see to the faithful execu- 
tion of the above order. 

The President resciiided tliis order, Ijccause 
of its invidious particularity; but tlie order 
and Gen. Grant'.s remonstrances expressed 
the result of his observations of the working 
of this trade, under Treasury permits, and of 
the special genius wliicli that enterprising 
people have for inii)roving- such opportunities. 
Indeed, the records of the Superior Court of 
Cincinnati show tliat one of that favored race, 
a leading mereluint of Cincinnati, sought to 
ingratiate hi m.sclf into special favor of the very 
Commanding General, for this trade, by mak- 
ing a partner of a very near relative — a part- 
nership made public by a suit to recover tlie 
equal share in the venture, whiclt was agreed 
to be set ofTfor influence. 

Gen. Grant wrote from liis lieadqiuirters at 
Viclcsburg, July lil, 18(;;;; 

My experience in West Tennessee is that any 
trade whatever with the rebellious States is weaken- 
ing to us to at least SS per cent, of our force. Ko 
matter what the restrictions thrown around trade, 
if any whatever is allowed it will be made the 
means of supplynig to the enemy what they want. 
Restrictions, it lived up to, make trade unprofit- 
able, and hence none but dishonest men go into it. 
1 venture to say that no honest raau his made 



money in West Tennessee In the last year ; yet many 
fortunes have been made during that time. 

Mr. Shuckers, in his life of Mr. Chase, 
says : 

It is probably no exaggerated estimate that from 
the beginning to the end of the war, the surrepti- 
tious traffic thus carried on reached, at the least, 
an aggregate of two hundred millions of dollars. 

This is of the trade besides that authorized 
])y regular permits. Gen. Canby, writing from 
New Orleans in 18G4, said that the Confeder- 
ate armies both east and west of the Missis- 
sippi, during the preceding twelve months, 
had been largely supported by this ttnlawful 
traffic, and that its inevitable result must be 
to give strength and efSciency to the Confed- 
erate army equal to an addition of .'lO.OOO men. 
He said tliere were ten tliousand men within 
our lines wIk) were stimulated into active op- 
positi(jn to the successful prosecution of the 
war by the cotton trade, and that in order to 
save the cotton in the Confederate lines they 
gave the enemy earning of our military ex- 
peditions. 

This conti'aband trade created many of tlie 
forttmes which were made in the war. wliieli 
establi.shed tlie demoralizing tradition that 
the war was prohtable to the Xorthei-n people. 
Our Commaiiding Generals testified against 
it, but between the arguments on the 
othe^ side, and the sentiment that trade fol- 
lows the flag, and the constructive regulation 
of it by bonds and permits, the trade went 
on in large proportions, and thus was pre- 
scntetl tJie paradox that the acquirement of 
that river whicii was thought an irretrievable 
disaster to tlie Confederacy, became a valua- 
ble channel of Confederate supplies. 

Gen. Grant made his strong protest, and 
then rested tlie case, saj'ing that no views of 
his own sliould prevent his executing orders 
from t liosc in autliority. It was an abominable 
traffic, in its supplying means to resist our 
armies, and in that its profits went chiefly to 
the di.sloyal and dislionest; but there was no 
way of preventing this but by total prohibi- 
tion.'and by arresting every person found with- 
in the lines without military business. Our 
government was not equal to that, and tlie 
affair was furtluu- embarrassed liy the circum- 
stance that the expectation of trade had 
greatly magnihed tlic importance of recover- 
ing the Mississippi. 



149 



There was alsu a fond buliet' that the tuk 
ing o£ Vicksburg would cause the South- 
weste^rn States to recognize that the Confeder- 
ate cause was lost, and would lead to a move- 
ment for their restoration to the Union. 
iSiiERMAN's report of the desperate state into 
Avhich he had driven JoHNSTOx'.sarmy beyond 
Jackson, and Gt.ant's rejiort of thedisband- 
nient of Pemberton's paroled troops, giving 
up the Confederate cause, and carrying dis- 
affection to their homes, nourished this no- 
tion. As if the fighting were done, and the 
work of pacification were now in order. Gen. 
Grant, in giving instructions to Sherman to 
issue supplies to the inhabitants who had 
been left destitute by our devastation, said: 

It shoukl be our policy now to make as favor- 
able au impression upon the people of thi.s State as 
jiossible. Impress upon the men the importance of 
goinz through the State in au orderly manner, re- 
fraining from taking anything not absolutely 
necessary for their subsistence while traveling. 
They should try to create as favorable an impres- 
sion as possible upon the people, and advise them, 
if it will do any good, to make efforts to have law 
and order established within the Union. 

Thus, after our army had been ordered to 
destroy everything that could subsist man or 
beast between Jackson and the Mississippi, it 
was transformed from ravening wolves to po- 
litical doves, to preach the gospel of the 
Union. 

Adam Badeau, in telling of tlie fatal blow 
given to the Confederacy by the taking of 
Vicksburg, says: 

The country in the rear of Vicksburg was full of 
paroled soldiers, swearing they would not take up 
arms again if they were exchanged. Pemberton 
was reported to have but -l.OOO men left together. 
The army that was paroled, said one, was virtually 
discharged from the rebel service. Thonsands 
crossed the Mississippi and went West; many 
begged a passage to the North, and quite a number 
expressed a strong anxiety to enter ilie niuional 
service; but this, of course, was not allowed. 
Johnston's army also was greatly demoruUzcd. and 
the men deserted by thousands. Even a poiiiical 
movement was started by citizens, we.-st of Pearl 
River, to bring Mississippi back inlo thu Uniun. 

In the same mood of glorious fruitiuii. Gen. 
Halleck, August 29, wrote •Qeii. Sherman, 
stating that the question of the reconstruc- 
tion of Louisiana, Missi.ssippi, and Aricansas, 
was now to come up, and that not only the 
length of the war, but our ultimate and com- 
plete success, will depend on his solution." 



He desired to have the opinions of the Gen- 
erals to lay before the President to iireclude 
those of "gassy politicians in Congress." He 
had written Banks, who had answered fully. 
He had also written Gen. Grant, who had 
not answered. He desired Sherman to con- 
sult Grant and McPherson, and write him 
unofircially, so tlrat it need not go on file, but 
that he could use it with the President, 

Such an appeal for a comprehensive opin- 
ion on affairs of statesman^sliip could not be 
made in vain to Gen. Sherman. The letter, 
dated September 17, occupies six and a half 
fine print pages in the memoirs. Its breadth 
of comprehension, and the keynote of its 
polic}', may be judged by this in the fore 
part: 

That part of North America known as Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Arkansas is, in my judgment, the 
key to the whole interior. The valley of the Mis- 
sissippi is America, and, although railroads have 
changed the economy of intercommunication, yet 
the water channels still mark the lines of fertile 
land, and afford cheap carriage to the heavy prod- 
ucts of it. 

The inhabitants of the country on the Mononga- 
hela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, 
and Osage are as directly concerned in the security 
of the Lower Mississippi as are those who dwell on 
its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the na- 
tion has recovered its possession, this generation of 
men will make a fearful mistake if they again com- 
mit its charge to a people liable to misuse their po- 
sition, and assert, as was recently done, that be- 
cause they dwell on the banks of this mighty stream 
they had a right to control its navigation. 1 would 
deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to 
come, to institute in this quarter any civil govern- 
ment in which the local people have much to say. 

Tiic, latter went on to describe truly tlic 
social and political conditions of tlieSoutlicni 
people, which made free government an 
absurdity, and to argue the necessity of keep- 
ing them in a state of pupilage, under military 
authority, until all traces of war were effaced, 
and the conditions made suitable for the 
restoration of local government, administeretl 
by the local people. It was a letter of wise 
statesmanship, whose wisdom has been con- 
firmed by our sorry experiment of recon- 
struction. President Lincoln paid it t!ie 
compliment of reading it carefully and of 
asking Haw.eck to telegraph Suermax for 
permission to pul:)lish, which SMi:u:\tA\ re- 
fused. President Lincoln also paid it the 
compliment of acting directly opposite to thti 



— 150 



advice of the letter, in his policy of recon- 
struction. 

But wliile the military authorities at Wash- 
ington, and the Generals on the Mississippi, 
had laid aside the sword, and put on the robe 
of the statesman, and were gathering in the 
political fruits of tiie campaign which had 
cut the Confederacy in two,' and broken its 
backbone again, they were awakened from 
their fond dreams of the political reconstruc- 
tion of a broken up confederacy by intelli- 
gence tiiat Gen. Bragg, with an army re- 
cruited from the dispirited and demoralized 
West, and re-enforCed by Longstreet's corps 
from the East, confronted Kosecrans south of 
tlie Tennessee, and tliat a great battle was at 
hand, and the army of the Department of 
the Tennessee was far away, and exercising 
no influence whatever in the war. 



CHAPTER LV. 

WHAT IT (OST I.\ TIME, MKX, A>;D MOXEV — ITS 

<tI;am) results — complete separation of 

GUAKT's army from the theater of the AVAR 
— the centrifugal military PLANS, AND 
HOW THEY NEUTRALIZED VICTOKIKS AND OR- 
GANIZED DEFEATS. 

'I'he time, men, and means cunsuiiied in the 
Vicksburg operation are essential elements in 
estimating the value of that great achieve- 
ment. The time may fairly be rated as nearly 
a year, beginning with an army disciplined 
and seasoned by much service. The calling 
of Gen. Halleck to the chief command at 
Washington in .July, 18G2, left Gen. Grant in 
< ommand of the Department of the Tennes- 
see, and i)ursuing the defensive policy. Gen. 
K( ell, in tlie Department of the Cumber- 
land, bad been ordered to turn his energies 
and forces to an exiicdition to occnjiy East 
Tennessee. 

If the military plans of ilie two sections 
bail been made to lit into each other, with the 
object of prolonging the war, they could not 
iiave better served tlie purpose. While the 
Army of the Department of the Tennessee 
was keeping to the defensive, and the Army 
of the parallel Department of the Cumber- 
land was reconstructing railroads, preparing 
for its diversion to East Tennessee— one con- 
dition of which, by Gen. Halleck's order. 



was that the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, 
running near a hundred miles along the ene- 
my's front, should be restored and made a 
line of supplies — the Confederate army, under 
Gen. Bragg, was improving the opportunity 
by a strong concentration and ofTensive cam- 
paign to the Ohio River. 

In this defensive policy, Sherman was at 
Memphis, and Grant's headquarters were at 
Jackson, Ten n.; but Grant was not in con- 
nection with Sherman, although a railroad 
ran from Memphis to Jackson by way of La- 
grange. His only way of communication 
with Sherman was by the rear to Columbus, 
Ky., and from thence by the Mississippi to 
Memi^his. While Gen. Bragg's march to the 
Ohio River was going on in tiie Department 
of the Cumberland, the onlj' operations of 
importance in the Department of tlie Tennes- 
see were the concerted movement against 
Gen. Price at luka, which culminated Sep- 
tember 19 — in which that part which was un- 
der Grant and Ord strangely omitted to act 
its part in the concert, letting Price march 
away from their front to fall on Rosecrans — 
and the decisive repulse of Van Dokn's attack 
at Corinth, October 4, by the troops under 
command of Gen. Rosecrans — a victory which, 
according to Badeau, was the occasion of 
much dissatisfaction to Gen. Grant, and for 
which, as appears from Badeau's representa- 
tion, he thought he ought to be the one pro- 
moted, instead of Rosecrans, and Rosecrans 
disgraced. 

But this decisive iej)ulse disabled Gen. Van 
DoRN for further otiensive operations for 
some time, and as it was the first decisive vic- 
tory' in that army since Fort Donelson, it was 
an excellent preparation for active operations 
by our troops. <.)n the l(>th of October Hal- 
leck's general order made some rearrange- 
ment of the departments, and, Badeau says, 
enlarged Grant's command. In the same 
month he received large re-enforcements from 
the Northwestern States, and on the 20th he 
proposed to Hallicck a concentration for an 
advance, saying: "I think I would be able to 
move down the ^Mississippi Central road, and 
cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." From 
the month of October, at the latest, the occu- 
pation of the Army of the Tennessee in the 
Vicksburg operation may be dated, even if 
all the previous time of organizing and pre- 
paring be left out of the account, It was 
at the ia>t of Septeujbcr, 1S76, wiien a part of 



loi 



tliat aviny left V'icksburg to go to the rt^licl' oi 
RosECKANs' army at Chattanooga. 

The Confederate force which Gen. Gka>"t 
had to encounter in the field and in the siege 
of Vicksburg has been given in its order in 
this review. That Gen. Pemberton would 
understate his force to Gen. J. E. Johnstox, 
or JoiiNSTox to Pemberto.v, is improbable. 
He was not able to bring to the 
field at any time a force greater than 
half of that which Grant had in 
the raid to Jackson. His force in all the 
Department of Mississippi and East Louisi- 
ana, reaching to the gulf, and including Gen. 
Gardner's division at Port Pludson, which 
March 31, 1S63, had a total present and absent 
of 22,827, was little more than half as great as 
Badeau mentions as in the Department of the 
Tennessee when Grant began tlie Vicksburg 
operation in October, 1SG2. 

The Confederate official report of March 31, 
1863, of the troons of Pemberton' s depart- 
ment, including, as above. Gardner's troops 
at Port Hudson, and the 1st Military District 
under Brig. Gen. Euggles, the 4th Military 
District under Brig. Gen. Adams, and the 5th 
Military District under Brig. Gen. Chalmers, 
and 2,337 Mississippi State troops, present and 
absent, gives the following grand total: Pres- 
ent for duty, officers and men, 48,759; aggre- 
gate present, 61,485; aggregate present and 
absent, 82,308. 

Gen. Sherman, in his memoirs, states that 
Gen. Grant had abundant force for the inte- 
rior campaign. Badeau states the force 
in Grant's department as 130,000 men. 
Grant, November 8, informed Sherman that 
he was strong enough to handle Pemkerton's 
force "without gloves," and without Sher- 
man's aid. To this great army was subse- 
qnently added a gunboat fleet, and a great 
fleet of steamboat transports, most of which 
were kept in constant attendance on the ariny~ 
during its swamp operations. During the 
siege of Vicksburg, the 9th Corps — a fresh 
corps, organized for the expedition to P^ast 
Tennessee — was added to Grant's army; also 
Herron's division from the Department of the 
Missouri, which Badeau mentions as the 
strongest division in the combined army. 

Whether recruits were added in detail 
during the campaign does not appear from 
the records, but aside from these, the Vicks- 
burg operation absorbed a great army, and 
was enormously costly in the naval part, in 



which part there was also much destruction 
of vessels and stores, and an enormous con- 
sumption of large ammunition. The cost of 
the stores destroyed by Van Dorn at Holly 
Springs was estimated by hin\ at four 
millions; by Badeau it is belittled to the 
bagatelle of a million. The true value was 
probably between the two figures, either of 
which shows great preparation of stores for 
the interior campaign. Gen. Grant wrote 
to Gen. Halleck, after the surrender of 
Vicksburg, that the army was so used up by 
hardship as to be unfit for any operation 
requiring much marching. The number of 
men consumed in the campaign can not be 
found without going through all the sur- 
geons' returns, and these are not complete. 

The 'officers' reports of casualties give only 
those of battles. Gen. Grant's reports rarely 
descended to such detail as the loss of men, 
and when they did, it was only to a part of 
the actual loss. The number of soldiers con- 
sumed by disease in all the Vicksburg opei-a- 
tion will never be known. To lose more by 
disease than by battles is not uncommon in 
campaigns; what, then, may be estimated of 
a campaign which, after the Holly Sprino-s 
failure, began by sinking the army for three 
months in the flooded Mississippi bottoms, 
where the soldiers had to lay logs to support 
their beds above water, and by working them 
in the water in the most unhealthy and dis- 
spiriting labors. 

Contemporary reports of the dying of the 
soldiers in that swamp habitation, and in 
those swamp labors, caused a popular de- 
mand for Gen. Grant's removal. The num- 
ber of men which Badeau states as all that 
Grant could bring to the siege of Vicksburg, 
by stripping his department, shows that a 
large number had disappeared, Badeau 
mentions tlie levee for miles "furrowed its 
whole length with graves," and that "the 
troops were thus hemmed in by the burial 
placesof their comrades." Gen. McClernand 
mentions the heavy reduction of his corps by 
sickness from the swamp labors. In various 
ways there are materials for a rational esti- 
mate that the number of soldiers consumed 
in the whole operation was much greater 
than the number killed, wounded, and cap- 
tured of the enemy. 

Other campaigns which have been at the 
last successful may have consumed more of 
the offensive arrnj' than of the enemy, al- 



— 1-V2 



thduuli. ;i« the oilensive isalwaj's .supposed lo 
!>(• I lie superior force, such a loss does not 
.sliDw brilliant generalship; but it is not 
usual for a General to begin an oflTensive cam- 
paign Ijy sticking liis armj' helplessly in a 
malarious swamp, and making its chief losses 
in that way. Xor did convalescence restore 
to sound health such of the sick as survived. 
Not only they, but the most of those who did 
not succumb, got the poison of that malaria 
planted in their bodies for tlic rest of their 
lives. 

But when the conditions oblige a General 
to consume his army heavily in attacks in an 
offensive campaign, his plan exiiects to gain 
thereby successes and strategic positions 
which shall either be decisive of the war or 
:iu advantageous base for further operations; 
l)ut the finality of the Vicksburg campaign 
placed the army out of the field of war. It 
i.siolated that army from all other operations, 
leaving the Con federate armies free to concen- 
trate against the army in the parallel depart- 
ment. And, as regards all the tlieater of the 
war, it left (^rajjt's army — to use his own 
phrase— "bottled up." Graxt knew not which 
way to turn to give his campaign some se- 
quence. In any rational military jilan his 
army should be co-operating or joined with 
that of RosKCR.VNs, on which the whole weight 
of the war was now left to fall. Grant evi- 
dently feared that this would be ordered, and 
therefore he urgently solicited leave from 
Halleck to divert his forces to another ex- 
terior operation on Moliile, at the same time 
hedging against the military use of his army 
)iy saying that it was so used up as to be unfit 
for any service requiring much marching. 

The Confederate Government thought 
Vicksburg a place of great militavy impor- 
tance, and its loss a heavy disaster. The 
national government thought the same, and 
glorified its capture accordingly, overlooking 
all its dreadful cost. Gen. J. E. .Toiinston 
thought the place of but little military im- 
portance, since both it and Port Hudson had 
failed to keep control of the river. Even 
when in our hands, with all our gunboats, we 
could not prevent the Confederates from 
crossing forces and] supplies— so little 
significance had this much vaunted cutting 
of the Confederacy in two. The statements 
of Qen. Grant, Gen. Canby, and of Secretary 
Chase's biographer show that our recovery 
of the Mississipi)i, and our practice of the 



hue sentiuient ihai ti'ade follows the Hag, 
made the river a groat channel for supplies to 
the Confederate army. Gen. Canby estimated 
the aid thus given to the Confederate army 
as equivalent to 50,000 men. 

Thus the loss of Vicksburg had a large com- 
pensation to the Confederacy by enabling it 
to convert its cotton into supplies for its 
armies, while it had no military sequence to 
Grant's armj-, and left it where it exercised 
no material or moral influence on the war, 
while the real campaign, on a true military 
line, was going forward under Gen. Rose- 
CRANS, and by a wonderful combination of 
scattering policies the Confederate armies 
east and west were left free to concentrate 
against it. The success in making one of our 
armies pull away from another armj', and in 
diverting armies from co-operation in move- 
ments on the vital part, was so complete as to 
indicate the work of brilliant genius. But iu 
all the war there was not so complete a per- 
formance of this off-pulling, isolating policy 
as when Gen. Grant lialted in his marclmear 
the Yallal)usha, and by his irresolution lost 
his great accumulation of stores, retreated, 
abandoned the interior of his great depart- 
ment, and took his army by the river to the 
Ijottoms west of the Mississippi, with Vick- 
burg its sole and final objective, and a man- 
ner of attacking it which not only had no 
possibility of success, but in its several bayou 
and canal attempts was so destitute of mili- 
tary sense and of common sense as to be in- 
dignantly scoffed at by the intelligent volun- 
teers. 

Having no military sequence; having done 
nothing to end the war nor to gain a position 
or line for further operations; liaving opened 
a line of supplies for the Confederacy; having 
isolated Grant's army while the real military 
operation was culminating, the militaiy re- 
sults of the Vicksburg campaign are reduced 
to a calculation of the comparative butchery 
and the comparative consumption of men 
and means. In this the excess of the con- 
sumption of the men and means ot the na- 
tion was greater than our superiority to the 
Confederacy in these resources. The war 
never could have been brought to a success- 
ful termination by successes got at such cost 
as that at Vicksburg. And that diversion of 
the army from the interior, completely neu- 
tralizing it as to all true military operations, 
prepared the conditions of disaster to the 



15S — 



Army of the Cumberland as thoroughly as if 
it had been artfully planned. Instead of the 
drawn battle of Chickaniauga being an occa- 
sion for blame, it is a cause for amazement that, 
with Grant's army bottled up in the West, 
and the Army of the Potomac paralyzed in 
the East, and by the still mure wonderful 
management from Washington, the army un- 
der Gen. Burnside, in East Tennessee, sepa- 
rated and neutralized, the Confederacy was 
not able to seize such an opportunity to 
destroy that army; and that the invincible 
Army of the Cumberland, now bearing the 
biunt of all the war, was able to end the bat- 
tle by a clear repulse of the enemy, and to 
gain its territorial objective. 



CHAPTER LVI. 

THE MATURED OPINIONS OF GENS. GRANT AND 
SHERMAN ON THE VICKSBUKG CAMPAIGN— THE 
REVIEWER HUMIiLY ACCEPTS THE JUDGMENT 
OF THESE GREAT GENERALS. 

The military results of the Vicksburg cam- 
paign were so completed by the surrender of 
the place, that, as Gen. Sherman remarks in 
his memoirs: "Grant's army had seemingly 
completed itsshare of the work of war," and it 
was now at rest where it had no influence on 
the great campaign now going forwai'd in the 
interior of the Western zone, not even to the 
holding of any of the Confederate forces to 
the defensive against it in Mississippi, or 
detaining the troops recently under Gen. 
J. E. Johnston from joining Gen. Bragg in 
the concentration against Gen. EosEcaAMS 
and the Army of the Cumberland." Says 
Gen. Sherman: 

Our success at Vicksbun; produced other results 
not so favorable to our cause— a geaeral relaxation 
of effort, and desire lo escape the liard drudgery of 
tlie Camp; officers sought leave of absence to visit 
their homes, and soldiers obtained furloua^hs and 
discharges on the most slender pretexts; even the 
general government seeniei to relax its efforts to 
replenish ourranUs witix new men, or toenforce the 
draft, and the politicians were pressing their 
schemes to reorganize or patch up some form of 
civil government, as fast as the armies gained par- 
tial possession of the States. 

The "politicians" were simply acting upon 
the simple military idea of the time, that the 



capture of Vicksljtirg was a fatal blow to t!ie 
Confederacy, and was ai least equivalent to 
the occupation of the State of Mississippi, 
and this idea is set forth by Badeau in his 
glorification of Grant's achievement. 

When a military operation has nothing 
further to do, and has left the army where it 
is neutralized as to the war, and its Com- 
manding General departs on a hunt for an- 
other peripheral expedition, is a time for re- 
laxation and furloughs, and for discharges of 
such as had become enfeebled by hardships 
in a malarious region, of whom there were 
thousands that had gone through the cam- 
paign, but were now too broken in health to 
be fit for another. But the war was yet to be 
fought, and now, while Grant's army was 
lying idle out of the theater of the war, the 
Confederate chiefs were straining ettbrt to 
gather a force under Gen. Bragg to fall upon 
the army of Gen. Rosecrans, now pushing 
into the heart of the Confederacy. 

Van Horne's History of the Army of the 
Cumberland narrates that on the 30th of 
August, at the time wlien the Army of the 
Cumberland was crossing the Tennessee River, 
a loyal citizen, escaped from Chattanooga, 
brought Gen. Rosecrans intelligence that 15,- 
000 men were on the waj"^ from Mississippi to 
join Gen. BracTg. Further along he states 
that Bragg had been joined by two divisions 
from Mississippi. Also, in his general re- 
marks on the battle of Chickamauga, he men- 
tions as among the Confederate troops men 
paroled at Vicksburg. 

The strategy of a campaign which thus enda 
by taking an army to a place where it has no 
influence on other operations, as if its part in 
the war" were done, wliile the war is still in- 
creasing in magnitude and its greatest actions 
are yet to be, is a subject for the study of the 
military profession, and should have a promi- 
nent place in the text books at the military 
institute. 

In going back from the immediate and fin- 
ished results to make a brief review of the 
grand tactics of the campaign, the reviewer 
has the satisfaction of following the matured 
conclusions of the Commanding General as 
given by his supervised historian, and also of 
liis greatest Captain, as given in his memoirs. 
Thus he has that confidence which the "lay- 
man" feels when he follows the judgment of 
men of the military profession, particularly 
of those who themselves, in their written 



— 154 — 



memoirs, were the grejitest part of the great 
events. 

Says Gen. Sherman in his memoirs, after 
having recited the several failures in tlie 
bayou and canal cutting attempts: 

I had always contended that the best way to take 
Vicksburg was to lesurae the movement which had 
been so well begun the previous November, viz. : 
For the main army to march by land down the 
country inland of the Mississippi River, while the 
guttboat fleet and a minor land force should threat- 
en \ icksburg in its river front. I reasoned that 
with the large force then subject to Gen. Grant's 
orders — viz., four army corps — he could easily re- 
sume the movement from Memphis by way of Ox- 
ford and Grenada to Jackson, Miss., or down the 
ridge between the Yazoo and the Big Black. 

Gen. Sherman also confirms the exhibit 
made by this history, that Gen. Grant's at- 
tempt to go to join Gen. Banks, by way of his 
Duckport canal. Willow Bayou, and Bayou 
Vidal, to New Carthage, was tor the purpose 
of getting away from his hopeless situation at 
Vicksburg, without seeming to go back', 
which, as he says, was "for other than mili- 
tary reasons," meaning that it was to quiet 
the country by seeming to go forward, when, 
in truth, he was abandoning the expedition. 
For Gen. Sherman goes on : 

But Gen. Grant would not, for reasons other than 
military, take any course which looked like taking 
a step backward, and he himself concluded 
on the river movement below Vicksburg, so as to 
appear like connecting with Gen. Banks, v/ho at 
the same time was besieging Port Hudson from 
the direction of New Orleans. 

Gen. Sherman narrates that his onlnion of 
the interior line, as that by which the catii- 
paign would achieve great results, to which 
the fall of Vicksburg would be a conse- 
quence, was concurred in by Gen. Grant after 
all was over. He says: 

He has told me since the war that had we pos- 
sessed in December, 1862, the experience of march- 
ing and maintaining armies witliout a regular 
base, which we afterward acquired, he would have 
gone on from Oxford, us first contemplated, and 
would not have turned Ijaok because of the de- 
struction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van 
Worn. 

Tliis is a candid statement by Gen. Grant 
that he abandoned the true tactical line, be- 
cause he had yet to learn how to move and 
subsist an army in a country of abundance, 



when his immediate depot of stores had bcei^ 
lost. 

No lesson of the war was so strongly im- 
pressed on the public mind, and on the 
minds of the volunteer soldiers, as that the 
education at the military institute turned out 
officers knowing the whole art of war; and 
that on the other hand, without this passing 
through the institute, no degree of general 
education and no natural aptitude, genius, or " 
experience, or achievement could make any- 
thing but a mere pretense of a soldier — a 
fiction, whose successes or failures were alike 
blunders. Upon this admirable rule were 
promotions and commands assigned and 
military operation? jndged. Yet the moving 
and subsisting of armies in tlie enemy's coun- 
try is an elementary part of the art of war. 
But Gen. Sherman here states a simple con- 
fession by Gen. Grant that after all 
the service he had seen in the war he aban- 
doned a promising campaign and retreated 
ignominiouHly,and thereby finally abandoned 
the true tactical line, because he had not yet 
learned the rudimentary part of war, that an 
army may be subsisted in a country of abun- 
dant supplies for a few days, when by sheer 
neglect of another rudiment of war it has lost 
its immediate depot of supplies. 

The younger part of this generation may 
get an idea of the way the war was made to 
last four years, and to cost .seven thousand 
millions, and to call out more than a million 
of men, when our greatest General, now in 
command of a great department, and of 130,- 
000 men, as good soldiers as the world ever 
saw, was yet serving an apprenticeship, and 
learning the very elementary parts of war, at 
the expense of sacrificing campaigns, and of 
flying from the tactical line to an impossible 
one. Gen. Sherman goes on: 

The distance from Oxford to the rear of Vicks- 
burg is little greater than by the circuitous route we 
afterward followed from Bruinsburg to .Jackson and 
Vicksburg, during which we iiad neither depot nor 
train of supplies. 

In other words, after ail the cost of getting 
to Bruinsbnrg, the army was far worse situ- 
ated for marching to Jackson then when, in 
November, six months before, it was at Ox- 
ford, and Pf;Mr>ERTON had fallen baqft to the 
south of the Yallabusha. Upon this Gen. 
Sherman remark.s— not as a criticism, but 
simply remarks: 



155 — 



I have never criticised Gen. Grant's strategy on 
this or any other occasion, but I tnought then that 
he had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us 
nix months of extra hard work; for we misht have 
captured Vickshurg from tlie direction of Oxford 
in January, quite as easily as was afterward done 
in July, iSOS. 

These reiuarks'by Gen. Shermvx, wliich are 
not a criticism, relieve the reviewer from the 
disagreeable work of criticism. This, and 
Gen. Grant's concurrence tlierein, saves the 
lay reviewer from the presumption of differ- 
ing from these great soldiers, and leaves to 
liim the more pleasant work of agreeing en- 
tirely with their conclusion. The mutual 
admiration and confidence of these great 
Captains give great interest to their judg- 
ment of the radical blunder of the whole 
campaign. But Gen. Shekmak, who states 
that it was for "'other than military reasons" 
that Gen. Grant practiced the imposture on 
the country of pretending to go to Port Hud- 
son because of his dead failure on Vicksburg, 
omits to state that it was also for other than 
military reasons that Gen. Grant left the in- 
terior line at Oxford, after he had arranged 
a co-operation with Sheeman, and had sent 
him back to Memphis, and that it was the 
vision of Gen. McClernand, with Lincoln's 
commission in his pocket, coming to com- 
mand a river expedition, that caused Gen. 
Grant to falter, to weakly inquire of Wash- 
ington, "How far do you want me to go?" to 
halt, to leave the enemy, relieved from the 
pressure of his advance, free to operate in his 
rear, and then to make the loss of his com- 
munications a pretense for going back to 
liead off McCiernand, leaving Sherman to 
take his men to blind slaughter at Chickasaw 
Bluffs. 

Gen. Sherman's statement of Gen. Grant's 
afterthought is further corroborated by Ba- 
DEAU, who, in narrating Grant's success in 
subsisting his army in the retreat from Ox- 
ford, after Van Dorn had destroyed his stores 
at Holly Springs, says: 

Gen. Grant has told me, when discussing this 
campaign, that had he known then what he soon 
afterward learned— the possibility of subsisting an 
army of liO.OOO men without supplies other than 
those drawn from the country— he could at that 
time have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and 
probably have succeeded in capturing the place. 

f This statement is the more interesting from 



being made upon Grant's discovery then, a 
Oxford, that an army in a campaign can draw 
supplies from the country, for, says Badeau: 

For over a week he had no communication with 
the North, and for two weeks no supplies. But 
the country was found to be abundantly stocked. 
Everything for the subr.istence of man or beast, for 
fifteen miles east and west of the railroad, from 
Coff'eeville to La Grange, was appropriated to the 
use of the army. The families of tlie farmers .suf- 
fered, but the soldier.-i were fed ; and the lesson was 
taught which Grant afterward applied in the rear 
of Vicksburg, and which Sherman, having seen the 
application, practiced on a still larger scale in the 
marches through Georgia and the Carolinas— the 
lesson that an army may live, ihouiih its communi- 
cations are destroyed. 

Thus does Badeau, approved by Grant, 
corroborate Sherman's statement of Grant's 
admission, that if he had then known how to 
subsist an army for a short time in a country 
of abundance, as he afterward learned, he 
could then have gone on from Oxford to 
Jackson. And Badeau makes the admission 
more interesting by stating that it was after 
Grant had learned, on the Holly Springs and 
Oxford line, the simple lesson that he could 
subsist an army on the country, that he left 
that true tactical line and went to an impos- 
able one, becjyise his line of supply liad been 
temporarily broken. 

Badeau, revised by Grant, has to explain 
Grant's present disregard of the lesson which 
he had learned, and hedoesitshrewdly by this: 

Although the soldiers found all that was neces- 
sary, Grant was anxious until he discovered the 
success of the experiment. It was one hitherto un- 
tried, and, while uncertain of its results, he moved 
his army back to La Grange, abandoning the cam 
paign, which had been pressed to a distance of fifty 
or sixty miles. 

Thus was the rudimentary educational ac- 
quirement by this costly lesson laid on the 
shelf, and Grant went to plant his army in 
the swamps west of the Mississippi, to learn 
further elementary lessons in the art of war. 
This gives an idea of what it cost to edu- 
cate one General. 

If Grant had gone on from Oxford to Jack- 
son, and established himself strongly there, 
Vicksburg would be untenable to the Con- 
federates, and would have fallen of itself. 
Gen. J. E. Johnston said that our possession of 
Jackson would eventuate in the loss of the State 
of Mississippi to the Confederacy. But reaching 



— i56r. 



it by a raid from Grand Gulf, we could only 
raid it. By the interior line the army would 
have possessed and covered the country of the 
Departmentof the Tennessee, and thestrategic 
places which had been the objective of a pre- 
vious great campaign of an army of 100,000, 
but which were now abandoned to the enemy. 
Its progress down Northern Mississippi would 
have converted the resources of a rich country 
to the national use, which this strange aban- 
donment left to supply the Contederate 
armies. 

It would have given support and co-opera- 
tion to the Army of the Cumberland, from 
which this strange departure isolated it as 
completely as if it had been taken out of the 
world. From the Department of the Cum- 
berland to the Mississippi River, the Depart- 
ment of the Tennessee was laid open to the 
enemy, north to the Ohio River; and all that 
region, open to Confederate incursions, 
flanked Roskcrans' army in the Stone River 
and Chattanooga campaigns. Happily the 
lay reviewer can avoid the presumption of 
drawing this conclusion on a purely military 
affair, and can escape the displeasure of dif- 
fering with military men on their own 
achievements, when these great Captains con- 
cur in the judgment that the abandonment 
of the interior campaign was a blunder, and 
was because Gen. Grant had yet to learn this 
elementary part of the art of war. 



CHAPTER LVII. 

GEN. GEANT AWARDED THE SOLE HONOR AND RE- 
SPONSIBILITY OF THE SEVERAL PLANS OF THE 
VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN — THE REASON WHY HE 
ABANDONED THE INTERIOR CAMPAIGN — HIS 
GREAT OPPORTUNITY. 

Gen. Grant's authorized historian afJirms 
that all of tiie operations against Vicksburg 
were of Grant's sole planning, and that not 
only did he unapproachably transcend all 
his Generals, but in the very turning point 
of the campaign, when it emerged from the 
swamp disasters and entered the triangular 
road to victory, he went contrary to the opin- 
ions of all his subordinate officers. 

Gen. Sherman generously awards the same 
exclusive honor to Grant. He says: "The 
eampaign of Vicksburg, in its 'conception and 



execution, belonged exclusively to Gen. 
Grant." He corroborates this by saying 
that when Gen. Grant retreated from the in- 
terior campaign, "I thought then that he had 
lost an opportunity, which cost him and us 
six months' extra hard work; for we might 
have captured Vicksburg from the direction 
of Oxford in .January quite as easily as was 
afterward done in July, 1863." No one has 
contested Gen. Grant's sole credit for all the 
planning of the several operations which 
have been embraced in the general term as 
the Vicksburg Campaign, comprising a 
variety of campaigns and expeditions. And 
both Sherman and Badeau quote Grant as 
admitting that his retreat from the campaign 
by the line of the Mississippi Central Rail- 
road was a mistake. 

This admission of the military blunder of 
retreating from a promising campaign, on the 
true military line, where he had abundant 
force, great preparation of supplies, and had 
only to go forward to accept' the success 
which was at hand, carries with it an admis- 
sion of Gen. Grant's sole responsibility for 
all the consequences of this error. The re- 
viewer may avoid the sin of presumptuous 
criticism by accepting the matured judgment 
of the sole author and finisher of those 
operations, and of his great Captain, and he- 
may plant himself impregnably on the base 
of their judgment in reviewing the direct 
consequences of this confessed blunder. And 
no operation in all the war had greater con- 
sequences, in the consuming of the volun- 
teers and resources of the nation. 

Both Gen. Sherman and Adam Badeau 
quote Gen. Grant as excusing his abandon- 
ment of the Yallabusha campaign by his in- 
experience in war, in the elementary part 
of subsisting an army in the enemy's conn- 
try; but this is an instance of mode.sty doing 
itself injustice. Badeau's narrative of that 
retreat shows plain I3' that Grant's object was 
to keep McClernand from the command of 
tlie river e.xpedition, and he narrates this as 
a sufficient reason. Gen. Sherman had just 
made an extraordinary march from jMemphis, 
with three divisions, to join Grant's arnu' 
south of the Tall^ahatchie, and thus all was 
ready for a decisive advance, when Grant 
heard that Lincoln was favoring McCler- 
nand's project of a river expedition. 

He thought to head off McClernanp by 
hurryiug Sherman back to Memphis to or- 



-^157 



ganize <ancl embark a river expedition ahead 
of McClbknind. By this, alone, did Grant 
sacrifice his campaign. He divided his army 
by a wide distance, where communication 
was impossible, and the force he had left was 
not suflicient for a bold ofl'ensive movement. 
That Grant intended any, after detach- 
ing Sherman, is incredible. To go forward 
was to e.tpose his half of the army to de- 
struction. The co-operation with Sherman 
in a concerted at'tack on Vicksburg, which 
was talked of, was, in the nature of things, 
impossible. Grant could not march to co- 
operate by attacking Vicksburg i7i the rear 
withont having to cross the ditiicult Yalla- 
busha, and expose his half of tlie army to 
Pemberton's concentrated forces. 

According to all rational calculations this 
would have taken his army to destruction. 
He could not comniunicate with Sherman 
to arrange concert of action, if that had been 
possible. His talk of co-operation, as repre- 
sented by Badeau, was so vague as to leave a 
doubt of its sincerity. It was so vague that 
Badeau was enabled to cast on Gen. Sher- 
man the sole responsibility for his slaughter 
of his troops at Chickasaw Bayoxi, by de- 
nying tliat he had reason to expect concert of 
action. He supports this by citing, as the ''ex- 
tent of Grant's promise of co-operation," the 
following: "I will hold the troops here in 
readiness to co-operate with you in such 
manner as the movements of the enemy may 
make necessary." In short, he had halted, 
while Sherman was to march back to Mem- 
phis, gather boats from all the rivers, and 
embark for Vicksburg, to heat McClernand, 
and there to sacrifice his troops by attempting 
the impossible. 

When a General halts for an indefinite 
period, in an offensive campaign, he abandons 
it. ^till more if when he has invaded 
the enemy's country, and stretched out his 
own communications, he sends back lialf his 
army out of sight, out of support and out of 
communications. But Badeau, in order to 
allow that Sherman, though in error, may 
have had some vague reason to expect co- 
operation, adds- "It was, however, under- 
stood in conversation that in case Pemberton 
retreated, Grant would follow him up, 
between the Yazoo and the Big Black 
rivers, to the Mississippi." Thus didGRANT's 
subsequent movements now' dependj on 
Pemberton's retreating, and retreating be- 



tween these rivers, all the way down to the 
Mississippi. Thus the plan was that when 
Grant sent back half his army, Pemberton 
was to return the compliment by retreating, 
and was to retreat in just the line that 
Grant desired. Otherwise Sherman was to be 
left without support. The lay reader has to 
admire that the lives of intelligent volunteers 
were placed at the mercy of such headless mili- 
tary plans as these. 

These afterthoughts of Grant's historian do 
injustice to his military capacity, in the vain 
eftbrt to cover the fact that he abandoned the 
campaign, to beat McClernand outof the com- 
mand ot the river expedition. He had aban- 
doned it when he sent back half his army. 
To say that he meant to go forward after 
that is to charge him with the incredible in- 
competency of reducing his army one-half 
in the tide of an oflf'ensive campaign in a 
hostile country. To suppose that he thought 
that when Sherman got to Vicksburg, Pem- 
berton would fall back to that place, and 
that then he would follow him and co-oper- 
ate with Sherman, is to accuse him of mili- 
tary idiocy. No forward movement was pos- 
sible after he had divided his array. His 
halting exposed the rest of his army to de- 
struction, if an enterprising General had 
been against him. He got off cheaply from 
the consequences of his own conduct by the 
lossof his stores and some detachments cap- 
tured. But after Sherman had gone, Grant 
heard from Halleck that Lincoln desired 
that McClernand's corps should form part of 
the river expedition, and that McClernand 
have "the immediate command under your 
direction." 

Badeau's narrative shows clearly that 
Grant then determined to go back and 
take the direction of the river expedition by 
going with it, which would reduce Mc- 
Clernand to the command of his corps. To 
beat McClernand was the great military ob- 
ject for which Grant gave up that which. 
if pushed forward with energy, might reason- 
ably have achieved greater results than were 
achieved by any campaign of the war. And 
in this he would let McClernand go and en- 
tangle his men in the West Mississippi 
swamps, ^till^the malaria had eaten them up. 
A fleet from the lower river, a year previous, 
had found Vicksburg impregnable to naval 
attack, and inacessible from the river, and 
had shown that the canal to turn the river 



— 158 — 



was an impossibility. This was intelligence 
which a General should have had before he 
abandoned a great campaign to repeat this 
experiment. Gen. Grant must have had it, 
but he seems to have thought that McCler- 
NAND might overcome these obstacles, and the 
great object of beating McClerxand obscured 
all other military objects. 

The enemy's taking the oS'cnsive was the 
inevitable conseqiience of Grant's slow, hesi- 
tating.and finally halting movement. The de- 
struction of his immediate depot of supplies 
was not the cause, but the consequence of his 
desertion of the campaign. With Sherman, 
he had had a force twice as great as Pembeu- 
TON could bring to oppose his advance. The 
season was favorable, the ground dry, 
the country rich in suoplies. If he had 
marched to Jackson, Pemberton would have 
been compelled to try conclusions with him 
on that line. His defeat of Pemberton and 
occupation of Jackson would have made 
Vicksburg untenable to Pemberton. All that 
rich country of Northern Mississippi would 
have contributed supplies to our forces, in- 
stead of feeding the Confederate army to the 
end of the war. 

Gen. J. E. Johnston said that Grant's pos- 
session of Jackson would bring the loss of 
Misisssippi to tbe Confederacy. As a soldi er 
he could not then believe that Grant in- 
tended only a devastating raid on Jackson, 
and the destruction of a railroad center which 
military intelligence would convert to great 
power as a base for further ojjeiations. The 
firm occupation of Jackson would have 
threatened Meriden, another railroad center — 
the two commanding all the railroads of Mis- 
sissippi. By the river to Vicksburg, and by 
the railroads to the North, Grant would have 
lines of supplies for any further campaigns, 
and in no part of the South could these be 
more feasible, or more in the vitals of the 
Confederacy. 

With such success as was within Grant's 
easy reach, by faithfully keeping on in his 
campaign, the administration would have 
sent him all the forces he wanted, and he 
might then, by real and great achievements, 
have risen to that supreme dictatorial posi- 
tion over all the armies and over the ad- 
ministration which he gained after vast sac- 
rifices, by comparatively small successes, 
which were magnified by the contrast of 
their broad setting in his own failures. 



Even if he had rested at Jackson, the coun- 
try which he would occupy, the disasters in- 
flicted on the enemy, and the forces which the 
Confederacy would have to keep on the de- 
fensive against his commanding position, 
would greatly cripple the enemy, and would 
be direct co-operation with the campaigns of 
the Army of the Cumberland, from which 
this diversion isolated Grant's army. All this 
sacrifice of his own great opportunity, and of 
his country's cause, and of the lives of the 
volunteers, was remorselessly made, to no 
other end than to beat Gen. McClehnand, 
whom he regarded as a personal rival, out of 
the command of the Mississiijpi River expe- 
dition, to vrhich Lincoln in his easy going 
mood had in an evil hour appointed him. 



CHAKTER LVII. 

A SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS FROM 
THE TIME WHEN GRANT TOOK COMMAND OF 
THE RIVER EXPEDITIONS TO THE TAKING OF 
VICKSBURG. 

By the time that Gen. Grant had completed 
his success in beating Gen. McClernand out 
of the command of the Mississippi River ex- 
pedition by assuming it to himself, he realized 
that he had beaten himself by taking his 
great army and navy to a place where any 
rational military operation was impossible. 
At the very outset he was reduced to the 
strait of making projects and undertakings to 
keep up the pretense of a military operation, 
but from which nothing else was expected. 

His Holly Springs disaster and retreat had 
disgusted the country, which now recalled all 
his failures, and looked upon this as cumula- 
tive proof of his incompetency. Erelong 
the utterly unmilitary character of his bayou, 
canal, and swamp undertakings, and the con- 
suming of the volunteers in hardships in that 
malarious morass, caused a popular demai)d for 
his removal. Public opinion was only in part 
deceived by his bulletins to Halleck, for the 
country had means of true intelligence. In 
the course of failures, this General, who had 
sacrificed a campaign to head ofT McCler- 
nand. was put to a great strait to keep his 
own military head on. 

The first phm ordered by Gen. Grant, on 
taking formal command at Milliken's Bend. 



— 159 — 



was a plan to abandon the Vicksburg expe- 
dition. Says Badeau: "On the 30th of Janu- 
ary, the day after he assumed coiiiniand of 
the Vicksburg expedition. Grant gave orders 
for cutting a way from tlie Mississippi to 
Lake Providence, and went himself to that 
place on the 4th of February." This was a 
project to get- from the Mississix)pi. on the 
west side, about seventy miles above Vicks- 
burg, through a swamp, into a small bayou, 
and from that into a chain of bayous, diverg- 
ing forty or fifty miles from the river, and 
through a wonderfully crooked cliain of sup- 
posed navigation of 400 to GOO miles, to fetcii 
out in Red River. 

Thus, after he h;id succeeded in putting 
himself in the place of McClernand, at the 
cost of sacrificing a great campaign, his first 
plan was to run away — to take his army aim- 
lessly somewhere, anywliere, so as to get off 
withoutseemingto reireatagain. Fortunately, 
he could not make an entrance into this laby- 
rinth, for it he had got his army and thegun- 
boats and transports fairly in, it is not prob- 
able that they would ever have come out save 
as Confederate captures. The experience of 
the Steele's Bayou expedition, and of the Ya- 
zoo Pass e.xi)euition, proved that a few men 
with axes could shortly block this sort of 
navigation, and that the great guns of the 
navy were of no use against skirmishers. But 
while the country was made to believe that 
Grant was evolving wonderful plans to cap- 
ture Vicksburg, he was planning to retreat, 
and was consuming his army and risking its 
total destruction by sending it into labyrinth 
exp)editions to keep the country deceived in 
order to save liimself. 

The plan to divert the Mississippi by a ca- 
nal wa,s also a plan to get away from Vicks- 
burg. It is hard to believe that Gr.\nt was so 
blind to the simplest physical forces as to 
suppose that this mighty river, running with 
vast volume a hundred feet below the surface 
of the earth, at the rate of five or six miles 
an hour, could be diverted by scratching the 
surface with a ditch. But Badeau says that 
the idea took hold on Lincoln's imagination. 
Hai.lf.ck told Grant, for Lincoln, to jiay par- 
ticular attention to the scheme to turn the 
Mississippi. Grant was now in a predica- 
nient when he needed a pretense of a plan, 
and thi.s pretense of diverting the river would 
divert Lincoln and the public mind. As 
early as the 4th of February he wrote Hal- 



LECK that he had lost all faith in it. But 
still he kept up the pretense, and kept on 
abusing his troops by this depressing labor, at 
which their intelligence revolted. The after 
curtailing of this stupendous plan to the lit- 
tle one of making a canal through which 
shallow boats could pass, was alike impossi- 
ble. The rise of the river at that point, by 
flood, is more than forty feet. Before the ca- 
nal could be dug, the fall of the river would 
leave it in air. Yet Grant kept the troops at 
this work for near two months after he had 
told Halleck that it was impracticable, and 
that already the Confederates had erected 
batteries to command the outlet, and there- 
fore it would be useless if made. 

The Yazoo Pass plan was to cut the levee on 
the east side of the Mississippi, at a place which 
by direct line was 160 miles above Vicksbug, to 
open a passage for shallow boats through nar- 
row and crooked bayous to the Tallahatchie, 
through that to tlie Yallabusha, and by that 
into the Yazoo. And then what? This de- 
tachment, whose long, narrow, and wonder- 
fully tortuous communication a few axmen 
could obstruct by felling trees across, could 
not reach any ground from which it could at- 
tack Vicksburg by the rear, save wliere the 
Confederates could quickly concentrate a 
force to attack it, and where it would be im- 
possible for Grant to support it in any way. 
The further it got into this trap, the nearer it 
would get to destruction. 

Fortunately for our troops, the Confeder- 
ates had planted a battery at the junction of 
the Yallabusha and Yazoo, which, by an air 
line, is a hundred miles above Vicksburg, 
which our boats could not pass, and fortu- 
nately,, the head of the expedition backed out 
before the Confederates had surrounded it. 
The Steele's Bayou expedition was partly 
undertaken as a diversion to relieve the en- 
tangled Yazoo Pass expedition. It took gun- 
boats and Sherman's corps into a circuitous 
■chain of narrow, crooked bayous, from which 
it was glad to make a very narrow escape. 
And if it had got further in, escape would 
have been less likelj'. 

The wonderful fortune of the army was in 
its successive escapes from Gen. Grant's 
plans. These various plans were carried along 
at the same time — the river diverting canal, 
the Lake Providence pL'in, the Yazoo Pass 
plan, the Steele's Bayou plan — severally 
aiming in o^iposite directions; and now came 



— 160 — 



the most wonderful of all, the Duckport ca- 
nal and bayou plan to get down to Gen. 
Banks' Department, which may be called the 
Port Hudson plan. Halleck and Lincoln 
had come to the conclusion that all of 
Grant's bayou undertakings were diversions, 
and that he could do nothing at Vicksburg, 
and they now urged him to get away and go 
and join Banks. Thus the taking of Vicks- 
burg had been eliminated from the campaign, 
and now the great objective was to get Grant 
to move somewhere, and to seem to go for- 
ward, although really to retreat. 

Under this peremptory urgency to move 
somewhere, Grant formed the Port Hudson 
plan. The panic of a routed army, under a 
cavalry charge, could alone excuse such a 
plunging into the unknown as that which 
Grant now ordered, under this pressure from 
the rear. The plan was to make a new canal, 
starting from Milliken's Bend, at Duckport, to 
a narrow bayou called Walnut, which fetches 
a great circuit to southeast and northeast, to 
Roundabout Bayou, then by great crooks to 
Bayou Vidal, which at a point in its circuit 
had a connection with the river by a crevasse 
at New Carthage. By this narrow and tortu- 
ous water route, whose navigation was in 
great part conjecture, which, if navigable at 
all, would cease to be as soon as the high 
flood fell, shallow barges were to supply the 
army, which was to march along the edge of 
these bayous to New Carthage, and from there 
by means of these flatboats to descend the 
river to Grand Gulf and carry that strongly 
fortified place by assault from these frail 
craft, in order to gain a point of departure to 
Port Hudson. 

From Grand Gulf Grant was to send 20,000 
men to Banks, while the rest abode at Grand 
Gulf, depending for supplies on this supposed 
navigable route of lifty miles in the enemy's 
country, through great woods, where a few 
choppers could quickly close it, until the 
corps of 20,000 had reached Banks in some 
unknown way, and Banks had taken Port 
Hudson, which might stand a sieee as long as 
Vicksburg. Then Banks, with his corps, was 
to come up to join Grant, and then the com- 
bined army would begin anew some operation 
against Vicksburg. With moderation of speech 
it may be remarked that the escape of the army 
trom this plan was a wonderful stroke of for- 
tune. 

The army was started on this retreating 



stratagem. The navigable route was never 
navigable. The falling river had left the ca- 
nal in air at the very time when Grant was 
reporting to Halleck that it could be de- 
pended on to supply the army, and that "the 
navigation can be kept good, I think, by us- 
ing our dredges constantly until there is 
twenty feet fall." The means for the suppli' 
of the army were found impossible after the 
army had begun its march. The impossibil- 
ity was before evident to all but the willfully 
blind. The array was on the move into the 
unknown, with the line of supplies, on which 
the Commanding General's plan depended, 
dropped out; but it must move, although to 
destruction, or Grant would be removed. 

The advance corps of 20,000 men, having to 
build its own road along the edge of the 
bayous, just above the flood, strained the 
road's capacity for its own subsistence; and 
from the failure of the water route it had no 
boats to cross the Mississippi. The army was 
now saved from retreating from a retreat by 
the destructive resort of running boats past 
the Vicksburg guns. This was a desperate 
afterthought in a desperate situation. At 
first it cost the destruction of about half, but 
soon the Confederates strengthened their 
water batteries, and at the last venture only 
one out of three loaded transports got by, 
and so this desperate resort ended. But by 
this aftertliought alone were boats got to 
cross the Mississippi. The plan to assault 
Grand Gulf by landing in front from towed 
flatboats was as pretty a plan for a colossal 
slaughter as the wit of man could devise. 
Fortune again saved the army from the Com- 
manding General's plan. 

The plan to divide the army at Grand Gulf 
by sending a part to Gen. Banks, holding the 
rest at Grand Gulf passive, to abide the result 
of the Louisiana campaign, depending on a 
circuitous, narrow bayou route, its convolu- 
tions reaching far into the enemy's country, 
or on a road by the same route, now stretched 
seventy miles to Hard Times, was a complete 
plan, if the object had been to have both 
parts of the army made prisoners. The ina- 
bility to make even a landing at Grand Gulf 
saved the troops from that premeditated 
slaughter. The accident of the finding of a 
landingat Bruinsburg, above the flood, and un- 
guarded, with a road running to the high 
ground ; the energy of the advance corps, which 
pushed on by a forced march to Port Gibson, 



— 161 — 



and beat a Confederate detachment, and 
thereby made Grand Gulf untenable, gave to 
Grant the chance to report not only a move- 
ment away from Vicksbiii'g accomplished, 
but a victory, and his point of departure for 
Port Hudson gained. This was reasonable 
assurance that his head would stay on long 
enough for him to consider the situation, and 
he stopped to consider. 

No reason can be found in Baueau's history 
for Gra-\t's abandoning his Port Hudsoii 
plan, now that he had gained the place 
which was to be the point of departure. That 
which Grant gave to Banks as a reason was 
that he could not retrace his stet)s. Badeatj 
repeats this as if it were a reason. But al- 
though Grant could give no reason for aban- 
doning his great plan, reasons enough are 
apparent. The reasons were the iin[)ossibility 
of his plan; an impossibility as apparent 
when he conceived it as now. His navigable 
route of supply on which it was based never 
bad an existence. Even if he could feed his 
army by that road, he could not protect it 
from the enemy. If he had halted, and had 
embarked part of his troops, the Confederates 
would have taken the offensive, and they 
could soon cut off his single road of supplies 
and besiege him at Grand Gulf. He had rea- 
sons enough, but to state them would be to 
confess the utter folly of his generalship. 

And now. by his miraculous escape from 
his own devices, a great opportunity was pres- 
ent, and he had only to let his splendid 
troops go forward to achieve a yictory which 
would have had the effect to wipe from the 
public memory all his blunders and failures. 
Although he had scattered his army by the 
necessity to protect the long line from Milli- 
ken's Bend, he yet had a movable force su- 
perior to Pemberton's, and soldiers confident 
in themselves and in their officers. The Con- 
federate detachments had returned to Vicks- 
burg. From Grant's position at Hankinson's 
Ferry, a march of ten miles would reach 
AVarrenton by the rear, and would make the 
Confederates evacuate that, as at Grand Gulf. 
This would restore the army to its base of 
supplies at Milliken's Bend, by a road of only 
two miles across the tongue of land, and 
would add to his offensive column the 
troops guarding the long road from Milli- 
ken's Bend to New Carthage. 

From Warren ton a march of five miles 
would take his army upon the railroad com- 



munication of Vicksburg. and force Pember- 
ton to an immediate issue, which our troops 
were eager for. Was there a soldier of that 
army, except Grant, who feared the issue? 
The great opportunity was before his face. 
No militai-y genius was required to seize it; no 
strategy; no tactics but of the simplest; 
nothing but to let his troops go forward, un- 
der their own ofiticers, to victory. The only op- 
portunity for the exercise of great military ge- 
nius in this situation was the genius to avoid 
a great opportunity. This was the genius 
which Grant exerci-sed as conspicuously 
here as he had done in the Mississippi Cen- 
tral campaign. 

The reason why Grant shunned this oppor- 
tunity, and the object for wiiich he marched 
his army away from supplies and from Vicks- 
burg, fifty miles into a hostile region, leaving 
Pejiberton's army on his flank and rear, can 
not be ascertained from any direct statement 
in Bapeau's liistory. Pretended reasons are 
alleged, which are contradictory to one an- 
other and are trivial in themselves and a 
reflection on Gr.'\.nt's competency, and there 
is much of vagueness, from all of which the 
critical reader is left to find the reason, which 
plainly v.'as that Grant wished to avoid join- 
ing issue with Pemberton in a battle, and that 
his movement into the interior had for its 
original object nothing more than a raid, to 
keep up that policy of seeming to do, which 
he entered upon as soon as he took com- 
niand of the river expedition, tliinking 
to regain, by the rapid marches of an unen- 
cumbered army, a point on the Mississippi 
from which to call for re-enforcements to be- 
gin a campaign against Vicksl-urg. 

No other objective than this can be sifted 
from Badeau's narrative; nor, in his after- 
thought attempts to give reasons, is there any 
tliat does not border on militarjr idiocy. The 
beginning of this raid was in a halting man- 
ner, as if Grant had not made up his mind. 
Badeau says the movements ''were in the na- 
ture of developments." They were halting, 
shifting, and aimless until McPherson hap- 
pened to stumble on a Confederate detach- 
ment at Raymond. Then all was shifted, and 
Grant followed on to Jackson, where he ap- 
plied his energies to destroy that which in a 
real campaign would have been imi:)ortant 
means for his own army. Then, upon a wild 
notion, he started all his army to race with 
JoHN.sTON for the Mississippi River. This was 



— 162 



a race to escape; ^or after he had avoided 
Fembekton alone at Vicksburg, it would be re- 
markably brilliant generalship to come to 
the issue with both Pemberton and John- 
ston, having the stronghold of Vicksburg for 
their support. 

His surprise by chance intelligence thnt 
Femberton bad crossed Big Black River, :ind 
was moving for his left and rear, turned him 
from that race, and now he was obliged to 
meet the enemy. And here, in spite of him- 
self, the splendid quality of the volunteers, 
their indomitable marching, though with 
insufficient food, the energy and skill of a 
corps commander whom he was trying to de 
feat, the divided counsels of the Confedeiate 
army, Pemberton's mistaken advance, and 
the accidental advantage of coming upon him 
in the demoralization of retreat, offered 
Grant an opportunity for an easy victory, 
which would have left no organized arnjy to 
oppose his march into Vicksburg. 

ilemarkable military genius was requisite to 
bring an army near to repulse by a retreating 
eneiuy of half its force, but Grant's was equal 
to the opportunity. He consumed the right 
of his army in assaults on a natural fortress, 
the only strong place in the enemy's line, 
which had a clear way round it to the ene- 
my's road of retreat, because of his persistent 
idea that the enemy, who in fact was retreat- 
ing by his right, was advancing upon his left 
rear. The heroic valor of the troops thus 
sent to needless slaughter won a victory in 
spite of the blunders of the Commanding 
General. Fortunately, he was remote from 
the battle ot Black liiver Bridge, where the 
splendid volunteers, under their own officers, 
gave Pembertor's army a heavy disaster, with 
bnt little loss to themselves. 

The time to storm Vicksburg was wlien 
Sherman's fresh corps reached it on the 
morning of the ISth, after the midnight 
when Pemberton's demoralized troops had 
entered it. To delay was to violate all mili- 
tary maxims. The defeated army must be 
uf very bad material if its morale can not be 
restored in twenty-four or thirty-six hours 
behind intrenchments. The order to assault 
on the next day, the 19th, was to inevitable 
slaughter, and even then it vvas made in igno- 
rance that the other two corps were not up to 
attack in concert, although this concert was in 
the alleged plan. The manner in which the 
assault of the 23d was ordered to be made 



was contrary to any manner of assaulting 
fortified places that was ever taught or prac- 
ticed by military men. It was a terrible sac- 
rifice ot heroic volunteers by a Commanding 
General who seemed to have no feeling for 
the slaughter of his soldiers, and no idea of 
tb.e art of war. 

Such tactics as Grant had in his aimless 
and shifting movements were intended to 
give to Pemberton the impregnable defenses 
of Vicksburg. He was as desirous. to have 
Pemberton within the fortifications as Pem- 
berton was to be there. His objective was 
not to meet and destroy Pemberton's army 
in the field, bnt to have it where he could lay 
siege to it. In real military operations. Gen- 
erals in ollensive campaigns seek to maneuver 
to come to issue with the enemy outside his 
fortified places; but Grant's great military 
idea was to get the enemy into his fortifica- 
tions. It vvas here, as afterward on a grander 
scale with Lee's ajmy. 

The labors at which Grant kept his troops 
in the siege wore them out without hastening 
the end. The shooting of pickets, and the 
local games of killing, such as that of "the 
death hole," were not war, but butchery, 
which had no infiuence on the event. The 
deliberate reckoning that, in such affairs, we 
can afford to lose two men to kill one of the 
enemy, is simply a cold blooded calculation 
on the murder of one's own soldiers, which 
does not approach the dignity ot even the 
wars of savages. 

At length the starved garrison surrendered. 
So small had become the expectations of ad- 
ministration and country of military results 
from our great armies and enormoits exi>endi- 
ture, so strained and protracted the discour- 
agement by (Jrant's operations, that this cap- 
ture of a starved garrison by four times its 
number, after more than its whole number, 
sick and well, had been consumed in tne va- 
rious undertakings against Vicksburg, was 
hailed as a prodigious victory. And now the 
victory which the Commandins General's 
plans had so long shunned, and which had 
cost such vast consumption and sacrifice of 
intelligent volunteers, was glorified as an 
achievement of his genius, and it was 
stretched back to make his failure in the Mis- 
sissip})i Central campaign, andall his failures 
in his bayou and canal undertakings, and in 
his marching his army away from victory 
after he had reached solid ground, parts of iu- 



— 163 — 



telligent strategy, all leading up to the crown - 
iiig victory. 



(JHAPTER LVJII. 

TIIK AKT i)F PROTRACTING THE WAK — TlIK DIS- 
JorXTEl) AM) DIVKRGINC. SYSTEM — SEESAW 
GEXKRALSnir — TO PREVENT OTHERS FROM SUC- 
CEEDING THE FIRST OBJECTIVE — THE PATRIOTIC 
VOLI'NTEERS. 

If the object had heen to protract the war 
for the interest of an army faction, and 
therefor to consume the resources of a great 
nation and the most spirited and intelligent 
soldiers the world has ever seen, without de- 
cisive results, strategic genius could not con- 
trive a more effective plan than by dividing 
the field of operations into difFerent parallel 
departments, each under a separate com- 
mander, directed in his separate line from 
Washington. 

Yet disjointed and bad as this system of 
separate and independent commands was, it 
had a theory that the several commanders of 
departments and of offensive campaigns 
would support and co-operate with each 
other. It supposed that these Generals would 
use their great discretion in loyalty to each 
other and to the country, and it had no 
thought that any one of them would have 
his mind divided between achieving success 
for his own advancement, and keeping a 
I'omraander in a parallel department from 
succeeding; that any one placed in command 
of an army of citizens would care more for 
beating a rival than for beating the enemy. 

If the object had been to so constitute de- 
partments and commanders, and so to order 
armies that one should give no support to an- 
other, or that the commander of one depart- 
ment should prevent the coiAnander of the 
adjoining department from succeeding, strat- 
egy could not better contrive it than by Gen. 
Grant's withdrawing his great army — the 
principal army in the West — from the interior 
campaign, and from all the territory of his 
department, save a few ports on the Missis- 
si{)pi River, isolating his army, and laying 
open all that country to C on federate occupa- 
tion, while the Army of the Cumberland 
was ordered on a campaign down the interior 
to Chattanooga. 

The region which Grant abandoned, to 
isolate his army in the Mississippi swamps 



included the strategic places which, in the 
previous season, had been the objective of a 
great campaign of an army of 100,000 men, 
and whose achievement had in its time been 
declared the breaking of the rebellion's back- 
bone. W^est Tennessee anil North Mississippi 
and Alabama were thus given up to supply 
the Confederate armies, and all these dearly 
gained strategic places were left to the enemy, 
on the right of Gen. Rosecrans' array, while 
it had to go forward into the heart of the 
Confederacy, stretching out its line of sup- 
plies, with the enemy in full possession of the 
country on its Hank. 

The strateg}- was so perfected that even if 
Grant had found the taking of Vicksburg 
practicable from the river, all the same it 
would have isolated his army so that it could 
give neither material nor moral support to 
the campaign of Gen. Rosecrans, nor hold 
any Confederate troops from joining the 
army which was opposing him. If the object 
had been to destroy one army after another, 
by subjecting each in its turn, unsui^ported 
by the others, to the combined armies of the 
Confederacy, it is hard to conceive how it 
could be better planned than was done. And 
of all the segregating and isolating of our 
armies by separate and diverging operations, 
that of Vicksburg was the chief, for surpass- 
ing in the bottling up property even Gen. 
McClellan's taking his army from Northern 
Virginia and the interior to the peninsula. 

Looking forward we behold the same won- 
derful management so ordering the Army of 
the Ohio in East Tennessee as to take it from 
co-operation with Gen. Rosecrans, and to 
provide that all the Confederate forces be- 
tween Virginia and the Mississippi should be 
concentrated against Rosecrans, and even 
strengthened by Longstreet's corps from 
Virginia, while our forces between the 
mountains and the Mississippi were divided 
into three isolated and non-co-operating 
parts. Further along in the war we shall find 
that Corinth, which was the threat strategic 
objective of Gen. Halleck's campaign with 
100,000 men, in the spring of 1862, was the 
base of supplies for Huon's army in his cam- 
paign against Gen. George H. Thomas' army 
in December, 1864. 

The declaration of Gens. Grant and Sher- 
man that the true line of operations was that 
down the Mississippi Central Railroad, which 
Grant abandoned, and that all the results 



— 164 — 



which came after wasting of tlie army and 
the season in the swamp operations, might 
liave been gained in the fall of 18(32, by sim- 
ply keeping on in the line upon which he 
had started, admits much more than the 
wasting of that arim' by a palpable blunder, 
which ignored all principles of the art of 
war; admits the withdrawal of the support 
which this line and this territorial possession 
would have given to the Army of the Cum- 
berland in its Chattanooga campaign. 

Is it unreasonable to suppose that such 
support and co-operation in these depart- 
ments might have changed materially the 
history of the war? Is it too much to say 
that good generalship, operating on these 
parallel lines, with such armies, might have 
swept all before them, and ended the war in 
the great central zone in 1863? All this is 
happily free from the temerity of a dispute 
of the judgment of professional armj' men 
by a mere layman; for this is only a direct 
conclusion trom the after judgment ex- 
pressed by these great Generals. 

The severest military critic could not argue 
a greater military blunder than is thus con- 
fessed by the actors thereof: confessed with a 
plea of an alleged reason which confesses ig- 
norance of the very elementary parts of the 
military profession. But in fact this aban- 
donment of the interior campaign was done 
"for other than military reasons." Can we 
regard the long holding out of the Confeder- 
ates in a war so conducted as proof of great 
generalship? On the other hand, can we set 
too high an estimate on the martial qualities 
of the Northern volunteers and their volun- 
teer officers, whose invincible valor, heroic 
endurance of hardship, and hard lighting 
under all the disadvantage and discourage- 
ment ot such leading generalship, fought the 
war through to the triumph of the nation? 

Upon the surrender of Vicksburg, Gen. 
Grant was promoted, and, \ipon his recom- 
mendation, Sherman and McPhekson. Ac- 
cording to Badeau, this was the extent of 
his generosity to subordinates. The volun- 
teers who had been consumed by his dreadful 
methods M'cre considered as simply to have 



done the duty which every man owes his 
country. The volunteer officers, who, with 
the men of the ranks, had saved Grant from 
his blunders, and had brought the succession 
of destructive operations out at last to vic- 
tory, by sheer hard fighting, were regarded 
by Grant and his approved historian as ex- 
cessively honored by being permitted to serve 
as officers under a West Point commander, 
and to lead the volunteers into undertakings 
and sacrifices which their intelligence told 
them were ordered without military knowl- 
edge or good sense. 

The more the war is studied tfie more does 
it insi)ire admiration for the soldierly quali- 
ties of the American volunteer, and the 
more does it raise pride in a country whose 
mass of citizens possess such martial superi- 
ority. The conscientious historian is obliged 
to say that the war did not evolve any Bona- 
parte to a leading command; but it did 
evolve a patriotic valor, and a military capac- 
ity in the mass of citizens above what any 
had believed. The citizen volunteers fought 
out the war to triumph in spite of blunder- 
ing generalship in the highest commands. 
These splendid martial qualities and heroic 
patriotism in the universal citizen are im- 
measurably higher elements of national 
glory and pride than if all had been achieved 
by the genius of one or two Generals, with 
soldiers who were unthinking machines. 
The honor and glory of saving the nation be- 
long not to any individual, but to the Amer- 
ican patriotic volunteers. 

From Vicksburg Gen. Grant went to take 
comniaiul at Chattanooga. The Chattanooga 
campaign of the Army of the Cumberland 
under Gen. Rosecuans, and the operations of 
Gen. Grant on the river, were maierially rel- 
ative; not by co-operation, but by the de- 
parture of one from the line of co-operation, 
upon which a regard for militaiy principles 
and a desire to end the war should have 
kept him. Because.of this essential relation, 
and forasmuch as the battle of Chattanooga 
terminated <ien. Grant's immediate com- 
mand of the Western armies, a review of that 
battle will terminate this series of papers. 



— 165 — 



CHAPTER L]X. 

the battles around chattanooga after gen. 
grant took command — retrospective glance 
— the disjointed conduct of the war — cam- 
paign of the army of the cumberland — 
loses its line of supplies at chattanooga — 
Sherman's relief expedition— stops to re- 
build RAILROAS — LEISURELY MOVEMENT OF AN 

expedition of urgency. 

Wliile Gen. Grant's iirniy wjts eiigugcd in 
the Holly ISprings campaign, the Army of the 
Cumberland, under Gen. Rosecrans, on the 
26th of December, 1862, began its movement 
which brought on the battle with the Con- 
federate army under Gen. Bragg at Murfees- 
boro, December 31. 

The alternating, see-saw, desultory charac- 
ter of our disjointed department military 
operations has an apt illustration in the cir- 
cumstance that while Gen. Rosecrans was 
preparing to move on Gen. Bragg's army in 
the Department of the Cumberland, Gen. 
Grant, in the parallel Department of the 
Tennessee, had begun a forward movement 
down the Mississippi Central Railroad with a 
large army, which, if continued, would have 
been great co-operation with Rosecrans, but 
as if it were devised that no co-operation 
should be with our several armies, Gen. Grant 
had halted irresolutely at Oxford; had changed 
his mind, sent Sherman back to Memphis 
with three divisions, which he soon followed 
with the rest of the army. Thus he was re- 
treating while Rosecrans "was advancing, and 
he was taking his army wliere no co-operation 
or mutual support could be possible in the 
future. 

Gen. Rosecrans, having refitted his army 
after the destructive battle of Murfreesboro, 
and awaited a season when military move- 
ments would be in a degree practicable in 
that region, started June 21, 1863, on his Tul- 
lalioma campaign against Gen. Bragg's army, 
which was holding a strong and intrenched 
line nurtii of Duck River, with rullahoma as 
the ciiief depot of supplies, and Chattanooga 
as the base. The strategy of the plan, which, 
demonstrating to cover the design, avoided 
the enemy's strong front line, and marched 
the main force upon his line of communica- 
tions, was completely successful, and showed 
good generalship; but heavy j. rains, floods. 



bottomless roads, and a mountainous country 



impeded the movement, and Gen. Bragg, by 
a precipitate retreat, was able to save his 
army, which now fell back south of the Ten- 
nessee River, burning all bridges. The opera- 
tion was completed by the 30th of June. 

The march of the main body of the army 
in the Chattanooga campaign began August 
10. The position of Chattanooga made it se- 
cure against direct attack, and was flanked 
by great mountains, making natural fort- 
resses, whose few passes were easily defensible. 
A difficult river was to be crossed in the face 
of the enemy, and on any line of operations 
the defensive army might occupy positions 
almost impregnable, unless the strategy of 
the Commanding General could conceal his 
intentions and divert the enemy's forces from 
his route. In fact this, which was called the 
"Gateway to Georgia," an.l the most impor- 
tant military place in the South, was more dif- 
ficult of attack than any place in the South. 
But skillful generalship made Gen. Bragi; 
think the advance was to be made on the 
east, and thereby the crossing of the river on 
the west was made, and the mountain passes 
to the west and south of Chattanooga were 
occupied without resistance, and by the time 
that Gen. Bragg comprehended the opera- 
tion he realized that he must evacuate Chat- 
tanooga or be shut up there. He withdrew 
to the southeast, and one division of our 
army entered the place, and this primary ob- 
jective of the campaign fell into our hands 
without a battle or any heavy skirmish. It was 
the solitarv instance in the war in which a 
great advantage and objective were achieved 

by strategy. 

Another illustration of the disjointed char- 
acter of.our military management is noted 
in the circumstance that the Army of the 
Ohio, under Gen. Burnside, although it had 
now returned from Vicksburg and had moved 
into East Tennessee, was directed separately 
by Gen Halleck's orders from Washington, 
and was not co-operating with Gen. Rose- 
crans in this vital campaign. Thus, between 
the mountains and the Mississippi the army 
of the department on Rosecrans' left was 
separate and independent, under direct or- 
ders from Washington, and the army of the 
department on Rosecrans' right was also 
separate, independent, isolated, and idle at 
Vicksburg. If all had been planned by great 
generalship to waste our energies, it could not 
be more to the purpose. 



— 166 — 



The authorities at "Washington, where Gen. 
Halleck fancied that he was directing this 
campaign by telegraph, now accepted that 
Bragp had fled, and they thought only of 
pursuit. In this grand delusion Gen. Hal- 
LECK, September 11, telegraphed Kosecrans: 

After holding the mountain passes on the west 
and Dallon or some other Doint on the railroad to 
prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be de- 
cided whether your army shall move further south 
into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here that 
a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee. It is im- 
portant that the truth of this should be ascertained 
as early as possible. 

If Gen. Halleck bad been directing by 
telegraph a campaign in the moon, he could 
not be more in ignorance of tbe situation. 
If our war were not so terribly tragical, a 
broad humorous side would be perceived 
which would make the strategy of Gen. 
Bourn and of Corporal General Fritz seem 
real events. Gen. Bragg had withdrawn to 
avoid being caught at a disadvantase, and 
now, re-enforced by Longstreet's corps, he 
was aiming to attack Rosecrams before he 
couldgather up his separated corps from the 
several mountain passes. 

At the time when Rosecrans received this 
surprising telegraphic order to occupy Dalton 
and the passes to tlie west of it, preparatory 
to being ordered further south into Georgia 
and Alabama, he was straining every energy 
to get his army out of these passes to concen- 
trate on the Lafayette & Chattanooga road, 
twenty miles north of Dalton, to cover Chat- 
nooga and prevent Bragg from falling on his 
forces in detail. But this review may pause 
to mention that Gen. Halleck's resources 
were equal to the consequences, and that in 
his annual report he conveyed that Gen. 
Kosecrans was going on a wild plan of ad- 
vance into Georgia without warrant of pru- 
dence or authority, of which Chickamauga 
was the conseciuence. This is only another in- 
stance that in our war the longbow, in tlie 
hands of the truly great General, was more 
powerful than his sword. 

That a campaign of invasion, of long dis- 
tance and in a dillicult country, is steadily 
diminishing its oH'ensive force by the detach 
ments required to guard its lengthening line 
of supplies, and that it needs steady re-en- 
forcing to make up for these and to supply 
the waste of the campaign, is a circumstance 



known to all, but the authorities at Washing- 
ton had in their wisdom resolved that Gen. 
RosECRANs should begin and complete his 
campaign into the heart of the South, unsup- 
ported on either flank, with the number of 
troops which he had at the start, which be- 
fore the Tullahoma movement began Gen. 
Garfield stated at 65,137, and which had in 
the battle of Chickamauga, according to the 
estimate of Van Horne's history, 56,160 men. 
It appears to be in pursuance of this idea of 
RosECRANs' advance further south into Geor- 
gia and Alabama thatHALLKCK on the 13th of 
September sent the following dispatch to 
Grant at Yicksburg: 

It is quite possible that Bragg and Johnston will 
move through Northern Alabama to the Tennessee 
River to turn Gen. Rosecrans' right and cut off his 
communication. All of Gen. Grant's available 
force should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth 
and Tuscurabia, to co-operate with Gen. Rosecrans. 

Thiswas to get Grant's forces back into the 
interior of his own department. It marked 
some progress of Halleck in learning the art 
of war, for it showed a perception that Grant, 
in his department, would in a degree be co- 
operative with Kosecrans, and that at Yicks- 
burg he waswithdrawn from all co-operation. 

But Gen. Bragg was now re-enforced by 
15,0U0 men from Mississippi, and by Long- 
street's corps from Lee's army, and his army 
now outnumbered thatof Rosecrans,' and the 
battle for the possession of Chattanooga had 
yet to be fought. The result of that battle, 
although the enemy had expended all their 
power of attack, and had been repulsed, was 
that the army, on the 21st of September, after 
two days of battle, had to fall back to Chatta- 
nooga and to a state of siege, in which its 
communication to the north became so dif- 
ficult and precarious that it was a question 
whether starvation would giye the enemy a 
victory which they were not inclined to trj- 
to gain by an attack. 

In tlie army there was no thought of defeat, 
or surrender, or retreat. It held the strategic 
objective. It knew that aid from the north 
was needed to open communication with 
supplies, but it knew that the government 
was al)le tosetul it on. and could not doubt 
its good I'aitii and commensurate energy. 
Meanwhile tlie Commanding General was 
making the plan which eventually opened 
the communications, and the cavalry expe- 



— 167 — 



ditions, in pursuit of the Confederate cavalry 
raids on the single road of supplies, were 
among the most heroic of all the war. 

By a liick or something else which was 
characteristic of all the military conduct of 
the time, Halleck's dispatch of the 13th to 
Grant was delayed ten days after leaving 
Cairo. Badeau says: "The messenger to 
whom it was intrusted failed to deliver it 
promptly." Singular coincidence! But on 
the 15th Halleck was awakened from his 
dream of Bragg's final retreatandof his send- 
ing part of his army to Lee, and of ordering 
Rosecrans from Dalton further south into 
Georgia and Alabama, by intelligence that 
Longstreet's corps had joined Bragg. He 
now began to see it all, and he telegraphed on 
the loth to Gen. Hl'rlbut at Memi)his: 

All the troops that can possibly be spared in West 
Tennessee and on the Mississippi River sliould be 
sent without <lelay to assist Gen. Kosecrans on the 
Tennessee River. Urge Gen. Sherman to act with 
all possible promptness. If you have boats, send 
them down to bring up his troops. Information 
just received indicates that a part of Lee's army has 
been sent to re-enforce Bragj;. 

This dispatch reached Viek.sburgon the 22d, 
on which day Grant had returned. That of 
the 13th was not yet delivered. Grant issued 
orders on that day. Sherman took three of 
his four divisions, and says that the last 
reachetli Viclisburg on the 28th to embark. 

Xow conies one of the strange features of 
this military conduct. Gen. Sheraian says in 
his memoirs: 

Gen. Halleck's dispatches dwelt upon the fact that 
Gen. Rosecrans' routes of supply were overtaxed, 
and tliat we should move from Memphis eastward, 
repairing railroads as we progressed as far as Ath- 
ens, Ala., whence I was to report to Gen. Rosecrans 
at Chattanooga by letter. 

Tlie truth was that Gen. JIosecrans' route 
of supply was cut off, both by railroad and 
river, by the enemy's possession of the valley 
of Lookout Creek, below Chattanooga. 

To order this relieving e.Kpedition to repair 
and hold that railroad, running 140 miles 
along the enemy's front, as a line of supplies, 
was to give it permanent employment, and 
was the way not to relieve Gen. Bosecrans. 
But Halleck's dispatches, which are given 
in Gen. Boynton's review of Sher.man's Me- 
moirs [Historical Raid] sustain Sherman's 
statement that he was ordered to repair this 



railroad for a line of supplies for his troops. 
Halleck's several dispatches were urgent that 
he should use all possible expedition, but 
they also required the repair and holding of 
the railroad, which forbade any expeditious 
movement. 

Gen. HuRLBUT, at Memphis, in answer to 
Halleck's inquiries as to progress in re-en- 
forcing Rosecrans, dispatched to him Septem- 
ber 21 that he had ordered a million rations 
and plenty of spare wagons to Corinth, and 
he had a cavalry corps to cover Sherman's 
movement; that the road was open to Cor- 
inth, and he had plenty of rolling stock to 
that place, and from thence to Chattanooga 
should not take more than eight days of hard 
marching. But Halleck still insisted on the 
repair of the railroad east of Corinth. In a 
dispatch to Hurlbut October 4 he said: 
'•Time is all important. The railroad must 
be kept up and guarded, in order to S|>cure the 
supi>lies of your army. Should Gen. Sherman 
be assigned by Gen. Grant to the command, 
you will furnish him with this and all other 
orders." 

Time all important, and the repair of the 
railroad, which would consume the all im- 
portant time. It is true that a dispatch of 
the 14th from Halleck to Sherman, received 
on the 16th, had this modification of the rail- 
road order: "When Eastport can be reached 
by boats, the railroad can be dispensed with; 
but until that time it must be guarded as far 
as used." Sherman narrates that at luka on 
the 20th he heard that two gunboats sent to 
his aid had arrived at Eastport, only ten miles 
off. Yet he kept on repairing the railroad, 
and was at luka on the 27th. The same dis- 
patch eoncludes with the following moderate 
expectation from Sherman's expedition: 

Should the enemy be so strong as to prevent your 
going to Athens, or connecting with Gen. Rose- 
crans. you will, nevertheless, have assisted him 
greatly by drawing away a part of the enemy's 
forces. 

This soars into the realms of grand strategy, 
but all this was the way not to assist the 
Army of the Cumberland. Such expedition 
as Sherman made with three divisions from 
Memphis to join Grant at Oxford, and made 
again in his countermarch, would have 
brought him to Chattanooga in a fortnight 
from Memphis. But this was the way to re- 



— 168 — 



live RosECRANS* army, and enable that to se- 
cure its victory. 

At length, on the 27th of October, Sherman, 
still at luka, got intelligence that Grant was 
ajipointed to supreme command from Vir- 
ginia to the Mississippi, with power to remove 
E.OSECRANS, and other plenary powers, includ- 
ing that of placing him (Sherman) in com- 
mand of the Army of the Tennessee, in 
wliich it appears that Hurlbut was the rank- 
ing officer, but he was only a volunteer. 
With this exhilarating intelligence he re- 
ceived from Grant an order to "drop all 
Wjork on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, 
cross the Tennessee, and hurry eastward with 
all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport till 
you meet further orders from me." 

No more delay of an urgent relieving ex- 
pedition to rebuild a railroad which was not 
to be used, and was left in the enemy's hands! 
No longer was the railroad from the north 
overtaxed to supply Rosecrans' army, for 
Grant was now in the command. It was now 
thirty-three days since Halleck's urgent 
order of the 15th reached Vicksburg, and 
twenty-five days since Sherman's first division 
reached Corinth, and in that twenty-five 
days his advance had reached Tuscumbia, about 
fifiy miles from Corinth. That was the way 
Grant's army relieved Rosecrans. 

Gen. Halleck's letter to Gen. Grant, sup- 
plementing Secretary Stanton's assignment 
of Grant to the command of the three depart- 
ments, gave liis version of the operations 
toward East Tennessee, of the general failure 
of co-operation, and of Rosecrans' operations 
in the Chattanooga campaign, sparing not the 
longbow in his own excuse. He also gave 
this piece of intelligence which rounds out, 
completes, and gilt edges the Vicksburg cam- 
paign : 

Itis now ascertahied that the greater part of the 
prisoners paroled by you at Vicksburg, and by 
Gen. Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally and im- 
properly declared exchanged and forced into the 
ranks to swell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. 

Gen. HALLECKsaidat the time that Grant's 
parole was not according to the cartel, and 
was not valid. But this is an exemplification 
of the nature of the co-operation which Grant 
gave to other operations, and it considerably 
diminislies Baueau's inventory of the results 
of the capture of Vicksburg. 

Fortunately the relief ordered from tlie 



East was more expeditious than that from 
Grant's army, and its commanders were eager 
to help their brother soldiers in the West. 
Fortunately, by the aid of these the plan 
formed by Gen. Rosecrans for opening the 
communication to Bridgeport, and left by him 
in the hands of Gen. George H. Thomas, was 
ready to be put in operation before Gen. 
Grant arrived, and was not opposed by him. 
Thereby the Army of the Cumberland was re- 
lieved by the reopening of its supplies without 
any assistance from Grant and Sherman. 
Had it depended on them, it is safe to say that 
at the least the soldiers would have been re- 
duced to very great straits. The operation 
which reopened the line of supplies was the 
first of the battles about Chattanooga, to 
which this preliminary chapter has now 
brought this review. 



CHAPTER LX. 

the soft delusion at WASHINGTON — THE 
AWAKENING — PROMPT MOVEMENT OF TROOPS 
FROM THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC TO THE 
RESCUE — DESTRUCTION OF STORES AND TEAMS — 
rosecrans' PLAN TO REOPEN THE LINE OF 
SUPPLIES — ROSECRANS REMOVED — GRANT AR- 
RIVES — rosecrans' PLAN EXECUTED UNDER 
GEN. THOMAS — BRILLIANT OPERATION AND 
BATTLE — THE LINE OF SUPPLIES OPENED AND 
THE ARMY TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE, 

At Washington the intelligence that Long- 
street had joined Bragg was a sudden 
awaking from the soft delusion that Bragg 
had ried, and was dividing his army to send 
to Lee, and that the way for Rosecrans was 
now open to Georgia and Alabama. Even as 
late as the 11th of September Halleck 
thought that Bragg was re-enforcing Lee, 
and on the 15th, in reply to a telegram from 
Rosecrans, Halleck telegraphed that no 
troops had gone from Lee to Bragg. 

Gen. Rosecrans. in his testimony to the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated 
that "Longstreet's movement to support 
Bragg was known to Gen. Peck as early as 
the Gth. and that ^ol. Jacques, 73d Illinois, 
endeavored to communicate the fact that 
Longstreet's corps was going to Bragg, to 
the authorities at Washington, so long 
before the battle that he was able 



— 169 



to wait in vain in Baltimore for 
a liearing, and then to reach us and take part 
in the battle of Cliickaniauga." Gen. Hal- 
LECK tries to show that he issued energetic or- 
ders for the aid of Rosecrans; but a previous 
management which had deprived him of the 
support of the army on the Mississippi on his 
right, and of the army in East Tennessee on 
his left, and had conceived and clung to the 
strange delusion that Bragg was scattering 
his army, could not retrieve all this after 
Bragg had received his re-en f or ce^ients from 
east and west, and was advancing with intent 
to attack Rosecrans before his widely divided 
columns could debouch from the mountain 
pa.^ses. 

The authorities at Washington decided 
promptly to transfer 20,000 men from the 
Army of the Potomac, then inactive on the 
Rapidan, to re-enforce the Army of the Cum- 
berland at Chattanooga, and through the 
energies' of the Quartermaster General and 
Government Superintendent of Railroads, and 
the officers of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 
20,000 men, comprising the 11th Corps of 
Gen. Howard, and the 12th of Gen. Slocum, 
under the command of Gen. Hooker, with 
their artillery, marching from the Rapidan 
to Washington to embark, were debarked at 
Nashville within eight days. 

The officers of the Eastern army responded 
with loyal spirit to the need to relieve the 
beleaguered Western army. In the soldiers 
there was never anj'' lack of this loyal spirit, 
either East or West. Thus it came about that 
troops fi-om the army on the Rapidan were 
moved to the communications of Rosecrans' 
army, co-operating with him, and eventually 
assisting the Army of the Cumberland to 
open the line of supplies, before any assist- 
ance had arrived from Grant's army. Yet 
the remark must be made that this transfer of 
troops from the Army of the Potomac to re- 
lieve a situation caused by the transfer of 
Confederate troops from Lee's army and from 
the Mississippi, when concert of action in our 
Eastern and Mississippi armies would have 
given the Confederates enough to do on their 
several lines, was a most wasteful way of 
carrying on war, and that this and the con- 
cert of action now ordered in the Western 
armies was only an effort to retrieve a suc- 
cession of blunders. 

Gen. Hooker's troops were moved without 
their transi.>ortation teams. The lack of these 



greatly restricted tlieir co-operation with an 
armj"^ whose railroad line of supplies was cut 
off, and which had now lost a large 
part of its wagon equipment throtigh 
the Confederate cavalry expeditions. 
Wheeler's cavalry had, on the 
30th of September, captured and burned in 
the Sequatchie Valley a train of from 700 to 
1,000 wagons laden with supplies, and then a 
train of wagons and of cars at McMinnville, 
in the heart of Tennessee, and had kept on lo 
Murfreesboro, which being resolutely de- 
fended, he did not wait to attack, as he was 
pursued by Gen. Crook with the cavalry of 
the Army of the Cumberland. 

Wheeler moved upon other places on the 
railroad, burning bridges, stores, and trains, 
and although he was eventually driven from 
Tennessee with severe losses of men, and the 
destruction of his effective force for a 
time, he had inflicted heavy damage 
on the Army of the Cumberland by 
the destruction of its stores and transpor- 
tation. Hooker's arrival secured the railroad 
from Nashville to Bridgeport; but he had not 
the means of transporting supplies to join the 
army at Chattanooga, which was now on 
greatly reduced rations, and the geographical 
and military situation waS such that the 
operation to open the line of supplies had to 
be made in tlie first instance from Chatta- 
nooga. 

The Confederate historian, Pollard, says of 
Chattanooga: 

Chickamauga liad conferred a brillirait glory upon 
our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held tbe 
prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of 
East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our niter beds were 
in that region, find a large portion of the coal which 
supplied our foundries. It abounded in the nec- 
essaries of life. It was one of the strongest coun- 
tries in the world, bo full of lofty mountains that it 
had been called, not inaptly, the Switzerland of 
America. As the possession of Switzerland opened 
the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany, and 
France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave 
easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Geoitsia, 
and Alabama. 

Chattanooga is situated in a valley on tha 
left bank of the Tennessee River, surrounded 
by lofty mountains and intervening valleys. 
Tliese mountains, in a range from north to 
south, are cut by the Tennessee River in a 
serpentine southwest course till it strikes the 
north end of Lookout Mountain, about three 



170 



miles below Chattanoofja, wlien it turns 
shortly to the northwest, the loop making a 
tongue of land tliree miles long called Mocca- 
sin Point, from tlie fancied resemblance of its 
outline to a mofcasin. The river keeping a 
northwest course for live miles, turns again 
abruptly to the south, making another nar- 
row tongue of land, and then to southwest. 
Down the river twenty-six miles by railroad 
from Chattanooga is Bridgeport, and eleven 
miles further to the sonthwest is Steven- 
son, Ala., where the railroad from Chattanoo- 
ga to Nashville turns to the north. Tnis rail- 
road, from Stevenson to Chattanooga crosses 
the Tennessee at Bridgeport and runs south of 
the river through a gap in Raccoon Mountains 
to Lookout Valley, through which valley it 
enters Chattanooga around the north base of 
Lookout Mountain. 

This valley, together with Lookout Mount- 
ain, was held by Gen. Buagg's forces, where- 
by our army's line of supplies by both railroad 
and river was cut off. And now the only way 
in whicli supplies could reach the army at 
Chattanooga from Bridgeport was by a cir- 
cuitous route up the Sequatchie Valley, and 
over the mountains north of the river, a dis- 
tance of sixty miles, and by a road which the 
fall rains soon made a slough. The number 
of wagons had been greatlj' reduced by the 
cavalry expeditions; the quantity whicli the 
teams could haul was fast diminishing by the 
nature of the road and the lack of forage; the 
animals of the army had to be left unsup- 
plied, and the rations for the men were get- 
ting very short. 

The possession of Lookout Vallev on the 
river would open to our army the navigation 
of tUe river up to the heel of Moccasin Point, 
and a road of less than a mile across this 
point would reach the river opposite Chatta- 
nooga, avoiding the guns of Lookout Mount- 
ain. Besides, a road from Brown's Ferry, at 
the heel of Moccasin Point, south and west 
through Lookout Valley, at the eastern base 
of Raccoon Mountains, to Kelly's Ferry, 
would open a practicable short road of sup- 
plies across a loop of the river to Kelly's Fer- 
ry, and thence by boat to Bridgeport. To get 
possession of Lookout Valley, between Look- 
out Mountain on the east, and Raccoon 
Mountains on the west, was, therefore, the 
object to which Gen. Rosecrajs's addressed 
liim.self as soon as he had made his position 
at Chattanooga secure by intrenchments so 



that he could safely detach a force for that 
object, in the face of Bragg's circumvallating 
army. 

Gen. Halleck, in his letter to Gen. Grant 
giving his version of previous operations to 
excuse himself and accuse Rosecrans, wrote: 

If you reoccupy the pns.ses in Lookout Mountain, 
which should never have been given up, you will 
be able to use the railroad and river from Bridge- 
port to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of 
vital importance, and should receive your early 
attentiou. 

This has gone into history as a jiroper cen- 
sure on Roseckans for giving up these passes 
as unnecessary and a military blunder. 
Badeau's history, revised by Grant, repeats 
this censure. But generalship at Washington 
was much easier than in the field of opera- 
tions, and was not limited by knowledge of 
the geographical situation. 

Lookout Mouiitain, twenty-eight hundred 
feet above tlie sea, and fourteen hundred and 
sixty feet above the Tennessee River, is a 
hundred and fifty miles long. One of its 
passes is forty-two miles south of Chattanooga, 
the next nearest twenty-six miles, and the 
nearest at the northern end of the mountain. 
Did Halleck mean all these, or which of 
them? To hold Lookout Mountain, and to 
cover the line of supplies below Chattanooga, 
required the holding of a line across Chatta- 
nooga Creek Valley, three miles to Lookout 
Mountain, and then the holding of Lookout 
Valley, making a line of not less than ten 
miles, overlooked at Chattanooga by the 
natural fortress of Mission Ridge. Tliis, to a 
badly hurt and retreating army, followed up 
by a victorious army, was equivalent to say- 
ing that it should restore the line of battle of 
Chickamauga, and that that "ought never to 
have been given up." In Lookout Valley 
the Confederates might concentrate any re- 
quired force, to fall on that detached wing. 

What was done was to intrench at Chatta- 
nooga, so that in the first instance our army 
could resist the expected immediate attack. 
Gen. Bragg gave as his plea for not following 
up his victory by an attack at Chattanooga, 
that he had lost two-fifths of his troops in the 
battle; and, second, that having cut off the 
line of supplies of the national army, he was 
confident that starvation would comjiel it to 
surrender. President Davis came to Lookout 
Mountain to anticipate the victory, This con- 



171 



fidence resulted in Bra(;g's ill fortune. Gen. 
RosFXRANS, having made his army secure by 
intrenchments which a part could hold, 
planned a movement for the other part to get 
possession of Lookout Valley. 

RosECRANs had previously ordered the con- 
struction of small steamboats and barges at 
Bridgeport, and two steamboats were now well 
advanced, and he was urging their comple- 
tion. He directed Gen. Hooker to concen- 
trate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, 
and advised him that as soon as enough of his 
train should arrive to subsist his troops, ten 
or twelve miles from his depot, he would be 
directed to move into Lookout Valley. He 
also ordered pontoons built at Chattanooga 
for a bridge at Brown's Ferry to connect with 
Hooker's army, and preparations to build 
storehouses on Williams' Island, just beyond 
the narrowest part of Moccasin Point, with a 
view to making the island a cover for a steam- 
boat landing. All of this meant that the army 
was at Chattanooga to stay. 

The original plan was tljat tlie pontoons 
should be carried across Moccasin Point, and 
then floated to Brown's Ferry, where they 
were to form a bridge by which the expedi- 
tion was to cross to Lookout Valley, and 
there intrench until it was supported by 
Hooker's troops, who were at the same time 
to move up from Bridgeport. The plan v?as 
far advanced in preparation when, October 
19, Gen. Rosecrans received an order to turn 
over the command to. Gen. Thomas. Gen. 
Grant, on the same day, telegraphed Gen. 
Thomas: "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. 
I will be there as soon as jwssible. Please 
inform me how long your present supplies 
will last, and the prospect for keeping them 
up." 

Tills was energetic, but as early as the 23d 
of September Gen. Rosecran.s' dispatches had 
shown that Chattanooga would be held against 
attack, and tliat its continued holding would 
be secured by prompt re-enforcements to 
open its line of supplies. Neither Rosecrans, 
nor Thomas, nor the soldiers had had any 
thought of giving it up. But now nearly a 
month had passed since Grant liad received 
orders of urgency to send aid to Rosecrans, 
and none from that army had arrived, or was 
itear enoiigh to assure aid before starvation. 
Therefore this order did not render the deci- 
sive service to the holding of Chattanooga 
which Badeav seems to ascribe to it. 



Gen. Thomas answered: "Two hundredand 
four thousand and sixty-two rations in store- 
house; ninety-six thousand to arrive to-mor- 
row, and all trains were loaded which had 
arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th. We 
will hold ttie town till we starve." On the 
same day Thomas directed Hooker to hasten 
his concentration and his preparation to 
move as Rosecrans had ordered. 

Gen. Grant reached Chattanooga in the 
evening of the 23d. and the plan for opening 
the line of supplies was laid before him. The 
next day, in company with Gen. Thomas and 
Gen. W. F. Smith, Chief of Engineers to Rose- 
crans, he rode out to a view on thenorthsideof 
the river, and approved the plan. Gen. Smith 
was charged with the enterprise, which was 
now almost ready for action, and Gen. Thomas 
immediately issued the necessary orders to 
Gen. Hooker, who replied that he would 
move on the 27th. Gen. Smith now decided 
that the risk would be less if he floated the 
pontoons down from Chattanooga, carrying 
part of the troops, and made a landing on 
the enemy's side, to cover the crossing of the 
rest. 

The operation was avery delicate one. The 
boats had to float for seven miles along a line 
of Confederate pickets, and the landing to be 
made in the face of their lire. Fifteen hun- 
dred picked men, under Gen. Hazen, era- 
barked, while Gen. Turchin, with his brigade, 
the rest of Hazen' s, and three batteries of 
artillery under Major Mendenhau., moved 
across and took position in the woods on the 
north bank, to cover the landing of the rest 
on the opposite bank, and to join them as 
soon as practicable. 

The boats moved from Chattanooga at 3 a. 
ra. on the 27th of October, directed by Col. T. 
R. Stanley. A slight fog favored their con- 
cealment. They hugged the right shore, 
rounded Moccasin Point, and reached the 
place of landing unperceived. As the lead- 
ing section of the boats landed, the pickets 
fired and fled. The other sections arrived in 
quick succession; the men leaped ashore and 
ascended a near hill to meet a small force 
which had hurried forward at the alarm of 
the pickets, which was driven back by a short 
engagement. 

The boats were busy in bringing over the 
rest of the troops, while those before landed 
were busy in taking positions. Hazen took 
position on a hill east of the railroad ga}>. 



— 172 — 



and TuRCHiN on one west of this gorge. 
Skirmishers were thrown forward, and then 
detachments with axes felled trees for barri- 
cades and abatis, and in two hours the de- 
fenses were such as to make the hold secure. 
Then the pontoon bridge was laid under the 
supervision of Capt. Fox, 1st Michigan En- 
gineers. The enemy cannonaded from the 
foot of Lookout Mountain, but the loss of 
men in all this brilliant operation was but 
six killed, twenty-three wounded, and nine 
missing. The loss of the enemy was about 
tiie same. 

While Gen. Bragg was wasting ammuni- 
tion cannonading the floating bridge. Hooker 
was moving up from Bridgeport. He started 
early on the 27th, crossing on a pontoon 
bridge, turned through a gap in Eaccoon 
Mountains into Lookout Valley, and at 3 p. 
m. the head of his column had reached 
Wauhatchie, three miles from the river. His 
road passed through hills, where resistance 
was expected, but no resolute opposition was 
made. As Gen. Bragg's position on Lookout 
commanded a view of all the country, and as 
he must have perceived that a force coming 
down that valley to join the one which had 
crossed the river meant the opening of the 
line of supplies to the army he was expecting 
to starve, it w'as to be expected that he would 
make a strong attempt to oppose Hooker's 
march, but he did not. There was a feeble 
resistance to the march beyond Wauhatchie, 
but after firing a volley the enemv withdrew, 
burning the bridge over Lookout Creek. 

There was also on the march some loss of 
men from the batteries on top of Lookout 
Mountain. At 5 p. m. Hooker's troops halted 
for the night about a mile from Brown's 
Ferry. Gen. Geary's division of the 12th 
Corps remained at Wauhatchie to hold the 
road leading back to Kelly's Ferry. In the 
night the enemy attempted to take advantage 
of tliis separation of tlie troops. About mid- 
night a regiment which had advanced toward 
Lookout got into a skirmish; soon after the 
sound of battle was heard from Geary's divis- 
ion, which was attacked by part of Long- 
street's corps. 

Hooker ordered Howard to send Schurz's 
division double quick to Geary's aid. This 
division met resistance from the enemy on 
ijear hills. Stei>'\vehk's division came to the 



support, and an action was fought in the 
night, in which the enemy were successively 
driven from two strong positions, by charges 
with the bayonet. Through this the aid 
failed to reach GKARY^ who had to fight it out 
with his own division. After a resistance to " 
superior numbers for three hours, he took tlie 
oifensive, broke Longstkeet's line, and drove 
him from the field. In these actions the loss 
of Hooker's army was 416. 

This night attack showed that the Confed- 
erate General had at lentrth realized the 
meaning of our lodgment in Lookout Valley, 
but his attempt to retrieve the loss was not 
made with sufficient force to overcome the 
splendid fighting of our troops. Two brigades 
were now moved, one from Chattanooga, 
to strengthen the hold on the valley, and the 
enemy's chance of recovering it was gone. 

The relative situations of the national and 
Confederate armies were now changed. The 
question of supplies to our army was settled. 
.The steamboat, which had now been repaired 
at Chattanooga, passed the batteries of Look- 
out on the night of the 28th, and one at 
Bridgeport was soon underway laden with 
rations. A road was made from Chattanooga 
to Browii's Ferry, thence to Kelly's, and 
work was begun to repair the railroad from 
Bridgeport to Chattanooga. And now, in- 
stead of Gen. Bragg's question how long tlie 
national army could hold out against surren- 
der from starvation, the question was how 
soon could it get ready to attack Bragg's 
army. 

This relief had been achieved through the 
plan formed by Gen. Rosecrans, and the aid 
brought bjf Gen. Hooker from the Eastern 
army, without any assistance from the two 
Western armies, one on the oast and the other 
on the West, from which, in any rational 
military plan, co-operation was to be ex- 
pected from tlic beginning, and from one of 
which, namely, that of Gen. Grant, the first 
relief was rationally to be expected. This 
was the first of the battles about Chattanooga 
after Gen. Grant took command. Although 
he had no part in the operation, the credit 
of the success redounded to his glory in 
Badeau's history. And, considering tlje 
genius he had before exhibited, great credit is 
unquestionably due him for not preventing 
the execution of this well laid plan. 



— 173 — 



CHAPTER LXr. 

THE MKillTY PREPARATION — ARMIES ANJl ADMIN- 
IfiTRATION WORKING IN HARMONY FOR THE 
FIRST TIME — LONGSTREET DEPARTS TO ATTACK 
BURNSIDE — GRANT OPvDERS AN IMPOSSIBILITY — 
SHERMAN AT LENGTH BEGINS TO MOVE WITH 
ENERGY — THE PLAN OF OPERATION'S AGAINST 
MISSION KIDGE — GRANT's MISCONCEPTION OF 
THE SITUATION — THOMAS ORDERS TROOPS TO 
FEEL THE ENEMY — THEIR SPIRIT CONVERTS A 
PEMONSTRATION TO AN ADVANCE AND THE 
GAIN OF AN ADVANTAGE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE FINAL EVENT. 

Tlie firm hold on the left bank of the Ten 
lu'ssee River, in the valley between Lookout 
and Raccoon mountains, whicli had been 
made strong by the 27th of October, opened 
the way for supplies, which soon began to 
come by small steamboat-!, and thus the siege 
of Chattanooga was in effect broken, and now 
preparations began for driving the Confed- 
erate army from its positions. 

In this preparation there was none of that 
dividing and diverting of resources which had 
given the chief of them to Grant's army in 
Mississippi, while thatof the Cumberland had 
to prepare for a greater campaign, nor of that 
stinting which had positively refused any ad- 
ditional force to Gen. Rosecrans, when he was 
ordered on the most difficult campaign of the 
war; but now all the resources of the three 
departments which had been placed under 
Grant's command were concentrated for the 
Chattanooga operation, with the aid of the 
two corps from the Army of the Potomac; and 
now tlie Wasliington authorities were boun- 
teous in furnishing every sort of equipment 
and sui)ply. At length three parallel depart- 
ments and armies were placed under one com- 
mander, and the military administration at 
Washington was supporting. This was rare 
harmony in the great war. 

Gen. Sherman was coining with the loth 
Corps, comprising four divisions, to 
which, by an order issued frdui luka. he 
addeda select force of 8,000 from the 17th (Mc- 
Pherson's) Corps, under command of Gen. 
Dodge. And now Gen. Grant ordered forward 
another division from McPherson's corps. All 
the troops of both armies holding posts in 
the rear were ordered forward, so far as they 
could be spared, especially cavalry and ar- 
tillery. Great energies and means were 
called out from the North to repair and equip 



the railroads, to increase the lines of supply. 
At Chattanooga Gen. Brannan. Thomas' Chief 
of Artillery, was instructed to prepare the 
fortifications for heavier guns, and to make 
re(juisitions for these and for all ammunition 
tliat might be wanted. Two additional pon- 
toon bridges were ordered to be laid to facili- 
tate tlie movement of troops. 

'J'his sound of mighty preparation might 
have warned Gen. Bragg that something more 
than the mere defense of Chattanooga was in 
the wind, but he supposed that his position 
on Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain was 
im))regnab]e, and now, in the faice of this 
gathering power, he sent off Longstreet witii 
15,000 men to attack Burnsidk in East Ten- 
nessee, having some grand project of ulterior 
opei'ations after overwlielming Burnside and 
recovering East Tennessee. Thus by a strange 
fortune, while forces from east, north, and 
west were gathering to Grant, in his front 
Bragg was dividing bis army. 

Pollard, who has a severe mind toward 
President Davis, charges this dividing expe- 
dition to him, but it was resolved upon by a 
council of war after Davis had left, and after 
Thomas' occupation of Lookout Valley had 
changed the situation. Bragg and his Gen- 
erals might reasonably reckon that his posi- 
tion was impregnable. If impregnable, .so 
that part of his army could securely hold it. 
and hold Grant's army in its front, he might 
reckon on recovering East Tennessee and 
threatening Grant's rear by Longstreet's op- 
eration. It did throw the Wa.shington au- 
thorities into panic, and if Grant had given 
way to them he would have sent part of his 
army to help Burnside, and thus the opera- 
tions •would have neutralized each other. 
But some military man has written that in 
real war the event depends on the question 
which side will commit the greatest blunders. 
There is a sort of satisfaction in the thought 
that blundering generalship was not all on 
the national side. 

Gen. Grant, having ascertained on the 7th 
of November that Longstreet was moving to- 
ward East Tennessee, became very anxious 
for Burnside, but he saw no way of relieving 
him, save by attacking Bragg on Mission 
Ridge. He sent another urgent message to 
Sherman, and on the same day ordered Gen. 
Thomas to attack and carry the north end of 
Mission Ridge on the next morning. The 
order said : 



— 174 — 



The news ■•■■ •'■ '^ is of such a nature that it be- 
comes an imperative duty to draw the attention of 
the enemy from Burnside to your own front. I 
deem the best movement to attack tlie enemy to be 
an attack on the northern end of Mission Ridge 
with all the force you can bring to bear against it; 
and when this is carried, to threaten and even at- 
tack, if possible, the enemy's line of communica- 
tion between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations 
should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four 
days, the moment Mission Ridge is in our posses- 
sion ; rations to be curried in haversacks. * * * 
The movement should not be made a moment later 
than to-morrow morning. 

To issue such an (u-dcr is e;isy wIkmi the 
conimander is utterly nnconsciolis of physic- 
al possibilities. This was to attack at a point 
which subsetjuently Gen. Sherman, with six 
divisions, and more offered hini, found im- 
pregnable. The operation which had seized 
Lookout Valley while the rations were at the 
shortest, had shown the indomitable spirit of 
Gen. Thomas' soldiers. They had had no 
thought of surrender or retreat, and whatever 
faintness they suflered from hunger was 
quicklj'^ cured by a full meal. But in the 
strait for food men were preferred bef<ire the 
animals, and men recover more quickly from 
starvation. 

Gen. Thomas had neither horse nor mule to 
move artillery. Part of his army was in 
Lookout Valley as much as five miles from 
his left, separated by Lookout Mountain and 
Chattanooga Creek Valley. Four miles be- 
yond the left of his line was the north end of 
Mission Ridge, which he was ordered to attack 
and carry. The order said also that Howard's 
cors of Hooker's command could be with- 
drawn from Lookout Valley to be used in this 
attack. Thereby if the attack had failed, the 
loss of Lookout Valley might be expected. 
Thomas, with his army stretched out more 
than twelve miles, and his center overlooked 
by the Confederate Army on Mission Ridge, 
was thus required to attack at one extreme a 
position which Sherman found impregnable 
to all the men he could use. 

Further along it will be seen that the lack 
of animals to move a gun was a fortunate 
thing for the army, in saving it from an at- 
tempt to execute this order, which was given 
in absolute ignorance of the situation, and 
which reasonably might be expected to match 
the consumption of horses and mules by an 
equal number of soldiers slain and wounded 
J in vain. Grant announced to Halleck and 



Burnside this order, as if the operation were 
a certainty. But Gen. Thomas and the Chief 
of Engineers, Gen. Smith, after a thorough 
reconnaissance of the ground, and a consid- 
eration of the lack of draft animals and 
the inadequacy of the force for such an oper- 
ation, agreed that tlie army was not in condi- 
tion to make it. Gen. Grant, therefore, re- 
voked the order, and now applied himself to 
the forming of a plan of operation for the 
combined armies, to be carried out as soon as 
Shrrman should arrive. 

Gen. Sherman, upon receiving Grant's 
order on the 27th, turned from the railroad at 
Tuscunibia, to cross to the north side of the Ten- 
nessee River. One division crossed, with very 
inadequate means of ferrying, and Sherman 
joined it at Florence, November 1. The other 
three divisions turned back eighteen miles to 
cross at Freeport by the aid of boats. From 
Florence he had to make a detour to north- 
east, up the Elk River to the Bridge at Fay- 
etteville. At Fayetteville he received orders 
from Grant to come to Bridgeport with the 
loth Army Corps, and leave Gen. Dodge on 
the railroad which runs north from Decatur, 
Ala., to Nashville. He gave orders for tlie 
movement of the four divisions, and then 
went on to Bridgeport, arriving at night, 
November 13. From thence he was sum- 
moned to Chattanooga, which he reached on 
the 15th, as his official report says; his 
memoirs say the 14th. 

Here Gen. Grant informed him of his plan 
of ojierations, and he narrates that next day, 
to-wit, on the 15th (or 16th) they walked out 
to Fort Wood, a prominent salient of the 
defenses, to view the situation, and he thus 
narrates the impression made on him, and 
that expressed to him by Gen. Grant: 

From its parapet we had a magnificent view of 
the panorama. Lookout Mountain with its rebel 
Hags and batteries stood out boldly, and an occa- 
sional shot fired toward Wauhatchie or Moccasin 
Point gave life to the scene. These shots could 
barely reach Chattanooga, and I was told that one 
or more shot had struck the hosnital inside the 
lines. 

All along Mission Ridge were the tents of the 
rebel beleaguering force; the lines of trench from 
Lookout up toward Chickamauga Creek were 
plainly visible; and rebel sentinels in a continuous 
chain were walking their posts in plain view not a 
thousand yards off. "Why,"' said I. "Gen. Grant, 
you are besieged;" and he said, "It is loo true." Up 
to that moment I had no idea that things were bo 



175 



bad. The rebel lines actually extended from the 
river below the town to the river above, and the 
Army of the Cumberland was closely held to the 
town and its immediate defenses. 

Gen. Grant pointed out to me a house on Mission 
Ridge, where Gen. Bragg's headquarters were known 
to be. He also explained the situation of affairs 
generally; that the mules and horses of Thomas' 
army were so starved that they could not haul his 
guns; that forage, corn, and provisions were so 
scarce that the men in hunger stole tne few grains 
of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the 
men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized by 
[he battle of Chickamauga that he feared they 
could not be got out of the trenches to assume the 
offensive; that Bragg had detached Longstreet with 
a considerable force up into East Tennessee, to de- 
feat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in 
danger, and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious 
to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at 
least him to force to recall Longstreet. 

The Army of the Cumberland had been so long 
in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry 
up to take the offensive ^rs/, alter which he had no 
doubt the Cumberland army would light well. 

The situation was, indeed, a revelation to 
Gen. Sherman, whose leading division in tliis 
rescuing expedition liad been twenty-five days 
getting from Corinth to Tuscumbia, fifty 
miles, and whose troops now, when two 
months had elapsed since he received the 
word of urgency on the Mississippi, liad only 
begun to arrive at Bridgeport on the 15th. 
But in order to get this view Gen. Grant had 
to go baclcward a fortnight; for tlie soldiers 
had now enough to eat, and a part of tliis 
army, which Gen. Grant said was so cowed 
by Ciiickamauga that it could not be got out 
of the trenches to fight until Sherman's men 
had shown how, had brilliantly carried out 
an expedition requiring tlie highest valor and 
intelligence; and tliis was in their greatest 
strait of rations. 

Following events made even a more pointed 
commentary on Gen. Grant's expressed 
oi)inion that the soldiers of Thomas' army 
would not fight. Sherman's narrative now 
telis the plan which Grant unfolded to him, 
and that next day they rode to the hills on 
the north side of tlie river opposite Cliatta- 
nooga, to reconnoiter the ground from tliese 
heights. This plan makes necessary a general 
view of the ground. 

The general course of tlie Tennessee River 
from Knoxville to Chattanooga is southwest. 
Striking the base of Lookout Mountain, three 
miles below Chattanooga, the river turns 
abruptly to northwest, and, after five miles, 



doubles on itself and then, after a loop, re- 
sumes its general southwest course. 

Four miles north of Chattanooga South 
Chickamauga Creek, fetching a bend to north- 
west and southwest, enters the Tennessee. 
Mission Hidge starts from the south bank of 
this creek, nearly two miles east of the river, 
and about five miles north of Chattanooga, 
and runs a little east of south, and terminates 
at Rossville, in the valley of Chattanooga 
Creek, nearly east of the north end of Look- 
out Mountain, and about three miles south 
of Chattanooga. The bending of the river 
away from the ridge makes the distance from 
the river at Chattanooga to the ridge about 
three and one-half miles. In the valley be- 
tween Lookout and the ridge, Chattanooga 
Creek runs in a general north course, and 
then turns to southwest to enter the river at 
the north end of Lookout. About two miles 
north of the South Chickamauga the North 
Chickamauga enters the river on the west 
side. The railroad from Dalton crosses the 
South Chickamauga, and runs through the 
north end of Mission Ridge by a tunnel, and 
thence southwest nearly four miles, to the 
town. 

Chattanooga is in a rough valley on the east 
side of the river, which is a prolongation of 
the valley of Chattanooga Creek up along the 
river to the South Chickamauga. On the op- 
posite side of the river the countrj' is hilly. 
Gen. Bragg's lines extended all the way from 
the South Chickamauga along the top of Mis- 
sion Ridge to Rossville, a length of seven 
miles. Tiic indented top of this ridge is from 
400 to (iOO feet above tiie valley. The Confed- 
erate array had also an intrenched line at the 
foot oL the ridge, starting about two miles 
north of Chattanooga, and curving from the 
ridge south of the town to cross Chattanooga 
Creek Valley and connect with the head of 
Lookout Mountain. 

About half way between the ridge and 
Ciiattanooga the Confederates had an in- 
trenched position on and in front of a hill 
called Orchard Knob, with barricades of logs 
and stones for half a mile to the southwest of 
the knob, and a line of rifie pits for more than 
a mile to the nortii, following the curve of 
Citico Creek, which runs northwest to the 
river. Between this and the national line the 
ground is generally Ipw, and was partly cov- 
ered with trees and bushes. The Confederate 
picket line was as much as half way between 



— 176 — 



Orchard Knob and Chattanooga, reaching to 
the river above the town, and at the head of 
Lookout below. 

The railroad which runs under the north 
end of Mission Ridge was Bragg's line of sup- 
plies, and his depot was at Chickamauga Sta- 
tion, east of the north end of the ridge. Gen. 
Grant conceived the idea that Bragg had 
left this vital point unguarded. Says Sher- 
man in his narrative: "Grant explained to 
me that he had reconnoitered the rebel line 
from Lookout Mountain up to Chickamauga, 
and he believed that the northern portion of 
Mission Ridge was not fortified at all." His en- 
tire plan was formed upon this strange mis- 
conception, and its decisive part was to be 
the carrying of the head of Mi-ssion Ridge, 
whicd commanded Bragg's line of supplies. 
This part was assigned to Sherman's army, to 
be assisted by one division from the Army of 
the Cumberland. Sherman, bringing his 
army from Bridgeport north through Lookout 
Valley, was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's 
Ferry, and then march by a long way over 
the hills west of the river, out of sight of the 
enemy, to the North Chickamaut;a. 

Pontoons had been made at Chattanooga, 
and carried by this road to the Xorth Chicka- 
mauga, to bridge the Tennessee for Sherman. 
Troops in these were to drop down the North 
Chickamauga, unperceived. to the Tennessee, 
make a landing on the east side, lay a bridge 
by which all of Sherman's troops were to 
cross, and carry the unguarded isortli end of the 
ridge by surprise before it could be fortified. 
•Thomas, meanwhile, was to hold the front, 
concentrating toward his left, and when Sher- 
man came sweeping down the ridge, Thomas 
was to join him and all were to sweep on- 
ward. Hooker, with one of his corps and 
such of Thomas' troops as had occupied Look- 
out Valley, was to hold that valley, and 
Howard with the other corps was to be held 
ready to act with either Thomas or Sherman. 
But the General is not wise who risks his 
army in a genei'al engagement on a plan 
based upon the supposition that his adversary 
is a fool. 

The plan was an admirable plan, if Bragg 
had been a General who would leave the vital 
point of his position unguarded; but because 
he did not so co-operate, but, on the con- 
trary, had made strongest of all that part 
which Sherman was tO take by surprise, the 
plan went all awry, and the success had to be 



achieved contrary to the plan in every par- 
ticular. 

Gen. Grant communicated his plan on the 
18th, and fixed the 21st as the day of battle, 
and Gen. Thomas made his dispositions ac- 
cordingly, one of which was to move How- 
ard's corps from Lookout Valley to a position 
on the north side of the river, between 
Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga, calling up 
two of his own brigades from further down 
the river to fill the place left by Howard in 
the valley. His arrangements were com- 
pleted by the 21st, but a rain delayed Sher- 
man's movements, and the day of battle was 
changed to the 22d ; but on that day Grant. 
notified Thomas of further postponement, 
because two of Sherman's divisions had failed 
to cross at Brown's Ferry, the pontoon bi-idge 
having parted. 

During all this time the authorities at 
Washington were very uneasy because of 
BuRNsiDE, and Halleck was telegraphing 
much worry and misinformation, and Grant 
had not only his own anxietj'^ to contend 
with, but had to quiet the Washington 
authorities with assurances which were not 
strictly according to the facts of the situation. 
And while thus waiting for Sherman he did 
not fail to cast the blame for delay on the im- 
mobility of Thomas' army, all of which was 
eager to begin. Thomas, at tliis juncture, 
suggested that, to avoid further delay, 
Howard's corps should take the place of those 
of Sherman's divisions, which were behind, 
and that these, in, the place of Howard's, 
could join Hooker's troops in Lookout Val- 
ley to attack the enemy on Lookout Mount- 
ain, or at least to divert his attention from 
Sherman's movement. But Gr.vnt was de- 
sirous that Sher.man's army should make the 
decisive movement, and he accepted Thomas" 
suggestions only so far as to permit Howard's 
corps to be moved to Chattanooga. 

Rumors now came that Bragg was with- 
drawing his array, and Gen. Grant on the 
2od sent to Gen. Thomas this: 

Tlie truth or falsity of the deserter who came in 
last night, statinK that Bragg had fallen back, 
should be ascertained at once. If he is really fall- 
ina back, Sherman can commence at once layiufj 
his pontoon trains, and he can save a day. 

To ascertain the truth or falsity of the de- 
serter. Gen. Thomas issued the following 
order to Gen. Granger: 



— 177 — 



The General commanding the department directs 
that you throw one division of the 4th Corps for- 
ward in the direction of Orchard Knob, and hold a 
second division in supporting distance, to discover 
the position of the enemy, if lie still remains in the 
vicinity of his old camps. Howard's and Baird's 
commands will be ready to co-operate, if needed. 

Granger issued the necessary order to Gen. 
Wood, to be supported by Gen. Sheridan. In 
an undulating valley, between Fort Wood, of 
tlie national line, and Orchard Knob, of the 
Confederate line, several divisions of the 
Army of the Cumberland now formed in line 
of battle, in plain sight from the enemy's 
counnanding positions. 

Botli armies looked on with admiration at 
the movements of the well disciplined troops 
of the Army of the Cumberland. The Con- 
federates thought it a parade, and made no 
preparations to oppose. Wood's division first 
deployed before Fort Wood. Then Sheri- 
dan's to the right and rear of Wood. How- 
ard's corps was in mass in tberearof these di- 
visions. Baird's division was to the right and 
rear of Sheridan in echelon. Johnston's di- 
vision was in arms in the intrenchiuents. 
About 2 p. m. Wood's division moved rapidly 
forward, Hazen's brigade on the right, Will- 
ich's on the left, and Beatty's in reserve. As 
if on parade the compact lines marched, 
sweeping before them the enemy's pickets and 
their reserves, and then on to the enemy's line 
at Orchard Knob, carrying the whole line by 
a dash at the point of the bayonet, capturing 
the 8th Alabama Fcegiment. The short and 
sharp conflict cost 125 men killed and 
wounded in Wood's division. 

As soon as Wood had driven the enemy 
from the position, Sheridan m(5ved to Wood's 
right, occupying a series of small hills. The 
line now taken had nearly all the high ground 
between Fort Wood and Mission Ridge, mak- 
ing a base of operations against tlie enemy's 
main line almost a mile nearer to the ridge 
than the Confederate picket line had been on 
the morning of that day. The vital bearing 
of this on that which the failure of Sher- 
man's attack made the decisive movement of 
tlie battle, will appear further along. And 
this was not in Gen. Grant's plan, but was 
achieved by a spontaneous movement, and 
by the dashing gallantrj'^ of those troops 
which Grant told Sher.man could not be got 
out of the trenches to fight until Sherman's 
men had given them an example. 



CHAPTER LXH. 

grant's waiting for SHERMAN — THOMAS* 
ANXIETY THAT THE ACTION SHOULD BEGIN — 
THE OPERATION AGAINST LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 
— ANOTHER VICTORY NOT IN GRANT's PLAN, 
AND WHICH HELPED TO SAVE THE ARMY 
FROM HIS PLAN. 

The brilliant demonstration of the 23d of 
November had made Orchard Knob the cen- 
ter of the battle front of Gen. Thomas' armj', 
between which and the foot of Mission Ridge 
was easy ground of less than a mile. Another 
important consequence of the advance was 
that it caused Gen. Bragg to bring from 
Lookout Mountain Walker's division to 
strengthen his defense on Mission Ridge, 

This had an important bearing on another 
operation which was not in Gen. Grant's 
plan — namely, Hooker's carrying Lookout 
Mountain. During the pageant of the 2od 
Sherman was struggling to get his divisions up 
to the North Chickamauga. Another division 
crossed at Brown's Ferry on that day, making 
three, but the bridge again parted, leaving 
Osterhaus' division on the left bank. Mean- 
while it wns improbable tliat this protracted 
movement could be concealed from the enemy, 
whose high positions looked out over all tliat 
region, and who liad a chance to defeat tlie 
operation either by fortifying the north end 
of Mission Ridge, or resisting the crossing of 
the Tennessee, or by retreating. 

Gen. Thomas, on the 22d, had urged Grant 
to take Howard's corps in place of the two 
divisions of Sherman's army, which were yet 
behind, letting these join Hooker in Lookout 
Valley in an attack on Lookout Mountain. 
But Grant had determined that Sherman's 
army should make the decisive attack, and 
so the operation was delayed. Fortunately, 
during this delay the unexpected seizure of 
the advanced line of Orchard Knob had 
greatly improved the situation, but still 
were fears that their aims would be defeated 
by Bragg's knowledge of them. As the 
proposition to make the attack with the aid 
of Howard's corps was rejected, Gen. Thomas, 
on the 22d, had moved it 6ver the river to 
Chattanooga, thinking that this might de- 
ceive the enemy into the belief that all of 
Sherman's troops, whose crossing at Brown's 
Ferry was in full sight of the enemy, were 
simply re-enforcing Chattanooga. 

On the 23d, as Sherman had now three divis- 



— 178 — 



long acrosF Jen. Grant decided to wiiit no 
longer for tue fourth. Gen. J. C. Davis' divis- 
ion from Thomas' army, wliicli was to join 
Sherman, was already at tlie North Chicka- 
mauga ready for the operation. The cliief 
energies of the Engineer Department of tlie 
Army of the Cumberland had been devoted 
to Sherman's operation. The pontoons for a 
double bridge had been built and car- 
ried over the hills and placed in the North 
Chickamauga, with*a brigade to man them, 
by the night of the 20th, ready for the opera- 
tion wliich by Grant's first order was to be 
made on the 21st. A steamboat was sent up 
from Chattanooga to assist the crossing. 

Gen. Thomas now advised Gen. Hooker 
that if Sherman's remaining division should 
fail to cross to join Sherman, he should en- 
deavor with it and his own command "to 
take the point of Lookout Mountain." Later 
he informed Hooker that Grant still hoped 
that Osterhaus' division could cross, but if 
he could not in time to join Sherman, the 
mountain should be taken if a demonstration 
should develop its practicability. Badeau 
says that Grant ordered Osterhaus that, un- 
less he could get across by 8 o'clock of the 
morning of the 24th, he was to report to 
Hooker. Hooker sent a staff officer to the 
river to ascertain that the bridge could not be 
joined, and made his arrangements accord- 
ingly. The detention of this division turned 
out a lucky accident, leading to the taking of 
Lookout Mountain, which was not in Grant's 
plan, and which materially changed the situ- 
ation, opening up Chattanooga Creek Valley 
around the souttiern point of Mission Ridge, 
and through that making Bragg's position 
untenable, even if all front attack had been 
found impracticalile. 

Gen. Hooker was not the man to neglect 
an opportunity. At 4 a. ra. of the 24th he 
reported that he was ready to advance against 
Lookout Mountain. His command now com- 
prised Geary's division of the 12tli Corps of 
the Army of the Potomac, Osterhaus' divis- 
ion of the Array of the Tennessee, and two 
brigades of Cruft's division of the Army of 
the Cumberland, under Whittaker and 
Grose. He sent Geary's division and Whit- 
taker's brigade up the valley south to Wau- 
hatchie, to cross Lookout Creek, and then to 
sweep down its right bank to cover the cross- 
ing of the rest of the forces. Grose was to 
seize the wagon road bridge near the mouth 



of the creek, a little to the left of the head of 
Lookout Mountain, and repair it. The other 
bank of the creek v; as held by the Confederate 
pickets. The enemy's main force was en- 
camped on the mountain side commanding 
the creek. Osterhaus' division was to move 
up from Brown's Ferry, under cover of the 
hills, to the point for crossing }.he creek, and 
was to support two batteries of artillery 
placed on hills to cover the crossing. Hooker 
also sent a part of the 2d Kentucky Cavalry 
up the valley to Trenton, to give warning of 
danger from that direction. 

The following description of the north end 
of Lookout is taken from Van Horne's histo- 
ry orf the Army of the Cumberland: 

On the front of Lookoui Mountain, intermediate 
between base and summit, there is a wide open 
space, cultivated as a farm, in vivid contrast with 
the natural surroundings of the wildest types. The 
farmhonse, Icnown as Craven's, or "the white 
house," was situated upon the upper margin of the 
farm. From the house to the foundation of the 
perpendicular cliff or palisade, which crops out 
from the rockribbed frame of the mountain, the as- 
cent is exceedingly steep, and thickly wooded. 

Below the farm the surface is rough and craggj'. 
The base of the mountain, next the river, has a per- 
pendicular front of solid rook, rising grandly from 
the railroad track, which, though, in part, cut 
tlirough the deep ledges, does not perceptibly mur 
nature's magnificent architecture. Over the top of 
tliis foundation Iront the narrow road passes, which 
in the western valley (Lookout Valley') throws off 
various branches leading west and south. East and 
west from Craven's farm the surface is broken by 
furrows and covered with shrubs, trees, and frag- 
ments of stone. 

On the open space the enemy had constructed 
his defenses, consisting of intrenchments, pits, 
and redoubts, which, extending over the f.-ont of 
the mountain, bode defiance to a foe advancing 
from the river. At the extremities of the main in- 
trenchments there were rifle pits, epaulments for 
batteries, barricades of stone and abatis, looking to 
resistance against aggression from Chattanooga or 
Lookout Valley. The road from Chattanooga to 
Summertown, an elegant village for summer re- 
sort, winding up the eastern side of the mountain, 
is the only one practicable for ordinary military 
movements within a range of many miles. So that, 
except by this road, there could be no transfer of 
troops from tlie summit to the northern slope, or to 
the valley, east or west, to meet the emergencies of 
battle, and this road was too long to allow pro- 
vision from the top for sudden contingencies be- 
low. 

To attack such a mountain seems to lift 
battle into the realm of romance; yet this de- 



179 — 



scription, and the plan of the attack, show 
that the: heroic spirit of the soldiers was di- 
rected by military skill. 

Geary's division crossed the creek at Wau- 
hatchie at 8 a. ni., captured the pickets, and 
then the column clinijjed the mountain side 
until its head reached the base of the pali- 
saded top. Then with his right holding to 
the base of the palisades, the line, facing to 
the north, swept along the mountain side to- 
ward the north end. At the same.time Grose 
attacked and "drove back the enemy at the 
bridge neaV the head of the mountain, and 
began to repair it. 

This brought out the enemy in force, occu- 
pying intrenchments and rifle pits, and one 
part advanced to the railroad embankment, 
which formed a good cover from which 
to open tire upon troops advancing trom the 
bridge. To avoid this fire in a direct advance 
Hooker now directed Osterhaus to send 
Woods' brigade to prepare a crossing half a 
mile further up the creek, under cover of 
woods. A part of Grose's brigade remained 
at the bridge, to hold the enemy's attention, 
and the rest followed Woods. Meanwhile ad- 
ditional artillery was placed to enfilade the 
near positions of the enemy. 

Woods completed the bridge at 11 a. m., 
and soon after Geary's division and Whit- 
taker's brigade, in line reaching from tue 
mountain base to the palisade, came abreast. 
The batteries now opened fire, and Woods 
and Grose, crossing the creek, placed their 
troops on Geary's left, extending it into the 
valley, and now the whole line swept forward, 
reaching from the creek up the mountain to 
the palisade, over crags, great detached rocks, 
bushes, trees, and all sorts of obstacles of a 
wild mountain side. The artillery at the 
northern bridge drove the enemy from their 
intrenchments at the foot of the mountain, 
and in their flight they fell into Geary's ad- 
vancing line as it swept round to the head of 
the mountain. 

At noon the victorious troops had reached 
a point where the orders required a halt to re- 
adjust the lines for a more cautious approach 
toward vSummertown; but they kept on, driv- 
ing the enemy's line out of its intrenchments, 
and making no halt until the middle of the 
open ground of Craven's farm was gained. 
Here the enemy met re-enforcements, and 
made a more determined stand, but the left 
of the national line closed up from below, and 



the enemy was driven from all the defenses 
on the open ground, and with broken ranks 
now retreated down the eastern side of the 
mountain. This skillful operation bad struck 
the fiank and rear of the Confederate de- 
fenses, turning them to naught. Hooker's 
report states the capture of between 2,000 and 
3,000 prisoners, five colors, two guns, and up- 
ward of 5,000 muskets. 

The heavy fighting ceased at 2 p. 'm. Hook- 
er's troops had expended their ammuni- 
tion, and now the fog which had enveloped 
the top of the mountain since morning set- 
tled far down its sides, completely covering 
the enemy. This prevented an effort to seize 
Summertovvn, and Hooker now waited for 
ammunition and re-enforcements. At 5 p. m. 
Carlin's brigade from Thomas' army came 
direct from Chattanooga, crossing Chatta- 
nooga Creek near its mouth, and ascended the 
mountain to Hooker's right, the troops carry- 
ingon their personsainmunition for Hooker's 
skirmishers. Skirmishing was kept up till 
midnight, the flash of the musketry seen 
from Chattanooga looking like a battle in the 
clouds. 

This brilliant operation had neutralized the 
enemy's position on top of the mountain, 
even if not made it untenable. It had 
driven the enemy's picket line from the 
river, and opened to our troops the way across 
Chattanooga Creek Valley from Lookout to 
Chattanooga, connecting the national line, 
and opening a wide distance in the Confeder- 
ate. And now there was a way open up Chat- 
tanooga Creek Valley and around the south 
end of Mission Ridge, whereby Bragg' s posi- 
tion ^jiight be turned, and he forced to pre- 
cipitate retreat without any direct attack on 
natural fortresses. 

Gen. Grant did not seem to appreciate the 
importance of Hooker's victory in its bear- 
ing on the main operation, and he expected 
nothing more from it than that next day 
Hooker should complete the capture of the 
mountain. He said in his order of the 24th, 
for next day: 

If Hooker's present position on the mountain 
can be m.iintained with small force, and it is found 
iniDracticable to carry the top from where he is. it 
would be advisable for him to mov" up the valley 
with all the force he can spare, jm ascend by the 
first practicable road. 

This was to keep Hooker, on the great day, 



— 180 — 



operating against the top of a mountain which 
he had before isolated and neutralized. But 
Hooker believed that he had made the 
enemy's position untenable, and Thomas, in 
his congratulatory order, gave tliis more per- 
tinent direction to Hooker: 

Be in readiness to advance as early as possible in 
the morning into Chattanooga Valley, and seize and 
hold the Summertown road, and co-operate with 
the 14th Corps by supporting its right. Map sent by 
courier at S'o'clock this evening, 

This, instead of wasting Hooker's forces in 
an operation around the top of Lookout, which 
now had no significance, would bring them 
into co-operation in the great attack on Mis- 
sion Ridge. Hooker had anticipated the 
enemy's abanclonment of the top of Lookout, 
and at daylight next morning his enterprising 
soldiers found it so. He reported this to Gen. 
Thomas, and received further orders to leave 
two regiments to hold Lookout, and with the 
rest of his forces to move on the Rossvilleroad 
to Mission Ridge 

This may be numbered the third of the bat- 
tles about Chattanooga since Gen. Grant took 
command. Like the affair of Orchard Knob, 
it was not in Grant's plan, and like that it 
gained advantages in the situation which were 
of great importance in the final event, in 
achieving a victory after it had been proved 
to be impossible upon the plan which Gen. 
Grant had formed and had persisted in with 
characteristic firmness. 



CHAPTER LXIII. 

Sherman's grand attack on bragg's un- 
guarded EIGHT — FINDS IT THE STRONGEST 
PART OF bragg's WHOLE LINE — SHERMAN's AT- 
TACK FAILS — grant's PLAN AT A DEADLOCK — 
HOOKER ADVANCES TO SOUTH END OF THE 
RIDGE — THOMAS ORDERED FORWARD ON THE 
CENTER. 

While Gen. Hooker had been attacking 
Lookout Mountain, Gen. Sherman had been 
crossing the Tennessee, and making his first 
attack on the north end of Mission Ridge. At 
midnight of the 23d, 116 boats, carrying a 
brigade, floated down the North Chickamauga 
into the Tennessee, to the place of crossing, 
landing on the east bank of the river, both 



above and below the mouth of the South 
Chickamauga. 

A steamboat aided the crossing of the 
troops. High water had now so widened 
the river that the boats intended for two 
would make no more than one bridge. By 
daylight two divisions were over, and the 
bridge construction was pushed with energy, 
and was ready at 11 a. m. At this time Gen. 
Howard, with a brigade and a cavalry escort, 
arrived, having come up the east bank of the 
river, which showed that the enemy had with- 
drawn their lines from the river and a great 
l^art of the valley. Howard left the brigade 
with Sherman, and returned with his escort. 

At 1 p. m. Gen. Sherman moved forwai'd 
with three divisions in echelon, covering the 
heads of columns with skirmishers. Meeting 
no serious resistance, they passed the 
foothills, and occupied the two most northern 
summits of Mission Ridge at 4 p. m. There 
had been no action, but he had not yet 
reached the right flank of the enemy. There in- 
tervened between him and the tunnel, which 
he was expected to carry on that day, a sum- 
mit upon which Bragg's right rested and 
which was fortified. 

Mission Ridge is cut into distinct summits 
by deep depressions. The deepest of these 
separated that which Sherman had occupied 
from the next, which was the right of Bragg's 
position, and was the strongest position for 
lateral defense within Bragg's lines. Cle- 
burne's division held this summit, which was 
broad enough for a strong force, and not too 
broad for solid lines. Heavy fortifications of 
logs and earth covered the troops on the first 
line, and higher ground to the south gave 
positions for supporting columns. Woods 
gave additional protection. An attacking 
force from any direction came under the 
guns of this position. 

Gen. Sherman's report says- 

The enemy was also seen in great force on a still 
higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he had 
a flue plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The 
gorge between, through which several roads and 
the railroad tunnel pass, could not be seen from 
our position, but formed the natural place d'armes, 
where the enemy covered his masses to resist our 
contemplated movement of turning his right 
flank and endangering his communications with 
his depot at Ciiickamauga Station. 

This place which Gen. Sherman had 
reached with so gre^t labor and delay, and 



— 181 — 



with such an expenditure of engineer ener- 
gies and means; which Gen. Grant expected 
to find unfortified, and to take by surprise; 
upon which delusion he had formed his plan 
so completely that it had no alternative, Gen. 
Sherman now found to be the strongest 
place, naturally and artificially, defensively 
and offensively-, that could be found in 
Bragg's line if he had freely searched for it. 
It was not only impregnable to his attack, 
but it had peculiar advantages for unexpected 
attack upon his attacking forces, as he found 
to his cost. 

Gen. Sherman hiid come to a full stop. Yet 
all the same did Gen. Grant telegraph to 
Washington: 

The fiRlit to-day progressert favorably. iShennan 
carried the end of Mission Rid^e, and his right is 
now at the tunnel, and liis left at Cliickamauga 
Creek, 

The rest told of Hooker's success. In the 
hands of a trjily great General, the telegraph 
is mightier than the sword. The relation of 
these events to Grant's plan gives a touch of 
humor to Halleck's reply: "I congratulate 
you on the success thus far of your plans." 
On that night Grant issued the following 
order to Gen. Thomas for the operations next 
day, in which may be noticed the valuable in- 
formation communicated, and the vague 
alternative provided for Thomas' army; 

Generai,: Gen, Sherman carried Mission Ridge as 
far as the tunn-el with only slight skirmishing. 
His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the 
hill; his left at ('hickamauga Creek. I have in- 
structed Gen. Sherman to advance as soon as it is 
light in the morning, and your attack, which will 
be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your 
command will either carry the rifle pits and ridge 
directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the 
presence of the enemy may require. 

If Gen. Grant thought that Sherman had 
carried the ridge as far as the tunnel, it shows 
again how a Commanding General, in a bat- 
tle, who thinks he is the god of the machine, 
may be ignorant of the essential parts of the 
situation, and may issue orders unconscious 
of their impossibility and destructiveness. 
Gen. Sherman had not carried Mission Ridge 
to the tunnel, and was never to carry it, and 
the situation in which Thomas was to co-op- 
erate, whicli was to be when Sherman's ad- 
vance had made a junction with Thomas, 
was never to arrive, and instead of attacking 



simultaneously, his forces were diverted to 
re-enforce Sherman. 

Gen. Sherman opened the battle on the 25th 
soon after sunrise. Corse's brigade moved 
down the southern slope ot the second hill 
gained the night before, and ascended toward 
Cleburne's i^osition under a heavy fire, gain- 
ing a place about eigiity yards from the ene- 
my's fortifications, from which he repeatedly 
advanced and was driven back, and in turn 
repulsed several attacks of the enemy, suffer- 
ing slaughter without possibility of advan- 
tage. At the same time Morgan L. Smith's 
division advanced along the eastern base of 
the hill. Loomis' brigade, supporting Corse 
on the left, was supported by two reserve 
brigades of John E. Smith's division. 

Gen. M. L. Smith pressed forward to the 
enemy's works, but gained no lodgment. 
Gen. Grant, observing from Orchard Knob 
the nature of this fight, at 10 a. m. directed 
Howard's corps, which was in position on 
Thomas' left, to go to Sherman's support. 
This corps was formed on the left of Sher- 
man's line, its left reaching to South Cliicka- 
mauga Creek. Sherman had now six divis- 
ions — three of his own, two of Howard's 
corps, and Davis' division of Thomas' army. 

Reducing his center. Gen. Grant persisted 
in his original plan of turning Bragg's right. 
Soon after Howard was in position Sherman 
made anotlier effort to turn the enemy's right 
flank. Corse's brigade, now under command 
of Walcutt (Corse being wounded), and 
Buschbeck's brigade again moved to the at- 
tack, and the brigades of John B. Smith ad- 
vanced in support, the extreme right of tlie 
line reaching near to the depression in the 
rear of Cleburne's first line of works, through 
which the railroad runs to the tunnel. This 
gorge is tliat which Sherman describes as the 
place d'armes. It was now found so. From 
this gorge a heavy force, in complete conceal- 
ment, came out upon Smith's brigades, and 
drove them in disorder down the hill. But 
this was in tarn taken in flank by AValcutt's 
and LooMis' brigades, and the previous situ- 
ation was resumed. 

At Chattanooga the appearance was that 
Sherman was repulsed, but he denies it. Gen. 
Grant, seeing this repulse, and clinging to his 
plan of making the attack on tne north end of 
the ridge the decisive action, now ordered 
Baird's division, from the right of Thomas' 
line, to move to Sherman's support. This 



— 182 — 



• order gave to Sherman seven of the thirteen 
divisions now before the enemy, leaving to 
Gen. Thomas but eight brigades in line be- 
tween Chattanooga and the ridge. Hooker, 
with seven brigades, was as far removed on 
his right as Sherman on his left. And, 
according to Grant's order of the night before, 
Hooker was expected to have occupation at 
Lookout Mountain. 

This sending of so great a preponderance 
of the forces to Sherman, precludes the after- 
thought which was cooked up, that the plan 
from the beginningdesigned Sherman's move- 
ment as only a demonstration, while the de- 
cisive attack was to be made by Thomas 
against the breast of the ridge. To send away 
seven divisions for a demonstration, while 
the real battle was to be fought by eight 
brigades, would be strange battle tactics. 

Gen. Sherman, who says in his memoirs 
that he has never criticised Grant's strategy, 
but who does make remarks thereon, places 
italicized stress in his report on tlie fact that 
Grant's order to him to attack at "dawn of 
day'- gave him notice that Gen. Thomas 
would attack in force early in the day. Re- 
lating the failure of his attack, he says of the 
situation at 3 p. m. : "I had watched for the 
attack of Gen. Thomas 'early in the day.'" 
Sherman had reason to expect this, yet there 
was a vagueness in Grant's order to Thomas, 
in this: "Your command will either carry 
the rifle pits and ridge directly in front of 
them, or move to the left as the presence of 
the enemy may require." 

Either carry the rifle pits and ridge in front, 
or move to the left, as the presence of the 
enemy may require! What could he make 
of that? ,Yet in the fore part of the order he 
gave this, which by itself is specific, but 
which was neutralized by the shifting alterna- 
tive that followed: "1 have instructed Gen. 
Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the 
morning, aud your attack, which will be sim- 
ultaneous, will be in co-operation," Simulta- 
neous with Sherman, at dawn, yet either to 
the front or to the left as the presence of the 
enemy might require. Bi'sides, Grant's post 
overlooked Thomas' troops, and Thomas was 
in his presence, yet he did not order him to 
attack, but on the contrary he diverted his 
troops to Sherman. 

Grant's original plan was still sticking in 
his mind, which was to hold Thomas' army 
until Sherman had carried the north end of 



the ridge and thereby eflfected a junction 
with Thomas, after which was this vague di- 
rection: "Further movements will depend 
on those of the enemy." In Sherman's re- 
constructed plan, after the event, he makes 
his attack the feint, and charges delinquency 
in that Thomas did not attack simultaneously 
at dawn. In Grant's reconstructed plan to fit 
the events, he makes his waiting to be for 
Hooker to reach the south end of Mission 
Ridge, although in his original plan Hooker 
was still to be in Lookout Valley, and in his 
order of the night before Hooker was to oc- 
cupy himself about the top of Lookout. The 
reality was that the operations were greatly 
encumbered by Gen. Grant's plan, and that 
when success was gained in spite of it, the 
afterthought recoiistuction of the plan to fit 
the successful events made a queer mixture. 
Gen. Baird moved as ordered, following 
the road on the bank of the river until he 
had reached the rear of Sherman's right, 
when he was told by Sherman that he had all 
the force he could use. Thereupon Baird re- 
turned and now formed on Thomas' left, to 
lessen the interval between him and Sherman. 
His report states that his division was again 
in line at half past 2 p. m. Sherman had 
found that the supposed undefended end of 
the ridge was impregnable, and that now the 
enemy's concentrative and offensive advan- 
tages made the attempt a vain slaughter, and 
he made no further effort. 

That which Grant's plan had made the de- 
cisive movement had failed, after drawing to 
it the bulk of the army, and now something 
else had to be done. Meanwhile Gen. 
Hooker, following Gen. Thomas' order, had 
moved up Chattanooga Creek Valley to the 
Confederate left flank at Rossville, driving 
the skirmishers before him. He had to re- 
build the bridge over Chattanooga Creek. As 
soon as he could cross he pushed forward 
rapidly to Rossville, where he met considera- 
ble resistance. Forcing the enemy to retreat, 
he disposed of his three divisions to sweep 
north on the summit and on both sides of 
Mission Ridge. 

While HooKEK was making these dispo- 
sitions on the Confederate left flank, Gen. 
Grant ordered a movement in the center, 
which was another radical departure from his 
original plan. Till now Thomas' troops had 
been held to co-operate with Sherman, when 
he had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and, 



— 183 — 



in the failure of tliis, had been detached to 
help Sherman; but now an independent 
movement was ordered from the center, after 
Sherman had spent his force, and had ceased 
his attempt. At last this strategic plan of a 
battle, whose main attack was to find the 
enemy's depot of supplies unfortified, had 
to resort to a direct attack by half the force, 
on a steep and rough ridge, from four to six 
hundred feet high, fortified at the base and 
on the top, which in any rational military 
calculation would be called impregnable, and 
which Bragg said a skirmish line ought to 
hold against an assaulting column. 



CHAPTER LXIV. 

THE STORMING OF MISSION RIDGE — GRANt's VAGUE 
ORDER — THE INTENT A DEMONSTRATION — THE 
TROOPS ASSAULT WITHOUT ORDERS — THE HEAVY 
LOSSES AND CAPTURES — HOOKER COMES IN AT 
THE SOUTH END OF THE RIDGE — THE ARMY 
RESTS ON THE RIDGE FOR THE NIGHT — SHER- 
MAN INFORMED OF THE SUCCESS. 

Gen. Grant's order to Gen. Thomas to ad- 
vance to the ridge, like the rest of his orders 
to Thomas in all this operation, was vague; 
but as it was verbal, it afforded facility for 
after reconstruction to fit the event. Van 
Horne's history, which may be accepted as 
that of Gen. Thomas, saj's: "Grant's order 
required that the enemy should be dislodged 
from the rifle pits and intrenchments at tlie 
base of Mission Ridge." He adds: 

The statement is made in his official report that it 
was the design that the lines should be readjusted 
at the base for the assault on the .summit; but no 
such instructions were given to the corps or di- 
vision Generals. Neither does it appear from his 
report whether he meditated an independent as- 
sault of the summit from his center, or one co-op- 
erative with Sherman on the left, or Hooker on the 
right, as tlie original plan prescribed for the for- 
mer, or as the issues of the day prescribed for the 
latter. 

Badeau says that Grant seized the oppor- 
tunity because Bragg "was weakening his 
center and making a flank movement in the 
presence of an enemy," which Badeau says is 
"the most difficult movement that can be ex- 
ecuted in war." In military erudition Ba- 
deau is great and precise. But a movement 



along the fortified crest of that ridge, with its 
intrenched base held, and "the enemy" 
nearly a mile away from the foot, could not 
be very hazardous save in a military maxim. 
And, in fact, Bragg did not need to weaken 
his center in order to resist Sherman, and did 
not. It was still held by nearly four divis- 
ions, and the troops sent to strengthen Har- 
dee on the right had come from Lookout. 
But, on the contrary. Grant had greatly 
weakened his own center by a "flank move- 
ment in the face of the enemy" to send aid to 
Sherman. Badeau gives as another reason 
that Grant was now satisfied that Hooker 
must be on his way from Rossville, although 
not yet in sight, therefore he "determined 
to order the assault." But as late as the 
night before Hooker's co-operation was no 
part of his plan, and, in fact, Grant did not 
now "order the assault." 

Badeau, in order to show that Grant was 
the god of the machine, says: "At first he 
simply directed Thomas to order the advance; 
but seeing the corps commanders near him. 
Grant repeated to them in person the com- 
mand." This would be important. None of 
the corps commanders heard this instruction 
to carry the rifle pits and then halt and re- 
form the lines "with a view to carrying the 
top of the ridge." Gen. Gordon Granger, 
whose corps consisted of Wood's and Sheri- 
dan's divisions, says in his report: 

Gen. Sherman was unable to make any progress in 
moving along the ridge during the day, as the en- 
emy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to 
relieve him I was instructed to make a demonstra- 
tion upon the works of the enemy directly in my 
front, at the base of Mission Ridge. 

It is most likely that Gen. Grant intended 
this movement as a demonstration to aid 
Sherman, still sticking to his original plan. 
Nor is it discreditable to his generalship that 
he hesitated to order an assault of that great 
fortress; for, although heroic soldiers might 
do it, it was hardly a thing for a General to 
order troops to do, still less to make the main 
part in a plan of battle. Even as Badeau 
states it, the order is vague and indecisive, 
and if literally followed would have been 
almost certain to defeat the assault. If that 
high, steep, rough, and fortified ridge could 
be stormed at all, it must be by rapid move- 
ment and a surprise, following the Confeder- 
ate troops from their intrenchments at the 



— 184 — 



base, Up the steeps, before tbey could reform 
and recover, just as it was done. To have 
halted in the intrenchments at the foot, 
under a storm of fire from the sides and crest, 
to reform the lines, "with a view to carrying 
the top of the ridge," would have given the 
enemy time to recover from panic, and re- 
form their lines for defense, in that position 
which Gen. Uragg said "ought to have been 
held by a line of skirmishers against an 
assaulting column." 

The intelligence of the soldiers told them 
the foolishness of such generalship. The 
soldiers of Thomas' army, which Grant told 
Sherman were so demoralized by Chicka- 
luauga that they could not be got out of the 
trenches to figlit, until Sherman's troops had 
set them an example, had been chafing all 
day with impatience to attack. Says Gen. 
Granger: 

For hours my command from behind their breast- 
works anxiously and impatiently watched this 
struggle of their brothers in arms away off to the 
left on the nortliern end of the ridge. =•■ =•■ ••■ As 
the day wore on their impatience of restraint 
gathered force, and their desire to advance became 
almost uncontrollable. 

This eagerness of the soldiers, let loose by 
the order to move forv^'ard, inspired by an 
enthusiasm which could not be stopped, 
threw the Confederate troops into complete 
panic, and carried that mountain, which by 
all rational military calculations was im- 
pregnable. It is evident that Gen. Grant at 
this time had no clear idea of what he 
intended, and that he had not yet thrown off 
his original plan, by which the successful 
part was given to Sherman, and the demon- 
strating part to Thomas. Fortunately the 
soldiers of the ranks and their immediate 
oflticers were far more intelligent than the 
commanding generalship. 

This indecision and vagueness of the mind 
and orders of the Commanding General allow 
bold relief to the clear orders issued by Gen. 
Thomas. That at 9:30 p. m. of the 24tli, to 
Hooker, concluded with this: 

Be in readiness to advance as early as possible in 
the morninj; into Chattanooga Valley, and seize 
and hold the Summertown road and co-operate 
with the 14th Corps by supporting its right. 

At 8 a. m. of the 25th he ordered by both 
signal and an aide: 



Leave Carlin's brigade at Summertown road to re- 
join Gen. Palmer. Move with the remainder of 
your force, except two regiments to hold Lookout, 
on the Rossville road toward Mission Ridge, looking 
well to your right flank. 

At 10 a. m. he sent to Hooker by signal the 
following: 

I wish you and Gen. Palmer to move forward 
firmly and steadily upon the enemy's works iu 
front, using Gen. Sheridan as a pivot. 

Gen. Thomas had now four divisions in 
front of Gen. Bragg's center, which was held 
by three divisions and part of another, the 
other part having turned to help resist Hook- 
er's approach. Wood's and Sheridan's divis- 
ions were in the center; Johnson's on the right 
of Sheridan, and Baird's on the left of Wood. 
The brigades of these divisions were in the 
following order, from right to left: Carlin's 
and Stoughton's, of Johnson's; Sherman's, 
Hooker's, and Wagner's, of Sheridan's; 
Hazen's, Willich's, and Beatty's, of Wood's; 
Turchin's, Vanderveer's, and Phelps', of 
Baird's. Two lines of skirmishers covered 
the battle front, and the several reserves were 
massed in the rear of their respective corps. 

The Confederate forces and dispositions on 
Mission Ridge, on the morning of the 25th, 
are thus stated in Van Horne's history of the 
Army of the Cumberland: 

Gen. Bragg now had his entire army on Mission 
Ridge. Cleburne's ana Gist's divisions were on the 
extreme right opposed to Sherman: his left was 
held by Stewart's division; his center by Breckin- 
ridge's old division, and portions of the commands 
of Buckner and Hindraan, under Gen. Anderson: 
and the divisions of Clieatham and Stevenson, fresh 
from defeat on Lookout Mountain, were in motion 
toward the right. The two parts of the army before 
Gens. Sherman and Thomas were commanded re- 
spectively by Gens. Hardee and Breckinridge. 

Six successive guns on Orchard Knob gave 
to Thomas' four divisions the signal to ad- 
vance, between 3 and 4 p. m., and the lines 
moved forward in magnificent array. The 
batteries on the ridge opened upon them, and 
those of the national intrenchments answered, 
firing first at the intrenchments at the base of 
the ridge, and then, as our advancing troops 
quickly came in the way, at the top of the 
ridge. The advancing lines came first upon 
the enemy's pickets and their reserves, then 
his troops in the woods, and then, in their 
irresistible march, driving the line from the 



— 185 — 



intrenchment at the bases in confusion up 
the hill. A thousand Confederates were here 
captured. All this operation was against the 
fire of as many as fifty guns along the crest, 
and against Bragq's efforts to strengthen his 
lower line. 

The troops had now done all that their or- 
ders required; but to halt under the fire of 
these guns on the crest was to halt for death, 
and to wait was to give the Confederate troops 
time to reform behind their strong intrench- 
ments on the summit of the ridge. The com- 
pletion of what Grant had ordered had left 
them under a storm of fire from the crest and 
aides of the mountain, with no outcome. It 
had left the troops to their own intuitions 
under fire. It was a time when the intelli- 
gence of the ranks rose far above the general- 
ship. With one spontaneous impulse the 
whole line, as much as two miles long, went 
on to climb the hill under a storm of fire of 
artillery and musketry. They advanced not 
in line, but in such parts as enabled them to 
avail of easier ascent or partial cover. They 
went up without firing, though receiving a 
destructive fire. The ofticers of all grades 
were inspired by the spirit of the men of the 
ranks, and so spontaneous was the spirit that 
the crest was reached and carried at six ditier- 
ent points at the same time. 

The Confederate troops were quickly driven 
from their intrenchments on the crest, and 
from all their guns. Bairu's division, which 
had carried its whole front on the ridge, 
turned to the north in line across the crest, 
and advanced to meet Cheatham's division, 
which had been hurried forward by Hardee 
to support Anderson's division, which was 
in confused retreat, A sharp contest fol- 
lowed, in which Baird drove this fresh 
division from several knolls, when night and 
the difficulties of the enemy's position closed 
the fight. Gen. Wood's division, which Van 
HoRNE, from Bragg's account, thinks was 
first to reach the summit, enfiladed the Con- 
federates to right and left, and one of his 
brigades (Willich's) with Sheridan's di- 
vision pursued the enemy down the eastern 
slope. 

Gen. Bragg's report relates that he had 
gone to his left to make disposition to secure 
that flank (from Hooker's column), as by the 
road across the ridge at Rossville "a route 
was open to our rear." When the national 
troops advanced, he thought that the hot fire 



from the ridge had repulsed them, but "while 
riding along the crest, congratulating the 
troops, intelligence reached me that our line 
was broken on my right, and the enemy had 
crowned the ridge." 

He dispatched to that point Gen. Bate, 
who had held the ground in his front, but 
he found the disaster too great for his force 
to repair. Then he learned that his extreme 
left had given way, and that his position was 
almost surrounded. He directed Bate to 
form a second line in the rear. Bragg re- 
lates that Gen. Hardee had moved from the 
north end of the ridge toward the left, when 
he heard the heavy firing; that he reached 
the right of Anderson's division just in time 
to find it had nearly all fallen ba^k, com- 
mencing on its left where the enemy had 
first crossed the ridge; that he promptly 
threw a part of Cheatham's division across 
the ridge, and made a stand by whicli tlie 
further advance of the national troops to- 
ward the north end of the ridge was stayed. 

But Gen. Bragg says: 

All ID the left, except a portion of Bate's division, 
was entirely routed and in rapid fliglit, nearly all 
the artillery having been shamefully aban- 
doned. •• '•' * A panic, such as I hud never 
before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon of- 
ficers and men, and each seemed to be struggling 
for his personal safely regardless of his duty or his 
character. In this distressing and alarming state of 
affairs, Gen. Bate was ordered to hold his position, 
covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's 
command; and orders were immediately sent to 
Gens. Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces 
upon the depot atChickamauga. 

Fortunately it was now near nightfall, and the 
country and roads in our rear were fully known to 
us, but equally unknown to the enemy. Ttie 
routed left made its way back in great disorder, ef- 
fectually covered, however, by Bate's small com- 
mand, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's 
advance, driving it back. After niglit, all being 
quiet, all retired in good order, ihe enemy attempt- 
ing no pursuit. Lieut. Gen. Hardee's connnand, 
under his judicious management, retired in good 
order and unmolested. As soon as all the troops 
had crossed, the bridges over the Chickaniauga 
were destroyed to impede the enemy, tliough the 
stream was fordablo at several places. 

So disjointed had Grant's operation become 
by the failure of Gen. Sherman in that which 
the plan designed for the decisive attack, that 
Sherman, during the battle of the ridge, was 
making no demonstration to prevent tiie 
withdrawing of a large force from the nortli 



186 — 



end o^ the ridge, to resist the advance of 
Thomas' troops along the summit. This 
eventually stopped their progress, and night 
ended the action, giving to Bragg all night 
for retreat. 

Gen. Thomas' report, with characteristic 
modesty of language, has this account of the 
storming of the ridge, which was ordered as 
soon as Gen. Baird's division, returning from 
Sherman, had got into line on Wood's left; 

Orders were then given to move forward on 
Granger's left, and within supportins distance, 
against the enemy's riflepits on the slope and at the 
foot of Mission Ridge. The whole Hue then ad- 
vanced against the breastworks, and soon became 
engaged with the enemy's skirmisliers. These, 
giving way, retired upon their reserves, posted 
within their works, our troops advancing steadily 
in a continuous line. The enemy, seized with panic, 
abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and re- 
treated precipitately to the crest, where they were 
closely followed by our troops, who, apparently 
inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill 
simultaneously at six different points, and so closely 
upon the heels of tne enemy that many of them 
were taken prisoners in the trenches. 

The report of Gen. Gordon Granger, whose 
corps was composed of Wood's and Sheri- 
dan's divisions, has a more graphic and en- 
thusiastic narration, in which is more dis- 
tinctly set forth that the movement to the 
ridge was ordered as a demonstration, and 
that the ascent was without orders. It is 
likely that this report was unhealthy to Gen. 
Grange's subsequent fortunes, in the military 
necessity to show that all came about as Gen. 
Grant had ordered. Says Granger: 

Gen. Sherman was unable to make any progress 
in moving along the ridge during the day, as the 
enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order 
to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demon- 
stration upon the works of the enemy directly in 
my front, at the base of Mission Ridge. I accord- 
injily directed Maj. Gen. Sheridan and Brig. Gen. 
Wood to advance their divisions at a given signal, 
moving directly forward simultaneously and brisk- 
ly to attack the enemy, and, driving him from his 
riflepits, take possession of them. 

At twenty minutes before 4 o'clock p. m. six guns, 
the signal agreed upon, were fired in rapid suc- 
cession, and before the smoke had cleared away, 
these divisions, Sheridan on the right and Wood 
on the left, had cleared the breastworks that had 
sheltered them for two days, and were moving for- 
ward. '^- '■' '■'■ It pleases me to report that scarcely 
a straggler could be seen as this magnificent line, 
stretching one mile from end to end, swept througli 
the valley up to the assault. At the moment of the 



advance of these troops Mission Ridge blazed with 
fire from the batteries which lined its summit. Not 
less tlian fifty guns opened at once, throwing a 
terrible shower of shot and shell. 

The enemy now taking the alarm, commenced to 
move troops from both extremities of the ridge for 
tlie purpose of filling the ranks below and around 
those batteries. In the meantime the troops hold- 
ing tlie woods were driven back to the works at the 
base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following. 
Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but 
our troops, by an impetuous assault, broke this line 
in several places; then scaling the breastworks at 
cliese points, opened a flank and reserve fire upon 
them, which, throwing them into confusion, caused 
tlieir precipitate flignt. '■' '■' * 

My orders bad now been fully and successfully 
carried out, but not enough had been done to sat- 
isfy the brave troops who had accomplished so 
much. Althoueh the batteries on the ridge at 
short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still 
pouring upon them a shower of iron, and the mus- 
ketry from the hillsides were thinning their ranks, 
they dashed over the broastworus, througli the rifle' 
pits, and started up the ridge. They started with- 
out orders. Along the whole line of both divisions, 
from right to left and from left to risht, simulta- 
neously and with one accord, animated with one 
spirit, and, with heroic courage, eagerly they rushed 
forward to a danger before which the bravest, 
marching under orders, might tremble. 

Officers caught the euthusiasm of the men, and 
the men in turn cheered the officers. Each regi- 
ment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way 
up a hill that would try those of stout limb and 
strong lungs to climb, and each tried first to plant 
its flag on the summit. Above these men were an 
additional line of riflepits filled with troops. What 
was on tne summit they knew not. and did not stop 
to inquire. The enemy was before them; to know 
that was to know sufficient. 

At several points along the line my troops were 
ascending the hill and gaining positions less ex- 
posed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more ex- 
posed to the fire of the musketry. Seeing this, I 
sent my Adjutant General to inquire first of Gen. 
Wood and then of Gen. Sheridan, whether the 
troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and 
to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In 
reply to tliis. Gen. Wood told him that the men had 
started without orders, and that he could take it if 
he could be supported. In the meantime an aide- 
de-camp from Gen. Sheridan had reported to me 
that the General wislied to know whether theorders 
that had been given to take the rifle pits "meant 
those at the base of the ridge or those oti top." 

My reply was that the order had been to take 
those at the btse. Conceiving this to be an order 
to fall back to those rifle pits, and on his way so 
reporting it to Gen. Wagner, commanding 2d 
Brigade of Sheridan's division, this brigade was 
withdrawn from a position which it had gained on 
the side of the ridge to the riflo pits, which was 
being raked by the enemy's artillery, and from this 



— 187 — 



point starting again under a terrible fire, made the 
ascent of the ridge. My Assistant Adjutant Gen- 
eral, on his way to Gen. Sheridan, reported to me 
Gen. Wood's reply, but, by my instructions, went 
no further with the message I had given him, as I 
had already sent ('apt. Avery, my Aide-de-Carap, 
directly to Maj. Gen. Sheridan, instructing him to 
go ahead and take the ridge if he could. 

Gen. Granger says that the time from leav- 
ing Orchard Knob to reaching the crest was 
one hour; that Sheridan, with two brigades, 
passed over the ridge, pursuing the troops 
who fled down the southern slope toward 
Chickamauga Station, till in about a mile he 
came up with a large body, strongly posted, 
which, by a charge, he put to flight; that 
Wood and Baird formed to meet a large force 
coming from the north end of the ridge, and 
a sharp contest lasted till dark. Granger 
claims the capture of thirty-one guns and 
3,812 men, and says his command lost in the 
action 20.21 per cent, in killed and wounded. 
This brilliant action and unexpected success 
was not gained without heavy losses of brave 
men. Granger's corps lost 2.337 killed, 
wounded, and missing, of whom only two are 
classed as missing. Johnson's division lost 
304 killed and wounded; Baird's division, 
565, out of a total of 1,679, being over one- 
third. Baird claimed more than 300 prisoners; 
Johnson, 1,165 prisoners. The captures of 
men and guns belong, in justice, to all the 
troops alike, as well to those who pursued the 
enemy as to those who had time to gather 
up the abandoned guns and surrendered 
men. 

All the evidence shows that not only did 
the troops storm the ridge without orders, but 
that a part of the line, in front of the strong- 
est resistance, was disconcerted for a time, in 
the ascent, by a recall. The officers knew 
that the assault was unauthorized, and had 
good reason to fear the responsibility if it 
should fail. Van Horne says: 

The division commanders did not arrest their 
troops, and for a time the corps Generals did not 
give official sanction to their advance. Tlie im- 
pression, Indeed, so far prevailed that the move- 
ment would not be antnorized, that Turchin's 
brigade, on the right of Baird's division, was halted 
when far np the ascent; and Wagner's brigade, on 
the left of Sheridan's division, was recalled from its 
advanced position by a stati' officer who was return- 
ing to Gen. Stieridan from Gen. Granger, with the 
information that Grant's order required only that 
the enemy's intrenched line at the base of the ridge 



should be carried. Soon, hovrever, it was apparent 
to all that the eagerness of the troops had created a 
necessity superior to the limitations of orders, and 
this conviction gave unity and energy to the as- 
sault, whose transcendent issue justified its other- 
wise unauthorized execution. 

Gen. Hooker, coming from Lookout, had 
been detained three hours rebuilding the 
bridge over Chattanooga Creek. He then 
pushed forward to a gorge in the south end of 
Mission Ridge, which was strongly held, and 
here the enemy were trying to cover a train of 
wagons which was loading with stores at the 
Rossville House. Under Hooker's threatening 
dispositions to carry the ridge on all sides, the 
enemy abandoned this gorge and the stores. 
Hooker then swept up along the ridge on 
both sides and on top, meeting the enemy in 
a line of breastworks, but driving him by tiie 
impetuosity of his attack, and so on as they 
made successive stands where the ground fa- 
vored them, until the greater part were scat- 
tered in flight, or killed or captured, and the 
remainder ran into Johnson's division, and 
were made prisoners. It was now night, and 
the troops rested on the ridge. 



CHAPTER LXV. 

the pursuit from mission ridge — MOST DE- 
STRUCTIVE TO THE PURSUERS — THE LOSSES IN 
THE BATTLE — THE RELATIVE FORCES — SHER- 
MAN'S GREAT MARCH TOWARD KNOXVILLE — 
THE COUNTERMARCH — LONGSTREET STAYS IN 
EAST TENNESSEE. 

Mission Ridge was carried too late in the 
day to admit of pursuit of such of the Con- 
federate army as had fled down the eastern 
side, or to finish the fight against Hardee's 
command, which still held the north end of 
the ridge opposite Gen. Sherman's army. A 
part of Sheridan's division and Gen Wil- 
lich's brigade of Wood's division had pur- 
sued down the eastern slope, and later on 
Sheridan had driven them from a strong po- 
sition, but night put a stop to his pursuit 
and to further fighting on the north end of 
the ridge. 

Gen. Grant ordered Gen. Thomas to recall 
Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to join 
Sherman in an expedition to Knoxville to 
relieve Burnside's army, which was threat- 
ened by both Longstreet and starvation, and 



— 188 



to pursue Bragg with the rest. Accordinglj' 
C4en. Thomas ordered these to start for Knox- 
vilie, and Palmer and Hooker to make pur- 
suit. Grant on the same night ordered Sher- 
man to move to Knoxville, but toward the 
latter part of the order he doubted, like this: 

I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has 
left. If not, of course the fjrst thing is to dispose of 
him. If he has gone, the only thing necessary to 
do to-morrow will be to send out a reconnaissance 
to ascertain the wliereubouts of the enemy. 

But he changed his mind in a postscript as 
follows: 

P. S.— On reflection, I think we will push Bragg 
with all our strength to-morrow, and try if we can 
not cut ofl" a good portion of his rear troops and 
trains. His men have manifested a strong dispo- 
sition to desert for some time past, and we will now 
give them a chance. I will instruct Thomas accord- 
ingly. Move the advance force early on the most 
easterly route taken by the enemy. 

Thus Granger's corps was withdrawn for 
Knoxville, and Sherman, the commander 
of the Knoxville expedition, went after 
Bragg. Hooker, however, was in the most 
advanced position, and he followed the enemy 
with great energj\ 

To follow this chase is not necessary to this 
review. One of Gen. Grant's principal mili- 
tary ideas was that the pursuit of a retreating 
army was the time for crowning achieve- 
ments. He has made record of his com- 
plaints against Rosecrans and Thomas for 
lack of swiftness in sucli chase. He thought 
that from Washington he could order Thomas 
to pursue, after his victory of NasIiyiHe, bet- 
ter than Thomas could. He desired tiie ad- 
ministration to hold back any promotion of 
Thomas for that decisive battle until he had 
seen wliether Thomvs would pursue with 
swiftness. He complained that Rosecrans, 
after his victory at Corintli, did not chase the 
enemy. 

But in this country, where the retreating 
enemy has to be followed in a stern chase by 
roads and defiles through woods and mount- 
ains, and by bridges, nothing can be made by 
pursuit of an army which has defiled into the 
roads and has got a good start. At the worst 
it can run as fast as the following troops can 
follow, and if it has an organized rear guard, 
it can obstruct tlie way by destroying bridges 
and felling trees, so as to make the chase not 
only vain, l)i;t destructive to tlie pursuers. 



who at each stand made by the retreating 
troops must deploy and attack against ad- 
vantages of position. 

Gen. Grant never made anything by such 
a chase, nor was anything made in all our 
war. Besides, a general battle is always pre- 
ceded by hard marching, loss of sleep, and 
great nervous strain, and to order soldiers on 
forced marches after one or two days of bat- 
tle is a hardness which assumes that they are 
nothing but machines. This pursuit was 
made with great energy for two daj's, Hook- 
er's troops being in the lead, and, with a 
dashing valor which hesitated not for conse- 
quences; but it destroyed more of our victori- 
ous soldiers than of the enemy. And this 
forced march of Sherman's hardly used 
troops for two days, in a direction from which 
they had to return, seriously delayed his 
march to the relief of Burnside, while it ac- 
complished nothing. 

On the second day Hooker's troops had a 
long action with Cleburne's division at Tay- 
lor's Ridge, where it had taken position in a 
mountain gorge to cover the fording and 
withdrawal of the supply train. Artillery 
was brought ud, dispositions made, and an 
attack, which, of course, was made with great 
gallantry; but when the train had passed, 
Cleburne defiled through the gorge 
in safety. Here the pursuit ended. It 
had been made without regard to the con- 
dition or the lives of the troops, and they 
had behaved with their wonted heroism, but 
it was, in fact, an abuse of the troops, and a 
sacrifice of brave veterans upon that dread- 
ful calculation, which afterward had so vast 
an exercise in the Army of the Potomac, that 
we could afford to sacrifice three national 
soldiers to one Confederate. 

Adam Badeau fails not to cast a reflection 
on Gen. Thomas for default in the pursuit, 
by this: "Grant was with the pursuing col- 
umn, but on the night of the battle Thomas 
returned to Chattanooga, and did not rejoin 
his troops." Thomas had more important 
duties, as a General, than to follow in a hunt, 
and Hooker needed neither Thomas nor 
Grant. In the action at Taylor's Ridge 
Hooker lost 422 killed and wounded. Grant's 
idea that the great part of a battle was the 
after chase, had given to Cleburne the oppor- 
tunity to wind up the affair by inflicting this 
check and loss of brave soldiers. 
In tnis ctiase Gen. Davis' division of the 



— 189 — 



Army of tlie Cumberland, now with Shkrman, 
crossed the South Cbickamauga near the 
mouth, and moved in pursuit along the north 
side of that river. He came upon one col- 
umn of the retreating enemy and liad a siiarp 
conflict, but the enemy made good his retreat, 
and Davis' line of march brought him into 
Hooker's rear. Gen. Howard crossed by the 
same way, and took a course further to the 
east, and detached a column to destroy the 
railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, with 
a view to sever connection between Bragg 
and LoNGSTREET. This done he returned. 
And now the expedition to relieve Burnside 
was committed to Sherman, with Howard's 
corps. Granger's corps, and Davis' division 
from Thomas' aruiy, besides three divisions 
of his own army. This would seem to be an 
adequate force. Hooker was ordered to re- 
main at Ringgold to cover Sherman's march 
from Bragg, by keeping np a feint of pursuit, 
and Col. Long was sent out with a cavalry ex- 
pedition on Sherman's flank to destroy com- 
munications and supplies. 

Gen. Sherman's report states his loss in the 
attack on the ridge as 1,949 killed, 
wounded, and missing, not includ- 
ing Davis' division. The attack by 
the troops under his command was made 
with great valor, but Gen. Grant's pro- 
found strategy in this battle had lighted 
upon the strongest place in Bragg's position 
for his main attack, just as his fortune had 
done at the battle of Champion's Hill. 
Van Horne states the aggregate losses of the 
armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee as 
5,616, of whom 330 are set down as miss- 
ing. He gives the loss of the enemy by 
capture as 6,142 men, 42 guns, and 7,000 
small arms; their loss in killed and in 
sucli of the wounded as could get away, not 
known. 

Badeau says: "The enemy's losses were few- 
er in killed and wounded, owing to the fact 
that he was protected by intrenciiments," but 
tliat "the rt/bel losses were reported at 367 
killed, 2,180 wounded, and 4,146 missing." 
Grant had added to the Army of the Cum- 
berland four divisions from the Army of the 
Tennessee and four from the Army of the 
Potomac, while Bragg, since Cbickamauga, 
had retluced his force by sending off IjOnc;- 
street with 15,000. That the victorious army 
lost more tiuin twice as many as the defeated 
in killed and wounded is because the strategy 



of the battle had pitched upon Bragg's strong" 
est positions for attack. 

Gen. Grant's total force was probably 
double that of Gen. Bragg, bntwas strangely 
separated and disposed by his plan of action, 
which had the singular fortune that the at- 
tack which gained the victory, after 
that which the plan meant for the decisive 
action had been repulsed, was made by four 
mucli reduced divisions, against nearly as 
large a force, on a natural fortress, while 
six divisions were inactive under Sherman. 
And this assault, which turned a defeated 
plan to a glorious victory, was made by those 
troops of the Army of the Cumberland, of 
whom Grant told Sherman that they were so 
demoralized that they could not be gotten 
out of the trenches to fight until Sherman's 
troops had set them an example. Although 
Gen. Grant's .strategy had aimed to give the 
victory to Gen. Sherman's army, holding 
Gen. Thomas' army as demoralized, there was 
a fitness of things in its being carried in the 
main by the Army of the Cumberland, which 
had made the great campaign that gained the 
strategic objective of Chattanooga, and 
which had joined issue with Bragg and Long 
street at Cbickamauga. 

Gen. Sherman's march with more than 
seven divisions of infantry, and a strong 
cavalry force, might be expected to do some- 
thing destructive to Long.street in East Ten- 
nessee, but his objective was limited to the 
relieving of Knoxville, where Burnside was 
now closely held, although not completely 
invested. Longstreet had made very active 
and resolute operations to recover East Ten- 
nessee, and wholly to cut off Burnside, but 
had been repulsed and foiled in repeated en- 
gagements, while Burnside fell back before 
his superior forces to Knoxville. Longstreet 
continued his intrenched approaches and 
tentative attacks at Knoxville from the 18th 
to the 29th, when he resolved to carry the 
place by assault. This was made in a most 
determined manner on a point of the works 
named Fort Sanders, and was repulsed, witii 
a loss of 1,500 killed, wounded, and prisoners. 
[Woodbury's Burnside and the 9th Army 
Corps.] This was on the day that Sherman's 
marcli from Chattanooga began. Longstreet 
now fell back; hearing of which Sher.man 
halted before he got to Knoxyille. He went 
there himself, and decided to return, leaving 
Granger's corps. 



— 190 — 



Gen, Sherman began his return soon after 
the 7th of December. His report says: "By 
the 9th all our troops were in position, and 
we held the rich country between the Little 
Tennessee and the Hiawassee." This was a 
breadth of country east and west, about half 
way between Chattanooga and Knoxville. 
Sherman continues: "On the 14th of Decem- 
ber all of my command in the field lay along 
the Hiawassee. Having communicated to 
Gen. Grant the actual state of affairs, I re- 
ceived orders to leave on the line of the Hia- 
wassee all the cavalry, and come to Chatta- 
nooga." LoNGSTREET fell back but a little 
way, when finding that the relieving army 
was returning, he settled in East Tennessee 
for the winter. 



CHAPTER LXVI. 

REVIEW OF THE STRATEGY OF THE BATTLES — THE 
PLAN FOUNDED WHOLLY ON A FALSE CONCEP- 
TION OF THE SITUATION — THE SPONTANEOUS 
ACTION OF THE SOLDIERS ACHIEVES VICTORY 
CONTRARY TO THE PLAN — GEN. THOMAS — THE 
AMERICAN VOLUNTEER — WAR TRADITIONS AND 
MILITARY GLORY. 

The victory in the battle of Mission Eidge 
was achieved by attacking positions which, in 
a military sense, were impregnable — positions 
so strong that to plan a battle to depend on 
them would be a military crime, and, in case 
of repulse, these natural fortresses would 
stand as monuments of the monstrous gen- 
eralship which ordered an army to certain 
butchery without a possibility of success. 

The victory is distinguished as aciiieved by 
the soldiers of the ranks, when the Command- 
ing General's plan had elaborately provided 
conditions which, upon all rational calcula- 
tions, made defeat certain. According to tlie 
plan, the army's situation for the battle 
was to be as follows: 

Part of the army, under Gen. Hooker, was 
to be in Lookout Valley, separated from the 
center at Chattanooga by Lookout Mountain 
and a wide valley — both held by the enemy 
— and by two crossings of the river, making 
any support of either part by the other, in a 
battle, impossible, the Confederates possessing 
Lookout Mountain and having the oppor- 
tunity to fall upon Hooker's isolated force, 
and again cut off the army's supplies. 



Another part of the army was to be in the 
Chattanooga fortifications, environed by the 
Confederate picket line, from the river below 
the town to the river above; this picket line 
and its reserves having the line of Pilot 
Knob for its base, and, across a plain from 
this, the intrenched base of Mission Ridge, 
beyond which the ridge, crowned with the 
Confederate army, seemed impregnable, and 
was so if resolutely defended by the troops 
who lield it. 

Four miles from the left of this central po- 
sition Sherman, with another part of the 
army, was to make the attack, and the center 
was to await his success in carrying the head 
of the ridge. To give to Sherman this oppor- 
tunity, his army was to be brought through 
Lookout Valley, past Hooker, and then up 
the west side of the river past Chattanooga, 
his march concealed by the hills, and then 
was to cross by pontoons four miles above 
Chattanooga, and come upon Bragg' s flank 
and rear by surprise. 

As thus divided and isolated by long dis- 
tances and great barriers, each of the three 
parts of the army was confronted by a great 
natural fortress, which in a militarj'' sense 
was impregnable. But the plan was wholly 
based upon the strange delusion that Gen. 
Bragg had left the head of Mission Ridge, 
on his right, commanding his depot of sup- 
plies at Chickamauga Station, unfortified. 
LTpon this belief was made all this delay, this 
strategic march of Sherman, and all the great 
engineer preparations. 

But prior to this plan and to Sherman's 
coming. Gen. Gkant, on the 7th of Novem- 
ber, ordered Gen. Thomas to "attack and carry 
the north end of Mission Ridge, and, when 
that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if 
possible, the enemy's lines of communication 
between Dalton and Cleveland." From the 
result of Sherman's attack on that point with 
six divisions, while Thomas confronted the 
breast of the ridge, and Hooker was advanc- 
ing upon its south end, may be reckoned the 
probable consequences if Thomas alone had 
tried to execute this extraordinary order. 
If Thomas could do all that, he could have 
fought the battle and gone on into Georgia, 
and there was no need for Sherman to come. 
Fortunately, Gen. Thomas' sound judgment 
saved his army from this ordered destruction. 

When it was found that all this great prep- 
aration and effort had brought Sherman to 



-m- 



the front of the strongest and most dangerous 
position in the Confederate line, and that not 
only was it inipregnably fortified, but pecu- 
liar preparation had been made for counter 
attack, the plan was exhausted. It consisted 
so entirely in Bragg's being taken by sur- 
prise, unguarded, on the north end of the 
ridge, that .when the mistake of this calcula- 
tion was realized, the plan had no alternative. 

But the affair was rescued from the plan of 
the Commanding General by the energy and 
sagacity of the subordinate commanders, and 
by the spirit of the soldiers, which went far 
ahead of the expectations of their officers. 
The length and hinderances of Sherm.\n's 
movement, and meanwhile a mistaken report 
by a deserter that Bragg was retiring, caused 
Grant to order a reconnaissance by Gen. 
Thomas to ascertain the truth, which Thomas 
converted into an advance in force that car- 
ried the enemy's first intrenched line and 
gave to the army confronting the ridge a for- 
tified base more than a mile nearer to Mission 
Ridge than its previous line. This had not 
been in the plan, and it may be seen how 
greatly it changed the situation with regard 
to the possibility of storming Mission Ridge. 

Tne continued delays to Sherman's move- 
ment, and Gen. Thomas' solicitude lest the 
enemy's information should defeat it, caused 
Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, 
which wonderfully succeeded. This made a 
radical change in the situation. It was not 
in Grant's plan, nor would a General be 
justified in making plan of operations which 
depended on carrying such a mountain. This 
opened the way up the valley of Chattanooga 
Creek, around the south end of Mission 
Ridge, and up a valley on the east side of the 
ridge by which Bragg could be taken in rear. 

Here was a fortunate deliverance from the 
plan, if there liad been generalship to grasp 
the new situation. There was no longer any 
need to assault mountains. Completer results 
could be gained with less sacrifice. But Gen. 
Grant, with characteristic firmness, clung to 
his plan that Sherman should make the suc- 
cessful attack, and so Sherman hurled liis 
brave troops against an impregnable position 
and slaughtered them. The center had been 
reduced to send aid to Sherman, but he found 
that to repeat tlie attack was only to repeat 
the slaughter in vain, and he rested; and now 
the plan was exhausted. 

Gen. Thomas was ordered to make a demon- 



stration in aid of Sherman, but Sherman did 
not respond. Grant's order of the demon- 
stration was strange and undecided. To make 
a demonstration by storming the intrench- 
ments at the base of the ridge, and then to 
stop, was to demonstrate in a way that might 
be expected to be slaughterous, and then to 
stop under a storm of fire from the sides and 
crest of the mountain. 

Fortunately, the spirit of the soldiers of 
the ranks cast off this vague order, and went 
on to storm the great ridge. The spontaneous 
enthusiasm re«;ued the battle from the Com- 
manding General's plan ; rescued it by storm- 
ing a position so strong that no General would 
have been justified in making its assault a 
part of his plan. The Comnianding General's 
extremity was the opportunity for the volun- 
teers of the ranks, and they gained a victory, 
whose glory all perched \ii>on Gen. Grant's 
head. 

To say that Gen. Grant, with an army 
twice as great as Gen. Bragg's, could tind in 
all that region no way to operate against him, 
save by a front attack against Lookout 
Mountain and Mission Ridge, is to slander his 
military capacity. Justice to him demands 
that it be said that he did not plan such an 
operation, but that his plan depended wholly 
on Sherman's finding the north end of Mission 
Ridge unfortified, and thereby an open way 
to Bragg's depot of supplies, and that 
nothing fell out as Grant had planned. 

Yet Adam Badeau admirably remarks: 

Few battles have ever been won so strictly ac- 
cording to the plan laid down; certainly no battle 
during the war of the rebellion was carried out so 
completely according to the programme, (irant's 
Instructions in advance would almost serve as a 
history of the contest. 

He then reconstructs the plan to fit the 
event losing sight of the whole foundation — 
namely, that Sherman was to find the depot 
of supplies unguarded, and bringing in 
Hooker "to draw attention to the right," 
and converting Sherman's attack into a dem- 
onstration "to still further distract the 
enemy; and then, when re-enforcements and 
attention should be drawn to both the rebel 
flanks, the center was to be assaulted by the 
main body of Grant's force under Thomas." 

But as it happened, two divisions were sent 
fi"om our center to aid Sherman, giving him 
seven divisions to "distract" with, and leav- 



— 192 — 



ing to Thomas only three 'divisions for the 
real assanlt. And when one of these returned, 
still Thomas' command at the center was far 
from being "the main body of Grant's force." 
Badeau winds up his effort with this: "Every- 
thing happened exactly as had been fore- 
seen." 

Gen. Sherman also disparages the brilve 
fighting of his troops by the after assertion 
that it was only a feint at one end, while 
Hooker was to feint at the other. He says in 
the memoirs: 

The object of Gen. Hooker's and my attacks on 
the extreme flanks of Bragg's position was to dis- 
turb him to such an extent that he would naturally 
detach from his center as against us, so that Thomas' 
army could break through his center. The whole 
plan succeeded admirably. 

Gen. Sherman forgot that only two pages 
previous to this he had narrated how Grant 
told him that "he believed that the northern 
portion of Mission Ridge was not fortified at 
all," and how elaborately his plan of a con- 
cealed march was formed upon this belief. 

In Flanders our army was remarkable for 
profanity; in the great secession war our 
greatest Generals were distinguished for ve- 
racity. 

In fact, Gen. BEAGodid not strip his center, 
although Sherman "disturbed" his right with 
six divisions, and another in sight; his force 
in the center was enough, if the troops had 
fought with their usual valor; but the en- 
thusiasm of our soldiers threw them into 
panic — a thing which could not be looked for, 
much less made a dependence in the plan of 
a great battle. 

From the blind plan and indecisive orders 
of the Commanding General, the clear orders 
of Gen. Thomas stand out admirably in relief. 
They show that he knew just what he wanted 
to do, and that his orders were all the time in 
advance of the mind of the Commanding 
General, comprehending the whole situation, 
and gaining successes in advance of orders, 
which were not in Grant's plan, and which 
so changed the situation that the heroic spirit 
of the soldiers was able to snatch victory 
from the jaws of a planned failure. In all 
this he was brilliantly seconded by Hooker's 
untiring energy and military skill. And this 
splendid achievement of the Army of the 
Cumberland was the fruit of a thorough 
training which began with Gen. Buell and 
Gen. Thomas, and had made it invincible. 



The civil war extended the breadth of a 
continent; yet it was less than the solar sys- 
tem, which, vast as it is, allows but one sun, 
round which all the other planets must re- 
volve, shining only by reflecting sunbeams. 
Even a continental army system can not be 
expected to be exempt fronr the conditions 
which govern the solar system.* Glancing 
forward to Gen. Grant's historian's third vol- 
ume, the reader observes that Gen. Grant 
was much dissatisfied with Gen. Thomas' 
slowness at Chattanooga; that this was one of 
the alleged reasons for Grant's order to re- 
move Thomas from command while the battle 
of Nashville was imminent— an order which, 
fortunately for the country, failed of connec- 
tion ; that after that completest victory of the 
war, which destroyed the offensive power of 
the Confederate army of the interior. Gen. 
Grant determined to strip Gen. Thomas of 
troops, and allow him no more a command 
in any active operations. All of this is more 
fully set down in Grant's letters to Sherman, 
printed in his memoirs. 

Another instance of the operation of the 
same solar law was seen in the Atlanta cam- 
paign of the following year, after Gen. Mc- 
Pherson was killed, in that Gen. Sherman ad- 
vanced to the command of the Army of the 
Tennessee, over Gen. Hooker's head, Gen. 
Howard, Hooker's subordinate, whose neg- 
lect of Hooker's orders at Chancellorsville, 
and of all rational military precautions, upon 
his shallow conceit that Lee was retreating, 
subjected his corps to a surprise, and sacri- 
ficed the campaign. 

The victory in the battles about Chattanoo- 
ga was gained by the volunteers of the ranks. 
The more one studies the history of the great 
war, the more is he impressed with admira- 
tion for tlie qualities of the American citizen 
volunteer soldier, and with the fervent belief 
that they were the best soldiers in the world. 
The greatness of a whole people is a better 
cause for national pride than the eminence 
of an individual. These splendid martial 
•qualities and this grand patriotism, in the 
volunteers of the ranks, are infinitely a 
higher national glory than the single genius 
of a Bonaparte, even if our war had devel- 
oped a Bonaparte. 

But war has a terrible sarcasm in its tradi- 
ditions, which heap all the glory of the patri- 
otism, heroic valor, heroic death, and dear 
victories of the volunteers of the ranks, upon 



— 193 



the head of a Commanding General who may 
even have been an incumbrance. The battles 
about Chattanooga raised Gen. Grant's mili- 
tary fame to its zenith, and resulted in his 
call to the East to the command of all the 
national armies. His history atfords an in- 
structive lesson in the possibilities of com- 
manding generalship and in the nature of 
military fame. 



CHAPTER LXVII. 

REVIEW OF THE EFFECT OF THE VICKSBURG CAM- 
PAIGN ON THE ARMY OF THE OHIO AND BURN- 
SIDE's EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

As goon as Knoxville had been relieved, 
Gen. BuRNsiDE, who had asked to be relieved 
from the command because of ill health, as 
soon as he had gained East Tennessee, but 
had continued at Lincoln's special request, 
now asked to be relieved, and he left on the 
7th of December. Gen. Foster soon arrived 
to take command, the active command de- 
volving on Gen. Parke, Burxside's Chief of 
Staff. 

Gen. Halleck had now rewarded Gen. 
BuRNsiDE for the brilliant campaign which 
had seized the long coveted East Tennessee, 
and had held it by numerous engagements 
against superior numbers, by promoting him 
to the responsible ofSce of scapegoat — a very 
essential office in all wars, and transcend- 
ently so in that romantic style of war whose 
remote campaigns are directed by dispatches 
from Washington, dictated by a General in 
Chief whose theory of war was so untram- 
meled by real conditions as Gen. Halleck's 
telegraphic campaign orders. 

The conduct of tlie Army of the Ohio after 
Gen. BuRNsiDE took command had so impor- 
tant a relation to the Vicksburg campaign, 
the Chattanooga campaign of the Army of 
the Cumberland, and the subsequent opera- 
tions under the command of Gen. Grant, that 
a review of these would be incomplete which 
did not touch upon this part. When Gen. 
BuRNSiDE was appointed to the command of 
the Department of the Ohio, in the last of 
March, 1863, he called for more force, and in 
April two divisions of the 9th Corps arrived in 
Kentucky. The Confederate expeditions into 
Kentucky were very active at this time, aim- 
ing at the communications of Rosecrans' 
army. 



On the 27th of April Gen. Burnside organ* 
ized the other troops in Kentucky into the 
23d Army Corps. The intention was to 
move into East Tennessee, which from the be- 
ginning had been the cherislied object of the 
government, and which was now to be under- 
taken by Burnside with the two divisions of 
the 9th Corps and the hastily organized 23d 
Corps, under Gen. Hartsuff. Says Wood- 
bury's history: 

Gen. Burnside submitted to Gen. Rosecrans a 
plan for a co-operative movement upon East Tennes- 
see. With the advice of Gen. Thomas it was ac- 
cepted, and preparations were accordingly made by 
the two commanders. The troops were 
properly concentrated for the movement, 
and on the 2d of June Gen. Burnside left 
his headquarters at Cincinnati and proceeded to 
Lexington to take command. The time was ripe 
for the operation, and officers and men were eager 
for the service. The 9lh Corps, strengthened by a 
division under Gen. Carter, was to march directly 
into East Tennessee by way of Monticello. Gen. 
Hartsufr was to follow ia support. Gen. Rosecrans 
was to advance upon Chattanooga. 

Tliis plan gives a glimpse of real war— of 
war lifted out from raids and disjointed^ cen- 
trifugal, seesaw campaigns, and placed upon a 
connected and mutually supporting plan. 
But it was not to be. Gen. Grant's abandon- 
ment of the Mississippi Central movement, 
and his diffusive expedition /to' isolate his 
great army at Vicksburg, had withdrawn the 
grand right wing of this operation, and now 
his situation was to withdraw the left wing 
just as the Army of the Cumberland in the 
center was about to start. If war is so near 
an art that rational calculations can be made 
upon positive conditions of forces and plans, 
is it too much to say that if these armies had 
been in the interior, co-operating, their march 
could not have been successfully opposed 
anywhere? Upon the same premises is it too 
much to say that when Halleck withdrew 
the 9th Corps from Burnside at this time to 
send to Grant at Vicksburg, he dealt the cam- 
paign of Rosecrans a fatal blow? This sacri- 
fice was a part of the cost of the Vicksburg 
campaign. And upon the same premises is it 
presumptuous to say that if a great genius had 
been directing our armies with intent to 
thwart them, he could not have done it more 
effectually? 

Gen. Burnside, on the eve of starting for 
the field, received an ominous inquiry from 
Washington, if any troops could be spared 



— 194 



from the Department of the Ohio to assist 
Gen. Grant. Soon an order reached Burn- 
side, at Lexington, to send 8,000 men to 
Grant. The 9th Corps, except one regi- 
ment, whose term of service was nearly out, 
was promptly disjiatched upon this order of 
urgency. This enforced the suspension of the 
East Tennessee co-operation. And while the 
military authorities were stripping Rosecrans 
of co-operation, and laying open his flanks 
west and east, and were devoting the great 
means of every sort to the supply and in- 
crease of Grant's army, and were denying to 
liosECRANS any further aid, they were per- 
emptorily ordering him to adyance, unsup- 
ported, more than a hundred miles further 
into the heart of the South, 'against the prin- 
cipal Confederate army, and upon tlic 
strongest Confederate position. 

The 9th Corps went to Vicksburg. After 
the surrender, instead of being sent back to 
the East Tennessee operation, it was marched 
in Sherman's useless raid to .Jackson. Wood- 
bury's description of the condition of the yth 
Corps when it embarked to return from 
Vicksburg, in August, gives an idea of that 
terrible part of tlie cost of taking Vicksburg 
which is not set down by Gen. Grant's his- 
torian, and is not given in the Commanding 
General's bulletins or reports. He says: 

The campaign in Mississippi was especially se- 
vere in the effects upon the ofliceis and men of the 
9th Corps. The excessive heat, the malaria that 
settled like a pall of death around the camps upon 
the Yazoo River, the scarcity of water and Its bad 
quality, the forced marches, and the crowded con- 
dition of the transports, told fearfully upon the 
troops. 

All the accounts of the movement agree in their 
statements respecting the amount of disease and 
mortality which accompanied it. The hardships 
which all were obliged to endure vvere excessive. 
Water which the horses refused to drinii the men 
were obliged to use in making their coffee. Fevers, 
congestive chills, diarrhea, and other diseases 
attacked the troops. Many sank down by the road- 
side and died from sunstroke and sheer exhaustion. 
Tlie sickness that prevailed upon the transports 
upon the return voyage was terrible and almost 
universal. Nearly every night, as the boats lay up 
on account of low waier and the consequent danger 
of navigation, the twinkling liglu of the lanterns 
on shore betokened the movements of the burial 
parties as they consigned the remains of some uu- 
i'ortunate comrade to the earth. 

When the troops reached Cairo the men were 
scarcely able to murcn through the streets. They 



dropped in the ranks; and even at the market 
house, where the good citizens had provided an 
abundant ana comfortable meal for the wornout 
soldiers, they fell beside the tables, and were car- 
ried away to the hospitals. More than half the 
command were rendered unfit for duty. There 
were notable men enough belonging to the batteries 
to water and groom the horses. 

From the diseases contracted in that cam- 
paign, few ever recovered entirely. Yet these 
troops had not had the previous dreadful ex- 
perience of four months in the hardships of 
the swamp operations, and of the .first 
forced marches away to Jackson and back. 
This accountof the condition of a corps which 
had come fresh from the North only two 
months before, gives some idea of the way in 
which the Vicksburg operation consumed a 
great army. 

Gen. Grant, as quoted by his historian, and 
Gen. Sherman in his memoirs, admit that 
they might have gone on from Oxford in the 
fall of 1862, and have taken Vicksburg from 
the interior. In this they confess that the 
Vicksburg operation by the river was in itself 
a blunder, and that this blunder caused the 
enormous expense of the river expedition, 
the consuming of the army in the swamp 
operations tor four months, and the loss of at 
least six months of time. This confesses a 
blunder of great magnitude; but all this was 
but the lesser part. Vastly greater was the 
cost of the Vicksburg campaign in its sacrifice 
of other greater campaigns. In all this it was 
equivalent to a year's prolongation of the 
great war. 

Meanwhile, in July, Gen. Burnside had to 
direct the forces to pursue Gen. .John Mor- 
gan's great raid into Kentucky, Indiana, and 
Oiiio, which he did with great success, and 
his directions were supported by wonderful 
energy, and Morgan's force was captured 
after a ptirsuit of nearly a month, which, for 
near twenty days, was in Indiana and Ohio. 
This raid again delayed preparations for East 
Tennessee. When the 9th Corps arrived the 
troops were unfit to join the expedition, and 
were sent to places in Kentucky for rest and 
recovery. Tlie East Tennessee expedition 
was now organized of troops of the 23d 
Coi'ps, some fresh levies in Kentucky, some 
from East Tennessee, and some from the 
North. The troops of the 9th Corps were to 
be disposed for following re-enforcements. 



— 105 — 



CHAPTER LXVIII. 

(iEN. BURNSIDE OCCUPIES EAST TENJS'ESSEE — A 
BRILLIANT OPERATION — HALLECK'S DISTRACT- 
ING ORDERS — OPERA BOUFFE WAR — THE ACTIVE 
CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE AFTER CIIICKA- 
MAUGA — THAT POSITION SAVED BY BURNSIDE IN 
SPITE OF HALLECK's ORDERS — BURNSIDE PRO- 
MOTED TO THE PLACE OF SCAPEGOAT — LONG- 
STREET IN EAST TENNESSEE A STANDING 
MENACE. 

The Confederate positions in East Tennes- 
see were so strong, and could be so quickly 
re-enforced both from Virginia and from 
Bragg's army, that it was only by strategy 
that such a force as that of Burnside could 
expect to succeed. Burnside moved from 
(!rab Orchard August IG, the infantry in two 
columns, the cavalry in another. Demon- 
strating toward Cumberland Gap, he moved 
to the mountains by more westerly gaps and 
more unfrequented roads, hitherto deemed 
impassable by a large army, his troops in 
light marching order, and after fourteen days 
of hard marching, the troops aiding the 
animals to haul the guns and wagons up the 
acclivities, they surmounted the sumiuits, 
and Gen. Buckner was surprised by the ap- 
pearance of an army approaching on ditfer- 
ents roads, as if it had dropped from the 
clouds. 

By this extraordinary march of 250 miles, 
over great mountains by difficult passes. 
Gen. Burnside gained East Tennessee, which, 
with due notice of his coming and line of 
march, might be called impregnable. His 
army consisted of about 18,000 men. On the 
1st of September Col. Foster's cavalry en- 
tered Kingston, and on the 2d Burnside 
entered Knoxville. On the 9th Cumberland 
Gap was surrendered to Burnside, with 2,500 
prisoners, eleven guns, small arms, and much 
ammunition. The recovery of East Tennessee 
was at last achieved, and it was done by an 
operation as bold, skillful, and brilliant as 
any in the war. 

On the 10th Burnside received from Gen. 
Gordon Granger a dispatch stating his occu- 
pation of Chattanooga, and giving a highly 
colored view of the results, as if that opera- 
tion were completed. Burnside was suflFer- 
ing from disease, and he now asked to be 
relieved; but Lincoln, with warm thanks for 
what he had done, besought him to stay. On 



the 11th he received tliis remarkable order 
from Halleck: 

I congratulate you on your success. Hold the 
gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of 
the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, 
to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with 
Gen. Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. Gen. 
Rosecrans will occupy Dalton. or some point on the 
railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also 
the mountain passes in tlie west. This being done, 
it will be determined whether the movable force 
shall advance into Georgia and Alabama or into the 
valley of Virginia and North Carolina. 

The Grand Duchess of Gerolstein's council 
of war ceases to be burlesque in the contem- 
plation of these and tollowing orders issued 
by Gen. Halleck to Burnside. To hold the 
gaps of the North Carolina Mountains to pre- 
vent access from Virginia, to hold the line of 
the Holston, and connect with RosecransI 
Only an affair of 200 miles or so, besides the 
necessity of holding Cumberland Gap and 
other widely separated points in Tennessee. 
And meanwhile Rosecrans. instead of dream- 
ing of Dalton and boundless marches into 
Georgia and Alabama, or into the valley of 
Virginia and North Carolina, was giving all 
his energies to getting his separated columns 
through the mountains west of Chattanooga, to 
concentrate them, before Bragg's re-enforced 
army could fall upon them in detail. 

Burnside did what he could to make dis- 
positions to carry out tliese diffusive orders, 
and had to do it against an active enemy, 
who had no intention of resigning East Ten- 
nessee. The utmost vigor and vigilance were 
required to repel the ever vigilant enemy, on 
a line now extended to 176 miles. On top 
of all this cam*) to Burnside from Halleck 
the following distracting order dated Septem- 
ber 13: 

Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible 
toward Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. 
Bragg may hold the passes of the mountains to cover 
Atlanta, and move his main army through North- 
ern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River, ana 
turn Rosecrans' right and cut ofT his supplies. In 
this case iiosecrans will turn Chattanooga over to 
you and move to intercept Bragg. 

To hold East Tennessee, the passes of the 
Nortli Carolina Mountains, and move with 
his infantry to Chattanooga! Corporal Gen- 
era< Fritz is without doubt an historical char- 
acter. On the morning of the 17th Bl'RNSide 
started to overtake the troops whom he had 



— 196 



sent up the valley on Halleck's first order, 
to march them back and down toward Chat- 
tanooga on his second order. Then came this 
from Halleck on the 14th: 

There are several reasons why you should re-en- 
force Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is 
believed tnat the enemy will concentrate to give 
him battle. You must be there to help him. 

Gen. BuRNSiDE got this order at Morris- 
town, forty miles northeast of Knoxville, late 
on the 17th, and next day he ordered all 
troops in that quarter back to Knoxville and 
London. Thus was Burnside from Washing- 
ton ordered to hold the North Carolina 
Mountains against troops from Virginia, to 
hold the line of the Holston against Gen. 
Jones' army and re enforcements from the 
south, and to join Rosecrans with his main 
army, besides liolding passes in the Cumber- 
land Mountains on his own account. That 
wliich Halleck's orders required was like 
the traditional spread of the bird of freedom. 

When Rosecrans had fallen back to Chatta- 
nooga Gen. Burnside submitted to Halleck 
three different plans of movement to aid him, 
declaring his preference for the one to move 
on Bragg's right and rear, and send the cav- 
alry to destroy the machine works and powder 
mills at Rome. This would be a bold move- 
ment, but, if made immediately, who can say 
that it might not succeed? But Halleck was 
still at cross purposes, and he disapproved, 
and gave this by way of censure for the past 
and direction for the future: 

The purport of all your instructions has been that 
you should hold some point near the upper end of 
the valley, and with all your available force move 
to the assistance of Rosecrans. 

And the purport and effect of all of Hal- 
leck's orders was to give up East Tennessee, 
if they had been followed. 

A history would be required to give a full 
view of the absurd muddling of these and 
Halleck's other orders to Burnside, whicii 
continued as long as Burnside remained 
there. Of course a scapegoat was a military 
necessity, and the General who had made one 
of the most brilliant and important achieve- 
ments of the war, and had done it with small 
means, and maintained it against great ef- 
forts of the enemy, was selected for this office. 
Halleck still seemed unconscious of the 
ridiculous impossibilities of his orders, when 
he^aftervvard'cited them to show how vigor- 



ous he had been in ordering Burnside to 
co-operate with Rosecrans, and how delin- 
quent Burnside. 

Then Longstreet was sent up in a deter- 
mined campaign to recover East Tennessee. 
Longstreet could be re-enforced to any 
desired extent from Virginia. Burnside, 
with his troops greatly extended, had to op- 
pose this superior force, led by one of the 
most enterprising of the Confederate Gen- 
erals. The peril of his army and of East 
Tennessee was very great, but Burnside, 
though suffering from disease, was a sanguine 
and bold General, and he had brave troops. 
Longstreet planned his movements with good 
strategy to cut off and capture Burnside, but 
he was met at eacli point, and was repulsed in 
all the important engagements of this very 
active campaign, as Burnside retired skill- 
fully upon Knoxville, where an assault and 
bloody repulse had expended Longstreet's 
present resources, and had made his cam- 
paign a failure in its great objective, by the 
time that Sherman's relieving march began. 

The brilliancy of the operation by which 
East Tennessee was gained was surpassed by 
the energy, skill, and hard fighting by which 
it was held. Fortunately Halleck's orders 
of impossibilities were but little heeded, the 
Commanding General having constantly to 
hold against an active enemy. Halleck's 
fault finding was an attempt to cover his own 
blunders by disparaging one of the most im- 
l^ortant, spirited, and successful campaigns of 
the war. Halleck would have sacrificed 
East Tennessee; Burnside saved it in spite of 
his orders. Yet Halleck pretended that 
Burnside was weakly going to give up Ten- 
nessee. Although Burnside's falling back 
before Longstreet to Knoxville was in accord 
with Grant's views, who at that time thought 
it well to draw Loniistreet further away, 
Halleck took it as a purpose to give up East 
Tennessee, and on the 14tlj of November he 
sent to Grant this mean and supremely ig- 
norant telegram: 

Advices from East Tennessee indicate that Burn- 
side intends to abandon the defense of Little Ten- 
nessee River, and full back before Longstreet to- 
ward Cumberland Gap and the upper valley. Long- 
street is said to be near the Little Tennessee with 
from twenty to forty thousand men. Burnside has 
about thirty thousand in all, and can hold his posi- 
tion ; he ought not to retreat. I fear further delay 
may result in Burnside's. abandonment of East Ten- 
nessee. 



— 197 



Again Halleck telegraphed Grant on the 
KJtli : 

1 fear he will not tight, although strongly urged 
to do so. Unless you can give him uumediate 
assistance, he will surrender his position to the 
enemy. 

This was from the hero of the fifteen miles 
of siege approaclies ot Corinth m thirty days, 
with a veteran army of a hundred thousand 
men; and it was concerning a General who 
had carried out one of the boldest camjiaigns 
of the war. Gen. Burnsidk's reward was his 
promotion by Halleck to the high office of 
scapegoat. He left Knoxville on the 7th of 
December. 

Gen, Parke moved a coltinm from Knox- 
ville after Longstreet on the 7th of Decem- 
ber to Blain's Cross Roads, thirteen miles 
east ot Knoxville. His cavalry was strung 
out sixteen mile.s beyond, where a force of 
Wheeler's cavalry fell upon a detachment 
far from support, and captured a wagon train 
laden with supplies. Parke's advance then 
fell back to Blain's Cross Roads. ' 

The winter was severe, and the troops in 
no condition for a campaign. Rosecrans' 
army had crossed the Tennessee in light 
marching order for a campaign in warm 
weather. Burnside's troops had crossed tiie 
mountains in light marching trim. Howard's 
corps had stripped at Bridgeport for Chatta- 
nooga. The movement of Sherman's army 
to Knoxville was one of great hardship from 
insutiicient clothing and food and hard 
marching. Burnside's troops were destitute, 
in rags, shoeless, and on semi-starvation ra- 
tions. Not till spring were communications 
restored so that the troops at Knoxville could 
be properly supplied. During that winter the 
hardships of the troops in East Tennessee, on 
a much larger scale, surpassed the historical 
sufferings of Washington's troops at Valley 
Forge. Yet in the midst ot their privations 
these hungry, ragged, and shoeless volunteers 
re-enlisted by regiments for three years. Yet 
our war traditions, following that hero wor- 
ship which, in the evolution of tradition, 
creates the gods of mythology, hold that the 
National Union was saved by the military 
genius of an individual. 

Longstreet abode all winter in East Ten- 
nessee. His attitude was a standing threat to 
our occupation, and eyen to Grant's rear. 
Grant's uneasiness was increased by reports 



that Longstreet was receiving more troops 
from Virginia, portending an offensive move- 
ment. Badeait says that Grant went to 
Knoxville about Christmas, to take steps to 
drive out Longstreet, but he found the troops 
so destitute, the weather so severe, and tlie 
difficulties of supplying the command so i)ro- 
digious, that a campaign was impossible. He 
says: 

The weather was extremely iiielemeut, and 
many of the troops stood in line with only a 
blanket to cover their nakedness. The difficulties 
of supplying the demand were so prodigious that 
great sufTering ensued. No railroad could be built 
under two months, at soonest; the fall in the 
rivers frequently interfered with the transportation 
of supplies; and now that the roads had become 
well nigh Impassable by reason of snow and ice, to 
send re-eniorcements would only be to put the 
men on more insufficient rations. 

Longstreet's attitude was a standing 
menace. Re-enforcements could reach him 
from both Dalton and Virginia, and his plan 
of aggression might recover the mountain 
fortresses and passes of East Tennessee, and 
compromise Grant's communications. Not- 
withstanding the destitution of the troops, a 
movement in force was made in January. 
Gen. Wood's advance on the 15th drove the 
Confederate cavalry from Dandridge, twenty- 
eight miles directly east of Knoxville. Long- 
street showed tight, and on the 17th and 
18lh there was skirmishing, and late on the 
18th a brisk cavalry fight, which McCook, 
with three Ohio cavalry regiments, closed by 
a charge that cleared the field and covered 
the retreat, which a council of corps and 
division Generals had decided to be better 
than to risk a general engagement. They fell 
back to Strawberry Plains, and subsequently 
to Maysville, followed by Longstreet. 

After this Granger's corps returned toward 
Chattanooga, and, Badeau says, remained all 
winter stretched out between Cleveland and 
Knoxville. Not till some time in the spring 
were communications restored so that the 
army in East Tennessee could be fully sup- 
plied. But Longstreet seemed to Grant to 
have the strategic advantage in East Tennes- 
see, and, from his position, to be able to com- 
pel the course of the next campaign. He had 
heard also that Longstreet had received 
heavy re-enforcements. He therefore ordered 
Gen. Foster to prepare to take the offensive 
to drive out Longstreet, and Gen. Thomas to 



198 — 



jtrepare for an advance to Knoxville, with 
such forces as could be spared from the pro- 
tection of Chattanooga and its communica- 
tions, to assist Gen. Foster to drive Long- 
street from East Tennessee. Gen. Foster 
wanted at least 10,000 men. 

Gen. Thomas' array was now greatly re- 
duced by furloughs to regiments of re-enlisted 
veterans, and the waste of his artillerj' horses 
and train animals in the siege had not yet 
been supplied. He advised a postponement 
till the railroad could be put in runningorder 
to Loudon, thirty miles from Knoxville, where 
the bridge over the Tennessee was destroyed. 
Gen. ScHOFiELD had now arrived, and assumed 
command at Knoxville, Gen. Foster, on ac- 
count of ill health, having been relieved. 
Grant had a conversation with Foster, 
which, with Schofield's dispatches, led him 
to countermand the order. Again there was 
an alarm about Longstreet early in March, 
but it did not cause any lartie change of dis- 
positions. 



CHAPTEE, LXIX. 

the inFFusivE dispositions after the great 
• victory — peripheral strategy again — A 

RAID, with an alternative — A SCAPEGOAT — 
MILITARY RAIDING GENIUS — GRANT's FAME 
AND PRESTIGE AT THE ZENITH — GRANT LIEU- 
TENANT GENER.\L .\ND MILIT.\RY AUTOCRAT — 
TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO- 
MAC — A GRAND ARMY READY TO BE CONSUMED 
— GRANT EMBRACES HIS OPPORTUNITY — THE 
END, 

The victory of Mission Ridge was followed 
by a long period of diffusion, such as that 
which followed the operation on Corinth in 
the spring of 1862. From the beginning of 
the war much stress had been laid on the 
sti'ategic importance of Chattanooga, but now 
no advance was made from it till in the fol- 
lowing May. And that, after a vastly greater 
expenditure of troops, means, and time, was 
made abortive by its failure to disable the 
Confederate army, and by Gen. Hood's march 
north into Middle Tennesse, where he made 
his base at Corinth, which had been the 
great objective of Halleck with an army of 
100,000, in the spring of 1862. Thus the dis- 
jointed strategy in the West had the fortune 
that it was successively lighting back and 
forth over the same ground. 



Great energies and means were applied to 
the rebuilding of bridges and roads, and to 
the gathering of munitions and supplies for 
the holding of Chattanooga, and for 
ulterior operations, whose nature was not 
yet decided upon. The region in the rear of 
the national advanced line was greatly in- 
fested by guerrilla parties, and raided by 
Confederate cavalry expeditions, against 
which were many national cavalry expedi- 
tions which were generally successful. Gen. 
Joseph E. Johnston succeeded Gen. Bragg, 
and made his base at Dalton, his dispositions 
covering all tiie country south of the na- 
tional lines, and securing its supplies to the 
Confederate army. 

Gen. Grant, on the 7th of December, an- 
nounced to Gen. Halleck that "it may now 
safely be assured that the enemy are driven 
from the front, or, at least, that they n o 
longer threaten it in formidable numbers;" 
he therefore reverted to his former peripheral 
strategy, of an expedition from New Orleans 
against Mobile. He said the country south 
of Chattanooga was mountainous, afibrdiyg 
little for the supply of an army, the roads 
bad at all times, and a winter campaign there 
impossible; therefore, he said: "I propose, 
with the concurrence of higher authority, to 
moye by way of New Orleans and Pascagoula, 
or Mobile. I would hope to secure that place, 
or its investment, by the last of January." 

The higher authority did .not concur, and 
Badeau says "Grant himself ceased to urate it 
when he discovered that Longstreet was 
likely to winter in Tennessee." With Long- 
street in East Tennessee and Johnston's 
army still in front of Chattanooga, and the 
defensive attitude improved by the Confed- 
erate cavalry raids on his lines of supply, the 
sending of an army round the circumference 
to Mobile would be in the same order of dif- 
fusive strategy as that w hich retreated from 
Oxford to take the army to the Mississippi 
swamps, and would be likely to permit the 
Confederates to recover East Tennessee and 
to march into Kentucky. 

Gen. Grant on the 11th of December con- 
ceived a more ambitious expedition. He 
wrote to McPherson at Vicksburg: "I shall 
start -a cavalry force through Mississippi in 
about two weeks, to clean out the State en- 
tirely of rebels." That would be an exten- 
sive cleaning out. Says Badeau: "This 
was the germ of what has been known as th. 



— 199 — 



Meridian raid." Tiiis contemplated raid 
grew in time and preparation to the force 
for a campaign. More than a month hiter, 
January 15, Grant wrote to Halleck : 

Sherman has gone down the Mississippi to collect 
at Vicksburg all the force that can be spared for a 
separate movement from the Mississippi. He will 
probably have by the 24th of this month a force of 
20,000 men. I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to 
move out to Meridian with his spare force, the 
cavalry goin^ from Corinth; destroy the roads and 
bridges south of there so effectually that the enemy 
will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebel- 
lion. He will then return, unless an opportunity of 
going to Mobile with the force he has appears per- 
fectly plain. 

Further along the letter has this sign of 
strategy: "I do not look upon any points, 
except Mobile in the South, and the Tennessee 
River in the North, i^s presenting practicable 
starting points from which to operate against 
Atlanta and Montgomery." It thus appears 
that the plan had the same alternative con- 
venience as that of the movement from 
Hankinson's Ferry away from Vicksburg — 
namely, that it was to be a campaign if it 
succeeded in getting to Mobile, and a raid if 
it failed. Gen. Sherman says in his memoirs: 
"I never had the remotest idea of going to 
Mobile, but had purposely given out that 
idea to tlie people of the country, so as to de- 
ceive the enemy and divert their attention." 
That tliis stratagem would be likely to divert 
ihe attention from his movement is easy to 
be seen. 

But Gen. Grant wrote to Gen. Thomas of 
this plan : 

He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far as Me- 
ridian at least, and will thoroughly destroy the 
roads east and south of there, and, if possible, will 
throw troops as far east as Selma; or, if he linds 
Mobile unguarded so as to make his force sufficient 
for the enterprise, will go there. Toco-operate with 
this movement you want to keep up an appearance 
of preparation of an advance from Chattanooga. It 
may be necessary to move a column even as far as 
Lafayette. 

This was by the Commanding General who 
planned the expedition. Badeati, wliose 
strategic mind ranges as widely as the poet's 
frenzied rolling eye, has also this as one of 
the objects of the plan: "To relieve East Ten- 
nessee, as well as to secure the safety of the 
contemplated movement into Georgia during 
the ensuing spring." Gen. Sherman, Feb- 



ruary 3, moved from Vicksburg four divisions 
on this alternative. Gen. William Sooy 
Smith was to move with 7,000 cavalry from 
Memphis, at the .same time, or thereabout, to 
join Gen. Sherman at Meridian, a route of 
over 250 miles, into the heart of the enemy's 
country. 

It was about this time that Gen. Grant 
ordered Gen. Thomas to move to Knoxville — 
Johnston then confronting Chattanooga. 
When he recalled that order, he issued an- 
other on the 19th to Gen. Thomas, \vhich was 
as remarkable — namely, to move in force to- 
ward Dalton. and if possible occupy that 
place and repair the railroad to it. This was 
to make a movement wliich Sherman re- 
quired the three combined armies for in the 
following May. It was to attack Johnston 
behind Rocky Face Ridge, which Sherman 
with the three armies found unassailable. 
Grant's object in this was to prevent John- 
ston's sending troops against Sherman. But 
the diverting movement would be a much 
greater thing than Sherman's naovement. 

Two days after Grant had issued this order 
he learned that Johnston had at Dalton six 
divisions, and had sent away but one brigade; 
yet he did not recall his order, although he 
now knew that it was to attack superior 
numbers in an unassailable position. Thomas 
moved on the 2'2d. On that evening Gen. 
Palmer advised Grant that he had received 
intelligence that Johnston had sent Cheat- 
ham's and Cleburne's divisions to re-enforce 
Polk, who was falling back before Sherman, 
and now all the available troops were moved 
up to attack Johnston. The movements and 
dispositions were carried forward on the 2?)(1 
and 24th, developing the enemy's positions, 
skirmishing, and driving him from the outer 
lines. Next day a resolute attack was made, 
which charged up the hill, and there met an 
overwhelming force. 

Skirmishing and cannonading were contin- 
ued till night, when our troops were with- 
drawn. Next morning Col. Harrison was 
driven from a gap six miles south of Buzzard 
Roost, nearly opposite Dalton, by Cleburne's 
division, one of the two which Grant thought 
had been sent away. Gen. Thomas had proved 
that not only had Johnston an unassailable 
position, but more tljan his own force, and 
that to attempt to stay in front of John- 
ston was to expose his army, besides the im- 
practicability of supplying it. Grant urged 



— 200 — 



him to stay and threaten Johnston and make 
him believe that he was making an advance 
into the South, until the result of Sherman's 
campaign should be known. But Thomas 
decided this to be impracticable, and gave 
orders to withdraw, his means of supply be- 
ing inadequate. Sherman had before this 
started to return. 

This operation cost more than 300 men. It 
effected nothing that Grant had designed. 
But Van Horne's History states that upon 
the intelligence gained by this movement, 
Thomas was impressed with the feasibility of 
a plan to turn Johnston's position by a move- 
ment through Snake Creek Gap, and requested 
Dermission from Grant to make preparation 
for it. But that Thomas should do this was 
not in Grant's ideas. In the following May 
this movement was made by Gen. Sherman, 
with the three armies combined, but made in 
such a manner as to leave the way open for 
Johnston to retreat. 

Gen. Sherman's march, bordered by Con- 
federate cavalry, reached Meridian, 150 miles 
from Vicksburg, on the 14th of February. 
Here he set his infantry at work destroying 
the Mobile & Ohio Railroad south and north, 
and the Jackson & Selma Railroad east and 
west. The rolling stock of these roads had 
been removed. Meanwhile Admiral Parra- 
GUT, at Sherman's request, made a co-operative 
demonstration against the forts in Mobile har- 
bor. Whatever indecision Sherman may have 
had hitherto, whether his movement was a 
raid, or a campaign to Mobile, was solved at 
Meridian, where he decided that it was a raid. 

He issued a s^^ecial order at Meridian on the 
18th, beginning: 

Having fulfilled, and well, all the objects of the 
expedition, the troops will return to the Mississippi 
to embark in another equally important movement. 

This order gave directions for the return 
march, to begin on the 20th. It appears that 
after his return he began to doubt that his ex- 
pedition had fulfilled all its objects, and he 
charged a default on Gen. Smith for not mov- 
ing at the appointed time, and for failing to 
join him at Meridian. But his communica- 
tion to Gen. Grant, including Gen. Smith's 
report, expressed only a mild dissatisfaction, 
and closed with this satisfaction : "Neverthe- 
less, on the whole, we accomplished all I un- 
dertook." 

His dissatisfaction, however, grew with 



years, and in his memoirs he gave a stronger 
version of Gen. Smith's conduct, and said: 

Gen. Smith never regained my confidence as a 
soldier, though I still regard him as a most accom- 
plished gentleman and a skillful engineer. .Since 
the close of the war he has appealed to me to re- 
lieve him of that censure, but I could not do it, be- 
cause it would falsify history. 

Let the truth of history stand, thougli 
military heads fall! But Gen. Boynton's 
very accurate criticism of Gen. Sherman's 
memoirs, which he treats of as a raid upon 
history, reviews this affair from the records, 
and proves that Sherman's order to Smith did 
not fix February 1, nor any exact time, for 
his start, but that he was to wait for a certain 
cavalrj' force, of which an entire brigade and 
a battery were to come from the North; that 
this brigade marched 250 miles, over a coun- 
try covered with snow and ice, crossing dif- 
ficult rivers, to reach Memphis on the Sth, 
after which Smith gave them only three days 
to refit before he started. 

Besides, Gen, Smith's movement was op- 
posed by Forrest's cavalry, estimated at 
6,000, which was in no way diverted from 
him by Sherman's movement. To order a 
cavalry force of only 7,000 on an isolated 
inarch of 250 miles into the heart of a hos- 
tile country, opposed by a cavalry force so 
nearly equal, seems a wild operation. To go 
140 miles of this way, and then return in 
safety, argues very good troops and a good 
General. Sherman says in the memoirs that 
Smith suffered a defeat at West Point, but he 
simply found Forrest, with about an equal 
force, in a very strong position to resist his 
crossing of a river, and that was his turning 
point from the wild expedition. The damage 
which Smith inflicted on the enemy seems 
about equal to Sherman's. He went further, 
and besides his great destruction of railroads, 
cotton, and corn, he brought in 3,000 horses 
and mules, and 1,.500 negroes — these last in 
pursuance of orders. 

Besides, from the unavoidable delay in 
starting, it was now impossible for him to 
join Sherman at Meridian on the day he had 
appointed to be there— namely, the 10th— 
even if it had ever been possible. Sherman 
did not get there till the 14th, and eight days 
after that he told his troops that they had 
done all they came to do. And Sherman 
was already going back when Gen. Smith 



— 201 — 



turned. Only in history did Sherman be- 
come implacable to Smith; for when Sher- 
man succeeded Grant in the Western com- 
mand he retained Smith, who had been 
Grant's Chief of Cavalry, as his own Chief of 
Staff', and intrusted him with the organization 
of the cavalry for the Atlanta campaign. 
Furthermore, Gen. Sherman assured Gen. 
Smith that his own movements on Meridian 
and the contemplated operations there did 
not of necessity depend on a junction with 
the cavalry from Memphis. If it had been 
otherwise, and if movements from these re- 
mote points, on such long and widely separat- 
ed routes into the unknown, had been planned 
by Gen. Sherman to depend on so exact a 
junction, it is hard to see how Gen. Smith 
could ever have regained any confidence in 
Sherman as a soldier or as a man of .sound 
mind. 

If theexiteclition was only a raid to destroy 
railroads, what was the need of Gen. Smith's 
joining Sherman at Meridian, when he was 
separately doing the same devastation? And 
if only a raid to Meridian, to destroy railroads. 
Gen. Grant ordered a very costly co-opera- 
tion when he ordered Gen. Thomas to attack 
Johnston at Kocky Face Ridge, to divert the 
enemy from Sherman, thereby to sacrifice his 
own veterans to help Sherman destroy rail- 
roads. This affair, like that of the previous 
spring in moving away fromVicksburg,showed 
the tendency of the minds of Grant and 
Sherman to tentative raids, rather than con- 
nected and comprehensive campaigns. This 
had exercise on a still greater scale in 
the following autumn, when Sherman, with 
a great army, turned his back on the still un- 
broken Confederate army, and marched ofT to 
raid the undefended country, abandoning all 
the objectives ot the enormously dear cam- 
paign, and leaving the real war to be sus- 
tained by Gen. Thomas, with the lesser num- 
ber of troops, widely divided in holding his 
lines of supply. 

The winter thus wore away without ap- 
parently evolving' any comi)rehensive plan 
of operations on either side. In anticipation 



of some campaign further into the South, 
Gen. Thomas made active preparations to sup- 
ply the army and to guard the lines of sup- 
ply, by constructing block houses at the rail- 
road bridges and depots. Early in March 
Gen. Grant became apprehensive that John- 
ston was to resume the oflTensive, but no im- 
portant movement was made. 

The victory in the battles about Chatta- 
nooga, like the Vicksburg campaign, was 
ascribed to Gen. Grant's military genius. 
His fame was now raised to the zenith, and 
his prestige was irresistible to the executive 
administration and to the politicians of Con- 
gress. A bill was introduced into the House 
of Representatives by Hon. E. B. Washburne 
— he whom Badeau tells of as falling away 
from Grant when the army was stuck in the 
Mississippi mud, and advising Lincoln to re- 
move him — to create the rank of Lieutenant 
General, "to command the armies of the 
United States." It became a law on the 2(Jth 
of February. The President on the 1st of 
March nominated Grant to this exalted rank, 
and he was immediatelj' confirmed. 

On the 3d of March Grant was summoned 
to Washington, which he reached on the 8th. 
He returned to the West to close up his 
affairs, and on the 23d arrived in Washingtcm 
to enter upon his great command. He was 
now military autocrat. The President and 
Secretary of War assured him of their inten- 
tion to give him the absolute control of all 
military movements. Upon his requirement 
Sherman was placed in connnand of the mili- 
tary division of the Mississip])!, over the head 
of Gen. Thomas, his senior, and McPherson 
in command of the Army of the Tennessee, 
over the head of Hurlbut. 

Gen. Grant, in the East, found a great, 
thoroughly disciplined, high spirited, veteran 
army; seasoned by many battles, in which it 
had always shown fighting qualities of the 
highest order; officered by his seiiiors in serv- 
ice; ready to be taken in hand by him and 
consumed, and he did not come short of his 
great opportunity. 



ERROR. 
On page 105, for Landman road Landrum. 



